Don’t know about them having trouble opening ammo box’s, but what I do believe, is that after the massacre at Isandlwana, and the victory at Rorke’s Drift, which was needed to keep the public back home happy, well their modern army was massacred my a bunch of savages dressed in cowhide or leopardskin, cowhide shields, and held weapons, then after they captured Cetshwayo kaMpande, and put him on show for Queen Victoria. While all this was happening, the British went further into Zulu land, to wipe-out, exterminate a proud Zulu nation.
The British (with a large amount of native help as well as Boers who really started the antagonism that led to Chelmsford invading without authority) did not really wipe out or exterminate the Zulu Nation, it split it up between puppet chiefs/chiefs that could see better deals or had axes to grind against Cetshwayo.
This of course led to tribal wars between the various factions and chiefs opposed to and supporting the old king Cetshwayo.
As a note
One of the columns stayed in Zululand at Kambula and defeated a large attacking Zulu force (bigger than the one that attacked Rourkes Drift) causing many of the Chiefs to take their warriors home.
From what I had read, the British Infantry cannot open more than one ammo crate at a time because of strict regulament. And for the same reason there is a shortage of tools for crates opening.
So when the fight began, the Britains didn’t prepare themselves with the crates already opened. That can explain why Zulu can conquer about 400.000 rounds of ammunition.
Its not the first time, and is still happening, when you take out the main power, you are left then with a lot of minority parties who want to take over, the country his left then with no structure, the country then falls apart, ruining what once was a proud Zulu Nation/People.
Thanks to the marvels of Google, it seems that there was no problem with ammunition supply due to a pedantic quartermaster or inability to open the ammunition boxes without a screwdriver.
The Ammunition Boxes at iSandlwana
Submitted by Ian Knight on Mon, 10/25/2010 - 10:40
Martini-Henry ammunition box
Opening of Martini-Henry ammunition box
Peter Vaughan in Zulu Dawn
The disastrous British defeat at iSandlwana is still sometimes attributed to a failure of ammunition on the part of the unit most involved in the defence - the 24th Regiment.
This is variously ascribed to the unwillingness of Quartermasters to issue rounds without due paperwork, to the difficulties of opening the ammunition boxes themselves - which were supposedly bound tight with copper bands - and even to a lack of screwdrivers with which to do so.
In fact, any careful analysis of the evidence doesn’t support any of these claims. While it is true that some of the Colonial units - those under the independent command of Col. Durnford - did run out of ammunition and have difficulty replenishing their supplies, there is no evidence whatever to suggest that shortage of ammunition influenced in any way the tactical decisions of the officers of the 24th Regiment, whose men constituted the main element in the British firing line.
There were huge quantities of rifle and carbine ammunition in the camp at iSandlwana - about 400,000 rounds in all. General Lord Chelmsford had taken the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, out on reconnaissance, but left their reserve of ammunition in the camp, with orders that it be made ready to send to him if he requested it. The camp was guarded by the 1st Battalion, 24th, whose reserve supply was also in the camp. The ammunition itself was stored in the Mark V ammunition box, which was a stout wooden thing, lined with tin, and held together with two copper bands. Obviously, such boxes were designed to take rough treatment on campaign - no point in them bursting open every time they were dropped - but access to the rounds was via a sliding wooden panel in the centre of the box. This was held in place by just one screw, and in an emergency it could be opened by the highly unorthadox method of giving the edge of the panel a hefty clout. This had the effect of splintering the wood around the screw.
When the battle first began, one of the Staff Officers collected a number of men not engaged in the fighting, and set about ferrying ammunition out to the firing line - this was the standard procedure at the time. One rather over-enthusiastic young officer attempted to requisition the 2/24th’s supply, but was sent away with a flea in his ear by the quartermaster, who was quite rightly mindful of his responsibilities to Lord Chelmsford. At that stage, the camp was not in serious danger, and in fact fresh supplies were organised from the 1/24th’s reserve. Later, when things started going badly, the 2/24th’s supplies were also broached, so that when - at the climax of the battle - the 24th companies abandoned their forward positions and fell back on the tents, they were still firing heavily. The reports of survivors - including half a dozen Zulu eye-witnesses - were unanimous on this point.
Once the Zulus penetrated the British line and over-ran the camp, however, there was no possibility of anyone renewing their supplies. The various groups of 24th - and others - therefore stood back to back and fired off what ammunition they had, after which the Zulu closed in. And therein lies the origin of all those reports which refer to the 24th being ’overwhelmed when their ammunition was expended’.
Of course, even now it is far easier to believe that a modern, Western, industrialised army could be defeated through some folly of its own, rather than that it could be out-generalled by a part-time civilian army armed primarily with spears - an army, moreover, consisting entirely of Africans.
But such a view is based on false assumptions of racial and technological superiority, and a misunderstanding of the tactical realities. In a funny way it slights the memory of the 24th - suggesting that, experienced battalions though they were, they had not managed to work out their own resupply, nor open their own ammunition boxes - and it is a view which denies the tactical skill, discipline, and sheer raw courage of the Zulu people. The battle of iSandlwana was more than just a British defeat - it was, after all, a Zulu victory.
http://www.ianknightzulu.com/node/6
See also http://www.1879zuluwar.com/t165-ammunition-boxes
The ammunition boxes were, from the final post in the last link, indeed made of sturdy wood and as shown in a picture in the first link were banded with metal, but as explained in the first link the boxes didn’t need to be broken open, only the slide held by a single screw.
I’m pretty confident from these links that I got my idea about a difficult quartermaster and or problems in opening the boxes from the film Zulu Dawn, despite having no recollection of seeing it.
My opinion as a non Brit: As a US Army NCO I was fortunate to spend some time with the Brit. Army in Germany during the 70’s and I have great respect for the professional Brit. NCO. Their traditions have been developed over centuries and they are serious about maintaining them. The Brit. Officer, lately, is highly professional as well - but that is relatively new, historically speaking.
The story about the ammunition boxes problem at Islandwana seems to have obtained currency originally from the observations of the future general and senior WW1 commander, Horace Smith-Dorrien who, by virtue of having a horse, escaped the battlefield (with great difficulty - he was recommended for a VC for his conduct in attempting to save fellow fugitives, but it was never awarded). Smith-Dorrien observed that, as demand from the firing line increased, it became necessary to open additional ammunition boxes, which were robust wooden boxes bound with two copper bands, each held in place by, I think, 7 screws. The process of opening the boxes was slow enough; delays, according to Smith-Dorrien, were compounded by the unwillingness of quartermasters of the individual companies to issue ammunition to men from other companies, even as the pressure on the British position increased. Smith-Dorrien - who was no fool - attributed to the ammunition box problem a significant portion in the blame for the centre column’s defeat.
The movie “Zulu Dawn” followed the views of historians who put weight on Smith-Dorrien’s account.
Other historians have questioned Smith-Dorrien’s opinion in the matter, and have rather laid emphasis on the disastrous positioning of the British firing line, which was positioned too far away from the camp, and the supply wagons, to allow rapid resupply of ammunition. As it was, soldiers ended up running back to their companies with helmets full of bullets. This situation clearly had a major influence on the outcome of the battle, one with which Smith-Dorrien, in the camp, may not have been well placed to observe. That having been said, I see no reason to question the accuracy of his observations in relation to the distribution of ammunition from the wagons, difficult ammo crates and all; nor would I question that this had at least some significant influence on the outcome of the battle. In this regard, it should be noted that the British introduced more user-friendly ammunition boxes in the later part of the war. Also significant, I think, is the fact that when they became aware of the approach of Zulu impis, the men at Rorke’s Drift took the step of opening a large number of ammunition boxes in anticipation of the pending attack. Best regards, JR.
Ummmm, not one rebuttal from the person who started this thread. From all the answers I’ve read, it seems the British military while competent and having a great military tradition, wasn’t so good after all. They’ve certainly lost their share of engagements.
Who has not
I don’t thing they were ““great”” they were okay. The way some things were set up were very ineffective and quite noticeable
History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.
- Winston Churchill
You have to wonder sometimes what they were thinking. I know it was the style back then, but walking around the green wilderness of North America in the 18th century in red tunics?
Perhaps something about the maximum effective range being about 100m, so who gives a ****?
Yet when they were would shoot and run. Then do it again. (American troopers) It proved pretty effective
Hardly unique to American troops - the British had their Light troops and the Rifle regiments, the French had the Voltigeurs, etc. There are however two simple reasons that this could never be more than skirmishing/harassment tactics:
- Cavalry. Infantry who can’t form a square to see off cavalry - or who aren’t in terrain so bad cavalry can’t operate - are dead. The Americans got away with it on occasion, but had they tried it somewhere like Saratoga they’d all be dead.
- Rate of fire/range at which it can be applied - which is related to (1). Until the rifled musket came along infantry might get two effective volleys against an oncoming column before it hit them, and maybe one against cavalry. Therefore, tactics relied heavily on the shock effect of massed volleys and upon the bayonet. Dispersing your troops in a skirmishing formation loses all shock effect from the volleys and means you will probably lose any bayonet attack you launch against formed troops.
As for red tunics, that dates back to Cromwell and the New Model Army. You need bright colours to see your own troops amid the thick powder smoke of a 18th and 19th century battlefield, and red was the cheapest bright colour available.
A number of very good points in the last few posts - not so much about the effectiveness of British forces, but more regarding the very uneven evolution of musketry between the late-17th and late-19th century. I believe that this is a major subject in itself - perhaps for its own thread ? Best regards, JR.
For me the British didn’t get the aftermath of Revolutionary wars. They still relied on massed volleys of gun fire from lines of muskets. War is evolving, and they don’t keep in touch with advancement of gun technology and tactics. US generals constantly encouraged their men to practise their shooting and backwoods skills, and always advised them to shoot to officers. This deeply unsporting concept was not embraced by the British who believed that the specific targeting of officers should not be normal practice for the common soldier in battle, being against the principles of common etiquette required to conduct gentlemanly warfare. Also skirmishing tactics of Americans are viewed by most high officers British as cowardice. British tried to adopt the new type of gun, the rifle, and a new type of uniform, a green one, but when the only direct supporter of this advancements, Patrick Ferguson, died in the battle of Kings Mountain the British generals briefly drop out any attempt to modernise their infantry. Remnants of
this attitude remained very much in the British military mind until well into the 20th century. That for me explains serious losses, like in the Boers Wars and against Zulu.
So did other successful armies in their range of tactics, such as Napoleon until he encountered more successful massed volleys from the British squares at Waterloo (although Napoleon also used squares) and the Union Army in the American Civil War which by then was using largely rifled bores rather than smoothbores as the main infantry weapon which allowed engaging the enemy at significantly greater ranges than in the Revolutionary War, but the problem remained that reloading single shot rifles took time and that two or more ranks allowed one rank firing while the other rank(s) reloaded, thus putting a good deal of fire into the advancing enemy. Fire and movement in anything vaguely like the modern form was impossible until the advent of repeating rifles.
If your criticism of British failure to learn from the American Revolutionary War is correct, then it follows that the French were equally guilty of the same fault as they also had ground troops fighting with the Americans.
The Boer and Zulu wars were quite different.
The Boer War demonstrates the difficulty conventional armies always have in fighting irregular forces.
The Zulus were defeated at Ulindi, and the Zulu War concluded, by a British force which used a mixture of tactics which included decisive massed rifle fire from a large force using fluid movement tactics in a large defensive square, which I think was a tactic not used and which may have been unknown as a tactic in the American Revolutionary War because of the limited range of muskets in that era.
The British, like all armies, have their share of failures and refusals to adapt to changed circumstances, but the expansion and defence of the British Empire between the American Revolutionary War and WWII demonstrates that the British were generally better than their opponents.
The American Continental Army was only on occasion able to defeat the British Army on a field of battle and hold it at the end of the day. When they did so at places like Saratoga, Yorktown, and The Cow Pens, those victories could be pretty dramatic and detrimental to the British cause in key strategic areas of significance. Saratoga thwarted the British strategy of dividing the Northern New England colonies from the rest of North America while The Cow Pens pretty much destroyed the most mobile parts of the British forces in the South eliminating their ability to forge and gather intelligence, resulting in their siege at Yorktown. But it should be noted that there were few illusions about defeating the British Army everywhere because the well trained Continental Army was always in short supply and fundamentally unreliable and panicky militia had to be relied on for numbers and to create the notion of a ‘peoples’ war’. The Americans, like Gen. Washington, knew they simply won by not being destroyed and remaining a cohesive fighting force. If that meant avoiding engagements or running from them so be it. That’s where the American penchant for using riflemen as snipers, pickets, and harassment came from --the inability to field a European style army that could hold the field until very late in the war and the unreliability of state militias to stand for very long after volleys of fire had blooded them or they saw Redcoats charging them with cold steel. As the Continental Army gained experience, funding, professionalism, etc - they were bucked up with the presence of well trained and funded French regular Army and significant French monies coinciding with an increasing unpopularity of the Crown and diminishing numbers of Loyalist volunteers pledging allegiance to it.
As far as snipers targeting officers, the British Army certainly responded in kind. In fact, one British sniper whose name escapes me had shot several Continental officers in a single engagement when, being weary of the fatigue of battle, he had a “most gallant” officer on horseback in his sights almost presenting himself as a trophy. He was tall and noble looking and the sniper felt he had already taken his pound of flesh that day and decided not to kill this older, distinguished looking gentleman on horseback he took for a middling, overage commander. That gentleman was none other than General George Washington.
The British also fielded large elements of American Loyalist militias and formal units that often fought unconventionally and of course their Native allies and adversaries also played a significant part in the fighting. Suffice, I think it’s a tad over simplistic to say the Americans waged a guerrilla war while the British fought back unsuccessfully using ridged conventional tactics. Both sides fought a conventional European style land war as well was engaged in unconventional guerrilla and terror tactics. The British certainly had much experience in this type of mixed warfare dating from the French and Indian Wars. In the end, it just wasn’t worth their while to hold the United States original 13 colonies as they still would have access to goods via trade without occupation costs…
I agree that the American War of Independence can mainly be profiled as a conventional war of the period. Naturally, in the circumstances prevailing, there was much irregular activities on both sides. Nevertheless, the war was basically conventional for the period, and the key issue, for a long time, was the ability of the Continental Army to survive. They were lucky to do so, as they suffered many serious disadvantages. Apart from the lack of fully trained manpower, the Americans had a severe supply issue. A most important aspect of this was their lack of gunpowder. The Brits had plenty of the stuff. They had ample access to the critical raw materials, and the product could easily be shipped to them from British powder mills. The Americans, by contrast, had limited access to the raw materials, and limited production facilities. Before the war, they would have relied substantially on British imports to meet the normal demands of a frontier state; they had a very great difficulty in increasing production to meet the demands of a conventional shooting war, especially in the early stages. This is, in fact, the origin of the contemporary maxim of holding fire “until you can see the whites of their eyes” - whether by musket-rifle, musket or (particularly) cannon, powder could not be wasted by whanging away on a hope and a prayer. In the end, the Americans only got by through raids by irregulars on local British powder magazines - and even then, powder supply was tenuous, to say the least.
It is not clear that the Brits fully appreciated this. Their leadership does appear to have been afflicted by a combination of excessive caution, arrogance and complacency. Had a more forceful British command launched a determined campaign against the Continental Army early in the war, they would very probably have run the American forces out of gunpowder, and left the Americans in the situation of finding out how effective the “queen of the battlefield” (the bayonet) was effective in the absence of any realistic firepower. A guess - the British artillery would have found an occasion to wipe them out. Thanks to British bumbling and French intervention, it did not work out like that. Yet more “might have beens …”.
By the way - the notion that Britain was slow to respond to the potential of the rifle in military use does have some basis in terms of their military thinking - but not in practice. Looking forward to the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, they were actually pretty advanced in practice. That, however, is not saying much. However, there were very good reasons why conventional armies were reluctant to adopt rifled muskets as a weapon of common use, and this reluctance was far from confined to the British. This is really an interesting topic in itself, worth a thread of its own. I will start one soon - not today. Best regards, JR.