From which i read only Ribbentrop “Between London and Moscow” and honestly i never meet a fragment that Stalin offered the separate peace to Hitler. He wrote actualy that he , Ribbentrop, welcomed the peace with Russia and tryed to persuade the Hitler in winter 1941-42 and later in 1943. However, he wrote Hitler was relictant to idea of peace with Stalin.This point confirm also Von Below (“Als Hitlers adjutant”). No any other top rated nazis i read , neither Albert speer, Guderian or Mainstain never admit the Stalin’s proposal for peace.
Not to mention the leading british ww2 historians - Bevour or Tayler. Non of them even hinted to an STalin’s proposals. My favorite Alan Clarck even critisized STalin for that in his “Barbarossa”. Now you see why i look at this matter suspiciously.FInaly - how could t happend that in West , anglo-saxon west i mean, nobody told about Stalin’s will to separate peace with Hitler.Imagine the accusation thay thay would have on USSR if the negoration took place.But nothing were published except the very few books you have listed.
No, I meant that was what Stalin thought. He thaught that the Allies were temporizing to let him alone against Hitler, and make them massacre each other.
Probably might thought so. But he also knew that allies were interested not to let USSR fall down- coz othervise the Britain should be doomed. He saw like allies - americans and Brits were involving itno the war more and more - so German victory in war becoming unclear since 1942.
Ribbentrop confirms the episode narrated by Peter Kleist in his book. December 14th 1942, in Stockolm, the German communist Edgar Clauss, officer of NKVD, by order of the last Soviet ambassador in Germany, Dekanozof, met the German diplomat Kleist. Clauss said that his government thought that was time to finish the war, and if Germany had accepted the Soviet conditions, Russian government would had been ready to sign an armistice in 8 days. Kleist immediatly flew to Berlin to report to Ribbentrop. After a first shock, Ribbentrop ran to Rastemburg trying to convince Hitler to open immediatly negotiations, with the only result of another histerical crisis by the Fuhrer.
I heard about such an attempts of Ribbentrop and Goebels (!!!) to persuade a Hitler to find a possibility to conclude a peace with USSR from a few different memours i read. However i still doubt the any soviet attempt of negorations took place. Especialy if to keep in mind the political situation of the moment.14 december of 1942 the Red Army has already almost surrounded the 6 army in STalingrad and the anglo-american allies succesfully and quickly pursued the retreating Rommel in Africa.What was the political sense of negoration when it’s becoming clear that Germans can’t win the war in East and definitelly losed war in Africa?
Stalin, who never suffered of political stupidity, hardly didn’t understand that new pact with Hitler should make him a sort of Axis-ally with all the bad consequences for USSR.He never underestimated the ability of anglo-saxon coalition to fight( unlike the manies axis leaders)
Consider that in diplomacy everyone always tries to start from a position of superiority, in giving, receiving and proposing. The Soviet proposal was accompanied by conditions such as strong as the battleground was in favor of the Soviet Union.
About this theme of negotiations between Germany and Russia, reported for its conseguences in Mussolini’s politics after their failure (forcing the Italian dictator to find an his way of solution, that was an Italian armistice towards the Alleys if Germany would had refused the Italian ultimatum ofa a peace on the East, way that after the fall of Mussolini lead to a completely different and disastrous armistice), there are new interesting books (in Italian language). I can suggest:
“Le potenze dell’Asse e l’Unione Sovietica” of E. Di Rienzo and E. Gin;
“1943. L’estate delle tre tavolette” of Franco Bandini;
The number of july of the current year of the magazine “Storia in Rete”.
J.A.W. has been given a fortnight’s vacation, but in case anybody else is interested the answer is that this is routine for UK archives - everything innocuous is on the 30 year rule, anything even vaguely sensitive is on the 100 year rule. Anything properly embarrassing/secret is never released.
So we’ll never know the secret letters and agreements between Churchill and Mussolini… but who decides if the documents are embarassing/sensitive? The Government I guess. In this case many secrets… will remain secrets.
Following J.A.W. statement, probably the Hess proposals will remain secret to cover the “dark side” of the British leading class.
For example the big oil company Shell was a great financer of the Nazism, up to 40 million Reichsmark per a single year.
The leadership of Shell consisted of people fully integrated into the Masonic lodges and sects, esoteric, more or less covertly racist, and that so much had been in the cultural and ideological birth of Nazism. These kind of leaderships were quitle spread in many environments, political, diplomatic, economical, and were not a little influential in the British plutocratic ruling class, even if they generally shew a low profile.
And the Nazi leaders knew well these “sects” and had attended them, although more or less secretly of course, so much to push Hess to his famous flight (not at all “crazy”) to try to change British policy through Germany (those entourages favorable to Nazism operated quite hidden, but not without influence).
The big mistake of Hitler and the less pragmatic Nazi leaders was to find a very difficoult, if not impossible agreeement with GB, and to attack Russia before this agreement or a victory over Britain had been reached.
Later, when an agreement was still possible with the Sovet Union, Hitler’s strictness made to fail the negotiations. Because despite the Hitler’s will, and later the conspirators of july 1944 aspirations (when however it was too late), an agreement was effectively possible only with Russia. German leaders had forgotten the Bismarck lesson.
I still can’t see what great damage could be done by releasing records relating to Hess’s flight to the UK about three quarters of a century later, particularly given the release of so much sensitive information about things such as code breaking and listening in on captured German generals and other secretive stuff in the UK during and after WWII, including Philby and Co and related matters.
Whatever relates to the Hess records, it seems most likely to be necessary to preserve something which could still be damaged by revelation. But I can’t think of anything that could fit that bill, with the possible exception of bringing the Royal Family into further disrepute via the former King’s involvement in some way. I doubt that anyone of significance in that era and on that issue is still alive and needing protection from disclosure.
[QUOTE] Originally posted by DVX: Because he had already adavanced twice proposal of peace or armistice; the fi
rst time in late 1941, the second a year later. Furthermore, the western Allies had promised the big landing firstly for 1942, afterwards for 1943, “reneging on their own promise” and Stalin thought they wanted to fool him, lefting to Russia the biggest burden of war. When Russia and Germany wou had very good bled and massacred each other, only then they would have intervened to win, indirectly over Russia too. [QUOTE]
No one promised an invasion in 1942 - where did you get fantasy from, DVX? There were a few American generals who wanted to invade in 1943 but they were dreaming and they were wrong. The raid on Dieppe threw cold water on that idea. Of course Stalin was suspicious of the West: he was pathologically suspicious of everyone. He probably couldn’t believe it when the West sought to help him - he wouldn’t have helped the West if the positions were reversed. Having said this, I wouldn’t be particularly surprised if Stalin made discreet peace feelers during the initially successful stages of Barbarossa, but rather surprised if he did so later on. The only thing Stalin respected was power and the willingness to use it ruthlessly. Why would he make peace after Barbarossa? He was winning.
No fancy Royal 744. I’ve posted my sources and I have not invented them.
Even after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Red Army had losses 8 times bigger than the Whermacht; every success costed so much higher to the Soviets… than Stalin have clear suspects on the continuos Anglo-American delays… because the blood of the Russian army was erupting much more than the Western Allies one, as matter of fact…
As the war progressed the Soviets were on the offensive so losses would usually be higher, they were also not just fighting the Germans but quite a few other Axis nations, so all losses have to be included not just the Wehrmacht which most seem to think is all that was fighting in the east.
Higher losses does not also equate to wanting to make peace, the Soviets were in a better position to replace losses than the Germans were generally throughout the war (who were suffering manpower shortages in 1940 and equipment was reliant on huge amounts of captured materiel to supply their own shortfalls from 1938).
The US had some sort of idea about launching a cross channel invasion in 1942 which was a complete impossibility (no troops built up, no landing craft, no supplies stockpile, green troops, no experience of large sea borne assaults), there was an agreement to possibly cross in 1943 which had to be put back as it was still not possible for the western allies.
Thanks, Leccy. Was a promise of an invasion in 1942 actually made to Stalin? I mean, was this formal in any way shape or form? I know that in the US there was a blustery “Second Front Now” movement, but it was a citizen-inspired (or “otherwise” inspired) movement not rooted in anything official. Given that Pearl Harbor didn’t occur until the end of 1941, “unrealistic” doesn’t even begin to describe thoughts of a cross-channel invasion in '42.
Going to be away for a few days so not got much time to search for the sources but they might be in the Green Books (US official history WW2 iirc). There was also some information in Stalin/Churchill or Stalin/Roosevelt letters which I have saved somewhere on one of my computers/external hard drives which of course are all indexed and ready to hand - erm nope
In the meantime, both U.S. and British planners were independently investigating the possibility of being forced into action in 1942 in order to assist the Soviet Union. When Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941, many observers felt that the Russians would fall before the German blitz as quickly as had most of the rest of Europe. Then the Red Army tightened and held in front of Moscow and, when the snows came, struck back. Despite this success, however, neither American nor British military leaders were sanguine about the ability of the Russians to withstand a new German offensive in 1942. U.S. planners wrote: "Although Russia’s strength was greatly underestimated by military authorities, including the Germans, a true test of Russia’s capacity to resist the enemy will come this summer."28 The outcome of that test, they believed, was the key to the European and possibly to the world situation. Defeat of the USSR would enable the Germans to dominate the whole of Europe, complete the blockade of England, and probably force England to capitulate. If so, then it followed that every possible effort should be made by the Western Powers to insure that Russia was not defeated.
At the end of February 1942, Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, wrote: “The task of keeping Russia in the war in involves . . . immediate and definite action. It is not sufficient to urge upon the Russians the indirect advantages that will accrue to them from Allied operations in distant parts of the world . . . Russia’s problem is to sustain herself during the coming summer, and she must not be permitted to reach such a precarious position that she will accept a negotiated peace, no matter how unfavorable to herself, in preference to continuation of the fight.” The two ways of assisting Russia, General
–11–
Eisenhower noted, were Lend-Lease aid and early operations in the west to draw off from the Russian front large portions of the German Army and Air Force. He was dubious whether a sizable ground attack from England could be mounted soon, but at least, he thought, air operations could be initiated.29
The U.S. Joint Planning Staff, studying the whole question of U.S. troop deployment, went much further. They believed that a considerable land attack could be launched across the English Channel in 1942. Although it would have to be done at first largely by British forces, American participation would build up rapidly, and the prospect of such reinforcement should enable the British to mount the attack on a slimmer margin than would otherwise be possible. On this basis, the planners outlined what they thought would be a possible operation to take place in the summer of 1942 with a D Day between 15 July and 1 August. The operation was to open with a fifteen-day air attack, the strategic purpose of which would be to divert the German Air Force from the east. The immediate tactical objectives were to establish control of the air over the Channel and at least a hundred kilometers inland between Dunkerque and Abbeville, and to inflict the maximum damage on German military installations and lines of communication. During the air offensive, commandos were to raid the coasts of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Normandy. In phase two, beginning about D plus 30, major land forces were to cross the Channel with the mission of securing the high ground north of the Seine and Oise Rivers, and of destroying enemy ground and air forces in the general area Calais-Arras-St. Quentin-Soissons-Paris-Deauville. The plan did not go into operational detail. The critical problem of landing craft received little attention beyond a listing of the barge requirements and a notation that both Americans and British would have to construct special craft.30
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MR. MOLOTOV
Dept. of State Bulletin, June 13, 1942.
The People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, following the invitation of the President of the United States of America, arrived in Washington on May 29 and was for some time the President’s guest. This visit to Washington afforded an opportunity for a friendly exchange of views between the President and his advisers on the one hand and Mr. Molotov and his party on the other. Among those who participated in the conversations were: The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Maxim Litvinov; Mr. Harry Hopkins; the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall; and the commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King. Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, joined in subsequent conversations on non-military matters.
In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. In addition, the measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks, and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed. Also discussed were the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war. Both sides state with satisfaction the unity of their views on all these questions.
At the conclusion of the visit the President asked Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin on his behalf that he feels these conversations have been most useful in establishing a basis for fruitful and closer relations between the two governments in the pursuit of the common objectives of the United Nations.
Certainly, then, a great deal of “talk” and chin-wagging on the subject, and even preliminary “blue-sky” planning on a cross-channel invasion in 1942. none of which was grounded in reality nor based upon 1) the availability of US troops and materiel in England, 2) nor on the existence of landing craft in the British Isles. Doubtless too, Molotov must have reported the rubbery conversations to Stalin which, in the minds of Roosevelt, Hopkins and King, were fully hedged and well-beyond the abilities of the allies to fulfill. So, while I’m confident no formal or detailed planning down to the level of ships, landing craft, actual fire support, air support, not to mention supplies (much less the construction of artificial harbors) was done, I have to give DVX his due in that Stalin may have claimed to have been “misled” into thinking that some kind of landing might have been imminent. I don’t really think so. Stalin was nothing if not a ruthless realist, knew that no cross-channel invasion was possible in the near future and used his “disappointment” as leverage to get as much for his own forces - supplies, trucks, aircraft, etc. - as possible.
Firstly, thanks Leccy for your interesting links, that confirm my sources.
Secondly, as you can see royal744, there were negotiations, promises, studies, hipotesys, talks, call you them as you like, for the second front in 1942. Clearly, any delay caused trouble and suspicion in Stalin.
I can agree with you that these delays were caused by well motivated military and industrial causes, but these couldn’t change the Stalin’s suspicion towards the Allies, instead just the opposite: he felt these delays like “fake excuses” done by bad allies.
It happens in relationships, and the misunderstandigs could be tolerate until things go well, thereafter…
For example the Steel Pact pointed the start of the war not before the 1943, becouse until that time Italian armed forces wouldn’t be absolutely able to fight a great world war. Nevertheless Italy entered into the war when Germany looked to be the winner. But when the war was going to be lost, the violation of Steel pact (war in 1939 instead of 1943) was resumed with the so called “molibdenum list” - the request of Mussolini to Hitler to start immediatly the war, before 1943: 18 millions of tons of strategical materials needed by Italian industry to manage a great war, for just 1 year war-lasting! (I newly suggest the book of Erich Kuby “The German betrayal. Like Third Reich ruined Italy”.
So, as you can see even Eisenhower feared a compromise peace between Hitler and Stalin: there had to be a reason (or more than one).
Don’t forget that just in USA was firstly published in 1939 the book of Walter Krivistky, former chief of the Soviet secret service in western Europe: “In Stalin’s secret service; an exposé of Russia’s secret policies by the former chief of the Soviet Intelligence in western Europe”. At the time it was clearly an editorial bomb (I’ve the Italian edition of 1940 “Sono stato agente di Stalin” and I’ve to say it’ s a really interesting book and, for people who like spy-stories, perhaps even better than the Ian Fleming novels, with the difference Krivitsky talks about his true story, it’s not a novel).
Krivitsky says that since 1933 onwards the foreign policy of Stalin was directed only to find an agreement with Hitler; at the time it was a scoop and explained the secret reasons of the German-Soviet pact, that for the author - the no. 2 on the killing list of the Ghepeu, after Trotsky - was all but surprising.
So why not another agreement during the German-Soviet war? Many sources say that the only obstacle to this agreement was Hitler himself, as he was the only obstacle since 1933 to 1939. After the Rapallo treaty of 1920, Germany and Russia were in good relationship, like General Von Seekt’s and Marshall Tugachevsky’s armies…
Hitler changed this policy, until he rediscovered a “filo-Russian” policy for tactical reasons since 1939 to 1941.
In 1943 Mussolini (and even before), some German leaders like Goering, other Axis governments (Romenian, Hungarian and even Japanese), wanted a new agreement, an armistice, between Russia as last possibility to not lose the war, and the western Allies feared this possibility.
There is a thing crossing my mind and it summarizes well with “Why did the US wanted “Russia” to continue the fight that much and why did they wanted germany to be defeated that bad?” Do they deliberately avoid the label “Soviet Union”?
Or is it just the fact Germany declared war? There was no point in wanting the Soviet Union to become stronger.
Another agreement between Hitler and Stalin would not demand to much of Stalin, but of Hitler. As I said before, Hitler did not see war as “an extension of politics”, rather the other way around: it was Hitler who needed to convince generals that politics actually were what was needed to serve his war eventually. The only exception was the peace with the UK in 1940.
The destruction of the Soviet Union however was crucial in his mindset. Once the war broke out it was to death. And everything after fell into this paradigm. Including negotiation with the west.
It is no far jump into the dark to state that if Hitler would have succeeded in peace negotiations in 1940 - giving in to some demands of Western powers, including the release of France, Norway, … but holding tight to the Polish gains - he would probably have been called a great man in German history. This would have made the blitzkrieg war the extension of his first geopolitical goal : a stable conquest of Poland. Czechoslovak territories didn’t need such war, or at least: UK and France did not wanted a war for that .
