Could Germany have won the war ?

I’m not totally sure how you gathered that from my comments as a I made no statements regarding strategic bombing. The American Air Forces made a cognizant shift towards more aggressive, direct attacks on Luftwaffe aerodromes using long range fighters, which was in fact the final death-knell of organized Luftwaffe resistance. But I might add that I think strategic bombing was valuable if often misapplied and dispersed. Speer did move the weapons factories to an extent, but in the end it was the stifling of fuel and lubricants production that hindered the German war effort the most. I would also point to Air Marshall Teddor’s “Transportation” planning and his use strategic bombers against French rail yards and depots over the objections of Harris and Spaatz as probably the most effective use of bombing by the Western Allies in WWII as it ultimately seemed to be a much more economical use of strategic resources and no doubt saved a lot of Allied lives after Overlord and had a much more direct effect on the fighting than trying to destroy ball-bearings factories in the heart of Germany’s elaborate defense networks.

It should also be said that strategic bombing was so effective against Germany because of its limited industrial output from the start and the vulnerability of geographically situated industrial bastions such as the Ruhr River Valley, and the need to have vast supply lines of logistics to feed the war industries as Germany lacked adequate resources within her baundries. However, that doesn’t mean that strategic bombing wasn’t as massive draw on Allied resources and manpower that may have weakened their ground forces somewhat. Heavy casualties and the skilled German air defense system also meant that even America’s seemingly boundless resources were sorely tested in the dark days of 1943, where entire units were battered into combat ineffectiveness with near 100% losses of original crews and planes in a matter of only a few sorties.

The argument between strategic bombing versus bombing in support of armies is a very complex one of costs and benefits. But I think the arguments have somewhat been muddled by the misapplication of Allied strategic air-power on boondoggle targets and wishful, fantasist thinking - the first raid on Ploesti is a prime example of this. And I generally agree with RS*'s comments here. I’ll add that The Luftwaffe certainly had plenty of strategic capability for France as twin engined bombers more than sufficed - especially since France had no real equivalent capability in 1939-1940. Against Britain, the Do17’s, He111, and Ju88’s (and certainly the beleaguered Stuka!) were strained at the limits of their ranges and capabilities. But remember, had the war happened the way it played out earlier, Britain would not have had the numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes to face down Germany with and they might have been enough. Also keep in mind the Luftwaffe had already suffered significant attrition in both the Polish and French campaigns and many of their crews were already exhausted from relentless hi-tempo operations closely followed by intense training for an air campaign against the RAF they were not designed for…

Okay this is stating the historical situation, but then historically Nazi Germany had already surrendered by the time the Atomic Bombs were developed. Given this subjects title with possibility of Germany winning the war, thought it was safe with the assumption that the neither the Allies or Russians were at the borders of Germany. Doesn’t matter to which situation you want to consider; that the Russian were defeated/surrendered, England conquered, or just the Allies fail to land across the channel. Unless the United States hasn’t entered the war against Germany, sometime late in 1945, the Atomic Bomb is going to attempted to be dropped and most likely at least the first one is going to be successful. How would Germany respond?

The threat to Britain in the Battle of Britain wasn’t supply of fighter aircraft but wastage of fighter pilots. IIRC there were many more fighter planes than fighter pilots in Britain at the end of the Battle of Britain.

If Germany had persisted for perhaps even a few more weeks the British losses might have allowed Germany to gain the ascendancy. Against that, or course, is that the British were shooting German planes down at a greater rate than the Germans were shooting down British fighters, so Germany’s ability to persist was debatable.

These ‘what if’ discussions often tend to focus too much on the spectacular conflicts rather than the real strategic threats and issues.

Until America came in, Britain’s major problems for long term issues affecting its ability to sustain a long war, and to some extent Germany’s, were more on the sea than in the air or land, North Africa notwithstanding.

One aspect is that Germany couldn’t get its major capital ships out in the latter part, and Britain couldn’t get its transports to North Africa through the Mediterranean but had to sail around the whole of the African continent to come back up through the Suez Canal, which took months out and home and effectively reduced Britain’s transport and RN escort shipping capacity to about a third or less of what would have existed if the Med route was open.

Meanwhile, some British naval activity was based in or came through Gibraltar and denied the Italians, and to a lesser extent the Germans, the Western Mediterranean.

Germany could have had a major impact on Britain’s war by:

  1. Pressuring Franco to accept German forces in Spain to take Gibraltar or, given Franco’s wily refusal to get involved in Germany’s war, taking the same approach Hitler took to Belgium, France and, later, Italy by just imposing German forces on Spain. Or just Gibraltar, which compared with the German airborne assault on Crete would have been a much less demanding exercise, as long as the Spaniards didn’t get involved.
  2. Concentrating submarine and or surface ships to attack British convoys which had to stop at Freetown to coal and water. As it was, those convoys generally proceeded without incident to supply North Africa with troops and materiel.

These two fairly simple steps would have deprived Britain of the ability to fight the war it actually fought in North Africa; possibly or probably resulted in a solely Italian defeat of or at least a stalemate with British forces in North Africa; and avoided the British campaign in Greece which may have delayed Barbarossa by a critical six weeks or so and perhaps improved Germany’s prospects of success in the USSR by getting it to Moscow six weeks before the crucial winter.

Conversely, if British forces weren’t diverted to Greece, they would have been stronger in North Africa with a different result there.

The major problem in this scenario is whether Italy’s campaigns in North Africa would succeed, without the German involvement which was actually required because of Italy’s failures, against British forces which had reduced reinforcements and supplies because of the Gibraltar / Freetown challenges to Britain’s lines of communication.

Obviously there is a fair bit of simplistic projections in these comments and what is built on them, but I think there was a definite opportunity for Germany to change the course of its war by taking just these two steps.

I haven’t read all the comments yet but I just wanted to add that the war would have lasted longer if it wasn’t the fact that the allies outnumbered German by 8:1. Otherwise that war would have lasted at least a few more years. In my personal opinion.

“8:1” where? Does that include U.S. and Commonwealth forces arrayed against Japan in the Pacific?

I was under the impression that Britain’s RAF had only fully modernized Fighter Command not long before, or perhaps not long after, the initiation of hostilities whereas the Luftwaffe had a ready supply of Me109’s from the outset - which conceivably could have been a larger advantage. That being said, the Hurricane was by far the bigger killer anyways in terms of numbers of German aircraft destroyed. Of course, it’s debatable how far the Germans were willing to persist as Barbarossa was already more than a glimmer in Hitler’s eyes by that point IIRC…

But I’m no expert on any of this LOL…

Also the almost always forgotten Chinese forces fighting the Japanese before and during the Pacific War, which forced Japan to keep most of its army in China.

IIRC Japan started the war with roughly 50 army divisions and could spare only about 12 of them for its southern thrust. (I’m ready to be shot down in flames on this.)

The demands in China were critical to the IJA’s opposition to the IJN’s desire to invade Australia early in 1942.

Can’t recall, and probably never knew, the proportion of Japanese forces engaged against Chinese forces and Japanese forces in static positions facing the USSR from the start of the Pacific War until the last days when the Soviets attacked, but I think it was perhaps about a quarter to a third of Japanese army forces in China facing the Soviets.

The net result of the Chinese fighting and Soviet threat was that the bulk of the IJA was committed to China rather than to the Pacific land war.

The general ignorance in the West of the contribution made by the Chinese, of which I confess I have only superficial knowledge as it’s an extraordinarily complicated history with the division between the Nationalist and Communist forces (it’s on my long list of things I have to read up on at some stage), overlooks the fact that if Japan had conquered China before starting its southern advance then Japan’s war would have turned out very differently. As with Hitler, Japan made the mistake of opening a war on two fronts, oddly enough inspired by Hitler’s early victories against the USSR.

I’m not sure that Japanese victory over China would have contributed much to Germany’s war. Eisenhower did an early paper in which he considered letting Australia go. As it was, America wanted to keep the lines of communication to Australia open to enable it to build up a base for a thrust against Japan. However, if Japan had been stronger and had succeeded in Guadalcanal and other eastern thrusts to Fiji etc and discouraged America from basing troops in Australia, those American troops and the naval, notably aircraft carriers, and air forces used in the South West Pacific in 1942 could (depending upon what forces America actually committed to a different war than the one which actually occurred) have been available for operations elsewhere, notably North Africa and Italy which could have advanced considerably the timing of American involvement in those campaigns while the Germans were faltering in the USSR.

Not forgetting of course that the Germans were not on their own - a few million Romanians, Bulgarians, Italians, Japanese, Finnish, Slovaks, Volunteers, ex PoW, Austrians, Annexed areas whose people were declared German and I am sure still more could be added - seems that many forget Germany was not fighting alone.

RAF Fighter Command was just about at the bare minimum they deemed that was required for the defence of the UK (55 squadrons were required - in May 1940 it had 30+ with 13 going to France), this number included Gladiators, Defiants and Blenheim 1F which were all of limited value.

By the end of the BoB the Luftwaffe was losing more aircraft than it could replace - it was suffering increasing numbers of unservicable aircraft with lack of spares, crew morale was dropping with crews being reported as dropping loads at the slightest excuse and running for home.

Compare to the RAF that had more aircraft at the end with more spares than at the beginning. The Empire pilots training schools were now turning out trained pilots and aircrew.

Out of the six fighter groups in Fighter Command only 10 and 11 were fully engaged with 11 facing the brunt. it is not widely understood that you still had one moderately engaged (12) and three relatively un engaged groups in the UK - Squadrons and crews could be rotated with the quieter sectors - with pilots being taken out of the line to train the new ones (something that the Germans and Japanese were failing to do and completely collapsed with by late war).

Did the EATS make much of a contribution to the Battle of Britain?

I’m inclined to think it was later, purely on the basis that the first EATS trained RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force, as distinct from RAF for non-British / Commonwealth readers) fighter squadrons weren’t formed in Britain until 1941.

There were certainly some Australians in the RAF during the Battle of Britain, but I think they were officers on exchange or direct enlistments in the RAF.

Don’t know about contributions from other Dominions to the Battle of Britain.

They were starting to make their presence felt at the end of the BoB - if the battle had gone on longer they would have had a marked effect - the Germans had no reserve pool like that though - their training was cut while the allies was actually increased.

Contrary to some belief as well the Germans still had Bi-Plane fighters in action in 1940 and as ground attack up till 1944 - they never fully modernised their forces and as the war progressed were forced to rely more and more on obsolete aircraft and designs as well as poorer quality aircrew.

Not familiar with German air training, but similar problem for Japanese who lost cream of the IJN pilots in the first year or so of the Pacific War. They still clung to a lengthy traditional training regime which couldn’t replace losses, while the Allies in general and the Americans in particular developed training systems which produced pilots relatively quickly at a higher rate than losses, along with aircraft production on the same basis. From then on it was only a matter of time before the Japanese lost control of the air, which in turn meant losing control of the land and sea battle grounds.

I’m not shooting you down or checking your facts on this and think you make an excellent point that should be mentioned more often irregardless of correctness of numbers. I was trying to watch one of the worst WWII documentaries I’ve ever seen produced by the miserably declining History Channel. During their idiotic, lazy, and generally ignorant use to random stock footage having nothing to do with the subject they were discussing at the time in a very ADATS manner (i.e. showing the same B-17 footage over and over when talking about the “Nazi Blitz” on Poland or during the Battle of Britain), I recall being outraged several times. One time of which was when seemed to wet themselves about MacArthur in the Philippines and mentioning how his 20,000+ (American) servicemen were outnumbered by the Japanese IJA of nearly 2,000,000 without ever bothering to mention that most of that Army was tied down in China…

I was trying to watch one of the worst WWII documentaries I’ve ever seen produced by the miserably declining History Channel.

Hi Nickdfresh – I was channel surfing and came across that History Channel abomination too. Within just a couple of minutes they made two non-trivial misrepresentations/errors.

I continued surfing. I guess they value Pawnstars more than their namesake. Pretty sad, actually. And educational channels like Animal Planet and the Discovery Channel are self-immolating with documentaries about mermaids and non-extinct extinct giant sharks. And idiots eat it up…

That must be the same trash I caught on history, it was aggravating to see 30’s German police, and Soldiers using British Rifles, Japanese too. Very poorly produced, and fact checking was nearly non-existent. I had to turn it off after a short time, and watch something more edifying like Barney.

The problem for filmed treatments of any war or any other topic is that, at least in the hands of uninspired directors, they require motion picture film or video.

It often seems that the film available determined the limits of the commentary rather than the commentary being based in accurate history and obtaining film to support that accuracy.

With rare exceptions, (1970s series ?The World at War? and occasional specific topic documentaries) I’ve rarely seen a so called filmed documentary which relied on motion picture film that was anything more than at best superficial and at worst stunningly inaccurate historically.

Conversely, there have been some excellent programs where filming contemporary images with relevant commentary has compensated for the lack of motion picture film, notably an American series quite some years ago on the American Civil War. That series, like ?The World at War? combined contemporary historical images with modern interviews with people who had connections with the War, and commentary by modern historians.

A series currently showing here on WWII secret colour film or somesuch is, compared with the latter, an excuse to show colour or colourised WWII film (most of which I’ve seen before in the couple of episodes I endured, so it’s not that secret) with an embarrassingly inaccurate commentary.

There is nothing wrong with programs which accurately inform people about topics which those well informed about the topic would regard as superficial. Those programs can, for example, let people like me with no scientific training get an understanding of complex subjects such as climate change. The problem is that those of us who, like me, are ignorant on such topics may lack the discernment to work out whether the program is usefully superficial or just plain wrong.

Conveniently overlooking the rather larger number of Filipino soldiers MacArthur had been recruited to train and command before he reverted to American rank shortly before Japan attacked. At least he was consistent in doing a shithouse job in both commands, ensuring that he was responsible for both the Filipinos and the Americans losing.

For a pretty good modern documentary on WW2 this was pretty good - a mix of modern actors and original film - 6 part series on Dunkirk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8u0Vsyt2PaM

I personally LOVE the History Channel. I don’t know about authenticity but it intrigues me to learn. Did you guys not like the movie GRAVITY with Sandra Bullock?..Well, the Canadian astronaut Chris Hatfield was ejected from a movie cinema for heckling the movie…because to him, space is not what is is portrayed in the movie, yet I loved the movie. Guys, I think the point is, like the Bible, as long as we get people interested in the movement then it will encourage them to want to reach out and learn more and value more about the cause. The people that watch History Channel are not all Brainiacs like Nick, PDF and maybe RS,…but people like me that get motivated to want to learn more, and want to join websites about war stuff, and subsequently learn the truth from real war historians like the ones who contribute to this site. In conclusion, I love History Channel because it gets the ball rolling and it mnakes me want to look up more facts and learn more. God Bless the Queen and God Bless The History Channel!!

i don’t know what Histroy Channel shows in North America but over here in Norway it’s only Pawnstars, Ancient Aliens and Iceroad truckers…

Like Norway doesn’t have enough Ice of it’s own, Hist. Channel sends you shows about it? I visited your Country many years ago, enjoyed it immensely. The Forests in Winter were amazing.

Unfortunately myths are spread and more readily believed by people through the medium of TV and the history channel has produced some exceedingly bad and inaccurate documentaries about warfare and equipment - perpetuating myths by spouting them instead of investigating them.

Many accept what those poorly researched shows claim as the truth and then come and say it on the net, some will accept corrections and enter a discourse others well they will rant up and down so spoiling factual discussion that can be backed up from various sources.