History is independant of victors or vanquished. If you haven’t learned that , there is not much hope.
I can gauge your responce by the ease with which to dismiss the impact Hitler had on Germany, the Wehrmacht and the whole European war. The ease with which you assume the CW version of Dunkirk is the right one??? In history there is no right and wrong side, there are always two sides to every event. You have to seek them both out to completely understand such an event. Not just pay lipservice to one side. A good historian would know this.
You are right. Maybe I should talk in riddles (like you) and then people might think I am clever (like you?)
I was thinking that I could gauge your response by the ease with which you assume the ‘unbeatable Wehrmacht’ version of history.
Somehow I think it is much easier for you. Just find a version that reflects well on the German Army and ignore anything that has negative implications.
Perhaps you have further ramblings you wish to add?
To an extent. But also to an extent, Franco-British operations were somewhat undermined by their own dependence on Belgium and their failure to anticipate the German plan (even though they were somewhat aware of a good deal of it–including Sickle Cut!). Gamelin was under a good deal of pressure–for he knew he was risking seriously overextending his forces and getting the best armed, most mechanized portion of them cut off in Belgium and/or the low countries–but not doing so would have been as politically unacceptable as the U.S. standing by and allowing Canada to be attacked or Germany standing by while someone invaded Austria today.
There were calls from within the French military to pursue less altruistic but more militarily sound strategy of fortifying the frontiers of France by either extending the Maginot Line to the sea and fortifying the border with Belgium, of creating smaller fortifications and awaiting the forces of the German breakthrough to coalesce. Once this line was pierced, then they would send the massed French mechanized forces to counter and smash any breakthrough. But this was heretical to the traditional French military thinking of the day…
It also should be noted that the fall of Fort Eben Emael via an expert German special operations attack in less than a day was considered somewhat shocking that completely threw off the Belgian timetable for mobilization. It was anticipated the Fort would hold for at least three days…
Um, I went to Buffalo State and took several history courses there. Their history dept. is designed to prepare high school teachers and is hardly a bastion of intellectual scholarship…
Back to Dunkirk:
Some friend here ask me for a wetland where panzer operation had succeded, do some reading about this:
Guderian ordered the use of armored forces and ensured success in the much more unfavorable terrain at lake Ilmen during Barbarossa.
And another British General Quote:
“We shall have lost all our trained soldiers by the next few days-unless a miracle appears to help us”
Gen. Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 25 May 1940.
But I don’t believe in miracles, although everyone has it’s right to have it’s own beliefs . But nowadays there are inquisitors everywhere.
What’s interesting is your constant attack on PM Winston Churchill’s credibility yet complete faith in nearly every one of the Fuhrer’s pronouncements at face value. Some might find that a bit troubling and would be perplexed that anyone would give more credibility to a mass murder who resorted to cowardly semantics of “evacuation” regarding his own atrocities…
I agree to an extent, and want the German point-of-view written. The problem here is that this isn’t a case of “victor’s writing the history.” It’s more of a case of German generals writing a fanciful after action report and absolving themselves for the blame of the BEF slipping away, and trying to pin it all on Hitler’s “stop order” as well as contemporary hack historians and neo-fascists pointing out selective quotes of Hitler’s speeches where he’s trying to cover his own arse for a military blunder. Many of the German commanders you’ve named thus far, including Bock, had previously called for panzer halt! orders in order to consolidate gains, resupply and repair the panzers, and to allow the infantry to catch up and guard the axis of advance against Allied counterattacks in the panzer "‘walls’ or “panzer corridor”(Keegon). The truth is that few, if any, German Heer commanders considered an evacuation at Dunkirk likely as they had little conceptualization of amphibious operations…
Secondly, John Keegan writes that:
“The Germans had collectively grown nervous that day - although Guderian, commanding the 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions, champed at the bit by every means to get forward. But Hitler, recorded Halder, ‘is anxious about our own success, doesn’t want to risk anything and therefore would be happiest to have us halt.’ Halder himself was concerned with the line of ‘walls’ of the developing ‘Panzer Corridor’ with his infantry, which was lagging behind the tanks…Nevertheless (despite much evidence of two key French armies collapsing) the German high command, prompted by Hitler’s anxieties, [b]on 17 May imposed a halt on the advance[/b].” (John Keegan, The Second World War pg. 76)
So, what magnanimous act was Hitler trying to show the Allies on 17 May? His Panzer Halt order of 26 May was no different, especially considering the modest success the French “Weygand Line” was beginning to have in the south where the French fortified their towns and fought hard, much harder than they had done previously. Their problem was that no French mobile reserve existed to counter any German breakthroughs. Saying ‘Hitler just let the British go at Dunkirk’ because he wanted peace is nothing more than a Post hoc ergo propter hoc argument and ignores a good deal of his other demonstrated military incompetency…
I know that this Sounds ever so simplistic but I don’t think the Germans really thought that they would ever do so well as they had. Poland had shown them what could be, but Im sure in their hearts they didn’t really envisage the success that they had. In other words their own success made them cautious. I think that they possibly gave the Allies too much respect.
If Dunkirk had come after something like the Balkans then Im not sure the BEF would have escaped.
I think the consensus is that the Germans saw Fall Gelb and Rot as an all-or-nothing proposition that was either going to be spectacularly successful or result in a costly long war if the French recovered quick enough. But the German planners not named Guderian, Rommel, Halder, and Manstein certainly did not envision the speedy collapse…
