Perhaps some credit could be given to the British for snatching salvation from the jaws of defeat.
Hitler wasn’t responsible for the evacuation of the British and some French forces. Failing to press the attack on Dunkirk was part of the reason for the survival of the main elements of the BEF, but it was the evacuation which was the essential reason for its survival and Hitler had every opportunity to stop that; made steady attempts to stop it from the air; and failed.
Unlike Stalingrad and Tobruk, there was a huge advantage to the British in evacuating Dunkirk where that was not an advantageous option in the sieges of Stanlingrad and Tobruk.
Just before midnight on June 2 1940, the Channel ferry St Helier slipped from the mole at Dunkirk, and headed for England with the last of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Captain William Tennant RN, Beachmaster and the man responsible for the naval organisation of the evacuation, signalled Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay, Flag Officer Dover: “BEF evacuated.” Then he and Major General Harold Alexander toured the area in a launch, Alexander shouting through a megaphone: “Is anyone there?” No one answered. They boarded a destroyer, with German bullets whistling around them.
Earlier that night, Alexander had watched the soldiers, illuminated by massive fires and with shells raining down, filing slowly along the mole, the wooden breakwater protecting the harbour at Dunkirk. “The men at no time showed fear or restlessness,” he said later. “They were patient, brave and obedient, and when finally ordered to embark they did so in perfectly disciplined groups, properly armed and equipped.”
Throughout the previous day, Alexander’s immaculate appearance and quiet good manners had raised the morale of all who saw him as he moved among troops waiting for nightfall, and for the ships to arrive. In every mind was the question: “What if the Germans overwhelm the rearguards before darkness brings salvation?” A soldier’s general, Alexander was absolutely the right choice to command the final evacuation of the BEF, and instil confidence.
Some 20,000 French were taken off that night in addition to the British troops. The next night, 63 vessels of all kinds, British and French, took off a further 26,000 French troops in a final lift. At 4.30am, as the grey light pierced the heavy pall of smoke hanging over Dunkirk, HMS Shikari, one of the Royal Navy’s oldest destroyers, cast off from the East Mole, her decks crammed with French soldiers.
The man behind this, the largest seaborne evacuation ever attempted, was a brilliant and forceful leader. Vice-Adml Ramsay had begun planning for the evacuation as early as May 20. His was the guiding mind that put into place all the meticulous arrangements, involving
some 900 vessels, between May 26 and June 4 1940.
Researching my book about Dunkirk brought home to me just what an astonishing and unorthodox feat it was. In the course of my career in the Royal Marines, I’ve carried out a number of amphibious landings, but the evacuation from Dunkirk was an amphibious operation in reverse, without any proper landing craft.
Its necessity, however, is beyond doubt. Only three weeks before, the Germans had invaded France, Belgium and Holland, an event for which the French and British Allies had spent some 10 months preparing. Having rushed forward into Belgium to meet the German onslaught, the Allies believed all was going according to the script. Then the enemy played a wild card: nine Panzer divisions crossed the Meuse in the area of Sedan, and advanced through the Ardennes.
A mere 11 days later, German tanks had reached the Channel coast. The Maginot Line on which the French had staked their hopes had been outflanked. The BEF and French armies of the north were now cut off from the rest of France. With the French and Belgian armies retreating on each side, there was only one recourse for the BEF: withdrawal to Dunkirk.
Dunkirk harbour was the biggest on the Channel coast. Surrounded by marshes that could be flooded, it was easily defended. To the east, gently shelving sandy beaches extended for nearly 20 miles, which meant that embarking troops was difficult: even small craft could not approach within about 100 yards of the waterline, so soldiers had to wade out to them. Larger vessels had to anchor well offshore; craft ferrying troops out had a long turn-round time. There were no jetties and no piers anywhere along the 20-mile stretch.
The harbour was under almost continual attack by the Luftwaffe, so Capt Tennant decided that all evacuation must be from the beaches. He soon realised that this was far too slow, and ordered a destroyer to come alongside the East Mole of the harbour. This was quickly followed by six more. As a result of Tennant’s bold decision, Ramsay switched the main effort from the beaches to the East Mole; this was connected to the beaches by a causeway, allowing soldiers to march directly from the beaches to the ships alongside the mole. The numbers of troops being evacuated rose sharply.
On that same day, May 28, the first of the “little ships” appeared. Their main task was to ferry troops from the beaches to the destroyers and ferries offshore. Without the “little ships” – whose epic voyage was retraced by a flotilla across the Channel yesterday – only a fraction of the troops would have been transported from the beaches. Ramsay was behind the decision that the “little ships” be sent across to assist after Tennant had signalled to Dover ‘‘for every available craft’’.
And as the evacuation proceeded, the RAF tore into the Luftwaffe, shooting down 132 enemy aircraft for the cost of 99 fighters. Without the RAF, many more ships would have been sunk, and few of the BEF would have got away.
Originally, it was thought that some 45,000 soldiers might be rescued. Eventually, 338,226 were taken away in what Churchill described as a “miracle of deliverance”. Thanks to Ramsay’s planning, the power and skill of the Royal Navy, and the gallantry of the Royal and Merchant Navy ships’ companies, and, of course, the crews of the “little ships”. There was a cost. Of 38 destroyers, six were sunk and 26 damaged. Of 46 ferries, nine were sunk and 11 damaged.
The evacuation from Dunkirk was undoubtedly the final phase in a defeat. But, had this culminated in the BEF’s surrender and capture, it is inconceivable that Britain would have fought on. The Germans might not have invaded our Island, but instead, as Hitler always hoped, Britain would have been forced to agree peace terms. The escape of the BEF followed by the failure of the Luftwaffe to win the Battle of Britain bought a precious commodity: time, allowing the British to absorb the lessons of the campaign in France and Flanders, to re-equip and
retrain her Army.
In 1939, the United States Army was ranked 17th in size in the world after Romania. It is therefore out of the question that America could have played any part in stopping the expansion of Germany had Britain capitulated. Without Britain, and her Empire and Commonwealth, continuing to resist, Hitler could have won the war, even after the invasion of Russia. The evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk truly was a retreat to ultimate victory over Nazi Germany.
‘Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory’ by Major General Julian Thompson (Pan Macmillan)
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