I appreciate that in general terms the Australian example was inspiring, but I was talking about the tactical lessons of the use of armour against the Japanese, rather than more general terms of inspiration. Slim was already implementing tactical reform long before 1944 and even before the Australians defeated the Japanese in PNG (which seems to be what was suggested by the original quotation).
Fair enough.
I misunderstood you to be saying that Slim wasn’t aware of the PNG campaign.
I agree that in general armour wasn’t a major factor in Australian or Allied, because the Americans were heavily involved there from 1943 onwards, activities in PNG.
The 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also used Lanchesters, to some effect, as they retreated down the Malay peninnsular. They were eventually defeated by japanese armour, but only after they hadd done much to delay and confuse the Japanesee advance.
Quite possibly. I really have no idea. What do you think?
Slim was advocating decisive masses of armour when he commanded I Burma Corps in 1942
Yes, but the reality of the logisitics and supply situation at that time…
Slim had hoped to annihilate his opponents on the Schwebo Plain (catching the Japanese with their backs to Irrawaddy River), where he could have used his armour to greatest effect in a battle of maneuver. However, Kimura wasn’t playing the game and crossed the Irrawaddy to defend its eastern bank. So the British and Imperial troops were forced to continue to use tanks mainly in Troop and Squadron formations to spearhead their attacks. Even with this setback to his plans, Slim fought what is considered his definitive battle with the crossing of the Irrawaddy and the taking of Meiktila.
The events referred to are 1944 and not 1942.
However, following on from that passage… Having been denied the chance to destroy the Japanese west of the Irrawaddy and having then crossed the river himself (building the longest Bailey Bridge in the world to that date, despite the logistical issues), Slim sent his armour to ‘blitzkrieg’ their way across the Burmese Dry Belt to Meiktila - the strategic heart of the country. There they fought a superb defensive battle of interior lines - using decisive masses of armour with mobile columns of infantry and artillery that would strike out from the city to defeat attacking Japanese columns in isolation and in detail.
I would hazard that anyone with just a passing interest in this theatre would be aware of the dates.
However, following on from that passage…
Which passage?
Having been denied the chance to destroy the Japanese west of the Irrawaddy and having then crossed the river himself (building the longest Bailey Bridge in the world to that date, despite the logistical issues), Slim sent his armour to ‘blitzkrieg’ their way across the Burmese Dry Belt to Meiktila - the strategic heart of the country. There they fought a superb defensive battle of interior lines - using decisive masses of armour with mobile columns of infantry and artillery that would strike out from the city to defeat attacking Japanese columns in isolation and in detail.
It all sounds very sensational. Could you supply a more detaled description of unit strength (perhaps from regimental histories), numbers and formations of tanks and infantry troops etc. that were involved in these actions?
I agree. In that case, why did you reply to my comment regarding the situation in 1942 with a quote referring to 1944?
Which passage
I was referring to the last passage you quoted from - re Slim’s attempt to trap the Japanese in the Shwebo Plain and the subsequent assault crossing of the Irrawaddy.
It all sounds very sensational. Could you supply a more detaled description of unit strength (perhaps from regimental histories), numbers and formations of tanks and infantry troops etc. that were involved in these actions?
Unfortunately I’m not aware of any published histories for the regiments involved and there is no published history for 17th Indian Division or 255th Indian Tank Brigade. However, the Indian Armoured Corps History covers the actions of the 5th (Probyn’s) Horse, 9th (Royal Deccan) Horse and 16th )PAVO) Light Cavalry pretty well and the war diary for 9th Borders and its actions at Pyawbwe and Wetlet, south of Meiktila, as well as the usual sources for the campaign - Slim, Woodburn-Kirby, Allen, etc.
After a complex deception plan, involving the switching of IV Corps from the left to the right flank, plus various feints by XXXIII Corps on the Irrawaddy north and south of Mandalay and a faked withdrawal by 28 East African Brigade, sufficient Japanese forces had been drawn away from the Meiktila area for IV Corps to launch an assault crossing of the Irrawaddy. 7th Indian Division conducted the assault crossing on 14 Feb 45 and the elements of 255 Indian Tank Brigade were also across by the end of the first day.
17 Indian Division (less 99 Brigade) followed - their mission was to break out and drive for Meiktila - 81 miles/132km distant. 17 Division was split into three columns - ‘Tomforce’ was the divisional recce force, being formed from the armoured cars of 16th (PAVO) LC, the divisional reconnaissance battalion (motorised infantry) and other divisional elements. 63 Brigade would meanwhile take the southern route, supported by Shermans Probyn’s Horse, while 48 Brigade would take the northern route, supported by the Shermans of the Royal Deccan Horse. 99 Brigade meanwhile was standing by, waiting to be airlifted into Meiktila.
Gotta go, sorry…
I think we’re confusing each other here. My point was that in 1942 the situation with Imperial Forces in Burma was such that any discussion of armour at the time was academic.
It would have been difficult for anyone with a modicum of intelligence not to be impressed by the way the Germans had stormed across Europe and, therefore not be speaking of it in 1942.
To be fair, Slim was the type of general who would have more than likely been studying the modern concepts of armoured warfare back in the thirties if not before.
Slim looked for inspiration from every quarter and I think it more than probable that he had found some inspiration in the Australian use of armour in PNG however small the actions in which they partook.
I was referring to the last passage you quoted from - re Slim’s attempt to trap the Japanese in the Shwebo Plain and the subsequent assault crossing of the Irrawaddy.
Those were my own comments, not a passage I was quoting.
Unfortunately I’m not aware of any published histories for the regiments involved and there is no published history for 17th Indian Division or 255th Indian Tank Brigade. However, the Indian Armoured Corps History covers the actions of the 5th (Probyn’s) Horse, 9th (Royal Deccan) Horse and 16th )PAVO) Light Cavalry pretty well and the war diary for 9th Borders and its actions at Pyawbwe and Wetlet, south of Meiktila, as well as the usual sources for the campaign - Slim, Woodburn-Kirby, Allen, etc.
Some of the ‘grass roots’ histories can be equally benficial. If you have not read it (as I appreciate you are well read ;)), try George McDonald Fraser
The Little Men is also very good
http://www.library.southlanarkshire.gov.uk/02_Catalogue/02_005_TitleInformation.aspx?searchTerm=Little+men&searchTerm2=&searchType=1&media=3&branch=&authority=&language=&junior=&fr=tl&rcn=070904710X
As is The Relutant major
There have been many others.
By the way, all British regiments keep regimental histories. I don’t know where youare based, but the reading room of the National Army Museum is a good source for practically all of them including disbanded regiments.
So far as the defence of Milne Bay is concerned, he would have drawn much more from it about air cooperation with land forces as there wasn’t any Allied armour there.
The Japanese landed some tanks, which did better than the defenders expected in the boggy ground, but they were eventually stopped by anti-tank ground forces.
However, air support was critical to the success of the Allies.
What was also critical to the Allied victory was that the battles were fought on a narrow strip between the sea and more or less sheer mountains, which resulted in the Australian ground forces fighting the Japanese on a generally limited front which deprived the Japanese of the advantage of their flanking and infiltration tactics which had been so successful elsewhere.
I don’t know enough about Slim’s thinking on this but there is a potential connection with his boxes in Burma where the defenders stood their ground supported by air, and armour when possible.
Slim’s inspiration for the boxes came from a Chinese general I forget his name, but Slim remarked that he was the only general he had met who had beaten the Japanese in battle. He asked the general how best to beat them and he recommended standing his ground and allow the japanese to waste themselves against the defences. Naturally, to do this in the jungles of South East Asia one would have to use the box system or something of the like. I think this fella recommended this but am not absolutely certain without looking it up.
I have a book, somewhere(?), with the Australians using Valentines in PNG. Will have a shufti this evening and see if I can find it.
Thanks for the info on the air thingie.
Slim:
In Maymyo, I had talks with many staff officers, often old friends with whom I had served in years gone by, and attended several conferences, including one Chinese general who had played a great part in the only real victory the Chinese had won against the Japanese up to that time - Changsha. I drew him on one side and listened very carefully, through an interpreter, to his account of the tactics of the battle. His experience was that the Japanese, confident in their own prowess, frequently attacked on a very small administrative margin of safety. He estimated that a Japanese force would usually not have more than nine days’ supplies available. If you could hold the Japanese for that time, prevent them from capturing your supplies, and then counte-attack them, you wold destroy them. I listened to him with interest - after all he was the only Allied commander I had heard of who had defeated the Japanese in even one battle. There were, of course, certain snags in the application of this theory, but I thought its main principles sound. I remebered it and, later, acted upon it.
Arguably, the main snag, of course, at the time, was the inability to resupply his own forces. As we know, this situation changed dramaticaly with the increase in both supplies and available aircraft to deliver them. When we speak of air supply, one cannot discount the influence and inspiration of Wingate in pioneering its use in Burma.
Thanks for the info on the box thingie.
In a way it doesn’t surprise me that the Japanese would have limited supplies for an attack against the Chinese as there was an element of “crash through or crash” in their thinking and tactics which expected quick results and was supplied accordingly, so they didn’t cope too well when they were severely stalled, as happened in the Philippines on a much larger scale after Manila. Not that failing to cope with being severely stalled was peculiar to the Japanese.
Here’s a very concise description of the air thingie in the general context of Milne Bay. http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/30017f4131c6b2acca256cfb0023646c/0fe6f2051919772aca256f500079c1c4?OpenDocument
User opinion on the Kittyhawks at Milne Bay. http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/asfaras/polly.html
Japanese troops pressed an airfield at Milne Bay to the extent that RAAF planes taking off were firing into Japanese positions at the end of the airfield almost before they were airborne., and receiving fire from those positions at the same time.
The CO of 76 Squadron, Bluey Truscott http://www.awm.gov.au/people/329.asp refused to obey an order to evacuate his squadron’s planes from Milne Bay at a critical point as he felt the Australian diggers, and American engineers, would feel they were being deserted. In doing so he put the precious planes at risk. This raises a nice question of whether it was an inspirational morale-boosting (or maintaining) piece of defiance or an ill-considered decision which threatened the future of the Allied air support at a critical point. Here is the view of one his pilots at p. 352 http://books.google.com.au/books?id=oWx1oq8RPcQC&pg=PA352&lpg=PA352&dq=brune+“a+bastard+of+a+place”+truscott&source=bl&ots=l6r624DZzm&sig=Y0cXVpQWrjvv2EHnVrSXIohsIN0&hl=en&ei=gleOS73HAdCHkAXcnL3_DA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=&f=false
I think this might have been what I was getting at (I haven’t found my book as yet). It would seem my tank identification isn’t very good. 
These forces were lacking in heavy anti-tank guns and the Matilda remained in service with several Australian regiments in the Australian 4th Armoured Brigade.
The Australian 4th Armoured Brigade was formed in January 1943 to provide armoured support for Australian Army units operating in the South West Pacific Area. The Brigade was never intended to serve as a single formation, rather its role was to provide a pool of armoured units from which units and…
, in the South West Pacific Area.
South West Pacific Area was the name given to the Allied supreme military command in the South West Pacific Theatre of World War II. It was one of four major Allied commands in the Pacific theatres of World War II, during 1942-45…
. They first saw active service in the Huon Peninsula.
Huon Peninsula is a large peninsula in Morobe Province, eastern Papua New Guinea, at . It is named after French explorer Jean-Michel Huon de Kermadec… campaign in October 1943. Matilda II tanks remained in action until the last day of the war in the Wewak, Bougainville and Borneo
A Matilda tank of “C” Squadron, 1st Tank Battalion, moves off an LCM, Launch Jetty, 8 November 1943. Altogether nine of “C” Squadron’s tanks were brought forward to support an assault by the Australian 26th Brigade against the Japanese defences around Sattelberg Mountain. For five days (17-21 November) the Australians fought a vicious close-quarters battle against elements of the Japanese 80th Infantry Regiment. Although the Australians made significant gains during this operation the Japanese still held the Sattelberg at its end.
http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/Web-Printer/DCC89A53B99FB911CA256CB80026E162?OpenDocument
Thanks for this. Interesting stuff.
I can confirm the point about 37mm and 40mm being completly incompatible. The 37mm had a necked case, the 40mm 2 pr didn’t. Not only would obturation have been impossible, but a 37mm would have just bounced around in a 2pr breech.
I did read somewhere, I think in Slim, that the Grant was popular in Burma. The 75mm gave good bunker busting rounds (AP followed by HE) and the 37mm had a cannister round, which the 75mm didn’t. For bunker busting, you usually just trundle up to the bunker, so traverse isn’t all that important. In thick jungle, the 37mm on top, with its relatively short barrel was easier to traverse - although a Sherman 75mm would have had less problems then a modern long tank gun
The Grant, while very deficient against German armor, was ideally suited for infantry support against enemy infantry and battlefield fortifications…
Providing - in Burma, with its nullahs, that is - there was recconnaicanse…
There were incidences in Burma of them leading attacks on villages, but being bogged down by driving into steep-sided nullahs and being unable to climb out. Working in samll troop detachments of three or four, each of them could become trapped.
They were, heowever, very good at bunker busting. As we know, the Japanese were excellent at cutting and blocking roads with bunkers and the tanks were the best weapon against this. Infantry were anihilated again and again when attempting to storm the bunkers without the tanks.