Hitler's Biggest Mistake?

Angering Curchill into promising to never surrender seemed pretty dumb to me…

But wasn’t that the fatal flaw of the Wehrmacht?

The Germans had the premier ARMY in the World, but the WEHRMACHT as a whole surely didn’t have a snowballs chance in hell of invading Britain.

Bingo.
Face it, Hitler made a lot of mistakes all up and down the line. Probably the most fatal of them all was the invasion of Russia. This was the fatal sin of hubris - an unreasoning belief that he didn’t need to check his beliefs against reality. He didn’t even so much as a consult a map of Russia to see that there was no way he could actually occupy and hold that land mass, and he forgot about Napoleon. No, correct that, he thought he was so much smarter than Napoleon.

Thank God for mistakes by tyrants. Hitler, from a philosophical and literature point of view, was a classic example of a Greek tragedy - a man brought down by own failings. Unfortunately he killed a lot of people along the way.
Hitler is one good argument for magnicide.

His second biggest mistake was in thinking he could subdue the English, not because they were so supremely tough - they weren’t - but because he had no way of getting across the English channel because he had no real surface navy in spite of German bluster to the contrary. If a real invasion of Great Britain had been attempted it would have been bloody, but 95% of it would have been sent to the bottom of the English channel by the Home fleet. As far as navies went, the English were no slouches.

Finally, failure to put fighter command out of business meant that the Germans couldn’t even provide adequate fighter cover for any invasion attempt. German aircraft designs were no better, and possibly inferior to British ones - they met their match in the air, and having met them, could not defeat them. The inability to defeat the English meant that a) there would always be a “second font”, b) that there was an unsinkable aircraft carrier offshore, and c) there was a perfect staging area for the invasion of Europe from the west.

As for Russia, one is tempted to conclude that if the West simply continued to supply the Russians with arms, trucks and foodstuffs, the Soviets would have defeated the Germand on their own. It would have taken a good deal longer, but I believe they could have done it.

The bigger question is, How could a nation like Germany be so completely stupid and compliant?

Just like Germany didn’t learn not to invade Russia, the Americans today should of learnt from the Russian Invasion into Afghanistan, that the dynamics of the country negate the possibility of a super power controlling the country.The Russians pulled out of Afghanistan in humiliation and the Americans and Canadians now decide not to pull out but still fail to have a total grip of the country.

Uh huh. And what, O strategic Oracle*, is the American mission in Afghanistan?

  • The original Oracle of course being a mad old bint who lived in a cave breathing hallucinogenic gases

We were almost there but Bush pulled alot of the rescorces to Iraq.

I don’t think anyone relaly knows the mission in Afganistan nor Iraq for that matter. I mean yes there is a mission according to the military and war educators like yourself who know a lot more than I do, BUT, the point is, we sometimes get involved in wars with a mission in mind but when we can’t get out gracefully, the mission becomes never ending and changing with the times. A 2 year committment becomes a seven yr committment. A billion dollar request for funds to Congress becomes a trillion dollar request several yrs later. If we don’t look at the exit strategies of other countries such as Russia and Afghanistan then how do we expect to learn from history?. Hitler obviously didn’t learn or care to know that Napolean couldn’t win Russia and he lost miserabbly as well.I was trying to draw a cross comparison of history 50 yrs ago and where we are today in referrence to countries such as Afghanistan(Russia>USA involvement). I am trying to make a reasonable and positive comment to the last thread if you at least give me half a chance and not always be so critical calling me troll and Oracle,(whatever that is) and other unkind words. My approach is trying to be positive if you give me a chance Thank You

I agree with you Herman, but the topic here is Hitler’s biggest mistake, not how many gratuitous sideswipes you can make against the US. It is a fact that the unorthodox partisan warfare in Russia presaged all such warfare (as it did in Yugoslavia) in Malaya, Vietnam, Palestine and also in Afghanistan. Regular armies, as the Germans discovered (and we should have known) do not stand up well against lightly armed guerrillas.

I guess we all agree the biggest mistake among many was invading the CCCP.

I would have to say Hitlers biggest mistake was invading the U.S.S.R… If he would of stayed allies with them they might of had a bigger chance of winning. He put too many resources in Operation Barbarossa leaving his western front more vulnerable to an invasion, Operation Overlord. Much of his manpower died in the harsh Russian wilderness and the strength of the Soviet army. Only if he would of stayed with the Soviets would he have had the higher advantage and could of made his world, not saying that I want to happen.

maybe his biggest mistake was going into politics in the first place…

Arguing that invading Russia was the big mistake is actually pretty academic, since it was at the core of the vision of Germania from the outset.
Given that tenet, failing to invade Blighty is without doubt the fundamental error.

Russia is big, but most of it’s population live in the European part, so one has ‘only’ to conquer and control as far as the borders of Tartarstan, despite plenty of boastful remarks to the contrary, the possibility of successfully controlling European Russia is real enough.

The Mongols conquered all of Asian Russia and European Russia with the exception of Byelorussia (hence the name).
Like the Wehrmacht, they were able to replenish their ranks with sympathetic locals (mainly from Turkey and the Caucasuses), and also like the Wehrmacht, they weren’t driven off by any partisan uprising. They got sick of the place and went home.

Consider the number of republics wishing for independence from Russia by 1941 (indeed throughout the history of the SSSR) and it is a fair assumption that once the cards begin to fall (for example if Moscow were to have been successfully encircled) then the cohesive existance of the Soviet Union would quickly have crumbled - as finally occurred in the 1990s.

Partisan movements, admirably patriotic as they may be, are hardly a showstopper in a general war of the scale of the second world wide difference of opinion.
In no way are WW2 resistance movements comparable to subsequent insurgencies (more or less civil wars) in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan or Iraq - where the invaders/occupiers fight by gentlemanly rules of engagement and where the guerillas have safe haven and sponsorship from accross borders over which they can safely assume not to be pursued (North Vietnam and speculatively before it Communist China, Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran respectively).
Not to mention in those cases, the geurillas aren’t being hunted by forces recruited from formerly subjugated neighbouring republics who have historical scores to settle.

Once European Russia had been occupied (the head on the Russian eagle that calls the shots after all), then it is a fair assumption that former Soviet republics (and even republics from within the Russian federation itself) would have succeed at first opportunity - just as every Axis power swapped sides once the writing was on the wall in 1944/45.
Then from where would Soviet partisans source their armaments? Where would be their safe havens (other than the Siberian Steppes). Who would support them morally and with intelligence, training, etc and who would be the potential future liberator, whose promise would fortify them against seemingly hopeless odds?
Never the thought of what consequences: I figure it sould concentrate the mind knowing what may lie in wait should the Ukrainians and Turkmens in the Waffen-SS, who held me personally responsible for their great grandmothers being shagged and raped by my great grandfathers, get hold of me.

Just as western resisitance movements would have withered had Britain surrendered (further support to the contention that failing to invade UK was THE big mistake), so too would Soviet partisan movements have evaporated once Moscow had fallen, organised counter offense by the remains of the Red Army ceased (and the vodka ration been restored to placate and pacify the stoic muzhiki).
Just as the planned German Werewolf resistance never even bothered to start - what possible hope would they have had in driving off the allied occupation forces and restoring a ‘Forth Reich’ all by themselves?

To argue that Russia would have done well enough against the Axis all on her own is pretty optimistic.

To point out the failure of Napoleon to conquer Russia in 1812 is simply to reinforce the need to avoid multi fronted wars; Napoleon had also the problem of fighting multiple fronts (against the Royal Navy at sea worldwide, against the British, Portuguese and later Spanish Armies in Iberia and variously Austria and Sweden on the Continent). Just like Hitler, the pot bellied short-arse from Corsica was unable to concentrate all of his resource on a single theatre.

Furthermore, unlike Hitler, Napeolon suffered approximately a 1:2 kill to loss ratio against Russia, the Wehrmacht managed about 1.5:1 against the Soviet Union.

No doubt about it, the loss of the grand vision of Germania and her leibensraum was sealed by a couple of fundamental cock ups in 1940.
While Russia was still allied with le Boche.

Arguing that invading Russia was the big mistake is actually pretty academic, since it was at the core of the vision of Germania from the outset.
Given that tenet, failing to invade Blighty is without doubt the fundamental error.

Russia is big, but most of it’s population live in the European part, so one has ‘only’ to conquer and control as far as the borders of Tartarstan, despite plenty of boastful remarks to the contrary, the possibility of successfully controlling European Russia is real enough.

The Mongols conquered all of Asian Russia and European Russia with the exception of Byelorussia (hence the name).
Like the Wehrmacht, they were able to replenish their ranks with sympathetic locals (mainly from Turkey and the Caucasuses), and also like the Wehrmacht, they weren’t driven off by any partisan uprising. They got sick of the place and went home.

Consider the number of republics wishing for independence from Russia by 1941 (indeed throughout the history of the SSSR) and it is a fair assumption that once the cards begin to fall (for example if Moscow were to have been successfully encircled) then the cohesive existance of the Soviet Union would quickly have crumbled - as finally occurred in the 1990s.

Partisan movements, admirably patriotic as they may be, are hardly a showstopper in a general war of the scale of the second world wide difference of opinion.
In no way are WW2 resistance movements comparable to subsequent insurgencies (more or less civil wars) in Vietnam, Malaya, Afghanistan or Iraq - where the invaders/occupiers fight by gentlemanly rules of engagement and where the guerillas have safe haven and sponsorship from accross borders over which they can safely assume not to be pursued (North Vietnam and speculatively before it Communist China, Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran respectively).
Not to mention in those cases, the geurillas aren’t being hunted by forces recruited from formerly subjugated neighbouring republics who have historical scores to settle.

Once European Russia had been occupied (the head on the Russian eagle that calls the shots after all), then it is a fair assumption that former Soviet republics (and even republics from within the Russian federation itself) would have succeed at first opportunity - just as every Axis power swapped sides once the writing was on the wall in 1944/45.
Then from where would Soviet partisans source their armaments? Where would be their safe havens (other than the Siberian Steppes). Who would support them morally and with intelligence, training, etc and who would be the potential future liberator, whose promise would fortify them against seemingly hopeless odds?
Never the thought of what consequences: I figure it sould concentrate the mind knowing what may lie in wait should the Ukrainians and Turkmens in the Waffen-SS, who held me personally responsible for their great grandmothers being shagged and raped by my great grandfathers, get hold of me.

Just as western resisitance movements would have withered had Britain surrendered (further support to the contention that failing to invade UK was THE big mistake), so too would Soviet partisan movements have evaporated once Moscow had fallen, organised counter offense by the remains of the Red Army ceased (and the vodka ration been restored to placate and pacify the stoic muzhiki).
Just as the planned German Werewolf resistance never even bothered to start - what possible hope would they have had in driving off the allied occupation forces and restoring a ‘Forth Reich’ all by themselves?

To argue that Russia would have done well enough against the Axis all on her own is pretty optimistic.

To point out the failure of Napoleon to conquer Russia in 1812 is simply to reinforce the need to avoid multi fronted wars; Napoleon had also the problem of fighting multiple fronts (against the Royal Navy at sea worldwide, against the British, Portuguese and later Spanish Armies in Iberia and variously Austria and Sweden on the Continent). Just like Hitler, the pot bellied short-arse from Corsica was unable to concentrate all of his resource on a single theatre.

Furthermore, unlike Hitler, Napeolon suffered approximately a 1:2 kill to loss ratio against Russia, the Wehrmacht managed about 1.5:1 against the Soviet Union.

No doubt about it, the loss of the grand vision of Germania and her leibensraum was sealed by a couple of fundamental cock ups in 1940.
While Russia was still allied with le Boche.

Hitler biggest mistake is he start a two front war,if the germans open only one front,Germany win the war.That time the german troops are effective forces with modern tanks,and weapons

I voted for declaring war on the US, if had distanced himself from the japenese and pearl harbor he may have kept the US out of that theater.

But yes Stalingrad was a big one, at the end the russians captured or killed 238,000 veteran german soilders, of those 5,000 game back at the end of the war. 20% of the german army casualties came from this useless fight. The total for stalingrad was 850,000 casualties of which 150,000 died. This city consumed three army groups worth of manpower, manpower which could have made the difference elsewhere. It was also a defeat for the germans which gave the russians a much needed morale boost. I think if hitler had just surrounded and bypassed Stalingrad there was an excellent chance the germans could have won in the East. And if they had won in the east, we would not have won in the west.

Missed this at the time and it’s rather too late now, but what the heck…

Sure they do - it was to prevent Afghanistan acting as a state sanctuary for the Al Quaeda group. Something it most definately can no longer do.

his biggest mistake was getting concieved:D…

I think you may be operating under a misconception. :smiley:

Hello Der Mann,
Hitler and Stalin did not trust each other period…
After the collapse of Russia, in the 90’s, it was discovered by Soviet Documents that they were moving massive amounts of troops and equipment to the West, I recently read about this, the plan was to attack Germany In July,of 41’, so in a sense, Germany got the jump on the Russians, from what would have been an inevitable war anyhow,I can’t quote the #'s now, but I’m sure other members have heard about this,
Kindly…Bernie…

I agree with an eariler statment with Hitler not listening to his generals and sticking his nose time and time again wher ehe had no business in