Armateur He-162 drawing (advice wanted)

[pdf27]

@Kiwiguy

Actually my father was at Normandy on 6 June 1944 and the Luftwaffe were not shy of making an appearance over the beaches from nearby airbases. Your knowledge is based on conjecture, mine on someone who was there.

I never said the Luftwaffe didn’t turn up. I said they were incapable of affecting the situation on the ground when they did. Which is accurate - they certainly shot up a fair number of troops and no doubt caused numerous casualties, which is all very unpleasant to those underneath it but didn’t affect the outcome or even the speed of the campaign one jot.

@Kiwiguy

Nor were the Luftwaffe so pitifully inept they could not disperse and hide aircraft.

They were a great deal better at it than that photo shows (those aircraft would be very easy indeed for any competent photo-interpreter to spot). It doesn’t matter much though - they needed an airfield close to the forward edge of the battle area, and the allies were more than capable of plastering any and all such airfields if they had to, all without affecting the tactical forces in Normandy at that. Bomber Command, 8th Air Force, and the tactical forces attacking the V-1 sites could all have been retasked if necessary (and were at some points - see the fate of the Panzer Lehr or indeed General McNair). If the allies know what grid square they’re in, then they can flatten them.

@Kiwiguy

The real issue is that Hitler could not be bothered getting out of bed and insisted that the real attack would come at Calais.

All of which says lots of rude things about German intelligence!

@Kiwiguy

The point of the He-162 that you people with your sharp minds cannot conceive that an aircraft so superior aircraft to Allied aircraft could have owned the sky to sufficient extent that one would not just be talking 200 He-162, but a variety of other aircraft. Air bases could have been under a virtual umbrella of patrolling Fw-190. Had the He-162 been in production in early 1944 then the waves of daylight bombing raids would have been blunted and air superiority over Normandy would not have been so assured.

That’s a bit like saying had the British had Vampires and Meteors in general service. The He-162 didn’t even fly until December 1944 and a handful were used in combat in April and May 1945. So if we’re bringing aircraft forward 18 months, I’ll have Bomber Command equipped with Lincolns, Fighter Command flying Furies, Vampires and Hornets and the Americans equipped with Silverplate B-29s and P-80s. Saying “the Germans could have done XXX” is meaningless without examining what the Allies could have done in response, and whether the Germans indeed had the capability to do XXX in any meaningful way.

@Kiwiguy

Nor is the issue what the He-162 would have inflicted on ground forces… That is a nonsense and i never proposed that, however no army could have survived without air cover and had the Allies been denied air supremacy, then the Allied armies would have been prey to lesser types of Luftwaffe ground attack aircraft.

Umm… what “lesser types of Luftwaffe ground attack aircraft”? Your putative 200 He-162s is already doubling the number of German aircraft in France, and even if the Allies had somehow magically lost all their air cover they were still well covered by light, medium and heavy AA guns throughout the Normandy bridgehead. The biggest contribution they could have made would be to reduce the level of air support available to attacking Allied troops - and even then the Bocage country limited what air support could do until Falaise, by which time it’s all too late.

[Rising_Sun]

@Ardee

At the danger of straying even further off original topic, there’s the one big thing we all know but which wasn’t included in your list: the ability of the Allies to act in concert, rather than each pursuing individual goals like invading Greece or not opening a second front on the USSR, etc., etc.

Definitely.

I think I’ve made that point in some ancient post(s).

@Ardee

I sometimes wonder if that wasn’t the best missed chance for Axis victory: if Japan had stuck west rather than east, putting the USSR in a two-front war and also severing the lend-lease coming in from the Pacific.

Japan’s choices in planning its expansion in the 1940-41 period were, essentially, to go into Siberia or go south. South won. Short version here.

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 forced the Japanese to review their program for the conquest of southeast Asia. For over a week they debated the question of the effect of Germany’s action on Japan. Some thought it better to move north now rather than south; others that the time had come to make concessions and reach agreement with the United States, whose hand in the Pacific had been strengthened by the Russo-German war. President Roosevelt, who listened in on the debate through the medium of MAGIC-the code name applied to intercepted and decoded Japanese messages-characterized it as “a real drag-down and knock-out fight … to decide which way they were going to jump-attack Russia, attack the South Seas [or] sit on the fence and be more friendly with us.” [8] The foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, favored the first course; the Army, the second; and the premier, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the third.

On 2 July 1941, at a Conference in the Imperial Presence, the leaders of Japan made their decision. It was a clear-cut defeat for the pro-Axis foreign minister and those who believed with him that Japan should attack Russia. For the others it was a compromise of sorts. Negotiations with the United States, begun in February 1941, would be continued in an effort to settle the issues between the two countries. At the same time the plans already made for the domination of Thailand and Indochina, the first objectives in the Southern Area, would be put into effect immediately. “We will not be deterred,” the Imperial Conference decreed, “by the possibility of becoming involved in a war with England and America.” [9] In short, Japan would attempt the difficult feat of sitting on the fence and advancing south at the same time.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm

The Soviets maintained huge forces against the Japanese for the whole of the war, and sufficient to deter any attack by Japan.

[JR11]

This thread reminds me of why I am wary of “what if”. At the risk of throwing in another one - what if the Japanese had struck southward into south-east Asia without attacking the US directly ? From a purely military point of view, it would, in a manner of speaking, have exposed Japan’s flank to American attack or, at least, an intensification of the USA’s economic war/blockade against Japan. But what about the politics - specifically, the politics in Washington D.C. ? There was a strong political tendency in the US against involvement in any foreign war. Short of a direct attack on US forces and/or territory, would the President have been able to muster enough support to take direct military action against Japan ? Of course, a tight blockade could have provoked a war in any case, but this would have been transparently obvious to the opponents of involvement in foreign wars who might have been in a position to block such a move. What if, what if …dangerous territory for historians … Best regards, JR.

[JR11]

BTW - regarding the mythical 200 “Salamanders” and so on - the whole concept of the “Volksjager” clearly arose out of increasing desperation on the part of the Germans regarding the ability of the Luftwaffe to shield German industry from Allied bombing. In its narrow conception, it was a total failure - no Hitlerjugend glider-trained fanatics ever flew a “Salamander” in anger (or perhaps at all). Nutty idea anyway - it is one thing to send a boy out to try to pot a T-34 with a Panzerfaust, but a jet fighter. In a broader sense, the programme was a failure because, in the He-162, they developed a surprisingly effective fighter (though not without problems and limitations) in a very short time. However, the resulting aircraft was really only suited to well-trained and/or skilled pilots - not to an airborne Volkssturm. And well-trained, experienced pilots were in ever-shorter supply by mid-1944. And, in any event, huge Allied air superiority and the lack of fuel for thirsty jet engines would have scuppered the programme even if … Oh Gods ! Too many “what ifs” for me … Best regards, JR.

[Rising_Sun]

@JR11

This thread reminds me of why I am wary of “what if”. At the risk of throwing in another one - what if the Japanese had struck southward into south-east Asia without attacking the US directly ?

A bit shorthand here, but time is short.

Tactically and strategically, virtually impossible. Add in politically, and quite impossible.

NEI was Japan’s main aim for oil.

Britain had to be defeated in Malaya, and Singapore naval base neutralised, to protect home route for oil from NEI. Also other Japanese mineral / resource objectives in Malaya (and Burma), among others. I think it was Eisenhower in his strategic appreciation early in 1942 who noted that Japan now controlled most of the rubber resources in the world, and a good part of the tin.

Japanese victory in Malaya and NEI leaves Philippines astride home route for oil from NEI, controlled by America which had imposed oil embargo on Japan and hardly likely to allow clear route home which defeats oil embargo as consequence of war operations by Japan.

US can reinforce its outdated Philippines fleet fairly promptly from Pearl Harbor, thus interfering with or even stopping Japanese advance through Malaya to NEI goal. War started on 7 December 1941 and Japan didn’t gain control of main NEI oilfields until end of January 1942, which allowed ample steaming time from Pearl. (USS Houston, a heavy cruiser, got from Pearl to Australia via NEI in about three weeks from 7 December 1941). Therefore, Pearl Harbor must be neutralised.

Pearl Harbor wasn’t an attack on the US directly per se, but a necessary tactical strike to support Japan’s very ambitious and stunningly successful first phase of operations towards the NEI, although the strike on Pearl was frustrated by the absence of major US ships and poorly planned and executed in a major respect by not destroying oil storages which probably would have done more immediate tactical damage to the fleet than merely grounding, rather than sinking, some US ships .

[JR11]

Thanks for response, Rising Sun. I was overlooking the Phillipines point in particular. I cannot disagree much on the tactical or strategic issues. However … what about the purely political “what if” ? In the absence of a direct attack (which changed the anti-war mood overnight) - without the “day that will in infamy” - would the US have mustered the political will to go to war with Japan, or to take economic actions that would have appeared as transparent warmongering to domestic opinion ? I am not really very good at this “what if” business" … Best regards to all friends in Oz, JR.

[Ardee]

JR – you are of course quite correct about US isolationism, and I can’t answer your question with any more definitivness than our friend Kiwi could supply. My thinking may be colored by our “more cynical age,” but FDR was already being provocative (without much public support) in the North Atlantic, to the point of losing ships. If FDR decided it was in the national interest, I’m sure something a little more direct might have been arranged in the Pacific that of course would have been entirely Japan’s fault. The public and mass media were less sophisticated than today, and such subterfuge would have had a better chance of working (although I do recall the public accusations FDR “allowed” Pearl Harbor, etc, etc.). FDR’s main interest was Germany, but still could have decided war with Japan was a back door into Europe, even without Hitler’s helpful declaration of war.

I think in the highly-charged atmosphere of the Pacific, and with Japan “on the move,” FDR could have pulled it off. Would the US public have shown quite the level of zeal and ardor as in the actual case? I doubt FDR could have pulled that part off quite as successfully…but probably successfully enough. Any diminishment of zeal might have been countered by greater US military preparedness. Just my guesses, of course. But it’s always been relatively easy to start a war.

[Rising_Sun]

@JR11

In the absence of a direct attack (which changed the anti-war mood overnight) - without the “day that will in infamy” - would the US have mustered the political will to go to war with Japan, or to take economic actions that would have appeared as transparent warmongering to domestic opinion ? .

My impression is that it wouldn’t.

I agree with what Ardee said about FDR and the Atlantic / German issue, but my understanding is that there wasn’t much appetite in the majority of the US population and Congress to get involved in another European war. The 'day of infamy 'changed that, although from purely logical and military / strategic viewpoints there was no necessity for the US to go to war with Germany as a consequence of an unrelated attack by Japan half the planet away. FDR and the pro-European camp chose to exploit Pearl Harbor to pursue their ‘Germany first’ policy.

At senior government levels in the US there was serious concern about Japan getting its hands on NEI oil as this would enable Japan to operate largely unaffected by the US oil embargo , but whether that would have translated into war with Japan if Japan had bypassed the Philippines and not attacked Pearl is unknowable. I’m inclined to suspect it wouldn’t, as the American public and Congress might have perceived invasion of British and Dutch colonies as irrelevant to American interests and not worth shedding American blood over, much as they saw the Japanese war in China 1933-41 as a war not worth getting involved in at a direct national level.

My comments on America are based on fairly superficial knowledge of American isolationism pre-WWII, so it may be that the picture is less clear than I have painted. Maybe one of our American members with deeper knowledge of that aspect could comment.

I am, however, reinforced in my comments by Churchill depriving Percival of the opportunity to resist the Japanese attack on Malaya by preventing implementation of the the Matador plan, which involved an incursion into Thailand to meet the correctly anticipated Japanese invasion, as Churchill wanted to ensure that Britain would be seen as the victim of Japanese aggression in America. His concern was that if Britain was seen as an aggressor itself by invading Thailand, this would be seen negatively in America and reduce the prospect of America entering the war against Japan. Churchill did not, of course, have knowledge of the looming attack on Pearl (despite abundant conspiracy theories and insupportable assertions to the contrary) which would have allowed Britain to implement Matador with probable approval, or at worst no negative consequence, from America in light of the Pearl attack.

[burp]

I agree both with Ardee, pdf27 and JR.
I agree with Ardee when he points out that a superior technology can act as a force multiplier on the battlefield. A well organized Lutfwaffe with a lot of jet fighter can be able to inflict a very heavy toll on USAF and RAF.
I agree with pdf27 when it says that even if 200 He-162 can be used, the amount of losses of Allies cannot change of course of war. The problem for the Lutwaffe is that USAF can sustain heavy losses, because his logistical and training chain can cover the losses in a much better way than Luftwaffe. For example, if every He-162 is ablet to shoot down 20 enemy aircraft before it is consumed or be bringed down, the USAF still can deploy several thousands of airplanes. For sure the USAF operations can be slowed by 200 full functionally He-162, but with only 200 jets the USAF operations cannot be halted.
I agree with JR when he said the Volksjager are too much demanding. Even if they are more simple than current normal jet fighter, Volksjager are still jets. That means:

• they need more fuel than ordinary blade propelled fighter;
• the reaction engine are still a fresh technology for 1943, with all problems related with it;
• they have better speed and act against slower fighter for sure, but those fighter are piloted by well trained and numerically superior allied pilots;
  At the end, for me, “Volksjager”, needs too much fuel, well trained mechanics and well-trained pilots to be sustained, to be the “cheap” alternative to Lutfwaffe that are supposed to be.

[Ardee]

I agree with Ardee when he points out that a superior technology can act as a force multiplier on the battlefield. A well organized Lutfwaffe with a lot of jet fighter can be able to inflict a very heavy toll on USAF and RAF.

Except your quoting Kiwi, not me. Actually, I don’t think anyone would argue with the idea that superior technology is a “force multiplier.” Anyone with even a passing knowledge knows technology has profound impact on the outcome of battle. Kiwi was suggesting that if the German’s had magically had these jets appear, the outcome of the Normandy invasion would have been very different. I’ll take the risk of attempting to paraphrase my own and other’s views: the jets were not enough by themselves, that the Germans lacked the pilots, fuel, logistics, and other resources to use them effectively, that the jets were not invulnerable to Allied responses. That of course ignores the issue of “reality” in introducing jets before their time.

[burp]

Sorry for the error.