Why would Japan do that? Where is the strategic benefit to Japan? How can Japan maintain an occupation in those places and beat Britain when it has only enough oil for its fleet for perhaps a year?
Roosevelt appears to have been under the misapprehension that it would help America to win the war. Had he had your clearsightedness, he could have just told the American public to absorb Pearl Harbor and wait for Japan to exhaust itself fighting the British. Oh, that’s right, Japan would have defeated the British in no time and held territory all the way to Aden. What on earth are you trying to demonstrate with your inconsistent assertions?
As for your arithmetic, you choose to add in numbers to Britain which are irrelevant to lend lease and leave out the additional forces supporting the Nazis in Europe and the Mediterranean, not to mention the Japanese.
A good yarn, one must admit Samjok, but citations of source authority would go a long way to making this more worth reading. Flights of fancy, and wishing it were so,according to your own personal ist’s, or ism’s may find eager acceptance on a site for prospective fiction writers, but do fall a bit flat on a factual history site.
The Red Sea was irrelevant to India, since the Mediterranean was already closed to Allied convoys (see the losses taken in getting convoys through to Malta from either direction). Supplies to India went around the Cape of Good Hope and up the Indian Ocean. Supplies to North Africa went via Suez however, and if possible (see below) it might have made a difference there.
Now for taking Ceylon, let alone Madagascar or Aden - have you ever looked at a map? Osaka to Trincomalee is over 4,000 nautical miles, with the route passing through a whole load of allied-controlled territory that had to be taken before the Navy could safely get down there. Aden is over 6,000 NM (a two month round trip for an invasion convoy) and Diego Suarez (Madagascar) is about the same distance. The longest seabourne invasion in history (parts of Operation Torch - most of the troops and naval escort were actually basing out of the UK) was just over 3,000 miles, and were supposedly making unopposed landings. To carry out an opposed landing at twice that distance with hostile territory all the way through (unlike Torch, where the Atlantic was under Allied control) is just ridiculous.
I have posted evidence that refutes your wild claims. Each time you then go on another wild claim without posting anything (even a book) that can be checked.
Whenever I ask for you to do some of the work and answer a specific question I get answered with yet more claims or rhetoric. Please will you answer a simple one like how many ships were lost at Dunkirk and since you wish to add the damaged that would be nice as I already have the answers including the names, classes and damaged by what (I already told you that the RN pulled its more modern destroyers out of that action due to loss and I meant that as damaged as well as sunk, most damaged ships were back in action shortly after Dunkirk)
I managed to provide you with a list of all Aircraft carrying ships sunk, where, when and how to refute your claim that loads were sunk by Italian and German aircraft.
There was an agreement to leave Iran six months after hostilities ended, Britain did but Stalin only did so after Pressure from the US.
The rantings aren’t the problem. The use of unsupported facts and figures are.
Hitler had an uncanny ability to draw the wrong conclusions. The fall of Crete at the cost of a few thousand paratroopers impressed the British and Americans so much that they developed large airborne forces. The heavy German paratrooper losses were more because of the primitive, unsteerable parachute with only one strap and because the troopers landed hundreds of meters away from their weapons, which were enclosed in containers and the unarmed troopers were extremely vulnerable while fetching their weapons. Losing a few thousand men while capturing a valuable island is immensely more justifiable than loosing tens or hundreds of thousands while loosing territory and evacuating. Had Hitler used paratroopers to capture some of the Soviet airfields 50 km behind the front in Barbarossa, it would have been extremely helpful.
The canisters were a problem. But the main problem was the poor planning, intelligence, and operational arrogance. Had the Allies better, centralized command and control, they almost certainly would have defeated the invasion. Fifty kilometers was almost nothing in the opening days of Barbarossa and the Wehrmacht overran airfields and largely destroyed much of the Red Air-forces on the ground anyways. And the U.S. Army had conducted successful–albeit small scale–airborne operations in WWI and would have developed them with or without the Crete operations. The Fallschirmjäger were still put to good use in legendary defensive battles in Normandy, Italy, and the Eastern Front…
5 million Indian volunteers out of 378 million is a ridiculously tiny fraction of the potential in human and natural resources. Let me put it another way. Had the Japs attacked only the Brits and not the Americans in 41. Without massive American help (the American public would have gotten tired of providing enormous amounts of materiel without much chance of recooping as the British kept losing the world over and pressured Roosevelt to cancel lend-lease), and without diverting forces to the Philippines or Pearl Habor, the Japs could have easily captured Ceylon, Madagascar and Aden and closed the Red sea to Britain. the hundreds of millions of Indians could do almost nothing to defend themselves against Japan (even less than the Chinese).
Five million men was a huge contribution to an army that suffered chronic manpower shortages. And the United States never would have just stood by and watched the British possessions being usurped by a potentially dangerous enemy…
German production suffered mostly for lack of raw materials and inefficient slave labor, but production in 1942, 1943 and 44 is beyond impressive for the size of the country and population and being at war. They managed to fight the Soviets, British, Americans, free French, etc, with what they produced (including synthetic fuel), while the immense USSR and British empire relied on American fuel, trucks, planes, raw materials, food, etc, and many of the ships to transport them.
German production suffered from The Great Depression and the limitations imposed on it stemming from Versailles and the fact that Wehrmacht strategic planners had not anticipated war until later in the 1940s when they would be able to approach a strategic parity with their adversaries. German forces managed to hold out, but was still a rail-based army that used horse and oxen for logistical transport until the end of the war. The fact they held out so long is a testament to their generally excellent training, cohesion, and the fact that they were fighting a defensive battle after 1942. And while American production was one of the greatest single factors, one cannot ignore substantial British and Canadian production as well as the huge contributions of British science and technology including the breakthroughs at Bletchley Park, which no doubt shortened the War and reduced Allied casualties…
I never understood how could Roosevelt justify providing so much to 170 million Soviets swimming in resources and to more than 400 million British subjects also with lots of resources in order to fight 80 million Germans with very little oil from Romania, ores, etc, If these huge powers with more than 570 million and a great many times more resources than Germany could not defend themselves even fighting together, they did not deserve supplies.
Um, a huge oversimplification. The British not only had its empire to draw on, but had to extend resources to defend it as well. And as the axiom goes, “he who defends everywhere defends nowhere” (paraphrasing). The Soviets did have a huge bounty, but a good deal of that bounty was seized by the Germans in 1941-42 with largely the intent of competing with the resources and industry of the inevitable “Jewish-controlled” American enemy. Should America have hoarded its resources and production until after the defeat of the British and Soviets so that they could be used by the millions of Americans? Or was it better to support those already engaged?
Iran is peanuts compared to India, which did not contribute even what you consider a trite hundreds of thousands of submachine guns.
The size of guns does not make an island upon which they are emplaced a fortress.
Five 15” guns do not make their emplacement impregnable. Yamato and Mushashi each had nine 18” guns. It didn’t do them a lot of good.
The guns on Singapore were there to protect the naval base from naval attack.
The naval base was to be home to a main fleet.
In the event of war with Japan, Britain was to send a main fleet to Singapore.
No British fleet was based or sent there, before or after the declaration of war.
Australian defence policy had been based since 1923 on the ‘Fortress Singapore’ policy. That policy was destroyed by Churchill’s persistent refusal to send a fleet to Singapore up to, and after, December 1941.
So far as its intended purpose was concerned, Singapore was, before and after Japan attacked, just an empty naval base with a few big guns protecting a fleet which wasn’t there. That is a long way short of a fortress designed for or capable of resisting a land attack from the north.
Even if the coastal guns had been supplied with an infinite amount of HE, there is no reason to expect that the result in Singapore would have been any different. Just a bit later, at best.
Too many amateur historians focus too much, and to no purpose, on the coastal guns and too little upon the well-planned and well-executed Japanese landings on Singapore and the subsequent land battles which were carried out with the skill and determination which Japan had showed the whole way down Malaya.
Lousy planning by whom?
Did Percival request HE shells?
Which is exactly what would happen on a ‘fortress’ with five 15” guns designed and sited as coastal artillery to repel ships attacking a naval base.
So you don’t think that maintenance of civilian morale, which is what Percival was primarily concerned with in that respect, on a small island with a population of mixed ethnicities was important, particularly when a significant number of Chinese were there who were naturally, and correctly, scared of what would happen if the Japanese won?
No, the pumping stations which controlled the water supply were captured by the Japanese.
The British troops who had fought the Japanese the length of Malaya and on Singapore might object to your opinion that the capture was easy.
As for warehouses etc being captured before the surrender, I have no idea what you’re talking about.
Yes, it is absolutely ****ing astounding that, after long planning for D-Day, Texas as a ship assigned to fire its guns on land targets would have been equipped with suitable ammunition for that purpose while the guns on Singapore, after a couple of decades of planning and construction intending those guns to be only coastal artillery firing at ships would have been equipped with suitable ammunition for that purpose.
It’s not an excuse.
That’s the whole ****ing reason the ****ing guns were ****ing there!
Do all of us a favour and research before thinking, and think before posting.
Guess when the plans to instal the coastal artillery were made, and how long that was before there were British troops deployed to meet the threat of a Japanese attack?
Yes, and, absurdly, managed to do so for a couple of centuries, or longer if one goes back to the East India Company.
Support these assertions, please.
Ditto
Ditto
In which factories in which parts of India with what masses of industrially experienced labour and accessible to which ports and with what guarantees of arriving safely in England? And where would the materials formed into the necessary components have come from?
Anyway, isn’t it rather contradictory to complain that the British were exploiting Indians and not treating them as truly equal members of the Commonwealth and then follow that up with a complaint that Britain failed to exploit cheap Indian labour?
I think the Merlins in the Hurricanes were put to the best use possible, with or without Indian labour, but maybe you can see a way they could have been put to better use in that plane. Perhaps by installing them backwards, or upside down, or sideways? It’s difficult to think of other options.
But, surely, wouldn’t that be exploiting the Indian untermensch?
Aiding the USSR didn’t exactly help spawn democracy there, either.
Lend lease was a program to support a war effort, not to effect political change in Allied countries, dominions, and possessions.
Why?
How?
By when?
With what impact upon the common purpose?
Possible obstacles:
Could people who weren’t American citizens enlist in the US armed forces?
Given that the US did rather well in WWII with its own forces, did it need millions, or any lesser number, of Indians?
Did millions of Indians want to join the US armed forces?
Did the US have the capacity to train them, whether in India or America?
Given the, from the British viewpoint, treachery of some Indian elements in British service, such as the INA, and large elements in India demanding independence, would the Americans have wanted to take the risk when they could meet their needs from their own population?
Bit of a problem there.
The Americans and British were fighting to defeat the Axis powers, with Stalin’s lot being allied with the Americans and British.
I don’t think Stalin, who wasn’t noted for being tolerant of people opposed to him, would have responded too well to America guaranteeing the independence of India after defeating him. But that’s only my humble opinion. I’m sure you can, from your vast knowledge of the mistakes made by all leaders, commanders and everybody else (except you if you’d been in charge) during WWII, explain why Stalin would have welcomed such a guarantee.
I hadn’t realised that Burma was the only way of supplying China.
Neither, apparently, had the Chinese, who had some resources of their own.
This just gets better and better as we delve deeper and deeper into the realm of fantasy.
So now we have the US antagonising Britain by making it get out of India and recruiting a few hundred million Indian troops the US doesn’t need or want and, in many cases, can’t even talk to without translators and now we’re going to throw in a few hundred million Chinese the US doesn’t need or want and who also can’t talk to the Americans, or Indians, without translators. And this ignores the problems with the variety of languages in India and China where some people in those countries couldn’t understand each other.
Bring on the day when an Indian in the field calls a Chinese (or vice versa) at base for a fire mission which has to be approved by an American (or vice versa). If trying to talk in English to Indians in a modern day call centre is any guide, we are looking at an epic cluster ****. Let’s just hope it’s not a nuclear strike, or Guatemala or the Azores or somewhere off the map being looked at is seriously ****ed.
Why would the Germans and Soviets be exhausted by 1944 because there are millions of Indians, Chinese, British and Americans somewhere else?
Apart from, of course, through pissing themselves laughing at the polyglot force assembled by the Americans, who are by then bleeding themselves dry feeding and equipping hundreds of millions of troops from India and China which aren’t anywhere near where the action is and who can’t be taken there because America has exceeded its shipping and production capacities trying to supply them to no strategic or tactical purpose.
Umm, how does this get the Allies into Japan and Germany? Or is there a special door they can enter through ‘etc’?
Anyway, if Germany and the USSR have collapsed, why do the Allies (that is, the Allies other than the former Ally, the USSR) need to occupy them?
Exactly how do the non-Soviet Allies manage to occupy the USSR?
Oh, now I get it. With all the Chinese and Indian troops, and the inexhaustible resources of the US.
And what happens then?
And for how long?
Possibly, but on those criteria the largest contingent would probably be the Soviets.
Which sort of ****s up your plan.
Well, there was the odd instance of armed animosity in France and its environs before they got to that point.
Also, as I recall, the Soviets, being a bit pissed off from the ministrations of the Einsatzgruppen and sundry other Nazi atrocities, were coming in from the other side and frightening the living shit out of the Germans, many of whom wisely surrendered to the Americans.
Capturing Aden and Madagascar would have denied the British access to the Indian Ocean and the red sea and isolated east Africa, Singapore, India, Australia and the oil fields of Iraq and Iran. It would have also allowed the imperial army to attack Iraq and/or Iran, gaining access to a lot more oil than there was in Indonesia and Burma.
You seem to think that the Japanese army in Malaya was superhuman. Actually, it was the support of 568 planes (eliminating British planes, sinking the British ships and attacking the ground forces, like in France), the imperial navy (providing artillery support and the ability to land in several places, outflanking the British repeatedly) and 200 tanks that made a big difference. That is why I insist that the hundreds of Hurricanes and tanks sent to Stalin were crucial. Had they been there (together with the Buffaloes and bombers already there) they would have made a huge difference. For example Australian pilots flying Hudson’s scored several imressive hits on Japanese ships, but were promptly dispatched for the lack of escort fighters. Repulse and PoW were sunk for the lack of fighter excort, otherwise they would have sunk many transports, destroyers, cruisers, etc, and supported their ground forces with their artillery. The Buffaloes would have survived longer and concentrated on the bombers, while the Hurricanes concentrated on the fighters (like the Hurricanes and Spitfires did during the BoB), achieving many more kills.
Regarding training Chinese troops. Stilwell had to train and equip divisions of Chinese troops to fight in Burma (he had to because the British weren’t doing much besides sacrificing Chindits) and used them quite successfully in Burma and China. Some of these Chinese were flown on return trips after supplying China over the Himalayas at a great cost. Many of the Chinese dressed in rags froze to death during the return trip. Regarding Indians having a problem with communicating in english, perhaps you don’t know that far more Indians spoke english than the Americans could afford to hire. Regarding the Indians and Chinese wanting to join the American army. If 5 million volonteered for the Birtish army, in spite of hating the British oppressors (they had to eat and there were few jobs and food available), it stands to reason that with the promess of liberating India and being treated more fairly in the US army and Marine corps, there would have been plenty of them joining.
I do think that five cannon firing 15" HE shells, 30 km, twice a minute could have wiped out the hundred some toy tanks of the Japs that made it to Singapore (after losing dozens in Malaya) and killed thousands of troops, making a big difference, together with the Hurricans, the Repulse, PoW and British tanks, but as you now I’m rather stupid.
Regarding the Soviets being upset by whatever the Americans or British did in Asia. I think that Churchill and Roosevelt should have severed relations with Stalin when he invaded Poland and Finland and never dealt with him and beaten him, along with Hitler, thus avoiding the 12 billion dollars wasted on him in WW II and the hundreds of billions wasted during the 50 years of cold war and the risk of destroying humankind.
Samjok, do you have some personal animosity towards the British in general, or Churchill in particular? your lack of charity towards Churchill, as well as President Franklin Roosevelt is repeatedly expressed in your posts. I personally find them both to be Men of the moment, the right people at the right time, for prosecuting the war efforts of the Allies.Faults, and foibles aside, both men are tip-top in my book.
Is the purpose of this thread to discuss, and improve the factual understanding of those events, or an opportunity to grind an axe of some sort? One must wonder.
Hi tankgeezer,
I have the greatest respect and admiration for the British soldiers, sailors and pilots. Mi point is that it would have been difficult to lead such a powerful nation more incompetently (Churchill and his generals). Yet, by writing history, Churchill portrayed himself as a saviour and people still buy it 70 years later.
That fits for an opinion, but opinions are too nebulous to defend beyond one’s own beliefs. When you cite specific instances of troop strength, deployments, resources of this, or that nation, you are departing from opinions and going to facts. For facts, you must be able to show legitimate recorded information that supports your assertions, otherwise, its all woulda, shoulda, coulda. How do you know of a certainty that Churchill did indeed cast himself in that light? how do you know of a certainty that he did, or even could actually write the official history of Great Britain in WWII? Show us this proof, and not whispers from conspiracy theorists, or other unproven sources. Opinions are fine, but cannot be justified when put forward as facts.
A rather interesting, categorical statement. Few would argue that there wasn’t room for improvement with some of Churchill’s policies and that he was a bit of a meddler; but it would be hard to reconcile the theory of Churchill and his commanders and policy makers like Brooke as “incompetents” when they were:
i.) on the winning side
ii.) held on despite the bleak German conquest of the continent
iii.) inherited the results of budget cuts and an army that began the War as a small volunteer constabulary force building it into a modern, mechanized and efficient force
iv.) managed to overcome the objections of cocky U.S. generals and admirals to pursue battles in the African and Mediterranean theaters increasing the combat effectiveness of the American military culminating in the rapid liberation of France
v.) ultimately, skillfully forging an alliance despite large misgivings on both sides of it
Yet, by writing history, Churchill portrayed himself as a saviour and people still buy it 70 years later.
I’ve never read Churchill’s history and have many misgivings about some of his ideas and policies, but he was far from “incompetent” but was rather a complex man with both great faults and the rare qualities of a great wartime leader.
Its hard not to be on the winning side when the Americans are on your side. Mexico was also on the winning side, havind declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan.
Most of the soldiers who fought in France were neither in Africa nor the Mediterranean, but were rather fresh and fought quite well, including most of those under Patton.
And the advance through France and Germany would certainly have been faster without Monty.
The alliance with the Soviets was great for the Soviets and prolonged the expenditures 50 years.
The men of the 1st infantry division would argue that thought, Algeria, Sicily, then redeployed for the Omaha Beach landing on D-Day. I’m sure they were flower fresh. You grasp at straws, and continue the pointless point of view lacking any substantiation. This is getting old Sam, and very quickly.
Britain wasn’t providing much in the way of military support while Australia was providing Britain with food and other materials. I don’t have the figures but I suspect that it would have been more a case of isolating Britain from Australia.
Assuming, of course, that Japan really could control the Indian Ocean.
As the Japanese couldn’t find the shipping and troops to invade Australia, what makes you think they could find the shipping and troops for an invasion of Iraq and or Iran?
Where would the shipping come from to transport the oil back to Japan?
I don’t know who that is addressed to, not least because nobody in this thread has said anything to support such an inference.
Agreed.
But without the troops taking ground it still amounted to nothing.
You assume that the Japanese would not have had intelligence on the air force dispositions in Malaya and would not have responded to an increase in British air power by marshalling greater forces themselves.
tankgeezer,
I said MOST of them. If you find me boring, why waste your time?
Rising sun,
The cannon did fire at the Japs, but with little effect with the armor piercing shells. It is a myth that the cannon could only fire seaward.
The Japs did not have unlimited amounts of planes to fight in China, the Philippines, Burma, etc, and could not afford heavy losses. I don’t wee why it is too difficult to believe that 800 Hurricanes (besides the Wildcats, etc,) would have been far more useful to the British empire in the Pacific and Indian oceans than in the USSR, in the short and the long term.
The Japs put 200,000 men as far as Wewak (they spent the war there, starving the last 2 years), they certainly had ships to put troops and supply them in Iraq and to carry the oil back to Japan. They lost most of their merchant and fishing shipt to American submarines, mines and planes. The British could not have fought the Japs alone. The Japs attacked the US guided by the wrong assumption that if they attacked the British, the US would attack Japan, so they chose a preemptive attack.
“tankgeezer,
I said MOST of them. If you find me boring, why waste your time?”
You may have, but its just a cheap way of crawling out from under shoddy posting. Oh, you’re not boring, circular maybe, obtuse, certainly. But not boring. Its my job to pay attention to posts that may dilute the quality of information found on this site, and you do have my attention.
But do you know what the arcs of fire were towards the peninsula and to the west?
You need to know that, and to know the actual and possible points of embarkation and landing for the Japanese, to demonstrate what effect the guns could have had on the Japanese.
Work out the logisitics of supplying and maintaining the planes, pilots and ground crew in the Pacific versus giving them to the Soviets. Add in convoy protection and the fleet train for the convoy protection ships.
Prove it.
Not in February - March 1942 when the Japanese decided they didn’t have the troops or shipping to invade Australia. So how were they going to invade Iran and or Iraq?
Like I said, they did send about 100 Hurricanes during the fighting in Malaya, but peacemeal (launching them from the indomitable, etc,), so that they were promptly dispatched or disabled (with few spares and mechanics and with damaged airfields), wasting invaluable planes and pilots with little adantage.
It would have been far more effective, had those and more planes started to arrive when Stalin started receiving them. Stalin also received some pilots and mechanics that served in Murmansk.
It would have also been safer to send the planes to Australia without Japan yet being at war than to the USSR around German Norway.
Another incredible blunder is the lack of an adequate radar system in Singapore-Malaya to render the British planes far more effective. Unlike the BoB, the few were left almost without eyes.
Like I said, they did fire on the Japanese with little effect with the AP shells.
The further away you are, the more ships you need to transport anything (Australia is further from Japan than Iraq is from Ceylon, which the Japanese could have made their center of operations, instead of remote Truck). Besides, there was little of interest for the Japanese in Australia (they had iron ore in Manchuria), compared to denying access to the British ships to the Indian & Pacific oceans and having access to the oil of Iraq. Moreover, given the imperial army’s intentions of attacking the USSR, entering through Iran would deal a fatal blow to the USSR by capturing the oil fields in Baku, depriving Stalin of oil, far more effective than attacking Siberia.
America wasn’t on their side until well after the war was well underway. It wasn’t the U.S. that declared War on Germany. And furthermore, the U.S. didn’t declare War on Germany in response to the invasion of Poland. It was only easy through the policies of Churchill in conjunction with FDR that drove the United States towards War that was initially politically unpopular–even if it was in the strategic best interests of America…
Most of the soldiers who fought in France were neither in Africa nor the Mediterranean, but were rather fresh and fought quite well, including most of those under Patton.
But Gen. Patton WAS!! So were most of his senior commanders and NCO’s. Patton learned from his mistakes, and so did the numerous, less heralded American commanders that matched–or even exceeded–his abilities. The North African Campaign fundamentally changed US Army doctrine and vastly improved its operational effectiveness. I suggest you read Rick Atkinson’s excellent ‘Liberation Trilogy’ series beginning with the first two written and released selections: An Army at Dawn and Day of Battle.
And the advance through France and Germany would certainly have been faster without Monty.
How so? I’m no big fan of Monty. But things could not have progressed much faster than they did. And Operation Cobra was in no small part due to Montgomery’s planning. The Americans were slogging though bloody hedgerow fighting while the Commonwealth forces faced the bulk of German armor. Yet once they broke through, the catastrophic collapse of German forces was almost complete as it was rapid…
The alliance with the Soviets was great for the Soviets and prolonged the expenditures 50 years.
How so? The Soviets suffered far more than almost any peoples in WWII. And how would expenditures been prolonged if the Germans effectively defeated and marginalized Soviet resistance and took most of the usable country?
