I apologize for the delayed response. Ribbentrop certainly wanted the Japanese to launch strikes on the United States and viewed a combined effort of IJN naval power coupled with the Wehrmacht prowess on land and in the air as the best possible way to overcome the U.S. before the economy could be fully engaged and was transitioned to a true war economy. However, I’m sure Ribbentrop and Hitler also expected the Japanese Imperial Army to open up a second front against the Soviets. Of course, they didn’t after the spanking at Khalkhin Gol showed the IJA they were no match for a fully mechanized and modern foe and they thought better of it. But IIRC, and I may not :mrgreen:, I believe the treaty explicitly states a belligerent is entitled to help only in the face of a clear attack by the Allies. I don’t believe the Japanese had the right to automatically expect German assistance they themselves had failed to offer in Operation Barbarossa, but Hitler simply thought that it was the best, most opportune gamble to enter a war against a weakened, shaken America…
And I apologize for mine. I was ill for the past few weeks with the common cold, and I have only recently recovered. It seems to me that the older I get, the longer my illnesses linger. Ah, well.
The most astonishing thought occurred to me after I finished rereading your post. Ambassador Oshima would have known about the Japanese defeats in the Soviet border skirmishes before Ribbentrop visited him in 1940, and again in 1941. It is astonishing to me that Japan did not inform her fraternal allies about the Red Army’s renewed strength in manpower and armaments (granted, I imagine these border skirmishes slowed the pace of Japan’s expansion in East Asia and allowed for more sober military analysis at headquarters, evidenced in Oshima’s evasive replies to Ribbentrop on Japan’s armaments industry.)
But the Japanese interpreted the Tripartite Pact to mean that Germany should assist her if America declares war, as Article III vaguely states, although that article does not support overt aggression by the contracting powers, perhaps justifying Japan’s noncommittal response to Germany’s acts of aggression; Hitler often forced his Axis sympathizers to join his armies in their foreign exploits. (“If you want to be in the kitchen, you must take part in the cooking,” seemed to be Hitler’s favorite phrase: his used it on Hungary’s foreign minister. It is surprising that Hitler did not force Japan to take part “in the cooking.”) In regards to Germany coming to Japan’s assistance, perhaps the Japanese believed that America’s obstruction to her island “empire” in the Pacific constituted a military threat, and so Japan believed that Article III automatically applied to her present situation.
I believe that the Tripartite Pact is, perhaps, the most important Pact to observe in this discussion because this document tightly bound Japan to the fate of her fraternal neighbors. If one looks at the entire Tripartite Pact, one observes that that document is the most binding and concrete Axis document to date, especially after one examines the preceding Axis agreements. The Anti-Comintern Pact, and then the Pact of Steel (Japan was not a signatory power but was aware of this Pact) made commitments that appeared to offer bilateral assistance, but the real substance, or international relations logic, of these agreements revolved around Germany’s conception of the new world balance of power (the Pacts state that each contracting power must respect the other power’s sphere of influence; in other words, if one wants to take this statement of fact at face value, Italy should not challenge Germany’s expansion in the East, as Italy threatened to do in Austria.) That first Pact was just a recognition of the fact that the Axis powers had ideological affinities, as does the second, only that Germany recognized that war with Britain and France was imminent, so military assistance clauses were added. When one finally comes to the Tripartite Pact, one sees that the agreement is an amalgamation of the other treaties, only that the Tripartite Pact implies America’s entry in the war. The essence of the Pact comes from Ribbentrop’s reassurances to Oshima that Germany would come to Japan’s aid, and that Germany could hold off the Soviet Union, given the military victories in Poland and France. In fact, immediately after America declared war on Japan, Oshima was informed by Ribbentrop that Hitler was contemplating how to inform the public about Germany’s declaration of war against the United States. I don’t believe that the Germans had any illusions when they signed the Tripartite Pact. The early focus of the discussions was on pretexts if and when negotiations with the Americans fail to materialize.
Forgive me once again, but I remember reading in a military historical magazine article eight years ago or so about Hitler’s biggest tactical error of 1942, which the author thought was Hitler’s decision to attack Sukhinichi. As far as the author was concerned, the attack failed for two reasons 1.) Hitler didn’t heed Commander Von Kluge’s advice on two panzer divisions–the name of the two divisions escapes me. Commander Von Kluge wanted these two divisions at the threatened Rzhev front. 2.) Instead, Hitler decided to use these two divisions in a pincer attack from North to South of the Southern Sector. The combination of these two issues caused the whole operation to stall because of lack of fuel and men.
In the stenographic record, one can see that that operation still exasperates Hitler, as he remarks: “That was an example with the headline: Don’t start an attack like this.” I found that remark rather amusing coming from a man of Hitler’s stature.
Hitler biggest mistake was give Japan a substantive military freedom and the weak Japanese forces attack the USA
The attack of Pearl Harbor was from military way a pointless action from Japan, but after all I think that action was a conclusive outing for the World War 2
USA deaclare war on Germany and Japan, and Hitler forces was split into two most parts, Eastern and Western front, and that was too much for the Axis
The Karabiner 98 and the Mp40 was also a wrong choice for the -40C degree Russian campaign in the winter time, the stringent german weapons probably isnt’t tested before the winter time in extreme conditions and runs cold (the axis troops start to use the soviet PPSH submachineguns)
Short hand about Tiger tanks, Panzerfausts, and the STG 44 invention was too late
I think Hitler win the USSR campaign, if the US not declare war with the Axis
The U.S. never declared War on the Axis-at-large, only Japan. Hitler declared war on Amerika in the 15th of December…
Interesting recent discussion in this thread. On the specific matter of whether Hitler was treaty-bound to declare war on the USA following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour - one way to look at this is from the point of view of what constituted “aggression”. Like many treaties of this sort, the relevant articles are somewhat vague. The strict interpretation of the term “aggression” equated it to an armed attack on one party to the treaty. On strict application of this interpretation, one can argue that, since Japan was the obvious “aggressor” in this case, Hitler was not treaty-bound to declare war on the USA in these circumstances. However, this traditional interpretation took no account of economic warfare. Following the Japanese intervention in French Indo-China (aggressive by any standards) the United States engaged in economic warfare with Japan through the use of financial and trade sanctions. These threatened to disable Japan’s ability to wage war. The oil embargo presented an immediate threat; Japan saw South-East Asia as a potentially critical source of oil. If it had backed down in the face of US pressure, it would have forfeited its capacity to secure these resources. Financial sanctions, such as the freezing of assets, presented a longer-term threat, limiting Japan’s ability to manipulate its finances to meet the requirements of its wars in China and (imminently) South-East Asia. On this broader interpretation of “aggression”, Japan could have been seen as a victim whose actions at Pearl Harbour were a “justifiable” response and, arguably, a “trigger” requiring a German declaration of war on the USA.
Of course, the reality was that, as always, Hitler would have taken his decision on political grounds with little concern for legal and diplomatic niceties. This brings us back to attempting to understand the basis of that political decision, something that remains very unclear.
On a related matter, in legal/diplomatic terms at least, treaty obligations to an even lesser extent could be used to justify Mussolini’s attack on France in 1940 in “support” of Germany. And it prompts another thought - could Hitler’s greatest mistake have been to have anything to do with Mussolini ? Not entirely kidding, JR.
which is exactly why (though you won’t find it directly in unclassified Soviet papers, but hints are there) Stalin would have attacked Nazi Germany and beyond occupied europe eventually when he felt it to be the right time (say…1942?).
Attacking USSR even if German HQ had known the potential of USSR was the right thing to do in 1941 seen in the pure military perspective.
In reality World War II came too early for Germany, Hitler still believed that Britain and France will not respond to his Polish tour. Unfortunately the did and that was the beginning of the deadliest and costliest war in human history.
USSR was out of Question and Germany would have needed peace with others before having any chance of success in the east. Basically Stalin was ready to sacrifice the entire Russian Population to preserve his Communist State.