Hard Facts about Communism/USSR.

the Tsar Russian was a greates state in the world that evil commies have destroyed.

Haha, Russia has always been unadvanced. Our state was really advanced. You can’t compare Czechoslovakia in 30’s and russia in 30’s.

Indeed the Czechoslovakia was the greates East European state even during the Soviet era.

Since 19th century we had most advanced industry in central Europe. Since 1948 we made only tractors and weapons for USSR.

Collectivisation of agronomy mean nationalization of soil, waste of resources, no private ownership, soil erosion… simply katastrophe…

Jan…
You seem to be, a naive boy!!!

The human change!!!.. Ok!.. You have time… But no misapplication!

I see…

You believe, that you have find oll the responds…

Listen to me… search again from the beginning…

Perhaps ther you can find same hope

And now to our theme:… ZHUKOV!

Sorry for my pretty late reaction, honorable ladies and gentlemen, but this week is completely fulfilled with different professional obligations. But, never mind that – let’s go to our slightly irrupted topic!

It is just the evidence that multinational states collapse as a rule.

Excuse me for my interference, but not necessarily, honorable Mr. Kato – Switzerland still represents a bold example that country that contains more than one national entity is not obligatorily susceptible to different nationalist challenges from within its own borders, especially if societal groups contained by the state do have an explicit and definitive supra-national identification.

…this phenomenon will soon disappear. Communism is dead.

Not inevitably, my dear Mr. Kato. Since he came down from the trees, man has faced the problem of survival not as an individual, but as a member of a social group. His continued existence is testimony to the fact that he has succeeded in solving the problem, but the continued existence of want and misery, even in the richest of nations, is evidence that his solution has been, at best, a partial one. Yet man is not to be severely censured for his failure to achieve a Paradise on Earth. It is hard to wring a livelihood from the surface of this planet. It is only because man is a socially cooperative creature that he has succeeded in perpetuating himself at all.

But the very fact that he has to depend on his fellow man has madethe problem of survival extraordinarily difficult. Man is not an ant, conveniently equipped with an inborn pattern of social instincts. On the contrary – he is pre-eminently endowed with a fiercely self-centered nature. If his relatively weak physique forces him to seek cooperation, his untamed unconscious drives constantly threaten to disrupt his social working partnerships.

In early societies the struggle between aggression and cooperation is taken care of by the environment – when the specter of starvation looks a community in the face the pure need for self-preservation pushes society to the cooperative completion of its daily tasks. But in an advanced community, this tangible pressure of the environment is lacking. When man no longer works shoulder to shoulder in tasks directly related to survival, when tree quarters or more of the population never touches the tiled earth, enters the mines, or builds something with its own hands, the perpetuation of the human animal becomes a remarkable social feat.

So remarkable, in fact, that society’s existence hangs by a hair. A modern human community is at the mercy of thousand dangers: if its farmers should fail to plant enough crops, if its railroad men should take into their heads to become bookkeepers or its bookkeepers should decide to become oceanologists, if too few should offer their services as miners, farmers, candidates for engineering degrees, nuclear physicists… in a word, if any of a thousand intertwined tasks of society should fail to get done, modern industrial life would soon become hopelessly disorganized. Every day the human community faces the possibility of breakdown – not from the forces of nature, but from sheer human unpredictability.

Classicistic wisdom claims that development of an astonishing game in which society assures its own continuance by allowing each individual to do exactly as he sees fit – providing that he follows a central guiding rule, will be sufficient to resolve the aforementioned problem. The name of the game is the market economy, and the rule is deceptively simple: each should do hat was to his best monetary advantage. In the market economy the lure of the gain steers each man to his task. And yet, although each was free to go wherever his acquisitive nose directs him, the interplay of one man against other results in the necessary tasks of society getting done.

Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that all the jobs of the society – the dirty ones as well as the plush ones – will be actually done, or that unequal access to productive resources will be able to assure necessitated degree of production, or that system will allow to all its members to play the game on the equal basis for valued rewards. Even today millions of people, in practically all parts of the world, have found reason to complain about the shape of their lives, and not a few of them have, from time to time, set up some sort of social movement, of protest, or reform to change existing societal fabric. Throughout history there have been men and women who imagined different societal alternatives, who thought about restructuring their societies in terms that they conceived of as better than any current arrangements. When people become dissatisfied with their current situations, thus compelled to change them, there is a plethora of alternative courses of action that are completely open. Different forms of more egalitarian social movements are then, at least sociologically, completely possible.:slight_smile:

I don’t think one should take Soviet statistics as credible one. The fact is that
the Soviet Union was not able to satisfy its own needs in food-stuffs in the following decades after collectivisation.

Well, fortunately we do have some highly credible American sources. So here they are:

Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, by Sherman Kent [third edition] – (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963) – p. 261

The crux of the agricultural problem was not the collectivization, but productivity per acre, deeply dependant upon adequate mechanization and chemization of agriculture. Agricultural corporations - the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union in farming production - actually represented a direct copy of the highly inventive American organizational patent from 1932, aimed to handle the giant farms as specific factories, with enclosed production and different “inputs” (such as pesticides, feed, fertilizer, and fuel) and “outputs” (corn, chickens, pigs, and so forth). The goal was to increase yield and decrease costs of production, typically by exploiting economies of scale, with factual employment of workers-like, wage-earning personal of different profiles (harvesters, drivers, veterinarians, manual workers, accountants, etc.). This goal transformed the Soviet countryside from millions of small peasant holdings to a consolidated pattern of fewer than 50.000 centrally controlled operating units.

Despite significant transformations in early 1970’s, the bulk of the Soviet agricultural production represented a direct copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, with some 26.000 giant farms – averaging 14.750 hectares (36.000 acres), plus so called state farms with average 6070 hectares (15.000 acres) occupying 97% of Soviet farmland. Some 38 million private plots of farm and city families made up the remaining 3 %.

Constant lack of sizable capital inputs for adequate machinery and chemicals (estimated lack of tractors for adequate soil preparation in 1956 was 200.000 units over 65 HP!) as well as ideologically driven abhorrence toward applied genetics in hybrid seeds production actually represented the main causes for the misbalances in the Soviet agricultural production.

International economics in the first half of the XX century were dominated by the brake in the fundamental unity of the old, known world, and the rise of two sharply polarized social and productive systems each of which was all but controlled by a giant. Not since the apogee of the Imperial Rome has any one sovereign community in the Western World risen to a position of such overwhelming superiority as the United States. Even Britain at the time of her industrial and commercial supremacy a hundred years ago never achieved such preponderance of power. And at the opposite pole the Soviet Union has an even more crushing power. The USSR has, with hardly any outside help, in merely 25 years of unparalleled effort not merely transformed itself from a mainly primitive peasant economy into the second largest Industrial Power equipped with every miracle of science and technology – from jet engines to hydrogen bombs – but initiated a completely new system of economic organization at fundamental variance with what was before. By her exertions USSR has proved the possibility of the conscious planning of supra-national economic destinies. The vast effort required and the constant, historically confirmed fear of armed attack led to policies – indeed to the rise of a whole system – which evoked apprehension, disapproval and hatred abroad.
Behind these struggles and antagonisms there were looms in both political spheres, with a fundamental problem of dealing with production, with transformation of primitive farming into an efficient provider of food for the growing population of both East and West. The old Malthusian problem of over-population and the forcing-down of living standards was once again posed for the majority of the human race.

Woytinsky and Wojtynsky: “World Population and Production”, New York, 1953

Sorry, honorable ladies and gentlemen - forced break of the page, the text i have entered is too long (12.745 characters)… to be continued.:roll:

PART II

The first successes of the Soviet experiment in economic planning were noticeable. Yet that experiment could not have started at a less propitious moment. Soviet Union had to rely on the export of primary produce to obtain the desperately lacking basic machinery to prime the pump of functional industrial construction. At the very point of launching the first of a series of industrialization plans these prices collapsed on the world market. Thus more and more had to be squeezed out of the country in order to obtain a shrinking amount of machinery from abroad. Additional problem was represented by the verity that the increase in Soviet production was slow in maturing.

“Industrialization and foreign trade”, League of Nations, (1945) p.13

In orther to overcome the difficulties encountered with the agricultural production, a wholesale collectivization of land was launched. The result was a collapse of the agricultural production. However, the collectivization, actually made possible an increase in supplies available to towns, thus it laid the foundation of the success of the drive for the industrialization. This was momentous: there can be no doubt that industrial production grew at a pace unparalleled even during the explosive expansion of the United States. As previouslu shown table shows, within a decade the Soviet Union, starting from a primitive state, emerged from the ordeal as the second largest industrial power of the world. The technical and economic achievement of the Soviet production was soon amply confirmed by the Russian capacity to resist German attack. Even the carnage of their administrative elite in the late 1930’s did not altogether stop expansion – it was merely reduced to a level roughly equal to that of the best years of the non-Soviet world.

Books suggested for further reading:

H. Arndt: The economic Lessons of the 1930’s (Chatham House, 1944)

P. T. Ellsworth: The international economy (Macmillan, New York, 1950)

Donald Marsh: International tTrade and Investment (Harcourt & Brace, New York, 1951)

A. Bergson: Soviet Economic Growth (Peterson & Co., Evanston Illinois, 1955)

National and International Measures to Maintain Full Employment (U.N.O., 1950); Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Areas (U.N.O., 1951)

Thomas Ballogh, The Dollar Crisis (Blackwell, 1949)

Since 1948 we made only tractors and weapons for USSR.

Indeed, honorable Mr. Fiala? How strange that these brochures for a Czech car named Tatra 600, or “Tatraplan” were printed in English, and distributed in Birmingham - United Kingdom…:eek:

Tatraplan – Export Sales Brochure, British

…or that this nice Czechoslovakian car, named Škoda, more precisely Škoda 1102 Convertible, produced in more than 80.000 units was exposed for sale for 5505 Dutch Guldens at auto show in Amsterdam, April 26 1950.

Škoda 1102 Convertible, International Automobile Salon, 1950

Pretty strange for a country that produced only tractors and weapons for USSR, isn’t it?:slight_smile:

Nobody want to talk about Generals anymore ?

OK.

Closed until I can split the off topic post.

All right, thread splited from “favorite russian general” and reopened.

Please avoid any kind of “inflamation”.

Well done PK…

Quote:
Since 1948 we made only tractors and weapons for USSR.

Indeed, honorable Mr. Fiala? How strange that these brochures for a Czech car named Tatra 600, or “Tatraplan” were printed in English, and distributed in Birmingham - United Kingdom…

Word “only” was hyperbolic, i mean five-year plans, major part of indusry were waepons, tractors(and other farm machinery and vehicles), simply heavy industry no matter the needs of market. Tatraplan was one of the best Czech post-war cars(with 603, 813 and some cars made in 50’s). Other cars made in age of communists (Škoda 1000, 100, 105, 120…)were perturbative, poor quality cars…

Nothing of the sort. Before collectivisation the USSR was the main exporter of agricultural production with the same problems of adequate mechanization and chemization but after collectivisation the agricultural output started to decline.

Agricultural corporations - the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union in farming production - actually represented a direct copy of the highly inventive American organizational patent from 1932, aimed to handle the giant farms as specific factories, with enclosed production and different “inputs” (such as pesticides, feed, fertilizer, and fuel) and “outputs” (corn, chickens, pigs, and so forth).

The Soviet Union had a different ideological and economic system opposing to the one of the US. So if it had really tried to copy something it would have had to begin with converting state property into private one and not vice versa.

The goal was to increase yield and decrease costs of production, typically by exploiting economies of scale, with factual employment of workers-like, wage-earning personal of different profiles (harvesters, drivers, veterinarians, manual workers, accountants, etc.).

The goal was to prevent the possibity of “counter-revolution” and crack down nationalism. This goal was openly declared in the communist party meetings and its official documents

Despite significant transformations in early 1970’s, the bulk of the Soviet agricultural production represented a direct copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, with some 26.000 giant farms – averaging 14.750 hectares (36.000 acres), plus so called state farms with average 6070 hectares (15.000 acres) occupying 97% of Soviet farmland. Some 38 million private plots of farm and city families made up the remaining 3 %.

To make some copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, the USSR had to be a capitalist state.

And at the opposite pole the Soviet Union has an even more crushing power. The USSR has, with hardly any outside help, in merely 25 years of unparalleled effort not merely transformed itself from a mainly primitive peasant economy into the second largest Industrial Power equipped with every miracle of science and technology – from jet engines to hydrogen bombs – but initiated a completely new system of economic organization at fundamental variance with what was before.

It is tendatious interpretation.

Bolsheviks inherited the industrial basis of the Russian Empire. Yes, the industry of the Russian Empire wasn’t the most powerful in the world but it rather closely followed the national industries of the leading countries. As to
primitive peasant economy, one may object that nearly all the European states ( even France and partly Germany) had peasant economies ( majority of the population involved in agriculture) in the 1920s.

The words “with hardly any outside help” are also wrong because the USSR concluded trade, economic and political agreements with all the leading countries and it wasn’t economicly isolated.

Woytinsky and Wojtynsky: “World Population and Production”, New York, 1953

Any foreign statistics of AnnualIncomePerCapita and Production indicators can be generared on the basis of the Soviet statistics. Foreign institutions were simply unable to make up surveys in such a closed country like the USSR.

But even if these figures were adequate, they are just general indicators that can’t give the idea about the proporion of national wealth distributed among ordinary population and retained by the state that pay miserable sallaries, owned all the means of production and even the living premises of its citizens.

Enjoy!

Czech Peoples Army photo album.

Cheers for that Egorka. Nice photos, even if they don’t show the Czechs being able to do much more than march badly…

Some better photos of our (Czech) army:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwE2wY8YOGU

Thanks!I enjoyed the photos immensely, but #15 with the 3 tanks, and infantry, I hope it was staged for the photo, as that tight little group is just what the NATO forces would have been hoping for in a war. Without range finders, (doesnt look like they are equipped) they would be easy prey for ranging equipped Nato tanks.

Umm… nice photos but that’s got to be one of the worst videos I’ve ever seen on YouTube - the pictures change in time with the music, but so fast you can’t actually take in the contents to any meaningful level of detail. Also, they’re pre-1938, so aren’t all that relevant to the topic of “Hard Facts about Communism”…

Interesting pics.

Incidentally, does The Czech Republic still produce variants of the T-80 MDT?

Also, they’re pre-1938, so aren’t all that relevant to the topic of “Hard Facts about Communism”…

No it isn’t, but its also Czech army. Egorkas’s photos of post-war army are not relevant too.:wink:

I dunno. I mean, ensuring your vassal states (sorry, I mean “fraternal socialist allies”, slip of the tongue there) are so incompetent militarily that they can’t pose a threat to you sounds like an awfully typical communist tactic to me…

LOL A good one pdf!! You are entirely right.

I don’t understand. Please type by easy english, because "…can’t pose a threat to you sounds like …"this phrase is not unambiguously transferable.

Would you be so kind to use plain English? Now is my turn to stare and stare at your post.:wink: