I’m not totally sure how you gathered that from my comments as a I made no statements regarding strategic bombing. The American Air Forces made a cognizant shift towards more aggressive, direct attacks on Luftwaffe aerodromes using long range fighters, which was in fact the final death-knell of organized Luftwaffe resistance. But I might add that I think strategic bombing was valuable if often misapplied and dispersed. Speer did move the weapons factories to an extent, but in the end it was the stifling of fuel and lubricants production that hindered the German war effort the most. I would also point to Air Marshall Teddor’s “Transportation” planning and his use strategic bombers against French rail yards and depots over the objections of Harris and Spaatz as probably the most effective use of bombing by the Western Allies in WWII as it ultimately seemed to be a much more economical use of strategic resources and no doubt saved a lot of Allied lives after Overlord and had a much more direct effect on the fighting than trying to destroy ball-bearings factories in the heart of Germany’s elaborate defense networks.
It should also be said that strategic bombing was so effective against Germany because of its limited industrial output from the start and the vulnerability of geographically situated industrial bastions such as the Ruhr River Valley, and the need to have vast supply lines of logistics to feed the war industries as Germany lacked adequate resources within her baundries. However, that doesn’t mean that strategic bombing wasn’t as massive draw on Allied resources and manpower that may have weakened their ground forces somewhat. Heavy casualties and the skilled German air defense system also meant that even America’s seemingly boundless resources were sorely tested in the dark days of 1943, where entire units were battered into combat ineffectiveness with near 100% losses of original crews and planes in a matter of only a few sorties.
The argument between strategic bombing versus bombing in support of armies is a very complex one of costs and benefits. But I think the arguments have somewhat been muddled by the misapplication of Allied strategic air-power on boondoggle targets and wishful, fantasist thinking - the first raid on Ploesti is a prime example of this. And I generally agree with RS*'s comments here. I’ll add that The Luftwaffe certainly had plenty of strategic capability for France as twin engined bombers more than sufficed - especially since France had no real equivalent capability in 1939-1940. Against Britain, the Do17’s, He111, and Ju88’s (and certainly the beleaguered Stuka!) were strained at the limits of their ranges and capabilities. But remember, had the war happened the way it played out earlier, Britain would not have had the numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes to face down Germany with and they might have been enough. Also keep in mind the Luftwaffe had already suffered significant attrition in both the Polish and French campaigns and many of their crews were already exhausted from relentless hi-tempo operations closely followed by intense training for an air campaign against the RAF they were not designed for…