What Firefly is getting at is that he doesn’t understand how the age of the soldier is an issue? If we assume a British soldier was pretty well equipped, well trained and prepared, well led and looked after then the average Argentine conscript was ill equipped (on some key points), hardly trained and prepared and led by what can only be described as bullies.
Bearing in mind the situation when the last Royals were captured in the invasion. Three Royal Marines were roughed up by some Argentines who thought they were nails, yet in June when the same Marines saw the same Argentines in the reversed roles, the Argentines bricked it.
And of course the mad desire of the Argentine officers to hold on to their side arms in the POW pens for protection against their own men. Lovely, what a professional army.
I’ll answer the questions on the force build up in the Falklands.
The Junta believed that the British wouldn’t sail down as fast as they did, and the THREE naval groups (two of whom were based around Belgrano and the Mayo de 25) would smash up the fleet on the way down. This was what the carrier was aiming to do, and made attempts to launch aircraft. The Belgrano had this aim also.
They hoped that the British would not come so quickly, forceing them to endure a horrendous passage through the Atlantic or a longer passage that would take them through the Pacific (can’t see this one but hey).
The whole Argentine plan was built around bluster and bluff to get its way to a diplomatic settlement. (Hoping the 9/10s of the law of possesion theory would hold water in the UN).
Unfortuantely, the Junta weren’t that bright, certainly in the world politics scheme of things. They thought they would be seen as victors by all of South America, however Chile (and others) used this time to rattle their own sabres (particularly Chile) in order to further their own aims. The Junta also didn’t realise that world opinion would be pretty much against them.
With Chile flexing her muscles, and a small disturbance in Argentina itself the bulk of the “good” forces were removed (some as scheduled at the end of Rosario, others not so and others not sent in the first place) and replaced with a conscript garrison. After all the Navy would protect the Islands… (wah wah ooops!!!).
With Belgrano safely berthed in Davey Jones’ locker and the Argentine Navy pulling their boats on to the shore, the Falklands garrison was set for a battle with the varsity.
British troops, well blooded, well equipped, well trained and well p1ssed off that someone had had the gaul to lower the Union Flag without the Queens consent were en route.
With the Argie Navy hiding on the mainland, the Air Force operating (heroically I might add) at the very limits of their endurance, the conscripts were not ready for the fight. They thought they would be seen as heros by the Islanders, and many were not told that the Brits were en route to take the Islands back.
Due to the Chile bit, no mountain troops were available, no Parachute Bde either. Only 1 fifth of the countries Marines (who were better trained) were sent and the Army units that were sent were from Buenos Aires and Tropical areas (they were not accliamatised or trained for the Falklands terraign and weather).
As a guess, the number of conscripts on the Islands would have been around +/- 60 - 70% of the Army units. The Marines, IIRC, had a lower percentage of conscripts, and a better class of conscript too.
The rest is history.
