Could Britain have won Malaya?

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#21

I was keeping this for the Malaya/Vietnam thread, as and when I am able to commit the time. However, although some of it is irrelavent to this thread, some of it, probably, is relavent. It doesn’t negate the argument of air support at landing beaches, but it does dilute the argument for air support making a difference later in the campaign.

On average fewer than 70 aircraft offered the punch, despite a peak of even squadrons in 1950, two-thirds of which were Spitfires, Tempests, Meteors, Vampires, Venoms, and Sabres. All others were Short Sunderland flying boats, Avro Lincoln medium bombers, and light bombers such as Beaufighters, Hornets, Brigands, and Canberras. Both Tempests and Hornets were suited to these operations, with good firepower and loiter times and relative resistance to bad weather. Later jet aircraft—fighters and bombers—were less useful.
Speed was a liability. Electronics and engines were more susceptible to climate-induced difficulties, and their range and loiter time at low altitude
were insufficient. Finally, the stress on pilots required special measures such as cockpit air conditioning and limiting sorties to one per day. The best aircraft for offensive air support throughout the Emergency was the Avro Lincoln medium bomber, an updated version of the venerable Lancaster of World War II fame. They were flown by rotating RAF squadrons and Number 1
(Bomber) Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). In addition to cost-effectiveness, Lincolns could deliver much heavier bomb loads than
lighter aircraft, and their slow speed and endurance of up to eleven hours when fully loaded made them excellent platforms for strafing attacks.
Offensive air support was not a major factor. It was only useful against an enemy whose position was known and that intended to hold its ground. The communists preferred mobility and stealth. In Malaya, CT positions often had to be checked by ground troops, normally resulting in ground combat or enemy withdrawal. Close air support also required aircraft with extremely short response times, which was not practicable because of the few suitable airfields and limited aircraft loiter times. Ground to air communication
was also poor because of jungle canopies. In addition, army radios were too heavy and took too long to set up. Offensive air support in Malaya was also limited by weather and navigation. Air strikes were often unreliable except in mid-morning, after fog and thin stratus cloud dissipated and before the rapid generation of cumulus and storms, which began around noon and could last into the night. This disadvantage was not mitigated until the introduction of radar target marking in 1955. Navigation was complicated by a paucity of aids and an unending sea of jungle, which yielded few landmarks.

By the way, I was of the opinion, probably on account of something I read somewhere years ago (might have been Noel Barber), that Percival had only recently taken command in Sigapore (at the outbreak of hostilities) and that he was largely obstructed by the ‘Old-hands’? Speaking of which, one cannot ignore hubris when considering the factors, Churchill wasn’t alone in this. Some of the generals, in the early stages of the war, were the wrong people in the wrong places. Not just generals, but also battalion commanders. There were good and bad, but it didn’t help any, when coordinating operations, to have so much of the bad.

#22

He was appointed GOC Malaya in May 1941. He certainly tried to improve training and readiness of his troops, but I don’t know anything about his internal command issues so I don’t know whether he received support or obstruction from the old hands.

Given that Japan decided on attacking Malaya only about two or maybe three months beforehand (it was a very short time - it’s in Tsuji’s book) and managed to undertake all staff and other work in that time, Percival had two to three times as long to organise his defensive force. Tsuji mentions in his book that many Japanese troops were not specifically trained for jungle warfare but were issued with written instructions on tactics only on the troop transports carrying them to Malaya. I think the instructions are in an appendix to his book. If so, it shows just how adaptable the Japanese troops were.

#23

Agreed.

Beachheads are, as they say nowadays, a target rich environment.

So are roads with columns of troops. The Japanese used them quite a bit, not least to ride their bicycles along.

Jungles with canopies were a zero target environment with WWII technology.

Depending on where the Japanese were, there were still opportunities for effective air attack on the advancing Japanese after they left the beachheads.

But probably not in direct support of ground troops in many instances because of the intermingling of opposing forces or because of the country they were in.

The place to concentrate air attacks on land, assuming better British air power, for a better result in Malaya was definitley the beachheads, but only after first attacking the invasion ships further out where they were nicely contained targets. That is exactly what happened in the Coral Sea, and why it was so successful. And exactly what didn’t happen in Malaya (except to Phillips’ force) and one of the main reasons why it was lost. Better to stop them getting ashore rather than try to deal with them afterwards.

#24

Okay. The two capital ships that were sent to intercept the Japanese landing force were sunk by aircraft.

So, presumably, what you are suggesting is a carrier task force to intercept them? Were there Britsh carriers available at this point in the war, or were they already commited to convoy escort duties in the Med. and the like?.. or, are saying that land-based aircraft could have been used to intercept the fleet at sea?

Given the scenario where a carrier force was despatched, or ground based aircraft made available, could not the Japanese have simply changed their invasion route and come overland via Indo-China and Thailand?

#25

The lessons of fighting the Japanese in the jungle were learned through experience in Burma. Troops were taken out of the line and trained, and then re-introduced into the line.

The successes the Argyll’s had had against the Japanese, were when they employed ambush tactics along the roads. However, the Japanese took to the jungle and hooked around the Argyll’s positions. The Argyll’s anticipated this and ‘did-a-runner’ before the Japanese could press their assault home. Then the Argyll’s repeated the action again and again. It sufficed in slowing the Japanese, but not holding them. It was only during the Battle of the Admin Box (later, in Burma), when the Brits had the air-supply capability, that they could begin to experiment with the idea of holding ground and allowing the Japanese to waste themselves against entrenched troops where their tactics of encirclement were ineffective.

As it happened, some British troops ran away in Malaya, hearing the sound of tyre-less bicycles approaching, they envisaged tanks aproaching.

The Brits had ruled out the use of tanks and didn’t anticipate the Japanese using them. The Argyll’s were fairly successful with their use of the armoured cars, but these were eventually knocked-out by Japanese tanks.

#26

Another point to consider, is that the Japanese infiltrated large numbers of spies into Malaya, prior to the invasion. As well as passing back information, they became guides for the Japanese forces as they advenced down the peninsula.

#27

Generally (in malaya and Burma), the Japanese operated as light, shock troops. There lines of communication were not that great, and, indeed, it wasn’t usually a major concern in an offensive. Their general rule was to capture the supplies of the enemy. Their tactics were adaptable and, presumably, had been developed in China. The differences of terrain presented by the jungle topography etc. would not have been too great a setback for tough troops with no fear of it. It might have hampered their advance if they had had to remain in the jungle, thus causing delays, but they had anticipated this with their spy network. They also used advance units dressed as civillians to confuse and surprise their opponents.

#28

The original intention was to send HMS Indomitable with Prince of Wales etc. She was an aircraft carrier that could carry about 50 Hurricanes or similar sized modern fighters, which would have been useful for defending the task force if nothing else. She didn’t go because she ran aground on a reef and was out of action for a while. HMS Hermes, another but older and smaller aircraft carrier was in the Indian Ocean at the time. She carried only a dozen Swordfish or Walruses so she wouldn’t have been much use, and would just have gone down with the other two. Indomitable would have had a fighting chance if she had a full complement of planes. I don’t know if anything else was available.

Land based aircraft would be a better option, flying out of Kota Bahru. The airfield was only a couple of miles from the east coast, giving a good arc across the water and to Singora and Patani in Thailand which were also invasion points. It would have been the ideal base from which to attack Japanese ships as they neared Malaya, while Japanese planes flying out of Saigon would have had reduced combat time because of greater distances to reach the battle area, unless using long range tanks. I’m pretty sure there weren’t any Japanese carrriers supporting the Malaya invasion or anywhere near it. All this assumes that the British planes were top line planes flown by good pilots. In reality, the Japanese had about 625 mostly good to very good planes with very good pilots against 158 mostly poor to average planes for the British. So far as fighters were concerned, it didn’t matter how good the British pilots were because their planes generally weren’t up to the task.

Col Tsuji flew over southern Thailand and northern Malaya in secret flights maybe six weeks before the plans for the invasion were finalised. He recognised that the airfields at Kota and Alor Star could destroy an invasion fleet if Britain had sufficient planes there. He also recognised that if Japan could capture them, it had air bases to support its advance south and, if necessary, north if Thailand resisted, so he gambled on being able to acquire them. Which he did. The invasion fleet actually carried quite a deal of aviation fuel and aviation supplies in the expectation of capturing airfields in Thailand and Malaya, with the intention of transferring planes from Saigon upon capturing the airfields, which is what happened.

Given the scenario where a carrier force was despatched, or ground based aircraft made available, could not the Japanese have simply changed their invasion route and come overland via Indo-China and Thailand?

It’s a long way to go by land, and doubly so from Saigon as they have to go a considerable way north and then south again. It introduces significant logistical and line of supply problems.

Sea transport was highly efficient at transporting large numbers of troops, and more so the way the Japanese did it in Malaya. The fully equipped troops on the ships were packed in 3 men to a 6’ x 3’ tatami mat, giving each man and his gear about six square feet. There might not have been enough road transport in Indo-China to carry the same number of troops, and supplies for the land journey, ignoring problems about the quality of roads and possibly having to fight their way through Thailand.

A land advance through Thailand would mean Japan was advertising its intentions days or even weeks beforehand. This would, or should, have resulted in Operation Matador or a similar operation being fully implemented to block the advance. In the actual event Matador was not fully, nor even largely, attempted, let alone fully implemented. With at least some days and possibly even weeks to implement it in the face of an advance through Thailand, the Japanese would, or should, have faced much more effective and fortified opposition.

The time taken for an advance through Thailand could not be accurately predicted, as it depended in part on how the Thais responded, so the attack on Malaya could not be dovetailed with the attacks elsewhere at the start of Japan’s war. As surprise was critical to Japan’s plans, this alone prevented telegraphing that particular punch. Which is not to say that the British were caught completely unawares as their observer aircraft noted the troop transports moving well before the attacks were launched.

#29

Yes. And their light initial ration issues refelcted that policy. Of course, it killed thousands of them later on in the Pacific where they couldn’t find enough stuff to eat.

Their tactics were adaptable and, presumably, had been developed in China.

Their essential tactic, from section level upwards, was infiltration and hooking around behind while pressing from the front, thus alarming the enemy that its lines had been broken (as distinct from merely penetrated in isolated areas) and was encircled and or cut off. Slim’s great triumph was teaching his troops that they could still fight successfully when encircled and could actually inflict more damage on the Japanese than vice versa if they held their ground. That greatly reduced the success of that particular tactic.

The differences of terrain presented by the jungle topography etc. would not have been too great a setback for tough troops with no fear of it.

The Japanese were certainly encouraged to treat the jungle as their friend, while the British forces were generally not too comfortable in it.

#30

Okay. So, given the situation regarding aircraft, troops, equipment etc. as was, when Percival arrived, with nothing further added beyond that which was:

First of all, what could have been done, in that limited time, to improve defences?

Secondly, when the risk of Japanese attack became more obvious, say, from the time that the Japanese themselves knew that they were going to plan an invasion, how could the British plans have been improved?

Let’s consider that we don’t have the wisdom of hindsight, but, also, that hubris does not reign, and that there is a will and drive to improve the situation locally.

#31

Thought I’d bring this forward, in view of my last post.

#32

Considering the climate etc. as described in post .20: did the Japanese use of radial-engined aircraft give them an advantage over those aircraft that were available to the British - anybody?

#33

I recall that when the Spitfires long promised to Australia finally arrived, long, long after Singapore fell and possibly a few upgrades later, they experienced problems in service in the tropics which hadn’t been encountered elsewhere. Alas, I can’t recall the details.

#34

It could be argued that France had more to do with losing Malaya than did Britain.

If the Vichy French hadn’t succumbed to Japanese demands to enter Indo-China the Japanese might have had more trouble expanding into Indo-China, which was their springboard for Malaya.

If the Vichy French had succumbed to British demands for transfer of the French navy to Britain as easily as they succumbed to Japanese demands for Indo-China, or if France had ensured that its navy was transferred to its Ally to enable its Ally to fight on for both nations when it became clear that France was going under, there would have been ample naval forces available to resist the Japanese invasion without taking one ship away from British naval activities elsewhere.

If both these things had happened, the French navy could have been based in French Indo-China well before hostilities began and might well have deterred the Japanese assault on Malaya.

LATE EDIT But this would have required two things that weren’t going to happen. A French government which wasn’t pro-Axis, or at the very least unwilling to defy the Axis powers. And a Thai government that wasn’t pro-Japanese following Japan’s gift of parts of former French Indo-China to Thailand.

#35

One thing Percival, and his predecessors, should have done in preparing for war with Japan was to arrange conferences with or otherwise communicate with Chiang’s Chinese generals; the Russian generals who fought at Nomonhan in 1938-39; and Claire Chennault and his Flying Tiger pilots who had been operating in China for several years by 1941, to acquire a clear understanding of Japanese tactics, strengths, and weaknesses on land and in the air.

#36

For reference.

Click on map for larger image, but use back arrow to return here as it opens in same window.

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map malaya.jpg
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#37

One thing that should have been done was to erect invasion obstacles at Kota on the beach and in the water. They were erected in the south but not at Kota. Given the rough seas and strong winds which applied at the actual landing and capsized some small boats, adequate obstacles in the water might well have caused serious problems by capsizing some landing barges or just making the already difficult landing impossible.

#38

The defences at Kota should have been better fortified. Two MG pill boxes did a lot of damage and held up the Japanese on the beaches. There should have been more. There should have been more artillery registered on the beaches to kill the Japanese pinned there. There should have been more artillery to deal with the landing barges and escorts, which needed the Japanese to be kept on the beaches to allow forward observers to direct fire on the beaches and naval craft. Once the forward observers were forced back, the artillery lost effect. The key to Kota was not letting them off the beaches, or at least not in sufficient numbers to win. The key to doing that was to keep them from reaching the beaches as much as possible, hence the importance of obstacles and artillery.

#39

The central problem is that there weren’t the planes available to do what was at least as necessary as defending Kota, which was to attack the Japanese landings in Thailand at Singora and Patani from Kota, Alor and elsewhere, to prevent the Japanese establishing airfields there.

Pervcival believed that the Japanese had been storing fuel at one or both of those airfields well before the invasion as they got into serious operation very quickly.

This then leads into the next failure, which was not implementing the revised Matador plan soon enough to enable the British to take Singora and Patani to repel the Japanese landing. Given the performance at Kota and elsewhere which had longer to establish defences, it may be wishful to think that they would have done any better even if they got to Singora and Patani.

#40

One aspect which was important in the chain of defeats was British failure to deny weapons and supplies to the enemy. Within the first week the Japanese captured enough food at Jitra to supply a division for three months, along with 300 trucks, 50 machine guns and 50 pieces of field artillery. The enemy got 1,000 drums of fuel for its aircraft at Alor, along with bombs and operational runways, enabling them to fly off a British airfield on British fuel to drop British bombs on British troops.

These and other similar events, along with a succession of failed demolition attempts on bridges etc, are all symptomatic of a routed army from very early in the campaign.