So sorry for my protracted silence, honorable ladies and gentlemen, but aforesaid verity is a depressing result of my unalterable official duties and factual dissemination of photographic material connected with this intriguing matter. However, I have finally prepared my answers, so here they are:
Yes, my dear Mr. Pdf 27 - proposed variant 1/b of your statement (capable of carrying out torpedo attacks, but deficient in that role because used in a very limited number) is the most accurate proclamation. 
Putting aside the fact that previously mentioned machine confirmed itself as a fairly durable, obedient aircraft, that behaved very well on water as well as in the air, He 115’s intended use as a torpedo-bomber was always delayed by low – priority which this type constantly enjoyed within boundaries of the German war-production effort. However, a small number of the He 115’s successful combat-activity examples, mainly achieved in mid-1941 and 1942, are sufficiently convincing as evidence that aforementioned type represented a capable, potentially usable, although not sufficiently protected naval attacker, especially helpful against Allied merchant vessels.
Having usually only 15 fully operational machines, regularly flown by crews of the 1./ KuFlGr 406 and 1./Ku.Fl.Gr. 906 from the available hydro-bases in Kirkennes, Stavanger and Tromsø, He 115C’s were, for example, best used against Allied convoys on the Murmansk route in bad weather conditions, in circumstances when “classicist” level and diving bombers were incapable even to start on their combat missions.
He 115 is launching her torpedo against unidentified allied freighter, British Channel - 1940
For example, on July 4, 1942 a single He 115 flown by experienced commanding officer of the 1./Ku.Fl.Gr. 906, Hptm. Eberhard Peukert successfully torpedoed US freighter “Christopher Newport” under almost impossible flying conditions. Using low clouds and fog over the up-welling, turbulent cold waters, with his engines turned off, he carried over his airplane in completely unobserved shallow dive toward that ill-fated ship, and achieved a direct hit!
Do you happen to know if the bomb which failed against the deck armour of Rodney was an armour piercing one…
Alas, my dear Mr Pdf 27 – I don’t know! The final answer to this dilemma still remains up in the air. 
You see, the only direct piece of information connected with this thorny issue is a pretty brief annotation written by a prominent naval historian S. W. Roskill in his outstanding, indeed colossal work “The war at sea”, 1939-1945. - Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961. - (Vol. I, p. 48), which described aforementioned occurrence with these words: “Battleship Rodney was struck by a 500 kilogram bomb which failed to penetrate the armour belt and caused only injuries to Paymaster Midshipman W. R. H. Lapper, Commissioned Gunner F. G. Roper, Midshipman J. C. S. Wright, seven ratings.”
Alas, type of the bomb was not mentioned.
However, your remark about the factual effectivity of the Luftwaffe in the Norwegian campaign deserves just one tiny, but – as always – completely historically proven observation.
You see, bearing on mind the fact that heroic American destroyer Laffey (DD – 724), commissioned February 8, 1944, which participated in the D-day landings of Allied troops at Normandy four months latter, when transferred to the Pacific was crashed by five Japanese Kamikaze planes, and additionaly directly hit by three bombs during one single hour on April 16, 1945 off Okinawa - was not only kept afloat by her gallant crew, but even capable to shoot down eleven enemy planes during the attack, and comparing these results with a pretty skinny (four German airplanes downed by AA fire) effect of the whole British naval combat group… well, I think that fighting capabilities of the belligerent forces back there in 1940were… pretty well balanced.
More critically expressed, the main misalignment in that previously mentioned evaluation of yours is embedded in factual neglection of a practical strength of the applied German airpower. Were the British naval forces - indeed impressive, both quantitatively and qualitatively! - faced by a force in the air as overwhelming as allied on the sea, British job would have been much more difficult. Allow me, please, just a very brief explanation.
You see, I have to admit that I was almost shocked by the fact that Germans, for example, although the Luftwaffe amassed more than 1000 machines for the operation, only partially used the most effective aerial anti-ship weapon that was available: the Ju 87.
Furthermore – more than 350 additional, combat-ready level bombers were completely available as well, but still unused in this operation, because German operational airdrome capacity was severely overstrung. The Do 17, for example, the mostly used middle-seized bomber Germany had at the beginning of the war, was completely unexploited in the Norwegian campaign! And yes - I completely do agree with you, my dear Mr. Pdf 27 - that verity essentially represented a tactical and planning pretermission that was fairly and squarely committed by the OKW.
While the bulk of the Luftwaffe units which have participated in operation Weserübung, for example, started from their north-German bases at dawn on 9 April 1940, the only Stukagruppe (40 airplanes only!) to participate in the campaign against Norway - those Ju 87 R machines within the I Gruppe St.G. 1 under command of captain Paul-Werner Hozzel - was not ordered to take off until 10.59!
Even then, instead of participation in a coordinated, joint attack against British naval forces, their target was previously totally neglected, and nowadays superbly famous fortress of Oscarsborg, and later on that same day (at 12.15 H) Norwegian positions at Ackershus, with the bombings carried out throughout the whole day till 17.30, and with a lull of one hour between 13.00 and 14.00 hours. In the very same time when the British ships were already under heavy aerial attacks! The Ju 87s were in the role of a ground attackers, and not anti-shipping airplanes, although the good old Stuka was the most effective weapon in the Luftwaffe’s armory carrying out the anti-ship sorties.
Ju 87 above the Norwegian coast, April 1940.
Being returned to their new, provisory and unsystematically forwarded airfield at Aarhus in Danmark, airplanes of the I. Gruppe St.G 1 were aloft again that same afternoon, this time heading not across the 250 km of the Skagerrak back to the still unfinished work at Oscarsborg, but out over the open sea in search of elements of the disengaged Royal Navy’s Home Fleet! Of course, as the British ships, previously exposed to fierce attacks of the KG 30 and KG 26 and with practically empty AAA ammo-storages, were at this time too far off, Hozel was instructed to turn back and to land in Norway at the Stavanger-Sola airfield. Indeed beautiful example of the completely unproductive tactics!
Aforementioned unit, however, demonstrated almost perfect case in point of unexploited tactical “Could-Have-Beens” on that very day, when – by pure serendipity! – JU 87’s encountered a lonely Norwegian torpedo-boat Aeger. Poor vessel was successfully, unproblemaically attacked, and only the vicinity of the Norwegian coastline saved the unfortunate crew – ship was conveniently stranded and scuttled by her illustrious captain.
So sorry, honorable ladies and gentlemen - forced brake of the post: that well-known message is again here in front of me! (The text that you have entered is too long (15672 characters). Please shorten it to 10000 characters long.)
OK - here we go… :roll:
