The Tomson 45. Calibur Sub-Machine Gun (aka. Tommy Gun) had a pretty decent firerate
but the recoil was just to hard to control. probobly the worst flaw of the wepon. Compared to the BAR. The BAR is better.
Are you sure? The BAR was originally designed as a machine gun, so I’m sure it had plenty of recoil too.
The main problem with the Thompson was its lack of range.
Any problems with the .45 Tompson? State your Thoughts here. Like the Tompson? Post here too
That is my problem with it:mad:
the only problem i would have with it would be the production cost and the BAR was an excellent weapon in the war, very accurate and is a kind of easy to carry .30 cal, gas operated machine gun which would scare any mp40 wielder
[quote=“Sergeant_Dorr,post:24,topic:2697”]
That is my problem with it:mad:[/QUOTE]
Eh ?
The Thompson in its various guises from M1921 to M1A1 is one of the easiest SMGs to control ever produced !
Can you compare it to another SMG ?
Your comparison to a BAR is a little strange, they’re completely different wpn types.
As bwing55543 infers, if you assume the Thompson has a heavy felt recoil, then you’d kak over that of the BAR.
Have you handled either ?
Few of the US or British personnel that carried it would have complained about much of anything regarding the weapon, other than it might be a little on the heavy side. The main military complaint was that is was complex and expensive to produce in comparison with other equivalent weapons, especially the Sten…
I know the British commandos were outfitted with M1928 Thompsons. Whenever they returned from missions, such as the raid at St. Nazaire, the first thing the staff would do was make sure the Thompsons were all right, then attend to the grunts themselves. That was completely to do with how expensive the Thompsons were.
[quote=“bwing55543,post:28,topic:2697”]
[QUOTE=Nickdfresh;109802]
Few of the US or British personnel that carried it would have complained about much of anything regarding the weapon, other than it might be a little on the heavy side. The main military complaint was that is was complex and expensive to produce in comparison with other equivalent weapons, especially the Sten…[/QUOTE]
I know the British commandos were outfitted with M1928 Thompsons. Whenever they returned from missions, such as the raid at St. Nazaire, the first thing the staff would do was make sure the Thompsons were all right, then attend to the grunts themselves. That was completely to do with how expensive the Thompsons were.[/QUOTE]
Actually Bwing, it’s unlikely to be due to the cost as that’s been SOP for the British Army since it’s inception.
Many years ago I read some papers on the C17 English Civil Wars, and that same philosophy was expounded then.
The BAR appeared at the very end of WWI. I dont know if it was used in combat before the armistice. It was so well liked the Belgians manufactored it, and hired Browning to do some additional design work.
The Belgian Army had supplied the bulk of their infantry with the BAR as a squad weapon by 1940. The Poles also purchased a large quantity for the same purpose.
Post 1940 photographs of German soldiers will ocassionaly show them carrying these Belgian made BAR.
The French used the basic design of the gas operating system in their Chatellerault M29 design, but placed the magazine on top. Most other LMG or automatic rifle designs of the era, like the Cezch BREN designs had the magazine on top. That allowed the mag to be changed without the gunner taking the weapon out of his shoulder & losing his point of aim. It also allowed a slightly larger magazine.
The US Army T/E placed one BAR per rifle squad. Experinced US infantry scrounged extras to provide more firepower. In the Pacific the Marines authorized two per squad in early 1943, then three per squad at the end of 43. As the combat experince accumulated the Marines used the BAR more as a ‘super SMG’ than a LMG, and provided two to four belt fed MMG per platoon for covering fires.
The BAR was kept out of combat in WW1 for fear that the germans would steal the design, the allies instead used a weapon so crappy, most infantrymen threw it away the first chance they got
The Belgian modified BAR, (produced at Herstal under licence from Browning,) was the Fusil-Mitrailleur 1930, known in German service as the 7.65 leMG 127(b)
It was chambered in 7.65 x 54 and some versions even had quick-change bbls and SF tripods.
They also used three models of the reczny karabin maszynowy wz. 28, which as you might gather was the Polish-built version. This at least had the advantage that it was chambered in 7.92 x 57.
I hardly think the main reason it saw relatively few engagements was that it was kept from the line due to worries that the Germans would steal the design ! That mindset would be the ultimate in preventing military escalation.
Does Ballou have anything to say on the subject ?
It only entered service in 1918, and it’s first recorded major action being in Sep that year.
Out of interest what was the “weapon so crappy, most infantrymen threw it away the first chance they got” ?
I suspect he’s pulling directly from Wiki - there is a similar comment on there regarding Pershing and the BAR.
I also suspect the weapon he’s referring to is the Chauchat in .30-06 conversion - apparently this was badly botched with regard to chamber measurements and the weapons were never reliable. However, the AEF did successfully use a large number of Chauchats in 8mm Lebel prior to the BAR coming into service.
Well, i dont know, i cant give any sources but i have heard it a number of times. I belive i heard it mentioned on an episode of the History Channel program “Man, Moment, Machine” which was about the death of Bonny and Clide
This i also do not remember, i’m pretty sure it was french and i do know the reason behind it’s “crappiness” was that it would frequently, without fail, jam.
No, i will never intentionally quote an article without providing a link
Correct. Despite the fact that the far superior Lewis Gun in British service was designed by an American, many US troops lamented on having the Chauchat (pronounced sha-show-knee) inflicted on them. But part of the problem with the weapon was not the recalibration, but mainly that the Chauchats received by the AEF were badly used and worn as they had been pulled out of service from the French Army. Also, I believe the weapon had an open magazine allowing dirt and moisture to get in and adversely affect reliability…
And indeed small numbers of BARs were in service for the ‘final push’ in 1918, it was the Thompson that never quite got to the troops…
The increase in numbers of BARs in a squad also altered squad tactics, as did replacing them with autos for every squad member.
In our enthusiasm to come up with the perfect rifle, ordnance seems to occasionally forget that a certain amount of cohesiveness of the rifle squad is/was based upon the teamwork necessary to keep the squad automatic rifle in action – at least that has always been the case in the Marines. Early in WWII we traded our old eight-man squad for a 13-man squad composed of three “four man” fire teams and a squad leader. Each fire team had one BAR (a total of 3 per squad) and each fire team’s job was to keep the BAR in action. This accounted for the cohesiveness in the fire team I spoke of above, and gave each fire team member a reason for existence. In the old days, we (as troops) were cautioned that (in combat) if there were only three men left in a squad, all three had better be carrying a BAR. The M14 with its selector switch and bipod did away with all that, as now all the rifles looked the same. The heat of the jungle caused the ever weight conscious Marine to leave the bipod in the rear to cut down on his load. Since every M14 was easily converted to full auto, most were. At this point, the fire team members no longer felt the necessity of covering and supporting the automatic rifleman, since all the rifles now looked and functioned alike; tactics went to hell in a handbasket.
The M16 simply perpetuated the mistakes of the past, except that it was now worse. Now every gun had a "go faster switch" and fire discipline became a thing of the past. I still remember the TV coverage of the battle of Hue with the rifleman sticking his M16 over the parapet by the pistol grip and firing a full magazine without the slightest idea of what he was shooting at. What a waste! Tactics were going the way of the "Do-Do Bird" and everyone was marveling at the number of rounds that the average rifleman was able to fire against our enemy(s), although I began to suspect that our real enemy resided in the Defense Department in the name of Robert McNamara, and leadership in the Military by individuals who hadn't seen combat since the charge up San Juan Hill.
The increase in numbers of BARs in a squad also altered squad tactics, as did replacing them with autos for every squad member.
In our enthusiasm to come up with the perfect rifle, ordnance seems to occasionally forget that a certain amount of cohesiveness of the rifle squad is/was based upon the teamwork necessary to keep the squad automatic rifle in action – at least that has always been the case in the Marines. Early in WWII we traded our old eight-man squad for a 13-man squad composed of three “four man” fire teams and a squad leader. Each fire team had one BAR (a total of 3 per squad) and each fire team’s job was to keep the BAR in action. This accounted for the cohesiveness in the fire team I spoke of above, and gave each fire team member a reason for existence. In the old days, we (as troops) were cautioned that (in combat) if there were only three men left in a squad, all three had better be carrying a BAR. The M14 with its selector switch and bipod did away with all that, as now all the rifles looked the same. The heat of the jungle caused the ever weight conscious Marine to leave the bipod in the rear to cut down on his load. Since every M14 was easily converted to full auto, most were. At this point, the fire team members no longer felt the necessity of covering and supporting the automatic rifleman, since all the rifles now looked and functioned alike; tactics went to hell in a handbasket.
The M16 simply perpetuated the mistakes of the past, except that it was now worse. Now every gun had a “go faster switch” and fire discipline became a thing of the past. I still remember the TV coverage of the battle of Hue with the rifleman sticking his M16 over the parapet by the pistol grip and firing a full magazine without the slightest idea of what he was shooting at. What a waste! Tactics were going the way of the “Do-Do Bird” and everyone was marveling at the number of rounds that the average rifleman was able to fire against our enemy(s), although I began to suspect that our real enemy resided in the Defense Department in the name of Robert McNamara, and leadership in the Military by individuals who hadn’t seen combat since the charge up San Juan Hill.
Given on the first commercial model of the Thomson was 1921, it didn’t quite make it to the troops by a good number of years…