Did US really devote only 15% of war effort to Pacific War?

World War II American Military
#21

I do have a few figures to give that I know of. The US army had just over 5 million troops oversea’s with about 3.5 million in Europe and 1.5 million in the Pacific. All 6 US marine divisions fought in the Pacific which was about 350,000 in the pacific including the marine aviation units. In terms of divisions the US army had 68 divisions in Europe and 21 in the pacific plus the 6 marine divisions. In planes the US army air force had almost 15,000 combat aircraft in Europe. In the Pacific it was over 21,000 combat aircraft which was 7,000 army air force planes and over 14,000 navy and marine planes.

The US had about 100 carriers at wars end and I believe over 60 of them were in the pacific. The US had over 400 destoryers at wars end and 296 were in the pacific. For most of the war of the 23 US battleships only 3 were in Europe with the rest in the pacific. I know at wars end the US had 7.6 million troops oversea’s. Just over 5 million were army troops which left about 2.6 million naval troops which included the 350,000 marines. I dont know the figure of how many naval troops were where but I would bet of the 2.6 million around 2 million were most likely in the pacific.

I would say they had more then 15% in the pacific. Just in army divisions they had more then 15% in the pacific. Ron

#22

Thanks for those figures.

At the risk of stating the obvious, they’re a consequence of the Pacific War being fought over vast expanses of ocean where in Europe, at least as far as US air and land assaults from Britain were concerned, Britain was a massive air craft carrier conveniently anchored quite close to continental Europe. Less so in the Mediterranean, but still much less of a drain on resources than the Pacific War was on America, and Britain for that matter in the Indian Ocean, Burma and India during Britain’s offensive phase later in the war. Also a consequence of logical division of responsibilities between the USN and RN.

If we add the resources devoted to building and maintaining the US carriers, battleships and destroyers in the Pacific and add to that the massive effort in the fleet train required to supply those ships over huge distances, and the materiel produced to supply them, the US naval effort was well above 15% of America’s naval effort. On your figures, at a wild guess it could be somewhere around or above 60 to 75% for the classes of ships you mention, which include the bulk of America’s capital ships which would have put a much bigger drain on resources than, say, the same number of destroyers.

As it was very much an amphibious landing war in the Pacific over several years versus only a few major amphibious landings in Europe, there would also be a correspondingly larger commitment of landing craft and associated transport and support in the Pacific than there was in Europe. Can’t recall which ETO landing it was, maybe Italy, but I think there was a shortage of US landing craft because of the demands on landing craft in the Pacific.

Add in the crucial factor of fuel required to run and supply the ships in the Pacific, which would have been a multiple of that required to cross the Atlantic and maintain convoy escorts etc and limited naval engagements, and it’s possible that more fuel could have been used in the PTO than the ETO. Against that is fuel consumption by merchant shipping in the Atlantic, especially in the build up for D Day and convoys to the USSR.

Your figures just add to the doubt about the oft recited 15% figure for the PTO.

What’s left out is the demand the US air war in the ETO put on US resources as there wasn’t any comparable sustained large scale bombing campaign in the PTO.

#23

I did find another figure to add in one of my books as it says on the day that D-day started there were 4,748 landing craft opperating in the channel and the Mediterranean and on that same date Nimitz and MaCarthur had 3,866 landing craft in the pacific. I would guess after D-day many in Europe went back to the pacific. Ron

#24

We’d need a break down of the different types of landing craft in each theatre for a fair comparison but, on the raw figures and assuming it covers landing craft for all services, nearly 45% of US landing craft were still in the Pacific at the time of highest demand for landing craft in the ETO. That’s three times the only 15% supposedly devoted to the PTO.

#25

I wish it gave a breakdown but it did not give any breakdown. Ron

#26

The reason for this was due to at the moment the Navy had major control of the decisions made in the Pacific and the were leading and supplying the Marines with old U.S. Army weaponry which means the got all the old weaponry. Which the Navy paid cheap for and that made the need of bonds go down. Now another point is the islands they were attacking were small and did not need as much supplies as attacking Normandy. 3 the Pacific theater was mainly neglected by the American public.

#27

No.

For example, check out the history of landing craft built and deployed during WWII and the BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) in the USMC in the Pacific War.

No.

The logistics in the Pacific war across thousands of miles of ocean were far more demanding than crossing a few miles of the English Channel.

No.

A major problem for the American government from Pearl Harbor onwards was that the American public was focused on revenge against Japan. The Administration had to work hard to convince the American public that the nation should devote its war effort primarily against Germany.

#28

I didn’t say they had all controll over them 2 yes it was very very expensive but compared to the Europe campaign it was little smaller 3 the last one I have no excuse