Tukhachevsky affair

You seem to be choosing one “criminal” over another, which seems a tad of a double-standard…

But he , beeing “innocent” absolutly voluntary “unmasked” his friends- Yakir,Feldman, Uborevich and ets.

He wasn’t “unmasked,” he was slandered by the NKVD on orders from Stalin…

Married, eh?

Are you ever gonna make an honest girl of her? :wink:

Trockij was responsible for Big Red terror in 1918-1921.About 2 mln were murdered.That’s more then enough to wiped him out from earth.

Trotsky was no more “responsible” than any other Bolshevik, and Stalin was far more of a direct terrorist, even during the Civil War. The only real responsibility Trotsky bares was building the Red Army into an effective fighting force more so than any other singular individual. Yes, a lot of people died, but that happens during revolutions and wars. The Whites also committed atrocities.

What would ever make Trotsky worse than Generalissimo Stalin? Why the distinction? Why is Stalin blameless for the debacle of the Soviet defeats in the opening of Barbarossa in your eyes?

A false wiki article , based on post-war Tuhachevski’s apologists works.I specially asked you - have you read the real work of Tuhachevskij?No, coz NO his any theoretical work DOES exist in nature.

It’s not a “false article.” You just don’t like it. There’s a difference…

And Tukhachevsky was one of four or five main strategists than formulated Deep Battle and his work found its way into several field manuals used by the Red Army until the Purge–one’s called “Deep Battle”. So, they didn’t exist?..

It does not wonder me, coz you have read ONLY Trockists works- the field that is absolutly dominates in USA nowadays.
I m not going to didsmiss their false propogandic ideas- kinda Idiot Budenny and “genious” Tuhachevskij. This is too obvious falsification.

I admit that Trotsky is a bit more admired here than perhaps he deserves to be. This is based on the perception that he was very successful and combined a powerful intellect with actual leadership and organizational ability. Something rare in most historical figures. I do agree he was a bit of an idealist, but he was also far more democratic minded than Stalin and criticized the over use of state terror and was abhorred by the notion of genocide, often criticizing even left wing movements that sought to murder or ethnically cleanse based on race or culture…

False.
Stalin was more realistic from most beginning- yet in 1920 he seriously objected to CK( central commite of party in head with Trockij and Lenin) to move the Red Army through the Poland to Berlin.It was Trockij who advocated that mad idea. They inspired- the Polish worker would support the Red Army becouse of solidarity class straggle.Stalin argued- the Poles are nationalist and their nationalistic feeleng will make them to resist to Red Army invasion.
The history has proved Stalin was right, Trockij was out to be the idealistic maniac, red army has been crushed coz his obsessed will to bring the revolution to Germany.

They were not simply “moving through” Poland and were capitalizing on their initial successes against the Poles. A Polish general inflicted a most unlikely defeat on the Russians that no one expected and Poland was on the verge of collapse IIRC. Trotsky certainly wanted to move to the German border to assist the German communists in their post-WWI workers rebellions. I’m no fan of a communist Germany, but had Trotsky completed this and turned Germany into a workers state, there certainly would have been no catastrophic “Barbarossa” and millions of dead Soviet citizens.

One can also argue that power would have grounded and forced Trotsky to become more pragmatic and no one can state “what Marshal Trotsky would have done.” Because we cannot know…

And Stalin was “realistic” alright. So realistic that he dealt with Hitler and beleived that Hitler was not going to attack him despite receiving reams of intelligence data from spies, reconnaissance, and his own commanders in Poland…

Oh sure , say yet that german T-III/IV directly contributed to development of Tiger;)
The all of Tuhachevskij wearpon that were ordered by Ary in 1931-1937 were OBSOLET and hopeless.Just in 1939-1941 the new generation of soviet wearponry were proved to be more or less effective.

You’re comparing tanks designed in the early 1930s/late 20s to German panzers that were designed in the late 1930s. Blaming Tukhachevsky for the failure of Soviet preparedness for WWII based on BT series of tanks is historically asinine, even irresponsible. The BT’s were better than anything in their day and you are essentially criticizing the design because it was obsolete by WWII. Well, no shit! A lot of things were. That doesn’t mean they weren’t good weapons systems that evolved into something else. In this case, the BT series directly led to the T-34!

http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Тухачевский#.D0.9F.D1.80.D0.BE.D1.82.D0.B8.D0.B2.D0.BE.D1.81.D1.82.D0.BE.D1.8F.D0.BD.D0.B8.D0.B5_.D0.B2_.D0.BA.D0.BE.D0.BC.D0.B0.D0.BD.D0.B4.D0.BE.D0.B2.D0.B0.D0.BD.D0.B8.D0.B8_.D0.A0.D0.9A.D0.9A.D0.90
… сам Тухачевский зачастую был некомпетентен в тех вопросах, которые ему приходилось решать. Фактически разработанные им наступательные доктрины и соответствующий устав Красной армии не предусматривали ни долговременной обороны, не организованной борьбы с танковыми клиньями противника. В частности лично Тухачевский сыграл крайне негативную роль в обеспечении Красной армии современной противотанковой, зенитной, полковой и дивизионной артиллерией. К сожалению, ситуацию сложившуюся в военном строительстве по вине склонного к волюнтаризму Тухачевского не удалось исправить до начала Великой Отечественной войны. Во многом успехи вермахта в 1941 году объясняются некомпетентной военной политикой Тухаческого, настоявшего в 30-ые годы на подготовке неимоверного числа десантников (более двух миллионов) и выпуске огромного количества легких танков (около 12 тысяч). Красная Армия готовилась громить врага на его территории, высаживая у него в тылу десятки десантных корпусов и продвигаясь вперед на колесных легких танках по европейским дорогам[источник?], абсолютно не умея при этом воевать в обороне и более того не имея никаких средств для организации обороны своей собственной территории

It should be noted that Tukhachevskiy itself was often incompetent in those questions, which was necessary to solve. The actually developed by its offensive doctrines and the corresponding regulations of the Red Army were lacked for sustained defense, organized fight with the tank wedges of enemy. In particular , personally Tukhachevskiy played extremely negative role in the equipment of the Red Army with contemporary anti-tank, AA, regimental and divisional artillery. Unfortunately, situation prevailing in the military building through the fault of inclined to the voluntarism of Tukhachevskoij could not be corrected prior to the beginning of World War II. In many aspects, the successes of Wehrmacht in 1941 explained by the incompetent military policy of Tukhacheski, that insisted in the 1930-yy on the preparation of the incredible number of landing force members (Paratrupers) (more than two million) and the production of the huge amount of light tanks (about 12 thousand). The Red Army prepared to raid enemy in his territory, setting down in its rear tens of landing paratruper’s armies and advancing on the wheel light tanks along the European roads, absolutely without knowing how in this case to fight in defense and what to do ot organize the defence on own territory

The great Deep battle plan, Nick…

admit that Trotsky is a bit more admired here than perhaps he deserves to be. This is based on the perception that he was very successful and combined a powerful intellect with actual leadership and organizational ability. Something rare in most historical figures. I do agree he was a bit of an idealist, but he was also far more democratic minded than Stalin and criticized the over use of state terror and was abhorred by the notion of genocide, often criticizing even left wing movements that sought to murder or ethnically cleanse based on race or culture…

Yeah , “democratic minded” Trockij has sunctioned the mass Red terror himself, and criticized the over use of it:)
Nice theory …

What would ever make Trotsky worse than Generalissimo Stalin? Why the distinction? Why is Stalin blameless for the debacle of the Soviet defeats in the opening of Barbarossa in your eyes?

And who is to blame for debacle of the Alliess defeats in the Asia for the opening of Japane war?
Roosewelt and Church i suppose? Hmmn, why not…
Who is to blame for catastrophic collapce of France - Lets blame the Albert Lebrun:)

Really? Right, everything is HIS fault now…

[i][b]The impact of the purges

Deep Operations were first formally expressed as a concept in the Red Army’s “Field Regulations” of 1929, and more fully developed in the 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle. The concept was finally codified by the army in 1936 in the Provisional Field Regulations of 1936. By 1937, the Soviet Union had the largest mechanized army in the world and a sophisticated operational system to operate it.[/b]

However, in 1937 the ‘Great Purges’ of 1937 to 1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Svechin, Varfolomeev and Tukhachevsky.[30] The purge of the Soviet military liquidated the generation of officers who had given the Red Army the deep battle strategy, operations and tactics and who also had rebuilt the Soviet armed forces. Along with these personalities, their ideas were also dispensed with.[31] Some 35,000 personnel, about 50 percent of the Officer Corps, three out of five Marshals,; 13 out of 15 Army Group commanders; 57 out of 85 Corps Commanders; 110 out 195 Division commanders; 220 out of 406 Brigade commanders were all murdered. Without the personnel and strategy, Stalin destroyed the cream operational and tactical competence of the Red Army.[32]
[edit] Deep Operations during World War II

The surprise German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) subjected the Red Army to six months of disasters. The Red Army was shattered during the first two months of war. Thereafter, it faced the task of surviving, then reviving and maturing into an instrument that could compete with the Wehrmacht and achieve ultimate military victory.

Soviet military analysts and historians subdivide the war into three distinct periods. Although the Red Army was primarily on the strategic defensive during the first period of war (22 June 1941–19 November 1942). The second period of war (19 November 1942 – 31 December 1943), which commenced with the Soviet strategic counteroffensive at Stalingrad, was a transitional period marked by alternating attempts by both sides to secure strategic advantage. After the Battle of Kursk the Soviets had firmly secured the strategic initiative and advanced beyond the Dnepr River. The Red Army maintained the strategic initiative during the third and final period of war (1944 – 1945) and ultimately emerged victorious.[33][/i]

Yeah , “democratic minded” Trockij has sunctioned the mass Red terror himself, and criticized the over use of it:)
Nice theory …

He killed far less people than Stalin would…

And who is to blame for debacle of the Alliess defeats in the Asia for the opening of Japane war?
Roosewelt and Church i suppose? Hmmn, why not…

Who is to blame for catastrophic collapce of France - Lets blame the Albert Lebrun:)

There are varying reasons. Churchill can’t really be blamed as much since he was not in power when the war began. The US suffered successive defeats in Asia, but the losses were minimized to an extent as there were only a relative small numbers of soldiers on the Philippines. Also, the United States only began to mobilize in 1940, something hardly comparable to the large standing Soviet forces of the era which greatly outnumbered those of Nazi Germany. You can try and blame Roosevelt for Pearl Harbor, but unlike Stalin, no one was screaming in his ear the Japanese were about to attack there…

As for France, there is an endemic abject failure of doctrine in “Methodical Battle,” which was something quite contrary too “Deep Battle” in that Methodical Battle was deeply rooted in the past and Deep Battle was a modernist doctrine attempting to address the nature of industrialized, mobile warfare…

The surprise German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) subjected the Red Army to six months of disasters. The Red Army was shattered during the first two months of war. Thereafter, it faced the task of surviving, then reviving and maturing into an instrument that could compete with the Wehrmacht and achieve ultimate military victory.

Soviet military analysts and historians subdivide the war into three distinct periods. Although the Red Army was primarily on the strategic defensive during the first period of war (22 June 1941–19 November 1942). The second period of war (19 November 1942 – 31 December 1943), which commenced with the Soviet strategic counteroffensive at Stalingrad, was a transitional period marked by alternating attempts by both sides to secure strategic advantage. After the Battle of Kursk the Soviets had firmly secured the strategic initiative and advanced beyond the Dnepr River. The Red Army maintained the strategic initiative during the third and final period of war (1944 – 1945) and ultimately emerged victorious

This is very true.
The initial disaster of Red Army was due to lack of any real-working defence tactic. The GErman Panzers simply cutted it through, surrounding the giant amount of red army troops within few days.The red Army , who is going to wage a war on enemy territory( according Tuhachevski doctrine) , wasn’t capable to face the really strong enemy on defence.
The soviets did not have enough AT, AA artillery to stop the panzers.( I don’t speak about truck - we have no enough truck till the mid 1943, Tuhachevskij has produced a 10 thousanfds of light tanks , but …forget to order the truck to move the supporting infantry behind the tanks.
Only after when the soviets has got the enough AT-artillery in Kursk battle - we could to face the German panzers and slow then down - after that the Soviet tank attack has been resultative.

I don’t think so. the Civil war costs 10 mln of lives.
And Trockij really planned to fire start all the Europe in 1920…The bloody-bath that migh to cost another up to 100 mln…

large standing Soviet forces of the era which greatly outnumbered those of Nazi Germany. You can try and blame Roosevelt for Pearl Harbor, but unlike Stalin, no one was screaming in his ear the Japanese were about to attack there…

Germans had roughtly 170+ EXPERIENCED division . Soviet had roughtly 190.
The Quantity of troops isn’t a all-important matter.The quality of germans officers corp was much higher.
and the american troops were defeat by relatively small number of japanes troops.

As for France, there is an endemic abject failure of doctrine in “Methodical Battle,” which was something quite contrary too “Deep Battle” in that Methodical Battle was deeply rooted in the past and Deep Battle was a modernist doctrine attempting to address the nature of industrialized, mobile warfare…

ha , modernistic mobile doctrine , that totally ignored the defence:)
Germans has captured all the france , having LESS troops then French-british contingent…
And this has happand yet in 1940 when Wermanch wasn’t such experienced.
So , honestly Nicki, if Russians fought bad like the allies in 1940 - the Hitler would finish the barbarossa yet in september.But he has not done it.

True, but he was solidly in power when he lost Greece and, having learnt nothing from that disaster, less than a year later lost Malaya for the same primary reason: committing forces to a doomed defence by denying his commanders the airpower they and higher commanders knew and had told Churchill was needed. The secondary reason in both cases was committing his commanders to doomed campaigns where Churchill’s political considerations overrode the commander’s proper military considerations, effectively hamstringing his commanders who, like poor old Percival in Malaya, have unfairly borne responsibility for losing battles and campaigns Churchill lost for them before the first shot was fired.

Churchill preferred to allocate air resources to Britain and the Med because he gave them higher priority than Malaya at the time, although it is questionable whether they were even needed for those purposes at the time. It is also debatable whether committing extra air power to Malaya would have altered rather than merely delayed the end result, but that is a huge “What if” topic in its own right.

Churchill failed, like some of his lesser commanders, to grasp that airpower was critical and that the days had passed of capital ships being the big boys. As was shown when the Repulse and Prince of Wales went down under air attack with Tom Phillips, another airpower sceptic, in command of the force.

It is to a fair extent the old story of people fighting the current war with the last war’s tactics and attitudes, although Churchill wasn’t that good as a tactician or strategist even in the Great War, having military skills and attitudes more attuned to the Boer than Great War.

Now I have seen the assertion that there was a German plan behind it in another place, and I migth also have found the source this.
I have the memoirs of Walter Schellenberg. He was in the German intelligence community -as it would be called today, and head of RSHA Amt VI (foreign intelligence) from mid 1941. He claims that the Germans (with Heydrich as primus motor) wanted to hand incriminating material on Tukhachevsky over to the Soviets, and were surprised to be asked for the price, as they planned to do it for free.
The book was written in 1951 and Schellenberg died in 1952.
(They asked for, and got 3 million rubles, which Schellenberg later were personally involved in getting rid of, as German agents in the Soviet Union using notes from this payment developed a habit of getting caught soon after, he claims)

The thing that clouds objective viewing is this: Both Schellenburg and Canaris are on record as having referred to German involvement in the Tukhachevsky affair, as is Richard Sorge. Before his death in 1942, Heydrich is recorded as having spoken of it, this (iIrc) is noted by General Beck (July '44 plot) at some point.
Thus, the Germans were certainly more than aware of the T. affair, and may have had some involvement without necessarily being the initiators or instigators thereof.
Where I hesitate, is assigning either knowledge or roles to the various persons I have mentioned, it being that Sorge remained an enigma till his death, and Canaris destroyed many records before his own death. Similarly, Schellenburg did not wish certain events to remain recorded knowledge, and may have deliberately clouded matters, post-war.

Respectful Regards, Uyraell.