Burma - The Longest War 1941 - 1939

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#21

The explanation of the Japanese soldier’s astonishing jungle mobility was really very simple. His primitive supply system was used almost exclusively on ammunition. He carried one or two days’ marching rations but, beyond these, he was expected to feed himself from captured supplies. This was all very well while he was advancing continuously, as he had been in Malaya and Burma during the first year of the war, but if his opponents did not retreat he would go hungry unless he withdrew; and since withdrawal involved loss of face*, the ultimate consequence would be starvation. Thus what had been a great source of strength against enemies who thought in terms of a conventional, logistic system would become a fatal weakness if employed against those who stood fast and were supplied by air.

The second British Arakan offensive was mounted XV Corps, consisting of the 5th Indian Division, 7th Indian Division, two brigades of 81st West African Division, with 26th Indian Division in reserve. The 25th Dragoons equipped with Lee tanks was also available. The 5th Indian Division was to advance on the coastal sector while 7th Indian Division conformed beyond the range, the left flank being guarded by the West African brigades.

Maungdaw was captured by the 5th Indian Division on 9 January, but further progress to the south was halted by an extremely strong defensive position at Razabil. The 25 Dragoons were called forward and quickly developed a technique for dealing with the enemy bunkers. After some progress had been made, however, the tanks were held up by soft going and coastal ‘chaungs’ which run between banks twenty feet in height.

It was now becoming apparent that the Japanese were pouring reinforcement into the Arakan and that these would probably be employed in a counter-offensive east of the Mayu range.

  • ‘Face’ as described by Bill Slim when speaking of the Chinese :

The most impotant thing to a Chinaman was ‘face’. I suppose ‘face’ might be defined as the respect in which one Chinaman is held by others. In practice, if a proposal can be put to a Chinaman so that carrying it out will enhance his prestige among his associates he will almost invariably accept it. Whatever ‘face’ is , and however annoying its repercussions may be to an Occidental, it is well to remember it is a very human thing. The Chinese are not the only people who bother about what the neighbours think."

"

#22

But not alone.

#23

Click on the link below to be taken to an animated map of the campaign.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/launch_ani_burma_campaign.shtml

#24

Having made a huge leap forward, and not having described the British fighting retreat through Burma to the Indian frontier, it might help readers understanding if the situation from the Japanese perspective is explained a little here.

The two sides had been more or less content to keep the status quo with the Japanese controlling Burma and thus protecting their north western flank, and the British, fighting a war on several fronts, not least in North Africa and the Mediterranean.
The British, in this theatre had, potentially, a wealth of manpower from India, but it was up until the end of 1943 terribly short of material, as reflected by the description of the air operations by the RAF.

During February through to May 1943 the Japanese had been surprised by the first Chindit (Wingate) expedition, ‘Operation Longcloth’ (The Chindit operations, I believe, are worthy of a separate thread). The Japanese had, until then, believed that the jungle, covered, razor-backed mountains which protected the Indian frontier to be impenetrable. The Chindits sallied out and operated in and through the region, deep behind the Japanese lines. One of the main benefits to the British was the experience gained by the RAF in re-supplying the forces by airlift. This would have particular consequences for the defence of the ‘Admin Box’ and the later battles of Imphal and Kohima.

There was one person on whom the first Wingate expedition made a massive impression. That was Lt-General Mutaguchi Renya, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 18 Division Northern Burma. Mutaguchi despised the British Army. His Division had fought and defeated them in Singapore. Now here they were, breaking into his own backyard, making their way in along routes he had already decided were impossible.

#25

When the Japanese completed their occupation of Burma in the summer of 1942, a colonel on General Terachi’s Southern Army staff, Colonel Hyashi Akira, thought the Japanese should not halt, but follow through into Assam and take Dimapur and Tinsukia. Imperial General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo was consulted, and ‘Operation 21’ was devised, in which a force of two divisions would approach India through the Hukawang Valley in northernmost Burma, another two divisions would take Imphal, the capital of the Manipur State, and a third force, one division only, would move along the shores of the Bay of Bengal to take Chittagong.

There would have been little to stop the Japanese if they had carried out Operation 21. But it was regarded as positively dangerous, or at any rate importune, by a vigorous and influential figure, Major Fujiwara Iwaichi. Fujiwara had personally raised an anti-British force – the Azad Hind Fauj or Indian National Army – from among the thousands of prisoners captured in Malaya and Singapore, and from his contacts with Indians in South East Asia he judged that Ghandi and Nehru would oppose an invasion by the Japanese.

At first, when Wingate conducted his Longcloth Expedition, Mutaguchi could not understand Wingate’s intentions. One thing he did not consider – was it a preparation for a much larger campaign later? Mutaguchi also discarded Fujiwara’s interpretation, namely that Wingate’s adventure indicated a new strength in the British Army. Fujiwara had, on elephant-back, gone around the expedition’s tracks and picked up prisoners. They did not know much, but the name Wingate cropped up again and again.

Fujiwara was forty days on Wingate’s tracks, from April to the beginning of May 1943, he took a total of 360 prisoners.

Mutaguchi’s puzzlement did not disguise the major impact upon him of this intelligence. Contrary to what he had supposed, a large force could cross the hills separating India from Burma. If the British could do it, then he, Mutaguchi, who had thrashed the British in Singapore and Burma, could certainly do it.

As regimental commander in China at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident near Peking in 1937, Mutaguchi believed he had sparked off the war in China which led, ultimately, to Pearl Harbour and the Pacific War. As divisional commander of 18 Division he had taken part in the conquest of Malaya from the British and been a major element in the surrender of Singapore. That was his second triumph. The third, crowning them all, would be the wresting of India from the British Empire.

“ I started off the Marco Polo Incident, which broadened out into the China Incident. And then expanded, until it turned into the Great East Asia War. If I push into India now, by my own efforts, and can exercise a decisive influence on the Great East Asia War, I, who was the remote cause of the outbreak of this great war, will have justified myself in the eyes of our nation.”

Source: L Allen – Inparu Sakusen

#26

Mutugachi began to preach the invasion of India to all and sundry, including the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of Burma Area Army, Lieutenant General Kawabe Masazu. On 22 March 1943, Kawabe met with Japanese Prime Minister, and War Minister, Tojo. After preaching the message to Tojo, and the head of Burmese Provincial Government, Dr Ba Maw, Tojo told him “The measures we take in Burma are really the first steps in our policy towards India. I’d like to stress that our main objective lies there, in India.”

Bill Slim, also, was planning an offensive for the XIV Army. He knew there was no point in trying to break up a Japanese offensive during its preparation, as he would be extending his communications over hundreds of miles across impossible country. His plan was to draw in his horns. He pulled in his outlying divisions, then in contact with the Japanese at various points along the Burmese perimeter and concentrate them on the Imphal Plain. Almost certain that the Japanese would pursue him there; he would draw them into a situation where there lines of communication were intolerably overstretched. Slim wanted to win a battle before he entered Burma. Then he would take the offensive and destroy the much reduced Japanese forces. For both the British and Japanese, Imphal was to be the killing ground.

The Imphal operation was to be named U-GO (Operation C) by the Japanese. The Arakan was nothing more than a sideshow, but the threat against British positions there would distract attention from the Imphal front and, with luck, keep the British divisions then in the Arakan, away from the central area of operations against Imphal.
The Arakan operation was named HA-GO (Operation Z). It was timed to begin on the 4 February 1944.

#27

As it became more and more apparent that the Japanese were pouring reinforcements into the Arakan and that these would probably be employed in a counter offensive east of the Mayu range. Christison, commander of the British XV Corps ordered the re-deployment of his tanks to support the 7th Indian Division who were executing a wide turning movement intended to cut the enemy’s lines of communications. Brigadier Evans’ 9th Indian Infanrty Brigade was tasked with relieving the right hand brigade of 7th Indian Division. Having done so, they settled into their position they were given the additional task of providing security for the 7th Division’s Admin Box, containing the divisional service units, lying some three miles behind them at the eastern exit from the Ngakyedauke Pass.

Meanwhile the Japanese were busy preparing a counter-stroke of their own. They had available the crack 55th Division, heavily reinforced with troops of equal quality, and their commander, Lt General Hanaya, planned to repeat the tactics which had proved so successful against the British the previous year. This time, however, his counter offensive, HA-GO, was much larger in its overall concept, which envisaged capturing the vital port of Chittagong. During Major General Sakuri’s (commander of 55th Division) advance he would capture the Ngakyedauk Pass and 7th Division’s Admin Box, crucial to his supply. It was expected that the two Indian Divisions of XV Corps would instinctively try to fight their way out, being severely mauled in the process and the West Africans, being isolated, would be forced to conform.

Whatever the faulty premises on which HA-GO was concieved, it achieved complete surprise. As a part of large scale Japanese movements, the HQ of 7th Division was attacked at 06.00hrs on 5th February. Major-General Messervy, his staff and those of the HQ personnel as could, made their way in small parties through the jungle to the Admin Box a mile or so distant, where the 25th Dragoons gave Messervy a radio set which enabled him to re-establish contact with his outlying brigades. Two of the Dragoons’ squadrons went to work providing crucial cover for the troops converging on the ’Box’ along the road between that and the, now over-run, Divisional HQ.

#28

Slim has summed up the essence of jungle fighting.

Australia became proficient in that area, after a lot of pain.

The main thing that was drummed into us during the Vietnam era was the virtue of aggressive patrolling and related tactics. No disrepect to the Americans, but they had a different conception of head-on battles based on larger units and heavy firepower supported by endless supply from land and air, with air and arty support. As a smaller nation with fewer resources, we worked on keeping off the obvious trails and ambushing the enemy with small units (at times down to section = roughly 10 - 12 men) and constantly denying the enemy ground by popping up all over the place and killing them on their trails. The result was that the VC and NVA learnt to avoid Australian areas and go through American areas, which were geared to bigger confrontations and didn’t patrol aggressively.

But in WWII we were learning those skills at high cost, as were Slim’s men and all the other Allies fighting the Japanese.

You wouldn’t get a better, shorter, and more enduring statement of jungle fighting than Slim’s.

Nor a better summary of basic Japanese tactics in the offensive phase in 1941-42.

(v)There should rarely be frontal attacks and never frontal attacks on narrow fronts. Attacks should follow hooks and come in from the flank or rear, while pressure holds the enemy in front.

#29

Yes, Slim’s description of jungle warfare tactics, were very much the tenets of the JWS in Johore (not the Sky Bar).

The tactics carried forward from both theatres of operations to the way the Vietnam War and other post-war, jungle campaigns were fought very much reflect the difference between the Pacific and South East Asia campaigns of WW2 and the way in which they were conducted.

#30

I’m not sure if I’m on the same wavelength, but I think you’re pointing to the difference between the amphibious landings, predominantly USMC, in the central Pacific and their grinding but relatively short large force campaigns compared with the much longer but, at times, even more grinding and smaller force campaigns in places like New Guinea and Burma?

#31

Pretty much. A predominant feature of the US advance accross the Pacific Islands, was one in which the Japanese were fighting a more defensive campaign. The U.S. Forces attacked with massive, overwhelming fire support. They were able to do this as the enemy were contained in a limited area and, quite frequently, underground.

The Burma Campaign, on the other hand, was more fluid as the distances were much vaster and offered both sides more opportunity to maneouvre. As was, I believe, though my knowledge of it is rather limited, the campaign in New Guinea.

#32

Wingate’s death in that crash was undoubtedly one of the greatest Allied losses of the War. A uniquely brilliant soul…

#33

Yes, at one point, Churchill had wanted to give him command of the XIV Army. Wavell had wanted to give him command of the Chinese Army in Burma, but Chiang Kai Shek opted for ‘Vinegar’ Joe Stilwell.

#34

When Messervy was attacked in his divisional HQ, he had attempted to rally his HQ staff and put up a fight. The intention being to practise what he preached i.e. forming a defensive perimeteer and hanging on to it. He was attacked by the Japanese battalion signallers from their divisional HQ in, what was for them, desperation, as their colours and escort (about sixty men had rushed forward into the attack. Messervey was unable to hold on, and as he beat a rather ‘speedo’ retreat, he lost his hat. One of the attacking Japanese found the hat and placed it on his own head and continued to wear it, earning himself the nickname Shogun (General) among his comrades (which serves to illustrate that all armies have their ‘characters’). Shogun, was later killed (in an action to be described), and the hat, once liberated, was returned to its rightful owner.

#35

Pretty much the same in New Guinea, but without the added burden of the China Road issues and against Japanese forces which were more isolated and further along their lines of supply than in Burma.

New Guinea was a war of attrition with slow, grinding advances from 1942 to 1944, conducted on the ground mainly by Australian land forces with varying degrees of assistance from all services of the US. MacArthur was building up his land forces in this period and unleashed them in 1944, when the campaign became one of rapid manouevre and, compared with the previous couple of years, huge advances along the north coast as he moved towards the Philippines.

#36

The Admin Box was an area of flat, open ground roughly 1200 meters square, surrounded on all sides by hills and jungle. It contained most of the first-line and all second-line transport for the 7th Division, which was operating on an animal transport basis (Mules; which had their vocal chords removed in order to be silent in tactical situations); the main dressing station (MDS); supply, ordnance, ammunition and engineer dumps stocked up with at least a month’s reserves; spare mules, provost, artillery of several descriptions, and much else. The units and sub-units defending manning the Box were in rough defensive positions. The manpower consisted largely of Indians so the ancillary services. They were armed and had been basically trained in the use of their weapons, but the most that could be expected of them was purely static defence; they were untried in battle and untrained in anything but simply firing from a trench.

The West Yorkshires (WY)were ordered to keep as large a reserve as possible so, therefore, only C Company under Captain Roche had a static role, to hold a vital position on high ground immediately north of the entrance to the Ngakyedauk Pass. The remaining Companies were kept as a strike force together with the ‘Lee’ tanks of the Dragoons. It was clear that Brigadier Evans had his work cut-out .The Dragoon’s Lees would prove a major factor, but they, for now, presented another headache as they too had their limitations; they could capture ground, but they could not hold on to it; they were completely blind after dusk and were most at risk then from the enemy’s tank-hunting parties. The only professional infantry present were the three WY companies. And the Japanese commander Tokuta’s favourite tactic was the night raid.

Shortly after dusk on the first night, the Japanese launched their first attack. Approaching under the cover of a ravine, they assaulted the MDS, guarded by a single infantry section (squad - to our American friends) and some twenty walking wounded. After a somewhat ferocious, but brief, battle, the Japanese overwhelmed the defenders and, in the comparative quiet which followed, the screams of the patients and medical staff could be heard as they were shot and bayoneted. Forty or so, were killed in this way, while some having been tied together, were dragged off into the jungle and shot. Some of the patients and the medical officer managed to escape, and from them the defenders learned the details of the massacre.

#37

For the Japanese, the barbaric massacre at the MDS was counter-productive, generating as it did a profound revulsion throughout Burma. British and Indian troops retained few illusions about their opponents, but they had respected them as soldiers. Now, they saw them merely as dangerous animals, to be exterminated with every means at their disposal. In the shorter term, it put an edge on the determination of Evans’ men to resist, and it proved that in close-quarter battle (CQB) their enemies were not supermen at all.

As ‘A’ Company battled with the Japanese, ‘B’ Echelon area, at the southern end of the perimeter, was probed by a 60-strong party of Japanese who were driven off by the fire of a mule company. This was considered to be the precursor of a heavier attack and, shortly after, a large column was observed making its way along a [i]‘nullah’ /i which ran below the positions held by the WY’s Orderly Room staff, Sanitation Section and other personnel belonging to the battalion’s HQ and Admin Companies, under the command of Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) Maloney.

The RSM had plenty of grenades and he detailed some of his men as throwers while others were to pull out the pins for them. Volleys of grenades burst around the startled column of Japanese, followed by rapid rifle and automatic fire. In a slaughter lasting ten minutes, 110 Japanese were killed, 45 of them in an area of forty yards, as they tried to scramble up one or other of the banks of the nullah (it was here that the body of the aforementioned ‘Shogun’ was discovered and Messervy’s hat was retrieved). A Japanese officer, frantic for revenge , slashed at the Orderly Room sergeant with his sword, but the latter caught the blow on his rifle and, with the assistance of his corporal, bayoneted the man.

A Japanese prisoner was taken in this action, and because he had allowed himself to be taken alive and had, in consequence, automatically become an outcast among his people, he was willing to talk freely. Also, the detailed plans for Hanya’s ‘Ha-Go’ offensive were found on an officer’s body. The orders contained specific references to the Admin Box, which was to be attacked with “fanatical fury” as a means of securing the accumulated supplies within…And so it began!

#38

The island campiagns in the pacific did not involve clashes with really enormous numbers of troops. I imagine people might not have been so interested in battles of smaller scale.

#39

A friend of mine who served on a British carrier in the Pacific (as an Avenger pilot), once told me that he had the greatest respect for the the marines of the USMC, who displayed great courage and tenacity during their island hopping campaign. Theirs was a great effort, sacrifice and contribution and ought not be trivialised.

#40

Within the captured orders was a map showing rendezvous (RV) points where the Japanese were to form up before attacking the Box. One of these RV’s was a bend in the nullah/chaung that the aforementioned force had been massacred in. Demonstrating a slavish rigidity to their orders, the Japanese returned to this point again and again despite their being repeatedly massacred. At one point the nullah became jammed with decaying bodies, so much so, that the British sent in a bulldozer to clear it.

In contrast to that relatively inexpensive encounter (for the British), other infantry combat was fierce, hard-fought and ruthless. A Japanese medical officer looking over the types of wound suffered by men of 112 Infantry Regiment noticed that they were chiefly bullet wounds and stab wounds from bayonets, indicating the ferocity of CQB fighting. The Japanese were stoical about the results of this, as about much else. A tough and robust sergeant was taken prisoner during the siege with a bullet wound in his left shoulder. When the British medical officer came to examine it, he saw the wound was crawling with maggots. The Japanese sergeant was totally unconcerned (probably because the maggots would clean the wound).