General Douglas MacArthur

And the fact that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army caught him completely with his pants down? Despite capturing numerous PLA “volunteers” in quilted uniforms previous to the Chosen intervention and refusing to believe that the Chinese were about to enter the War in great numbers?

No, MacArthur was fine when he was going against a third world army with first class weapons, but he presided over what was nearly the greatest defeat of a US army.

No, MacArthur’s hubris is inexcusable, and a blunder directly comparable to his failings in the initial phases of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines…

He was just another overrated, overblown windsock filled with his own mythos, and a bombastic fool that mostly took credit for underlings work, which is probably why he was unable to respond to crisis of the surprise variety…

OMG! Did I just completely, 100% agree with a Chevan post?

MacArthur was a fool. Funny, his successor, Gen. Matthew Ridgway (one of America’s most underrated, ignored Generals) was able to contend with the Chinese and drive them back over the 38th Parallel without nukes, despite being horrendously outnumbered.

If this refers to Mac in Korea, he must have been going for a personal best. He’s already presided over America’s worst defeat in the Philippines.

He was just another overrated, overblown windsock filled with his own mythos, and a bombastic fool that mostly took credit for underlings work, which is probably why he was unable to respond to crisis of the surprise variety…

He had a lot of failings, but he also presided over some great victories. It’s an unfortunate fact of life that a lot of so-called great men (and women) are total arseholes, but it doesn’t undermine their achievements. The selfish drives which spur them on to control others are what sets them apart.

One view of Mac, which is common in Australia and in all recent popular Australian writing, is that he was an arrogant, publicity-seeking, petty prick. True. And that he drove Australian forces on relentlessly over the Kokoda Track without even flying over it to see just what lousy country they were fighting in and how unreasonable his demands were. True. Also true of the Australian commander, Blamey, who was just as big a prick but with no idea about public relations as he made the mistake of saying what he thought. There are other criticisms of Mac, all true.

But for all those criticisms, we have a man in his sixties who has come through the most gruelling experiences in the Philippines and during his escape from them to arrive in Australia radiating public confidence (which he didn’t feel personally) and bolstering the public and government. It’s a great piece of leadership and of personal grit. He was as inspirational to the Australian public at that critical time as Churchill was to the British public at his best. Morale wins wars and lack of morale loses them. Mac was a morale builder.

If we had had a commander who was happy to accept defeat then the Japanese might have got over the Kokoda Track to Moresby, and changed the course of the war, for Australia anyway. Mac wouldn’t accept this. He pressed his commanders to press their subordinates to press their troops to attack, attack, attack! His demands might have been unreasonable, but they produced a win.

Mac was a complex and intriguing man, but it is most unfair to write him off in a series of perjorative comments, however accurate they may be, without balancing them with his good qualities and successes.

:smiley: You are correct indeed…

Korea is such a double edged sword for Mac. He turned around an undertrained, retreating army. Then turned them back into a retreating army. But in the Philippines he was fighting a first class army (as far as training and discipline go), and his forces were cut off. Even if he ran the campaign perfectly, they probably would not heave been relieved; they only would have blooded the Japanese for a few more months (which could have shortened the Pacific campaign)…

He had a lot of failings, but he also presided over some great victories. It’s an unfortunate fact of life that a lot of so-called great men (and women) are total arseholes, but it doesn’t undermine their achievements. The selfish drives which spur them on to control others are what sets them apart.

One view of Mac, which is common in Australia and in all recent popular Australian writing, is that he was an arrogant, publicity-seeking, petty prick. True. And that he drove Australian forces on relentlessly over the Kokoda Track without even flying over it to see just what lousy country they were fighting in and how unreasonable his demands were. True. Also true of the Australian commander, Blamey, who was just as big a prick but with no idea about public relations as he made the mistake of saying what he thought. There are other criticisms of Mac, all true.

But for all those criticisms, we have a man in his sixties who has come through the most gruelling experiences in the Philippines and during his escape from them to arrive in Australia radiating public confidence (which he didn’t feel personally) and bolstering the public and government. It’s a great piece of leadership and of personal grit. He was as inspirational to the Australian public at that critical time as Churchill was to the British public at his best. Morale wins wars and lack of morale loses them. Mac was a morale builder.

If we had had a commander who was happy to accept defeat then the Japanese might have got over the Kokoda Track to Moresby, and changed the course of the war, for Australia anyway. Mac wouldn’t accept this. He pressed his commanders to press their subordinates to press their troops to attack, attack, attack! His demands might have been unreasonable, but they produced a win.

Mac was a complex and intriguing man, but it is most unfair to write him off in a series of perjorative comments, however accurate they may be, without balancing them with his good qualities and successes.

Some excellent points in his defense. But I know that those that chafed under him that did most of the actual planning, including the Aussies and US Marine commanders.

Certainly, his occupation of Japan could not have been carried out any better than it was, so we can thank him for that. But I really think there were far better generals that didn’t get promoted because of Mac. And his attempted usurpation of Pres. Truman is unforgivable to me…

He stuck to what he knew best! :smiley:

Except that in the Philippines he never turned around the undertrained, ill-equipped army he was paid a ridiculous amount to ensure that the Philippines wouldn’t suffer exactly what his deficient leadership achieved, ably assisted by Filipino political incompetence.

But in the Philippines he was fighting a first class army (as far as training and discipline go), and his forces were cut off. Even if he ran the campaign perfectly, they probably would not heave been relieved; they only would have blooded the Japanese for a few more months (which could have shortened the Pacific campaign)…

If they’d held out strongly, as distinct from the tenacious and courageous but not militarily strong way they did, for another couple of months, which they couldn’t do because of Mac’s failures, they would have influenced the Japanese drive southwards. Although probably not to any noticeable extent, unless large forces and supplies were diverted to the Philippines.

On the other side, Gen Homma was pretty close to giving up on defeating the entrenched Americans but was spurred on by higher command. If the American defense had been stronger, as it would have been but for Mac’s stuff ups, in the last days then Homma might have been driven to press for his earlier proposal of just leaving them there as a beseiged but harmless garrison, just like Mac and other US commanders did later to the Japanese.

But I really think there were far better generals that didn’t get promoted because of Mac.

Like so many great men, Mac was a great man in his own mind which enabled him to keep lesser men out of the eye of the public and his superiors as, with relentless and purely self-promotional control of the press, he fought his most desperate battles against his worst enemies, being Halsey, Nimitz, King, the USN, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs. If only the Japanese had received as much attention from him, Mac might have done better against them. :wink:

Hello everyone my first post here, I hope to learn alot and share on a war that we still feel global repercussions from.

Some very interesting opinions of Macarthur in here, some are not privy to the extensive writings of what went after the fall of Baatan it would appear.

Macarthur so I see played the media and the public much like a politician but as a general there was much better IMO.

4 theaters. ended the japanese’s attempts at controlling the asia region.
Midway.
Coral sea.
Gaudacanal.
New guinea.

Each as important as the next, each as unique to the survival of the communication and supply line between Australia and America.

Macarthur was only involved in 1 of these theaters.

It is worth noting his complete failure in the Phillipines, however the naval aspect of that battle was always going to over ride any difference to what went on. America and Australia could of never supplied that area with the Navy Japan had there.

New Guinea should of been lost, no doubts about it, Japan should of got to moresby and thus have a base to interupt the supply line from America and hit the port of brisbane where so many offensives were built from.

Macarthur really stuffed up in New Guinea, He made silly WW1 style orders. He stated he would never be a WW1 general and sit miles behind the lines giving out orders when not knowing the true conditions of the front or sharing them with the soldiers . He did exactly that but from a different country and enviorement.

He made orders based on his own intelligence section that completly contridicted the reports from the Owen Stanley front line, He told and ordered and bullied a far inferior and supplied force completly without any military initiative to attack and nothing else and that there not doing there job, yet they were facing an enemy at points 6 times greater, the enemy were the veterans of Malaya and amongst the very elite of Japanese soldiers.

The commanders on the ground ignored macarthur completly, took no word he said. They would of been Slaughtered instantly had they.

They staged a fighting withdrawal threw the Oewen Stanlety mountains.

When the battle first erupted the supply line was massive threw an unforgiving jungle mountain range, everything had to be carried, The Japanese had a really short supply line and no such mountains.

The commanders on the spot could only force the Japanese to contest each and every centimeter threw ambushes and slow them down. Every potential point in which a stand could be made was, and before over run by superior numbers a withdrawal with ambush after ambush.

The commanders could only buy time, each mile conceeded was a mile shorter supply line for us and a mile longer for them.

Eventually a much larger force was brought to its knees as re inforcements for us arrived.

The Japanese in an unforgiving enviroment were delayed by about a month and forced to endure horrendous conditions.The soldiers withdrawing destroyed everything they could not carry, this hurt the japanese as they needed supplies just like we did when we had the mass supply line

Thus the withdrawal defeated them.

Macarthur though kept ordering attack, he kept denying the size of the force and never once comprehended the conditions and theater.

If he was listened to Major General Hori’s south seas force would of marched into Port moresby and Macarthur would of lost again.

Quite a serious incompetant piece of leadership from him. Not well known but recorded at the time by the commanders and telegraphs, communications between macarthur and others, japanese records and japanese casulties.

This was the only battle Macarthur was involved in that stopped Japan.

Some may point to Milne bay, same thing happened except with the goings on in Gaudacanal Japan couldnt muster a force capable of taking her.

All the commanders that ignored macarthur basically got sacked, not good.

What went on in the counter attack once the Japanese were brought to her knees is quite abbhorrent to.

When Macarthur was givin command of the allied armies in the south west pacific area he was ordered to have a staff consisting of officers from all involved, he chose his baatan gang only, yet ignored officers more experienced and proven officers who had fought the werhmach successfully in Nth Africa and had seen mostly a full ww1.

Really macarthur in combat operations only ever mopped up what japan left behind after failing to isolate Australia and over committing herself in trying too.

The real American contributer to Japans stopping was a Mr Nimitiz and his action to take Henderson Field. The briallant tactics at Midway which put the three strong carrier force in a position to get some luck and the allied efforts in challanging the attempted seaborne invasion of Moresby.

After that really the allies had the full military iniative, mass more of everything to throw at the japs and basically control of the air and most of the sea once the mighty American industrial machine kicked in.

He could handle superiority and succeeded except in Baatan but couldnt handle mot having the iniative.

Much over rated military commander and much unknown one.

There is some very well researched material written by a Peter Brune which considers everything in the initial battles of New Guinea.

The next stages in New guinea campaign were carried out by an Australian Army corps which was probably the most experienced and successful corps at that point in WW2 on the allied side.

Really only logistic support and naval and air support was contributed by macarthur in the 1 battle that shaped japans eventual defeat that he was involved in, but at first he should of lost it from his doing if not his orders were not ignored.

I don’t disagree with the essence of your comments, but how do you respond to the comment that Japan was defeated on the water as much as, or more than, on the land? And in the air from water-borne planes?

Coral Sea saved Moresby.

Midway tipped the balance.

USN in various engagements saved Guadalcanal.

USN in Philippines enabled MacArthur to land.

USN in central Pacific allowed the island campaign there.

The ground war was horrible, but the naval war allowed the ground war to advance toward Japan?

As I said 4 battles defeated Japan, 3 of them Naval.

Midway was the one you could highlight. If she fell and fell cheaply the other 3 would of been fought on different levels than what they were.
however once she survived the other 3 became as important as eachother and each as unique.

I was pointing out macarthurs involvement when the war was up for grabs, after that it was a question of time and casulties before Japan was utterly defeated.

There’s alot of stuff out there about Macarthur hardly known about that went on in his early days as supreme allied commander, also some misgivings about the Phillipines invasion.

Actually, MacArthur should have been court-martialed. He allowed his entire air force in the Phillipines to be destroyed on the ground when it was already known for a considerable number hours that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. He was like a deer caught in the headlights, frozen stiff.

General Marshall said to him, “General, you don’t have a staff, you have a court.” Macarthur was a megalomaniac of the first order - he brooked no one gainsaying him and promptly fired or demoted anyone who dared to. The Pacific War, as if anyone needs reminding, was fundamentally a navy war and was mostly won by the navy. if the navy hadn’t decisively defeated the Japanese not 6 months after Pearl Harbor at the Battle of Midway, Macarthur would still be treading water off the coast of New Guinea. In this context, Korea fits right in. He never spent a single night in Korea during that war. Imagine.

Well, the Phillipines probably would have had to have been invaded at some point in time, but it may not have been necessary to do so in order to defeat Japan. What I find really reprehensible about Macarthur, in addition to the comments I made earlier, is that he passed the buck to General Wainwright, on orders to be sure, and then actively opposed Wainrwright receiving any kind of recognition or a medal which congress wanted to accord him! What kind of man sends another to certain defeat on [i]his[i] orders, relegates him to three years of Japanese prisons, and then opposes his getting any kind of recognition at all? A very, very small man, indeed.

Macarthur, lest we forget, had an ego larger than this planet. He called, sneeringly, Eisenhower, “one of the best chiefs of staff I ever had” when he was seething with jealousy that it was Eisenhower who was picked to run for President when he Mac was convinced that he should have been chosen. LOL. We make heroes out of midgets sometimes.

my father served as a front line combat soldier in the 1st Cavalry Division, 5th Cavalry Regiment. He saw MacArthur four times: once in Australia, next on Los Negros Island, then on Leyte and then in Manila. “One of the bravest men, I’ve ever seen” was my father’s assessment.