Bomber Harris, Criminal or Hero?

World War II British Military
#124

Well you see, I just wanted to be on a coservative side, so that you would not accuse me of exaggeration. :wink:

I’m not the one downplaying it.
Just as a matter of interest, do you agree with him that the ‘jewish’ holocaust was in his words ‘very exaggerated’ and the 6 million figure is wrong.

Yes, I agree. 6 million is a symbolic number. There is Holocaust memorial in France, where six light projectors shoot in to the sky from the six sides of the David’s star. It is this kind of symbolism I am talking about.

In my humble oppinion, the real figure is about 4 million, which does not make it any easier for the jewish victims diring the war.

Best rgards
Igor Korenev

#125

Wasn’t he after “Lebensraum” (literally, room in which to live) rather than slaves? If so, surely it would be a matter of national policy to depopulate the captured reasons. Certainly, the Germans made quite a good start on depopulating the areas of Poland and the Soviet Union they captured. In Poland something like 25% of the population died during the war.

Poland was the eastern territory for Hitler. Just like Ukraina, Belorussia and Russia were. The Lebensraum implied depopulation by many different ways (including Holocaust).

Regarding the percentages it is not that clear I guess. It depends in which borders take the countries and if counting by nationalities or not.
This is a quote from wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties#endnote_Poland): “Losses by ethnic group were 3,100,000 Jews; 2,000,000 ethnic Poles; 500,000 Ukrainians and Belarusians.”
The total population of Poland before 01-sep-1939 was app. 35 million. The Poles were about 25 millions. 3.5 million jews, app. 5 million Ukraininas, app. 1 million Belorussians, app. 1 million Germans.
Most of the poles lived in the area soon to be occupied by Germany.
All of the Ukrainins and belorussians and most of the jews (app. 2 mill) were in area soon to be taken back by USSR.

So the percentage numbers change dramaticaly depending on this factors. If you just remove the stats for 2 millions of jewish population, that was almost completely completely killed during the war, the situation shifts dramaticaly.

But this of course does not show, that Poland was not one of the country that suffered enourmous death rate during WW2.

Best regards
Igor Korenev

#126

May also depend on how you count deaths. AIUI (please correct me if I’m wrong) the Germans deprived the Poles of many resources such as adequate food, medical supplies, etc. This will have led to a greatly increased death rate.
However, I had forgotten that “Poland” has been a rather elastic concept this century. It’s quite possible that the figure I was quoting is a before and after number for the population living within the boundaries of Poland as a state - in which case it becomes rather useless.

#127

pdf27:

May also depend on how you count deaths.

I think if one reads “XXX losses” it normally means all death causes. This is especially true when talking about a whole country, where any unnatural death (murder, famine, ect) are counted as losses. Sometimes even unborn children are concidered as losses.

#128

Can be, problem is that people are often very cavalier in how they do the counting. This can lead from only counting the easy official statistics (which will only show cases where there is a clear, attributable cause of death) to rectal extractions intended to support the author’s point.

#129

Oh really.
well open please the memoirs book of Harris :“Bomber offencive”. London. 1947

…The basic objects of defense industry was to be searched for, where they occur in any country of peace, i.e., in cities themselves. One should especially emphasize that besides as in Essen( when was killed a lot of civilians-my comment Chevan) we never made with the object of film any specific plant.The destroyed enterprise in the city we always considered as additional success. The center of city always remained our main purpose. All old German cities are most densely build ot to to center, and the outskirts of them always more or are less free from the buildings. Therefore center section it is municipal is especially sensitive to the incendiary bombs

So as could you see if not the german industry was the goal for the Harris then what was it for?
Certainly the terrorizing and killing of population - the “favorite method” of Nazi when they bombed London, Warsaw , Gernica and ets (but just in much less scale.)

OR may be Harris lied?

The goal was to disrupt both the infostructure, and the civilian populations in the towns enough to effect the German war effort

But the barbarian way which Harris choose for the disrupt the German infostructure was via the mass killing of peoples. It was the Nazi tactic to terrorised the population and killing the civilians but in MUCH MORE scale.

Cheers.

#130

I have not to agree.
The killing of civilians was the not forced measure in the Harris tactic. Don’t forget about psychological reasons and politic.
There is no doubt that Britain people wished the retrebution for Germans after the cynical Blitz bombardment of UK. And therefore the Churchill in his public speech useed this point as the importaint for the justification of bombing.(Remenber about “Wind and whirlwind”).
I can understand britains i that time.
But the problem was that not many peoples in Britain knew that this “retribution” planned as the mass slaughter of German polpulation ( abot 50% victims were the women and 20% - children).
To be the honest after the war when true about “effectiveness” of bombing come to the surface many people in Britain were agitated of this murder. The firebombing of Germany caused at least 10 times more death of civilians than both US and UK civils victims in entire WW2.
Even W.Churchill was frightened of responsibility and he was forced to remove from Harris.
Poor Harris after the war become the “scapegoat” together with strategic RAF high command . Certainly it was not only his blame. He just did it’s work as “good soldier”.
But many Nazi “good soldier” were shooted for less dirty work.

Cheers.

#131

It is a question of equality. The bombing of Britain by the Germans isn’t considered a war crime, so why should the bombing of Germany be considered a war crime ???

okay, I now understand. it is no crime at all to kill 600.00 civilians? to me, both sides commites a true war crime when killing civilians for no really obvious reason (I pointed out why earlier). the us 8th air fleet did those permanet attacks on targets like factories and railroads f. e., but most effects are achieved with explosive bombs, not with fire-bombs. there were also civil losses by the us and they also used the strategy of wiping out living-areas, but the brits did that with a greater success and IT WAS the main aim of the BC. earlier in another thread, I related to those statements that showed off a proud attitude towards the effects of the BC (“applaud ont he result”), maybe some of those posters should think about that twice. but reflecting own parts of history that were not so glorious in a most objective way seems not easy for some sons of the winners. I do not want to hear any sorry, but please understand that I can find nothing heroic or good in killing helpless and defendless people in such a way. again: this is a crime and a to built up a statue for harris is the wrong way …

I also agree that Goering was never charged for his Luftterror, because this would have had a bad effect for the allied side.

personally, I find it a bit dangerous to bring in the holocaust-card as someone named it here - especially as a german. there should never be a direct comparison between the holocaust-victims and those of the bombing-nights.

jens

#132

I think you’re overstating the importance of this phrase. It’s a direct biblical quote (Hosea 8:7) and nicely fits in with Churchill’s rhetorical turn of phrase.

British experience from the Blitz - notably at Coventry - was that it was far more destructive to bomb the centre of a target than attempt attacks on factories. If you hit a factory with anything but extremely heavy bombs (and I’m thinking 5 tonne + in size) you can pretty much dust off the machine tools, sling a tarpaulin over the roof and resume production. The British knew this from their experience on the recieving end during the Blitz.
However, if you hit the centre of a town you generally knock out water and electricity supplies to the factories around that town. The factories are out of action until these essential supplies are restored, and as they will have been damaged over a wide area the restoration work is much harder than if they were at a single point.
How true this lesson was for Germany, I don’t know (the USSBS may have further data on this). However, it is what the British believed at the time and it did influence their decision making process.

I don’t agree with that (see above). Until very late in the war the bombloads dropped by the US were simply too light and the bombs too small to do very much damage to factories (although they could do quite a lot of damage to what they were producing, hence the drive to bury or decentralise).
There are exceptions to this - largely for things like the Fischer-Tropsch plants for producing synthetic fuels - but these are mainly places that would burn down of their own accord given half a chance.

#133

Hello!

Does anyone have text in English of the RAFs “moral area bombing” directrice from February 1942?

And does any one have a text in English of the paper leaflets dropped by the RAF on Germany in August - October 1942. I read it in Russian. And it say among other that “it is not for revenge”, but nontheless “we will hunt you down mercilessly”. And it was not told about German generals, but about ordinary people.

I think if we could post these two documents here, it may clear some issues.

Best regrads
Igor Korenev

#134

Hello!

It has been mentioned in here by someone that it was Russians that asked for the bombing of Dresden. So the claim is that the British just did what Russians asked them to do.

Does anyone have an info (with references to the sources) about what exactly did Russians ask for?
Common! Lets get some life into our forum! Some fresh going fight of ideas! :wink:

#135

Stalin didn’t have any success getting the other Allies to open the Second Front in 1943.

Then again, the Americans didn’t have any success getting Churchill to do it in 1943, either.

Things must have improved by early 1945 when Dresden was bombed, despite America and Britain by that stage worrying about how to deal with the Russian bear if it kept going westwards, or even just stayed where it was, after Germany was defeated… :wink:

Does anyone have an info (with references to the sources) about what exactly did Russians ask for?

The Russian Request for Allied Bombing of Communications in the Dresden Area:

  1. The Allied-Russian interchanges that had begun in the closing months of 1944 and had become, with the passing of time, more frequent and more specific, culminated in the ARGONAUT Conferences of January-February 1945. On 4 February, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, together with their foreign secretaries and military advisors, assembled at Yalta to present definitive and specific plans, and requests, for bringing the war against Germany to a victorious conclusion, by the summer of 1945, if possible (Other considerations involved in the ARGONAUT deliberations are not pertinent or relevant here). At this meeting, Marshal Stalin asked Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, to outline to the Conference the situation existing on the Eastern Front and to describe Russia’s plans for subsequent operations. At the conclusion of his extended presentation, General Antonov made three specific requests for Allied assistance to the Russians: 27

Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable: (1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front. (2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes. (3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East (It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February).
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy (In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig).
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

  1. It was the specific Russian request for bombing communications, coupled with the emphasis on forcing troops to shift from west to east through communications centers, that led to the Allied bombings of Dresden. The structure of the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex, as outlined in paragraph 8 above, required that Dresden, as well as Berlin and Leipzig, be bombed. Therefore Allied air authorities concluded that the bombing of Dresden would have to be undertaken (1) in order to implement strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, and now agreed upon at the highest levels of governmental authority, and (2) to respond to the specific Russian request presented to the Allies by General Antonov to “paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.”
    http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:_iXt0skUZNwJ:https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm+Strategic+Bombing+in+Relation+to+the+Present+Russian+Offensive&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=au [Website is down so I’ve had to use Google cache]

P.S. I’ve come into this thread late, so if this has already been posted I’m sorry.

Common! Lets get some life into our forum! Some fresh going fight of ideas! :wink:

So, I’m not the only one bored with the dull state, or total lack of, debate lately? :smiley:

#136

Well RS, I hate to tell you the dull state of this site is common on other sites too, probably because most members are enjoying the northern summer.

The other problem is since you’ve joined you’ve kicked off five million threads and there is nothing left to talk about:shock:

I believe there is only one way we can rectify this situation;)

Regards digger

#137

I suspected that.

I suppose they’re entitled to enjoy their pale imitations of a real summer. :smiley:

The other problem is since you’ve joined you’ve kicked off five million threads and there is nothing left to talk about:shock:

I believe there is only one way we can rectify this situation;)

So, the solution is that I go north for the summer; locate Egorka, Chevan and others, and force them back to their keyboards? :smiley:

#138

P.S. I realise that there is another solution available, but I’m not into seppuku.

Or all that fond of a culture which extols it, as shall soon become apparent in a post in the A bomb thread which, even allowing for the gentle delights of the northern summer, ought to drag someone away from their hired deck chair (How can a chair on a beach be a chair for a deck on a ship?) on a rough pebbled beach with no surf.

They don’t know what they’re missing down here. :smiley:

#139

Yes, despite their own promise. :wink:

http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:_iXt0skUZNwJ:https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm+Strategic+Bombing+in+Relation+to+the+Present+Russian+Offensive&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=au [Website is down so I’ve had to use Google cache]

Yes, I know of this page but have not read it yet - could not connect even to Google cash page… So thanks for that!

I still have to read it through. But the first comments are:

[ol]
[li]Formally USSR did not ask to bomb Dresden. [/li][li]USSR asked to bomb “junctions” (I guess these are the transport junctions), not the city center.[/li][li]The infamous air raid was not the first and not the biggest one over Dresden, yet the civilian casualties were the highest.[/li][/ol]

Did I get it correct so far?

#140

RS, go forth young man and share some vodka with our Russian friends:D

Dresden was the major transport junction(outside of Berlin)and virtually all rail traffic going to the Eastern Front passed through.

The major rail yard in the suburb of Friedrichstadt is next to the city centre. Immediately south of the city centre were more substantial rail yards and industry in the suburb of Sudvorstadt.

Significantly there were two major rail junctions in the area defined as the city centre, one of these junctions immediately west of the main railway station. There is also a misconception the city centres of German cities were devoid of worthwhile military targets.

Regards digger

#141

Yes, I know of this page but have not read it yet - could not connect even to Google cash page… So thanks for that!

[ol]
[li]Formally USSR did not ask to bomb Dresden.
[/li]> [li]USSR asked to bomb “junctions” (I guess these are the transport junctions), not the city center.
[/li]> [/ol]

Did I get it correct so far?

That’s my reading of it. Russia wanted transport junctions bombed and the other Allies apparently selected Dresden as one of those points, although the following paper concludes that Russia wanted the “Dresden area” bombed which isn’t necessarily the same thing as bombing the city of Dresden.

In case you can’t get onto the site (it’s very slow even on cache today, but I’m using a different ISP now) I’ll post the full thing as it’s an interesting analysis that contradicts a lot of the popular myths about the Dresden bombing. Unfortunately the tables don’t maintain their format. It’ll take a few posts.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 14-15 FEBRUARY 1945
BOMBINGS OF DRESDEN

Prepared by:
USAF Historical Division
Research Studies Institute
Air University

I. INTRODUCTION:

  1. The reasons for and the nature and consequences of the bombing of Dresden, Germany, by Allied air forces on 14-15 February 1945 have repeatedly been the subject of official and semi-official inquiries and of rumor and exaggeration by uninformed or inadequately informed persons. Moreover, the Communists have with increasing frequency and by means of distortion and falsification used the February 1945 Allied bombings of Dresden as a basis for disseminating anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. From time to time there appears in letters of inquiry to the United States Air Force evidence that American nationals are themselves being taken in by the Communist propaganda line concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden.

  2. The purpose of this historical analysis, based in its entirety on existing official documents and on standard reference sources, is to provide a more detailed and definitive account of the reasons for and the nature and consequences of the February 1945 Dresden bombings than has heretofore been available. The narrative portion of this historical analysis sets forth a framework for arriving at definitive answers to such recurring questions concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden as the following:

a. Was Dresden a legitimate military target?
b. What strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and to the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden?
c. Did the Russians request that Dresden be bombed by allied air forces?
d. On whose recommendation, whether by an individual or by a committee, and by what authority were Allied air forces ordered to bomb Dresden?
e. Were the Russians officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden?
f. With what forces and with what means did the Allied forces bomb Dresden?
g. What were the specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings?
h. What were the immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings on the physical structure and the populace of the city?
i. Were the Dresden bombings in any way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives?
j. Were the specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings similar to or different from the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany?
k. In what specific ways and to what degree did the bombings of Dresden achieve or support the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians?

  1. Each statement of fact in the narrative portion of this analysis is, as indicated in the reference notes, a citation from a standard reference work or is authenticated or amplified in the supporting documents that are attached herewith. These latter comprise an official and definitive case history of the bombings of Dresden.

  2. In as much as it is exclusively the 14-15 February 1945 bombings of Dresden that have repeatedly been the subject of inquiry and controversy and the basis of Communist propaganda, the subsequent historical analysis and the attached supporting documents are primarily concerned with and relevant to the February bombings only. Nevertheless, as a matter of record, the following is an authoritative tabulation of all Allied bombings of Dresden: 1

Date
Target Area
Force
Acft
High Explosive bombs on target (tons)
Incediary bombs on target (tons)
Total
7/10/44
Marshalling Yards

8th AF
30
72.5

72.5
16/1/45
Marshalling Yards

8th AF
133
279.8
41.6
321.4
14/2/45
City Area

RAF BC
772
1477.7
1181.6
2659.3
14/2/45
Marshalling Yards

8th AF
316
487.7
294.3
782.0
15/2/45
Marshalling Yards

8th AF
211
465.6

465.6
2/3/45
Marshalling Yards

8th AF
406
940.3
140.5
1080.8
17/4/45
Marshalling Yards

8th AF
572
1526.4
164.5
1690.9
17/4/45
Industrial Area

8th AF
8
28.0

28.0

II. ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target

  1. At the outbreak of World War II, Dresden was the seventh largest city in Germany proper.2 With a population of 642,143 in 1939, Dresden was exceeded in size only by Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Leipzig, and Essen, in that order.3 The serial bombardments sustained during World War II by the seven largest cities of Germany are shown in Chart A.

  2. Situated 71 miles E.S.E. from Leipzig and 111 miles S. of Berlin, by rail, Dresden was one of the greatest commercial and transportation centers of Germany and the historic capital of the important and populous state of Saxony.4 It was, however, because of its geographical location and topography and as a primary communications center that Dresden assumed major significance as a military target in February 1945, as the Allied ground forces moved eastward and the Russian armies moved westward in the great combined operations designed to entrap and crush the Germans into final defeat.

  3. Geographically and topographically, Dresden commanded two great and historic traffic routes of primary military significance: north-south between Germany and Czechoslovakia through the valley and gorge of the Elbe river, and east-west along the foot of the central European uplands.5 The geographical and topographical importance of Dresden as the lower bastion in the vast Allied-Russian war of movement against the Germans in the closing months of the war in Europe.

  4. As a primary communications center, Dresden was the junction of three great trunk routes in the German railway system: (1) Berlin-Prague-Vienna, (2) Munich-Breslau, and (3) Hamburg-Leipzig. As a key center in the dense Berlin-Leipzig railway complex, Dresden was connected to both cities by two main lines.6 The density, volume, and importance of the Dresden-Saxony railway system within the German geography and e economy is seen in the facts that in 1939 Saxony was seventh in area among the major German states, ranked seventh in its railway mileage, but ranked third in the total tonnage carried by rail.7

  5. In addition to its geographical position and topography and its primary importance as a communications center, Dresden was, in February 1945, known to contain at least 110 factories and industrial enterprises that were legitimate military targets, and were reported to have employed 50,000 workers in arms plants alone.8 Among these were dispersed aircraft components factories; a poison gas factory (Chemische Fabric Goye and Company); an anti-aircraft and field gun factory (Lehman); the great Zeiss Ikon A.G., Germany’s most important optical goods manufactory; and, among others, factories engaged in the production of electrical and X-ray apparatus (Koch and Sterzel A.G.), gears and differentials (Saxoniswerke), and electric gauges (Gebruder Bassler).9

  6. Specific military installations in Dresden in February 1945 included barracks and hutted camps and at least one munitions storage depot.10

  7. Dresden was protected by antiaircraft defenses , antiaircraft guns and searchlights, in anticipation of Allied air raids against the city.11 The Dresden air defenses were under the Combined Dresden (Corps Area IV) and Berlin (Corps Area III) Luftwaffe Administration Commands.12

Strategic Objectives, of Mutual Importance to the Allies and the Russians:

  1. As early as 1943, the Allies and Russians had begun high-level consultations for the conduct of the war against Germany; in essence, for combined operations designed to defeat Germany by Allied bombardment from the air, by Allied ground operations against Germany from the west, and by Russian operations against the Germans from the west, and by Russian operations against the Germans from the East. At the Tehran Conference (28 November-11 December 1943) between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, the grand strategy for these combined operations was outlined and agreed upon by the three powers.13 Details for executing the grand strategy were not considered at the conference, but were to be worked out by the individual forces in keeping with the fortunes and progress of the war.14
#142

continued

  1. In the closing months of 1944, Allied land advances in the west and Russian advances from the east, coupled with the ever-growing devastation from aerial attacks by the Allied heavy bomber forces, made it apparent that early in 1945 Germany proper could be invaded from both fronts and that the Allied strategic air forces would be more and more called upon to give direct support to these vast land operations. In September and October 1944 the Allies and the Russians began the exchange of information on their specific plans for operations designed to bring the war to a close in 1945.15 Simultaneously, the Allies and the Russians laid the general groundwork for closer cooperation and assistance in their forthcoming operations.16

  2. On 14 December 1944, the American Ambassador to Russia, Mr. Averill Harriman, personally stated to Marshal Stalin that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), “was very anxious to operate in concert with the Russians and to help the Russian armies whenever such support might be needed.”17 Ambassador Harriman specifically discussed with Stalin the use of Allied air forces in the Mediterranean in support of Russian land operations in the Balkans.18 While there was no direct mention, in the 14 December conversations between Stalin and Harriman, of the employment of the massive Allied strategic air forces operating from the west, it was to be assumed that these forces would be used to support Russians operations on the Eastern front.

  3. On 23 December 1944, President Roosevelt informed Stalin that–given the Marshal’s permission General Eisenhower would be instructed to send a representative to Moscow to “discuss with you the situation in the west and its relation to the Russian front in order that information essential to our efforts may be available to all of us.”19 On 26 December Stalin stated his acceptance of President Roosevelt’s proposal.20 The officer designated to confer with Stalin was Marshal of the RAF, Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander, SHAEF, and immediately responsible to the Supreme Commander for all Allied air operations. Among the topics discussed by Stalin and Tedder at their meeting on 15 January 1945 was the employment of the Allied strategic air forces in the forthcoming combined operations. Tedder outlined to Stalin the “application of the Allied air effort with particular reference to strategic bombing of communications as represented by oil targets, railroads and waterways.”21 There was also specific discussion of the problem that would face the Russians if the Germans attempted to shift forces from the west to the east and of the necessity of preventing this possibility.22

  4. Therefore, on 25 January 1945, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the British War Cabinet, which was responsible for preparing such analyses for the Allied air forces, presented to Marshal Tedder, through appropriate channels, a working paper entitled “Strategic Bombing in Relation to the Present Russian Offensive.23 The findings of this authoritative body were as follows:

The degree of success achieved by the present Russian offensive is likely to have a decisive effect on the length of the war. We consider, therefore, that the assistance which might be given to the Russians during the next few weeks by the British and American strategic bomber forces justifies an urgent review of their employment to this end.24
It is probable that the Germans will be compelled to withdraw forces, particularly panzer divisions, from the Western Front to reinforce the East . . . . To what extent air bombardment can delay the move eastwards of these or other divisions destined for the Eastern Front is . . . an operational matter. It is understood that far-reaching results have already been achieved in the West by disruptive effect of Allied air attacks on marshalling yards and communications generally. These have hitherto been aimed at assistance to the Western Front and should now be considered in relation to delaying the transfer of forces eastwards.25

For the next several days these recommendations were carefully studied and evaluated by the appropriate authorities in the Supreme Commander’s staff, particularly among those immediately responsible to him for planning and authorizing air operations. On 31 January, the decision was made by the Deputy Supreme Commander Tedder and his air staff that the second priority for the Allied strategic air forces should be the “attack of BERLIN, LEIPZIG, DRESDEN and associated cities where heavy attack will . . . hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts.”26 As of 31 January 1945, the Allied decision to establish Dresden as a second priority target, because it was a primary communications center and in support of the Russian armies, was by no means unilateral. The decision was founded on basic and explicit exchanges of information between the Allies and Russia and was clearly a strategic decision of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians.27

The Russian Request for Allied Bombing of Communications in the Dresden Area:

  1. The Allied-Russian interchanges that had begun in the closing months of 1944 and had become, with the passing of time, more frequent and more specific, culminated in the ARGONAUT Conferences of January-February 1945. On 4 February, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, together with their foreign secretaries and military advisors, assembled at Yalta to present definitive and specific plans, and requests, for bringing the war against Germany to a victorious conclusion, by the summer of 1945, if possible (Other considerations involved in the ARGONAUT deliberations are not pertinent or relevant here). At this meeting, Marshal Stalin asked Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, to outline to the Conference the situation existing on the Eastern Front and to describe Russia’s plans for subsequent operations. At the conclusion of his extended presentation, General Antonov made three specific requests for Allied assistance to the Russians: 27

Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable: (1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front. (2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes. (3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East (It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February).
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy (In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig).
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

  1. It was the specific Russian request for bombing communications, coupled with the emphasis on forcing troops to shift from west to east through communications centers, that led to the Allied bombings of Dresden. The structure of the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex, as outlined in paragraph 8 above, required that Dresden, as well as Berlin and Leipzig, be bombed. Therefore Allied air authorities concluded that the bombing of Dresden would have to be undertaken (1) in order to implement strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, and now agreed upon at the highest levels of governmental authority, and (2) to respond to the specific Russian request presented to the Allies by General Antonov to “paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.”
#143

continued

The Recommendation and Authority for the Allied Air Forces’ Bombing of Dresden:

  1. On 8 February 1945 SHAEF (Air) informed the RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces that Dresden was among a number of targets that had been selected for bombing because of their importance in relation to the movements of military forces to the Eastern Front.28 This action, based upon the authoritative recommendation of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, SHAEF (Air), and in turn based upon the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee (see paragraph 16 above), was in keeping with the procedural structure and authority set up in SHAEF for the conduct of aerial operations by Allied forces.29

  2. Allied aerial operations were ultimately the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, though normally he delegated the immediate authority for employment of Allied air forces to his Deputy Supreme Commander, Marshal Tedder. The latter, in turn, relied upon the commanders of the RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces (General Carl Spaatz, Commanding) for the actual conduct of specific strategic aerial operations. The top commanders of the Allied strategic bomber forces were required to conduct all of their operations within the framework of bombing directives laid down to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (the British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff). In February 1945, when SHAEF (Air) directed the bombing of Dresden in immediate support of the Russians and in keeping with strategic objectives of mutual interest to the Allies and the Russians, the strategic objectives of mutual interest o the Allies and the Russians, the strategic bomber forces were operating under the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) “Directive No. 3 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” dated 12 January 1945.30 The second priority, after bombing of the German petroleum industry for the Allied strategic air forces was, in that directive, listed as the bombing of “German lines of communications.”31 The authority for and the ordering of the bombing of Dresden by Allied strategic air forces and the steps taken to carry out these orders were therefore within the framework of the existing basic CCS Directive No. 3 governing the operations of the Allied strategic air forces in Europe.

Information Officially Given to the Russians by the Allies Concerning the Intended Date of and the Forces to be Committed to the Bombing of Dresden:

  1. Although the exact procedures for maintaining day to day liaison between the Russians and the Allies on Allied bombing operations was for a long time the subject of negotiation between the Allies and the Russians, certain procedures for such liaison were nevertheless in effect prior to the Allied bombings of Dresden.32 Therefore, the following actions were taken by Allied authorities to notify the Russians that in accordance with their expressed wishes as to actions and timing, stated at the ARGONAUT Conference on 4 February 1945, Allied strategic air forces would bomb Dresden during the first half of February.33

  2. On 7 February 1945, General Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces, informed Major General J. R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission, Moscow, that the communications targets for strategic bombing by the Eighth Air Force were, in the order of their priority, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cheanitz (and others of lesser importance).34 On the same date, General Spaatz also notified General Deane that a 24-hour advance notice of the intention to conduct actual bombing operations against Dresden (and the other targets of mutual concern to the Russians and the Allies) would be forwarded in order that General Deane might so notify the Russians.35 Moscow notified the proper Russian authority that Dresden was among the targets selected for strategic bombing by the American Eighth Air Force.36 On February, General Spaatz informed the United States Military Mission that, weather permitting, the Eighth Air Force intended to attack the Dresden Marshalling Yards with a force of 1200 to 1400 bomber planes on 13 February.37 On 12 February, therefore, the Russians were informed of the Americans’ intention to bomb Dresden.38 Weather conditions did not permit the Eighth Air Force to carry out its attack against Dresden on 13 February.39 Accordingly, on 13 February by similar procedures the Americans informed the Russians, that the Eighth Air Force would attack the Dresden Marshalling Yards on the 14th.40 Subsequently, the Russians were informed by the Americans that Dresden, together with the other high priority communications centers targets, would be subject to attack whenever weather conditions permitted.41

The Forces and Means Employed by the Allies in the Bombing of Dresden:

  1. In the Dresden bombing attacks of 14-15 February 1945 the American Eighth Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command together employed a total of 1299 bomber aircraft (527 from the Eighth Air Force, 722 from the RAF Bomber Command) for a total weight, on targets, of 3906.9 tons. Of this tonnage, 1247.6 tons were expanded by the Eighth Air Force, 2659.3 tons by the RAF Bomber Command. The Americans employed 953.3 tons of high explosive bombs and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs–all aimed at the Dresden Marshalling Yards. The British employed 1477.7 tons of high explosive bombs and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs–all aimed against the Dresden city area.42 The American aircraft used H2X (radar) bombing method, with visual assists, and the British used the marker and visual method.43

Specific Target Objectives in the Dresden Area:

  1. As related in paragraphs 5-11 above, Dresden became a military target as (1), and of overriding importance, a primary communications center in the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex; (2) as an important industrial and manufacturing center directly associated with the production of aircraft components and other military items, including poison gas, anti-aircraft and field guns, and small guns; and (3) as an area containing specific military installations. The night raid by the RAF Bomber Command was intended to devastate the city area itself and thereby choke communications within the city and disrupt the normal civilian life upon which the larger communications activities and the manufacturing enterprises of the city depended. Further, the widespread area raid conducted by the British entailed bombing strikes against the many industrial plants throughout the city which were thus to be construed as specific targets within the larger pattern of the area raid.44 The Eighth Air Force raids, which were by daylight and followed, on the 14th and 15th February, the night raid of the British (13/14 February), were directed against rail activities in the city.45