Could Operation Barbarossa Have Worked?

[Jagdtiger]

I think that Germany could have won the Eastern Front. First of all, if they had launched Operation Sealion in July 1940 when they had tremendous air superiority and momentum from previous victories then they could have knocked Britain out of the war, preventing them from sending supplies to the Soviet Union. This also would have made it harder for the United States to supply them.

Even if they hadn’t done that they still could have won if Hitler had not believed that he was an infallible military commander. Hitler stretched his line way too thin without many supplies, trying to conquer everything at once. The best, and probably most costly example of this is when he split Army Group South into Army Group A under List and Army Group B under Weichs. He then sent the larger forced down into the Caucuses in an attempt to reach the oil fields and the smaller force to Stalingrad. They found some of the oil fields burning and never even reached their ultimate destination, the Baku oilfields.

Also, Hitler sacked many of his good and experienced generals such as Rundstedt, for retreating at times where it made perfectly good sense. This brings up another point about Hitler’s no retreat order, which was stupid and cost many lives.

[Cojimar_1945]

I would think the occupation of the USSR by Germany might have been feasible given that the Germans were only using a tiny fraction of their industrial might against the Soviets. If Germany actually put some effort into the conflict than victory would seem plausible.

[Chevan]

@Ashes

That’s the much debated 64,000 dollar question isn’t it.

I think it’s not so disputable question among historians as the matter of argue among the retired GErmans generals ,whose favorite work is to write the books “How Hitler has bothered them to win the War”

Go for Moscow like the all rampaging Guderian [and Bock] wanted, or, as happened the turn South.
Found this on ‘‘articles of war’’ the ‘‘what ifs’’ of Hitlers decisions.

Having lost their battle for Moscow with Hitler, the German generals applied themselves to the rapid conclusion of the diversion of Army Group Center’s panzer’s southward with the expectation of advancing on Moscow once this move was complete. Among the benefits of a panzer drive south was that the vulnerable and extended southern flank of Army Group Center would then be secured. Once it was completed, there would be no threat of a northward thrust against the rear of the army group by Soviet forces nominally to the south or southwest of it.
Whether such a threat to the flank of Army Group Center ever existed, however, is open to debate. Despite the fact that the Soviet Southwestern Front was stronger than the fronts opposing the advances of the German army groups further north on the Eastern front, its armies were being pushed back. They had thus far managed to avoid being caught in the destructive battles of encirclement that other Soviet armies had been trapped in, but the Soviet forces fighting Army Group South were not in a position to disengage without risking destruction.

There is not just a treat for the Central Southern flank but also and pragmatic military action to help the Group Army South to crush the Soviet SouthernEast front.
Don’t forget - although the soviet Southern front retreated the situation wasn’t so critical for Red Army here and , the Kiev Fortified area still was more more then serious barrier for the GErmans.
Turning the 2 tank army of Guderian to the South , Hitler captured the whole Ukraine ( agricaltural and industry base of USSR) at the moment whan it was the best for it.
And the further Soviet “resistence” agains AG Centre just has demonstrated for Hitler(and for everybody else)- there no more serious soviet troops on a way to Mocsow.

In order for even a small part of these forces to represent a serious threat to the German advance in the center, against Moscow, they would have had to have been fully disengaged in the south first. To do this implied weakening Soviet resistance in the Ukraine. Withdrawing substantial forces would have meant significantly weakening the Soviet defense in the south. Since the Soviet forces in the Ukraine were already being pushed back by the German offensive, doing so would have risked turning what was a battle for the Ukraine into a Soviet rout comparable to that occurring further north. Under these circumstances it was extremely doubtful that an effective Soviet attack could have been mounted against Army Group Center’s exposed southern flank.

In the postwar period, under the influence of the writings of German generals involved in Barbarossa campaign – Guderian in particular, there has been a great deal of attention given to the implications of a successful German attack on Moscow. Some historians, Stolfi for example, have gone so far as to suggest that a German victory in the war against the Soviet Union depended on capturing Moscow before the winter of 1941-42 and that there were no good military reasons for the Germans not achieving this result. Such writings focus on the redirection of panzer forces south – on Hitler’s orders – as the primary reason the German campaign failed to reach Moscow before the winter. In response, other historians like Glantz have suggested that part of the reason the Germans turned south was the increasing Soviet resistance on the Moscow axis at the time of the Battle of Smolensk and the need to secure Army Group Center’s southern flank. These are the same reasons expressed by Hitler in his arguments with the army generals and written into Directives 33 and 34.

I have to say the both historians are pretty true.
In fact the political meaning of capturing Moscow was critical for entire war in the East. And also the Soviet Reserve Front that took part in the Smolensk battle in august, creating some troubles for Germans.
Sure the capturing of Moscow would be the most importaint task for Hitler, but…
He Goes not Race for territory, he goes race to destroy the Enemy troops, and then the territory has come inot his hands:)
Remember in France, Hitler initially had crushed the French army - then the entire France had fall down to his foots.
Same in the East- he was fully devoited of his strategy.
Turning to the South - he aimed to liquidate the serious enemy forces, as he has destroyed it befor in the AG Centre in fierced battles near the Smolensk and Bobryisk.
In fact the Soviets has no any more troops to defend to Moscow in august-September.
So he could wait ( as it was actually clear) while the last power soviet forces would have been surrounded and crushed in Ukraine.
It was right military decision - to turn the Guderian to the South where the soviets absolutly did not wite him.
And the resault was a great…for Germans.
So the GErmans succes on the South ( as well and North, where the Germans had joined with Finns )) has been realized due to Hitlers orders.
By the oher words , the Hiler decision turn the Tanks to south has no any real influence at the Moscow.
There is the whole other matter with failure of attack of Moscow in november-december.
As you may be know the Hitler suncirely hope that Japane would attack the Soviet Far East.
But Japs , has choiced the “Southern Direction” i.e the attack of the Southern Asia ( involving USA into the war).
Hitler was in fierce when he has been informed in autumn that Japanes will not attack the USSR. ( the bitish hsitorian Alan Clark has wrote in his excellent book “Barbarossa” about this scene).
As the direct and immediate resault- the Soviets moved about 10 of fresh and fully armed syberian divisions to the Moscow.
This additional force actually helped to save Moscow.
But it wasn’t failure of Hitler IMO, who did not even suspect about Japane behaiviour.

And the debate goes on.:mrgreen:

Excellent post though, thank you.
I think the Hitler has conducted an brilliant military compain in the 1941 in the USSR.
Due his command the Soviet Ukraine has been cuptured , Leningrad and whole nothern front has been paralysed by siege.
And winter indeed has no so critical influence at the failure of barbarossa as it usially is portrayed in the west.
In fact soviets has the simular troubles with frost ( as they survived it in the Finland in 1940)

[Ashes]

@Chevan

Excellent post though, thank you.
I think the Hitler has conducted an brilliant military compain in the 1941 in the USSR.
Due his command the Soviet Ukraine has been cuptured , Leningrad and whole nothern front has been paralysed by siege.
And winter indeed has no so critical influence at the failure of barbarossa as it usially is portrayed in the west.
In fact soviets has the simular troubles with frost ( as they survived it in the Finland in 1940)

Perhaps not such a brilliant military campaign by Hitler.

Key elements of Hitlers directive 21…

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1084/hitler_directives/dir21.htm

…was compromised by the fuehrer himself, with Directives 33 and 34.

And of the new Directives, [the Army group centre Panzer’s North to Leningrad and South to Kiev,] the author of a very good book on Barbarossa says…

''All the objectives Hitler had outlined in directive 33 had been achieved. Yet the operation remains essentially, because strategically, a failure. It did not win the war for the Germans, and today we can see that it was not necessary, even as a prelude to victory. Indeed, the Ukrainian campaign went far to lose Hitler the war, in that it’s conception and pursuit denied him the chance of subduing the Russians before winter…

The brilliance came from the exploits of the relatively few Panzer Divisions led by men like Guderian, Hoth, Kleist etc who ran rings around everyone and made Hitler look good.

Think it came down to a competition between Hitler and Stalin as to who made the biggest blunders, although as the war went on, Hitler took even more control himself, while with Stalin, the penny dropped after his disastrous spring offensive in '43, and he let his commanders have a bit more latitude.

And why the failure of Barbarossa?
Probably a combination of poor German logistics, few reserves, the 17 fresh Siberian divs, plus the effect of 30 degrees below zero weather on troops not fitted out for those extremes, [and don’t forget the Fuehrer].

From Hitler in the Obersalzberg Speech…

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/hitler-obersalzberg.html

‘‘Since the autumn of 1938 and since I have realised that Japan will not go with us unconditionally.’’

Don’t think Hitler put much faith in Japanese help.

[imi]

Of course it’s work if Hitler don’t open two front,and the primary target was the oil fields at the Caucasus.
The first wave was a catastrophe because the winter(like also Napoleon),in the second wave the soldiers are tired and broken,vehicles without petrol,weak supply and many soldiers fights in the western front,but I think the axis side do his best every time.