Could Germany have won the war ?

World War II General WWII Discussion
#21

Germany was not ready for war in 1939 and Hitler gambled that the allies would have fumbled about and let him build an empire out of eastern Europe.

When they were ready- war would have begun in the mid 1940s. This was based on a strategic plan set in motion before Hitler gained power. If foresaw the following events happening before a “preventative war” could be initiated [with the expectation of a European wide war emerging out of the first actions].

A bilateral trading empire built on credit and barter would be established ,with secure ties through Scandinavia; Eastern Europe; Russia and the Balkans.

The Stockpiling of all necessary arms, ammunition and fuel to wage 12 months of continuous mechanized warfare, including some 8 million tons of naval fuel [marine diesel and bunker fuel].

Stockpiling of sufficient resources to build a second years worth of “necessary arms, ammunition and fuel to wage 12 months of continuous mechanized warfare”…after which time it was expected a total war economy would be in place. Long term view planned for Substitute materials industries to be established to replenish key armaments resources under foreign sphere of control.
Anticipated force structure at completion.

An Army of 75-85 front line divisions with another 40 reserve brigade/divisional units. This included 36 Panzer Divisions, while the rest of the “active divisions” were fully motorised.

A medium sized navy with the follow estimated structure…

Several aircraft carriers plus several fast battleships, supported by at least a dozen fast Panzerschiffe and ½ dozen dedicated replenishment tankers/AOE.
~ 80 Zerstroers /Torpedoboot designed to counter British naval warships.
~ 80 U-Boats plus another ~80 completed in the first war year.
Several hundred R-Boot S-Boot and M-Boot for coastal protection.
Naval aviation with a fleet of 400 planes.

An Air force with strategic bomber force of 400 multi engine strategic bombers -as a deterrence force plus similar number of Me 109 interceptors. The tactical air force started out with about 1500 small by-planes as “trainers” and “army cooperation” planes. This quickly grew to about 4000-5000 planes by 1939 including medium bombers ; dive bombers and fighters. Through the early 1940s the Air force would have been maintained by substituting more advanced models planned from the late 1930s.

Finally advanced weaponry had been planed from the 1930s on, to give the Wehrmacht at technical edge in any future battlefield. These included Helicopters for Naval usage, Ballistic Rockets for Army usage and jet aircraft plus guided missiles for Air force usage. With uninterrupted peace time development these would have been operational by 1943.

#22

ubc: so what?

Hitler’s personality would not allow him to sit quietly by and build strength. If not before, he proved that on Sept 1, 1939 (decidedly NOT 1943-ish).

Or, if you prefer, assume Hitler’s plans went forth exactly as planned (something which happens so often in the real world!). Meanwhile (of course) the rest of the world would be doing nothing, despite the obvious build up by Germany? If you intend to suggest Uncle Adolph would have had an unstoppable juggernaut, it’s already been pointed out the UK was closing the gap in arms. The Soviets were building T-35s, of which Hitler knew nothing. Or do you posit a massive improvement in the efficacy of the Abwehr, despite Nazi arrogance and assumptions of racial superiority leading to inevitable victory? Against these, Adolph would throw massive numbers of … obsolete tanks, because there was no war to drive development. And he probably would still be using inaccurate maps of the Soviet Union to plan his Blitz. And face the same problems of unbalanced manpower and logistics (unless those clever Abwehr agents first convinced the USSR to change the gauge of their rail system?).

Please stop citing pipe dreams to support unstated hypothesizes.

#23

Correct. To this I would add that both the French and the Soviets were improving as well. The French Army was in the midst of creating its own panzer divisions (in mentality as well as equipment wise) and improving their (DLM’s) mechanized units with newer and better tanks. The French Air Force was also in the midst of a major upgrade as it was a generation behind the newly created Luftwaffe in 1939. There was also the possibility of a younger, more vibrant French commander rising over the old men like Gamelin had things been delayed for a bit. The British had already closed the gap with the RAF and was now concentrating on improving her Army…

Please stop citing pipe dreams to support unstated hypothesizes.

Seems to be a fetish of his. One also cannot cherry pick how things would have gone differently without looking how the Allies were also evolving. For instance, there were some in the French Command that opposed the Dyle Plan, or at least the scale of it. What if a more dynamic leadership comes to the fore of the French Army?

#24

OMG “fetish”??? calling the facts “fetish”…Nick Fresh its alwasy a waste of time responding to you as presumable Ardee and his juvenial “Pipe Dream” responce.

Read what I wrote again… Hitler did not figure in any of these plans I detailed in post # 21. THOSE WERE THE PLANS IN PLACE BEFORE HITLER TOOK OVER STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE WAR EFFORT; WITH HIS 4 YEAR PLAN in 1936!!!

Don’t talk to me anymore , instead read and study the following sources.

Wilhelm Deist : “The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament”

Wilhelm Deist : “Germany and the Second World War- Vol 1 The build up of German Agression”

Eberhard Rossler: “The UBoat-The evolution and technical history of German submarines”

#25

So? There were lots of “plans” in 1936 regarding Santa Clause, The Tooth-fairy, and the Easter Bunny. Just because these were “plans” in no way means German industry–already severally overtaxed and on a continuous near war footing after Hitler’s rearmament–could have carried them out. Germany was already severally in-debt by 1939, IIRC, and facing belligerent powers that were also “rearming”. Secondly, off the top of my head, if you’re going about rearmament schedules Germany would not fully be ready for war before 1948…

Don’t talk to me anymore , instead read and study the following sources.

If you want your assertions to go unchallenged, then don’t post here!

Wilhelm Deist : “The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament”

Wilhelm Deist : “Germany and the Second World War- Vol 1 The build up of German Agression”

Eberhard Rossler: “The UBoat-The evolution and technical history of German submarines”

And what exact information did you glean from these sources? Hypotheticals, optimistic and hopeful projections, and murky long term strategic plans do not an army make. I have a source for you: Adam Tooze’s [b]Wages of Destruction[/b]. Germany simply did not have enough industry to go around and industrial production was dwarfed by that of a United States in the a midst on an economic Depression and that wasn’t even trying at that point. Hitler gambled on Operation Barbarossa against a USSR that had a nearly three-to-one advantage in every strategic category because of this–and he lost…

#26

Nickdfresh – I smell “troll” here, and so won’t add to your comments above. You’ve evidently come across ubc before, so you’ll have to use your own judgement on that. But I DID think about saying something very similar (in my previous post) to your tooth fairy analogy!

#27

It’s been a while since he’s posted here at length, but ubc seems to enjoy figuring out how the Third Reich could have won the war with often preposterous assertions, selective history, and cherrypicking facts. When told most of what he is saying is patently ridiculous and that Germany did not exist in a vacuum and the Allies would have reacted, he then gets snippy and demands we stop reading Western sources. At least this time he posted some German sourced-works but notice he doesn’t quote anything from them. He has also ignored the fact that much of what I say is based on a German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser.

I think he suffers from the condition known as Panzer-fonboi’ism…

#28

I think he suffers from the condition known as Panzer-fonboi’ism…

Yeah, that was coming through pretty clearly… :wink:

#29

Rommel often outran his lines of communication. Which can be command stupidity or, more often in his case, attempting to maintain the initiative as an aggressive and adventurous commander.

No different to O’Connor on the other side.

Rommel failed to take Tobruk despite about a nine month siege. That was partly a consequence of the ability of the British Commonwealth forces to supply Tobruk by sea, while Rommel was unable to stop that supply line.

The fact remains that Rommel failed at Tobruk and ultimately failed in North Africa, leaving towards the last moment like MacArthur in another example of conspicuous military failure being converted in the uninformed public mind into some sort of misplaced military competence and glory by a military commander who, in the final analysis, was a failure in his last command. Yet in each case they were given commands for the rest of the war (or in Rommel’s case until Hitler chose to dispose of him well before the end of the war, which must have been a power Roosevelt regretted lacking with MacArthur even earlier in the war.).

Rommel was clearly an astute and capable commander with the ability to exploit an advantage, unlike his often more timid Allied opponents, but he was at best a minor commander in the whole scale of things in the war. I’d take a punt that the Soviets had about a dozen and the Americans and British each had maybe half a dozen or so commanders of equal or greater ability, of whom we’ve never heard. Apart from O’Connor, the only one I know of is the American Gen. Eichelberger in the Pacific, and he did a lot more with a lot less and and a lot quicker than Rommel in vastly worse conditions.

#30

Answer to the original question is “No.”

#31

RS – There is, of course, much truth to what you say. I am certainly not a Rommel-phile, one who thinks there is no pedestal grand and lofty enough for the man. And I also admit the study of generals is not my driving interest when I look at war, though I certainly have read a book or two about various individuals, by authors both good and bad. I can’t, for instance, relate to your reference to Eichelberger, as I’m not as familiar with the campaigns in the Pacific, and not familiar with him at all.

But I wonder if you engage in a little bit of spacious argument above. Is “ultimate” victory or defeat a valid means for rating a general? This thread is about Germany’s ability to win the war, and the consensus seems to be gravitating towards the conclusion “No, it couldn’t.” By your measure, does that mean Germany had no good/great generals during the war, because they all ultimately lost? And if so, what are we to make of such legendary figures as Hannibal, who also – ultimately – lost?

No, I do not mean to compare to Rommel to that level of generalship; it was merely the first name that came to mind of a general who was superb at tactics, but lost first strategically, and then finally, tactically before the gates of Carthage. (Well, maybe the association with North Africa also helped me think of Hannibal). Rommel was brash, aggressive. He took risks, and was astute enough in his choices of risks that many of them paid off. His front-line perspective both hurt and helped his command. So far, much of what I’ve said echoes what you’ve said, and is also consistent with my earlier post.

But you also say that the Allied powers also had numerous equals-in-ability to Rommel, of which we’ve never heard. Hmmm. Maybe my perception of him is colored by authors who may have worshiped the man, but one of the things I find unique about Rommel is that was able to generate a great elan amongst his men, as well as fear in his opponent’s. Among the Western powers, the closest analog I can think of is Bradley. And yes, to make an understatement, there were a great many cultural differences between US military services and Nazi Germany’s, but I still don’t think there were many songs, like the Rommel Lied, written and sung about Bradley – and any effort to produce one might well have resulted in derision. (Another candidate, mentioned by yourself is McArthur – but he seemed to generate as much dislike in his subordinates as admiration, and I would not put him in Rommel’s category – and I certainly think he was overrated as a general and a leader as well). Rommel’s style of leadership, despite its flaws, also generated intense loyalty and fighting spirit in his troops. Many Western leaders might be his equal in generating one or the other – but both? As a result, Rommel could ask his men to do risky things, and they could (not always) succeed where others might fail. That may not always be good “generalship,” but it is great “leadership.”

As for Soviet leadership, I am admittedly less knowledgeable. No names spring to mind, in part due to years of limited information exchange that followed the war, as well as the coloring of my thoughts by Cold War propaganda about the Soviet system and how it operated. Maybe you or others can provide examples.

In the ultimate analysis, I would rank Rommel as a “good” general – aggressive, daring, astute, calculating, perceptive – one who was above average, much stronger at tactics than strategy but still, only “good” in military “science.” Yet as a leader of men in battle, capable of getting the most of them – there I would rank him a bit higher. And I think that is the quality, in combination with his “good” application of military science – that made him, and his luck. And don’t think he had many WWII equals when that is factored in.

JMHO, based on the doubtless-biased things I’ve read.

#32

Agreed. I would also add that in Rommel’s meteoric rise to command, he never lost the propensity to be very close to the battle. I think this inevitably and proverbially allowed him to see the trees with great clarity, while sometimes missing the forest…

#33

One more contributing factor why Germany could in my opinion not win the war is that Germany’s Allies, the Axis powers, were also far from being prepared for the war, either not really being preparing (some of them also could not, due to lack of industry) or were in the midst of modernization programmes. They themselves on occassions went on their own to war and putting themselves into bad positions like Germany did itself. Italy attacked too early France, Japan attacked too early China. Then they were already in it, but were not adequately prepared (Japan for China maybe yes, but not for the Soviet Union or the Western Allies). So, after all drawbacks the Germans had with their industry, they still seem to me to have been those best off, concerning industrial capacity especially.

Another thing which at least made huge troubles was the attitude towards conquered nations, especially in Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe. The Germans in fact would have had a huge pool of people whom they could drag into the war especially agaisnt communism. From the Soviet Union where people experienced communism first hand, they were greeted as liberators (Ukraine, Byelorussia and to some extent also Russia - and of course the Baltic states), in Yugoslavia where many people were quite incontent with the monarchy or hated/feared communism as well, and even in Poland there was at the very very beginning of the occupation, due to the media reporting excessively on Soviet crimes in then Eastern Poland while keeping silent of those committed by the Germans, some tendency among some people to be willing to fight the Soviets together with the Germans, thinking of the Germans as the lesser evil in that case.
Well, none of these for the Nazis actually good opportunities was really used, they instead opted for either annihilating the local inhabitants or in areas with local conflicts to not engage or to do so halfheartedly. More or less they (and their allies) drove themselves local people into various resistance movements on occassions.
The result was that they had to fight the Polish Armija Krajowa and Armija Ludowa partisans in Poland, the UPA in Western Ukraine, the Soviet partisans in conquered parts of the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Partisans in Yugoslavia as well as Četniks on the occassions their goals were contradicting, Greek Partisans in Greece, Albanian Partisans in Albania and later in the war, Czech and Slovak partisans in the areas of Czechoslovakia (I think I got them all now in Eastern Europe). To them also come the various partisans and resistance movements in other areas like France, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg and, last but not least, even in Austria and Germany itself. Especially at the beginning these wars against resistance moevements were not big, by far not when compared to what was going on at the same time on the Eastern Front or Africa, but it was draining ressources like manpower and material, and this was growing the longer the war took. And all these movements could gather intelligence for their enemies, some more, some less successful.

While fighting the communist partisans in these areas was I think inevitable, they probably would not have grown so big without some sort of “motivation” for people who did not identify with communism. Rather nationalist partisans (which also grew bigger) could have maybe been brought on the own side with some intelligent political moves. The way they handeled it they brought mostly far right extremists on their side as well as people who still thought that communism was simply worse. Not that this means that they have gathered little men, but they certainly could have gathered more.

I hope that it is understandable what I wanted to say, I hurried a little while writing the text.

#34

The Italians attacked a France that was already defeated for all practicable purposes. They faltered badly despite this for many reasons, not least of which they were attempting an alpine campaign against pretty good defenses and crack troops…

#35

Not as the sole criterion, but it’s a major factor that has to be considered in any evaluation of a commander.

There is also the question of how to define “ultimate” victory, or defeat. If a nation wins or loses it doesn’t necessarily follow that any of its generals were, respectively, unusually good or unusually bad as there are all sorts of factors beyond the control of any individual commander in a national loss. However, if a commander wins or loses a campaign when he had sufficient control to be largely independent of external factors then the win or loss is highly significant in evaluating the commander’s performance.

MacArthur is a glaring case in point. He lost half his air force on the ground on the first day because he went off the air, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. He appears to have been in some sort of shocked inability to operate. Because of poor planning on his part before and during hostilities, he lost a large and vitally important part of his food supply at a critical point for his hungry forces retreating towards the stronghold at Bataan while they were pursued by Japanese forces who had outrun their lines of communication and were at risk of stalling their advance because of the lack of food. Unlike the Australians during their Kokoda retreat who were in similar, albeit very much smaller in scale, circumstances but who destroyed or fouled their food supplies before abandoning them so that they were useless to the advancing Japanese, MacArthur left his food intact. It was a major bonus for the Japanese and enabled them to press their advance. His forces duly starved at Bataan and Corregidor and were forced to surrender after MacArthur had left. It is likely that better performance by MacArthur would have done no more than delay the American surrender, but the fact remains that his performance didn’t even approach barely competent.

Rommel was in a different position with the siege of Tobruk because as a land based commander he couldn’t do much to control the resupply by sea of the Australian and British garrison which was a major factor in its ability to hold out, and in Rommel’s failure to reduce it.

Germany couldn’t have won the European war that we now know as WWII, but it could have and in fact did win the European war up to mid 1941. Britain and its Commonwealth were the only ones fighting Germany at that time. They had no hope of dispossessing him of his European conquests. Whether Stalin would have attacked Germany between 1942 and perhaps 1944 at the latest is unknowable, but there is a good prospect that this would have happened. There was no guarantee that the Soviets would have won, not least because Germany’s lines of communication would have been very much shorter than after Barbarossa and it could have concentrated its land and air forces effectively against advancing Soviet forces, which had performed pathetically a few years earlier against the vastly outnumbered and outgunned Finns in the Winter War.

Hitler’s attack on the USSR in mid 1941 is usually said to have been his fatal mistake, but this ignores his unnecessary declaration of war on the US following Japan’s entry late in 1941 when the Soviet campaign was far from decided. Indeed, it was the early successes in Germany’s Soviet campaign during the second half of 1941 which was one of the factors which tipped Japan towards deciding to go to war against what would become the Allies.

By giving Roosevelt the opportunity to wage war against Germany when American domestic sentiment might otherwise have wanted America’s military response to focus solely on Japan, and by giving Roosevelt the opportunity to pursue the ‘Germany first’ aims agreed with the British, Hitler ensured that America’s industrial might would be deployed against Germany. While the Pacific War was a massive conflict, America never devoted more than about 15% of its resources to that conflict. The other 85% was devoted to defeating Germany. Once that was combined with the USSR’s massive industrial and human resources under Stalin’s ruthless management of them, and with Germany’s failure to run an efficient war economy under Hitler’s incompetent management of just about everything, there was little prospect that Germany could win. The final nail in Germany’s coffin was probably its lack of sufficient natural resources to sustain the type of war it was engaged in, and the failure to secure those resources from captured territories for the duration of the war.

There were lesser factors which reduced Germany’s war effort, none of major importance in their individual selves but in combination still contributors to the inability of Germany to prosecute its war successfully and which put it at a disadvantage compared with the Allies. To take just four. One, German agriculture tended to use wives and daughters as full time workers while this was less so in British agriculture, so British farm women could replace farm men taken into the armed forces with considerably less impact on agricultural production than in Germany. Two, Germany relied heavily on forced labour, and more so in the final years of the war. That labour was inefficient; required close supervision; and was at risk of sabotaging the war materials it produced. This was the exact opposite of the position with free labour in the Allied countries. Three, the Heer relied heavily on horse transport, which was slower than motor transport; unable to carry loads with the same efficiency as motor transport; and which required fodder, blacksmithing, veterinary services and so on which were less efficient that servicing motor transport. Four, German war production of various items lacked the efficiency, speed and quality control of American mass production methods. (The German disadvantage was probably on a par with the British. When American equipment started being supplied to British forces, many British mechanics etc were amazed that, unlike British equivalents which could require filing etc to make parts fit British machines, the American parts for American machines etc just fitted right in.)

When all these factors are allowed, it is all the more remarkable that the Germans did as well as they did. Without Hitler’s hubris from mid-1941, they might still own France, which would put modern Greece in a very awkward position in expecting Western Europe to bail it out. :wink: :slight_smile:

#36

Correct me if I wrong, but it was my understanding that, even though it seemed to be a good opportunity to attack practically defeated France, it meant that Italy was also in the war with Great Britain, which was far from being defeated, which in the end meant a lot of troubles for Italy.

I think there should be kept in mind that the Soveits planned and started several modernizations etc., as a result of their poor performance against Finland.
But of course you are right, this does not make a guarantee for a victory.

#37

Mussolini assumed that Britain would collapse very quickly as well under the might of the German forces, he would then be able to carve out a new Mediterranean and African Empire at relatively little cost. It must be remembered that Britain was in negotiation with Italy for war material and weapons so Italy could assume Britain needed them desperately and therefore was less of a threat than it really was.

He tended to count numbers of men and equipment rather than quality and believed his armed forces to be stronger than they were in reality.

The League of nations ineffectiveness to deal Italy in Ethiopia had given Mussolini and inflated idea of his importance and Italys power, especially coming as they were after aquiring parts of the old Ottoman Empire post WW1.

#38

Good point, but the Soviets also managed to counteract those moderernizations etc by embarking on a fresh purge of military and related leaders in 1940-42 which undoubtedly reduced their offensive and defensive capacity. The extent to which the purges undermined or were balanced by the modernizations is beyond my knowledge.

We should also keep in mind that some months before the USSR suffered spectacular losses in the Winter War it was also, under Zhukov, crushing the Japanese at Khalkin Gol / Nomonhan to the extent that the Japanese decided not to pursue IJA ambitions to push north into Siberia and decided instead to push south. Two Soviet generals from that successful campaign were subsequently executed in the purges, which says something about the idiocy of Stalin and his henchmen in doing all they could to undermine their own army.

This leads into a wider question related to Germany’s ability to win the war and the wider conduct of the war by all major combatants, which is: Were the Soviet, German and Japanese forces which were ruled by varying degrees of fear and brutality better or worse for it compared with the non-Soviet Allied forces which weren’t?

#39

Interesting, I knew only of the purge of 1937-1939 which already has cost them dearly. Can you tell me more about it?

Well, I think that such regimes which pursue very strict politics can create on the one side brainwashed fanatics which will go to death for their political ideals or emperor, ruler, etc., or may motivate the soldiers to do better as they fear the consequences of not doing so. On the other hand it might make some desperate soldiers who know that they are awaiting bad consequences bad home work together with the enemy.

Ok thanks, that clears it up to me :slight_smile:

#40

Wiki ain’t my favourie source, but whatever it lacks in accuracy it makes up for by being concise on this issue.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purge_of_the_Red_Army_in_1941

The Khalkin Gol generals executed were
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grigoriy_Shtern who, interestingly, served at a senior level in both the Winter War and Khalkin Gol
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yakov_Smushkevich

If the entry on Shtern is correct, it alters my understanding and the frequently repeated version that Zhukov was in command at Khalkin Gol and demonstrated his brilliance as a commander by running that campaign. I’ve never read anything in enough depth that specified the chain of command on the Soviet side and have just accepted the common version that Zhukov was the commander demonstrating his early genius. Which he may well have done, but in a subordinate role in the whole show.