Not something I’ve ever thought about or taken any notice of, and I can’t think of any examples to guide me. Instinctively, I’d probably be more likely to say ‘its’, but maybe others would say ‘her’.
You’re a pro R/S, you’re a pro!
Yes, i do agree with you’re first part of you’re post.Australia would of sufferd,but i don’t think if America lost that amount, it would not effect America like how it would of effected Australia.
Regrads
You’ve got me thinking on this one.
Australia is consistently referred to in the feminine in ‘My Country’ by Dorothea MacKellar, an early 20th century poem every school kid here used to learn and a few lines of which from the following verse almost every Aussie knows by heart.
I love a sunburnt country,
A land of sweeping plains,
Of ragged mountain ranges,
Of droughts and flooding rains.
I love her far horizons,
I love her jewel-sea,
Her beauty and her terror -
The wide brown land for me! http://www.dorotheamackellar.com.au/archive.asp
The gender attachment isn’t as strong here as it is in, say, Mother Russia or The Fatherland in Germany.
I expect it’s acceptable to refer to Australia in either the neuter or feminine gender. I’d accept both. I think perhaps we do both.
I’m in that state of uncertainty now similar to being unsure about how to spell a word, and the more you think about it the more uncertain you become.
I agree that Australia wasn’t fighting for its life in 1944. That phase passed during 1943 as the Japanese were driven back in Papua and New Guinea, and as events elsewhere such as Midway and other Japanese naval losses destroyed Japan’s ability to advance towards Australia and even to supply its advanced forces properly.
We had no Australian land forces in Europe or the Mediterranean, or anywhere outside the SWPA, after early 1943, when our 9th division returned to Australia, although we still had about 50,000 men serving with British forces.
Curtin had a constant battle with Britain and America to retrieve our three divisions from the Middle East, as Churchill and Roosevelt gave the war against Germany priority over the war with Japan. This was in accordance with their predetermined ‘Germany first’ policy, which they never bothered to tell Australia about and which we discovered only by accident around, from memory, May 1942 through a chance remark to one of our representatives in London.
Churchill, understandably, also gave preservation of British interests priority over preservation of Australian interests, which resulted in him in February 1942 unilaterally ordering troop ships carrying the returning 6th and 7th Divisions to go to Burma, which was a British possession and also the route to the more important British possession of India. This sparked a war within a war between Churchill and Curtin which, fortunately for Australia or I’d probably be speaking Japanese now, Curtin won.
If Churchill had won he would, with his characterstically poor military judgement where Australian forces were concerned, have landed our troops in Burma when their equipment was following them on slower transports and was not, in any event, tactically loaded which means that even when the transports arrived much further time would have been lost unloading them and equipping the troops to fight. There is no question that we would have had two divisions go into the Japanese bag along with the main elements of the 8th Division which was captured in Singpore. This would have left us with only the 9th Division, which was stuck in the Middle East. There is little question that we would have been defeated in Papua later in 1942 without the 6th and 7th Divisions returning to Australia.
Curtin still had to fight Churchill and Roosevelt during 1942 to get the 9th Division back when we were still fighting for our survival. It returned early in 1943.
Cablegram 159 CANBERRA, 16 November 1942
MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRETDear President Roosevelt,
I have carefully considered the suggestion in your message of 1st
November [1] for the retention of the 9th A.I.F. Division in the
Middle East and your proposal to send a U.S. Division to Australia
from Hawaii conditionally on the right to divert it elsewhere
within the South-West and South Pacific Areas.
2. As explained to Mr. Churchill in my message of 17th October
which was repeated to you [2], it is impossible for Australia to
despatch to the Middle East the reinforcements necessary for the
maintenance of the 9th Division, in view of the difficulties
already being experienced in maintaining the Australian Army and
meeting the heavy wastage from tropical warfare in New Guinea.
Unless the Division returns to Australia, it cannot be maintained,
whereas it can be built up again in Australia by the allocation of
personnel from other formations which are being disbanded owing to
the contraction in the number of our divisions.
3. The attitude of the Australian Government has all along been
quite definite and clear regarding the future employment of this
Division.
4. After the outbreak of war with Japan, and following a statement
generously volunteered by Mr. Churchill that no obstacles would be
placed in the way of Australian troops returning to defend their
homeland [3], the Government requested that all Australian troops
overseas should return to Australia.
5. In March, we allowed two Brigade Groups of the 6th Division to
be used in Ceylon on the understanding that the 9th Division would
return to Australia as soon as possible. [4] Had these brigades
returned directly to Australia we would have been able to
strengthen the forces in New Guinea much earlier with battle-
trained troops.
6. In April, the Government agreed to the postponement of the
return of the 9th Division until it could be replaced in the
Middle East. [5]
7. When the Australian Government had every reason to expect the
return of the Division in July, it raised no objection to its
transfer from Palestine to the Western Desert to help stem the
Axis advance. Mr. Churchill was advised that there would be
difficulties in the despatch of further reinforcements from
Australia and that when the available reserves were exhausted the
Division would have to be withdrawn from the line of battle. [6]
8. On 30th July, in a further personal cablegram to Mr. Churchill
[7], I stated that it was impossible for the Government to do more
than agree to an extension of the period for the temporary
retention of the 9th Division in the Middle East. A limit was set
to the reinforcements that would be available and it was
specifically stated that ancillary units were not to be broken up
for use as reinforcements. It was emphasized that the Commander-
in-Chief of the Middle East would therefore need to have these
facts in mind in his use of the Division.
9. Mr. Churchill, the Australian Representative [in] the United
Kingdom War Cabinet and the Commander of the Division have been
informed that:-
(a) no further reinforcements for the 9th Division are being
despatched from Australia;
(b) the Government is not agreeable to the 9th Division being
broken up by replacement of wastage from ancillary and other
units;(c) it is essential that the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East,
should have regard to this position in his use of the 9th
Division. [8]
The Government views the present use of the Division as absolutely
governed by the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by it some
time ago, and I have told Mr. Churchill that in our plans and
dispositions we are relying on the Division being returned in good
shape and strength. [9] Now that the situation in the Middle East
for which the 9th Division was retained has been cleared up
satisfactorily, the Government expects early effect to be given to
the understanding reached in April.
10. You might be interested to know that, on the entry of Italy
into the war, certain units of the 9th Division, reinforcements
and Corps troops were diverted to the United Kingdom, where they
were organised into the 9th Division for the defence of Britain
against invasion. This Division, which was later transferred to
the Middle East and withstood the siege of Tobruk, therefore
really became an additional overseas commitment. It was realised
at the time that it would probably be beyond our capacity to
maintain it and experience has proved this to be the case.
11. The decisions on global strategy have been taken by Mr.
Churchill and yourself The Commonwealth Government has shown a
ready willingness to co-operate in other theatres at considerable
risk to the security of Australia. This has been demonstrated by
the service overseas of our naval, land and air forces and our
continued participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme. The
Government considers that the contributions it has made to other
theatres entitle it to the assurance that the fullest possible
support will be given to the situation in the Pacific. You will
recall that the Military Advisers of the Australian Government
consider that three further divisions are necessary in the South-
West Pacific Area. [10] In view of its responsibilities for the
local defence of Australia and in the light of the views of its
advisers, the Government feels that the maximum strength of the
Australian forces should be concentrated in the South-West Pacific
Area to meet all the contingencies of the military situation in
the Pacific.
12. We are grateful to learn that you are sending to the South or
South-West Pacific Area a division from Hawaii. [11] We would be
delighted to welcome it to Australia, where it would be an
invaluable addition to the two splendid American divisions already
here. [12] Yours sincerely,JOHN CURTIN
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/6~76
See also Curtin’s cable to Churchill http://vrroom.naa.gov.au/main_display.aspx?ObjectType=ResearchRecordDisplay&iRecordId=977
Thanks Rising Sun, i was simply curious:)
Another error of not being specific on my part…I was including the members of the RAAF. They may not have made up a large portion of the Allied Air Power in Europe but I would imagine trained and equipped Airmen could have had a large impact on the war in the Pacific given how crucial air power proved to be.
For y’alls sake I’m glad Curtin won against Churchill too, Without the Silent Seventh and the 6th Division Australia would certainly have been in dire straights and with the bungling of the Burma campain on the Allies part they surely would have been lost.
Australians served in both the RAF as direct RAF enlisments (as did Americans and others with the Eagle Squadrons http://www.eaglesquadrons.com/coppermine/index.php?cat=5 before America joined the war) which were mostly enlisted during the early part of the war, and as RAAF units serving under British command in Europe and the ME. Their casualty rate was the highest of all Australian forces in the war. http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/raaf/
Regarding the entry at the bottom of the last link about Flight Sergeant Rawdon Middleton, 149 Squadron RAF, who was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for flying his plane to save his crew while wounded, a mate of my father’s did something similar in his damaged bomber over the English Channel returning from a raid over Germany. By the time his crew had left he couldn’t, so he died in the crash. Many other pilots did the same. As is so often the case, many more men who deserved a medal didn’t get one, or the recognition that goes with it, not that that takes anything away from those who got well deserved medals.
Yes and no.
In the crucial early days they needed planes to fly and, despite Churchill promising deliveries of Spitfires those planes did not arrive until after the threat to us had passed and then, typically, fewer than were promised. When the Spitfires did arrive they proved to be less reliable in tropical service than they had been in the ME and Europe. I think there were also some silly equipment problems which reduced their performance, such as ? being supplied with desert dust filters for air intakes which were unnecessary in the tropics and which severely reduced their top range of performance.
In fairness (if fairness is the right word) to Churchill, he deprived his own forces of the air support his military advisers told him was necessary for the defence of Malaya, although that air support was potentially available from reserves held in Britain against diminished German attacks.
Air support to ground forces was critical in some land battles undertaken by the Australians, such as at Milne Bay, but even there and on a wider strategic view it was the ability to destroy Japanese naval, troop, and merchant shipping which mattered more. This required pilots trained for tactics, flying and planes often rather different to the medium to large pattern bombers most Australians crewed in or under the RAF. For example, the Beaufighter was more effective attacking landing barges and small to medium ships than were fighters or large bombers. http://www.raaf.gov.au/raafmuseum/research/units/30sqn.htm
The planes and pilots we needed perhaps most were transports for supplies in and wounded out during the crucial days in the second half of 1942, and men to fly them in often lousy conditions and to land on impossible landing grounds. We lacked them, and we lacked the leaders (both Australian and American) to make this happen although some American Dakota pilots had shown it could be done (just!), so we suffered higher losses than we should have and did less well than we could have in that campaign. This was compounded by the drain on resources for food up the chain by foot and carriage of the wounded down the chain during the critical Kokoda Track campaign. As a simple example, depending on the distance one man might be needed to carry food just to supply himself and another man or two carrying supplies to the front. Effective air drops could have avoided this wasteful exercise, although the terrain was not favourable to them but it would still have been better than foot carriage. Similarly, carrying or escorting wounded back down the track used men and food which would not have been necessary if air transport was used.
I could go on, but I won’t.
Mate, you’re nowhere as glad as I, and my parents’ generation who were the ones who faced the Japanese threat, are that Curtin won. 
Not that they knew anything about Churchill’s actions at the time. 