I think at that time politician accepted responsibility for their actions. Chamberlain had returned with “peace in our time” and he had been duped. So he was responsible for British troops being in danger and accepted it. I would not call it cowardly he accepted responsibility. Unlike some of the slimy ones we have today. But do not think that was the end of it, Churchill had a lot of resistance from within the government and was being pushed to find a peaceful solution, especially after Dunkirk. You also had the US ambassador briefing against him in the US.
Mabye cowardly was the wrong term. But in military terms “conduct unbecoming an officer/leader of the armed forces” I do see what you are saying and it is repectable to accept responsiblity for your mistakes. And as you said he was duped. I can understand the resistance to Churchill because from what I have learned he did seem to make him self out to be a war monger. Which wasnt really the case. I think he was just looking out for the best interest and protection of the UK. Good thing you didnt just back out of the war because this would have done nothing but strengten Germany’s intentions.
GS wrote
But in military terms “conduct unbecoming an officer/leader of the armed forces”
This may be a slip or a misunderstanding, but the prime minister is not the leader of the armed forces, the King was.
It is also worth pointing out that a lot of the higher classes looked on Hitler as a good thing and were quit impressed with what he had done in Germany. They had also gone through one terrible war and did not want to repeat it. Chamberlain’s appeasement was not, at the time, looked on by the public as the wrong direction to take. Churchill had returned to government as the first lord of the admiralty but was known for changing sides as it suited his plan. He had changed parties at least once.
I think he was just looking out for the best interest and protection of the UK.
And I would agree that he was not a war monger, just could see the inevitable coming and wanted the country to be in he best position when it happened.
Andrew Wrote
The British Forces had limited numbers of the Matilda Mk1 Infantry Tank, this had much better Armour than the German Tanks which were involved in the Invasion of France, but it’s main problem was the Gun, it had a 2 Pounder which compared to both German & French tanks was a Peashooter,
You are confusing the Mk1 with the Mk2. The Mk1 which was in greater supply had a crew of 2 and was armed with an MG. It had very good armour but was designed to support infantry in he attack not take on tanks.
The Mk2 (about 50 in France) was a far better tank and served on until the 88 came on the ground in the desert. It served in the Far East and was well regarded. At the time of France it was virtually invulnerable with 75mm of armour. It’s 2 pdr (40mm) gun as MD said was a match at this time for any German tank. The Matilda’s failing was that it had a small turret ring and when upguned to the 6 pdr the gunner had to load as there was no room for the loader.
The Matilda 2 was designed to take on tanks and was very good at it, the trouble was that it could not take on other targets as the 2 pdr fired only AT ammo not HE, a problem solved with the 6pdr and the introduction of the Grant/Lee tanks.
The link below takes you to an orbat of the BEF. From this it would appear that each Bde had an AT company and each Div had an AT RA Tegt.
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/British-Expeditionary-Force#Order_of_Battle_.28WWII.29
Some of the links to units do not work.
I think the reason was the use of surprise and concentration of effort. The German only had to be at one place, the Allies had to be every wear. The French did not react quickly and nether the BEF or the French co-ordinated their action well. Arras is a good example of this.
Thermopylae
Just a quick point, Hollywood has rewritten history again in this one, they fail to mention that there was also 7000 Greeks present. But what’s fact to a good film. 
First:
IMO Chamberlain gave Britain the much needed time to get ready for war. After WW1 military was a dirty word in both Britain and France (due to huge, often unnecessary sacrifices due to mostly bad leadership, the French almost lost a whole generation in the trenches). Only during the Spanish civil war did the western nations realise the danger coming from Germany. This caused a crash rearmament programme in Britain and France.
Secondly:
In 1939 did the French mobilise for a German attack, which didn´t come. This mobilisation caused many needed workers to leave the arms factories to become soldiers. After a few months the government realised iot´s mistake and sent a lot of workers home. This caused bad morale among the troops, who did not get demobbed.
Then, due to Belgium´s insistence on neutrality there was no coherent planning along the northern flank (actuallly British troops who entered Belgium in May 1940 to take positions against the Germans were in some cases stopped by Belgian troops).
The French didn´t want to offend the Belgians, so the Maginot line fortifications along the Belgian border were much weaker.
Another thing was the Allied planning for a repeatof WW1. During WW1, successfull attacks were always preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment. The French general staff thought that intelligence about Germans moving heavy artillery to ther front should give them plenty of warning about where a German attack would take place to move troops to this sector. The French generals never thought about Stukas acting as flying artillery.
The Ardennes were considered impassable for heavy artillery and tanks. Therefor the sector around Sedan was watched by socalled B divisions, units made up mostly of middleaged conscripts with little training, lack of artillery and armour, as well as motorised transport. The idea was that they should just watch and if they notice enemy movement, crack A divisions would be moved there, the A divisions were mostly deployed further south in sectors the French generals thought to be more dangerous.
Two battalions of one of these substandard divisions (51st infantry division, if I´m correct) , panicked and opened a gap, through which Guderian´s troops could break in and attack the other French positions from the back and the flanks.
Then, the French Army was a logistical and communicatiobs nightmare, with lots of interservice infighting. Due to this intelligence from French reconnaisance pilots was not acted upon. Also fighters were deployed piecemeal and not concentrated. Equipment wasn´t handed out. After the invasion the Germans found lots of modern French fighters, which due to some stupid orders had been flown to Northern Africa instead of using them against the Stukas.
Jan
Another major problem is that we went to France expecting to fight a repeat of WW1, not a lightning war of manoevre, for which we were ill-prepared. In small-arms for instance, the British army had hurriedly bought Thompson M1928s from the Americans since no concern had been given to SMGs, which were considered to be “gangster wpns” and of little military value.
FWIW German Panzer strengths during the Battle of France
Panzer I: 523
Panzer II: 955
Panzer III: 349
Panzer IV: 278
Panzer 35t: 106
Panzer 38t: 228
Panzer-Befehlswagen I: 96
Panzer-Befehlswagen II: 39
Yes I love that story. Of course the Spartens where much much (much much) more trained and stronger than any of the Persians, but again if (i think it was quarter million) soldeirs came charging, the Spartens where sure of defeat. It was tactics, and they knew what to do. They choose a good position to wait and slay off the Persians. Of course this is WW2 history! War is more with the head than with power and force.
“First with the head, and then with the heart.”[/quote]
See if you can get a copy of “Gates of Fire” by Steven Pressfield, (I don’t have the ISBN as my copy was lent to a ‘friend’…) An excellent novel of the lead up to, and battle of Thermopylæ.
“Go tell the Spartans…”
“The Art of War” by Sun Tzu is the quintessential textbook on tactics, everything in it can be translated to modern warfare.
Required reading at RMAS.
Yes I love that story. Of course the Spartens where much much (much much) more trained and stronger than any of the Persians, but again if (i think it was quarter million) soldeirs came charging, the Spartens where sure of defeat. It was tactics, and they knew what to do. They choose a good position to wait and slay off the Persians. Of course this is WW2 history! War is more with the head than with power and force.
“First with the head, and then with the heart.”[/quote]
See if you can get a copy of “Gates of Fire” by Steven Pressfield, (I don’t have the ISBN as my copy was lent to a ‘friend’…) An excellent novel of the lead up to, and battle of Thermopylæ.
“Go tell the Spartans…”
“The Art of War” by Sun Tzu is the quintessential textbook on tactics, everything in it can be translated to modern warfare.
Required reading at RMAS.[/quote]
Edited: Poor taste as I reflect. :? Sorry guys.
I’ll be brief:
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The right wing of French society was fairly pro Hitler. The Left wing of French Society was also fairly pro Hitler as he was a friend of Soviet Union having just signed the Molotov-Ribonthrop Pact. basicaly no one was up for fighting the Germans.
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The French were expecting the Germans to come through Belgium as the had in WWI. So that is where they sent all their better divisions including a large part of their tanks and the BEF. When Germany attacked further South at Sedan and Dinnant (against poor quality troops) the better French troops were too far North to be redirected and were pinned in Belgium.
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The French High Command failed to respond to the new tempo of war and organise counter attacks that would have cut off the German panzer breakthrough.
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The Germans had far supeior airplanes and pilots and established air supremacy early on with predictable results.
yes,but,the germans were pro frenchs?.
their low morale killed france.
As you have seen by the attacks the French socialist president Leon Blum faced in 1936, when he supported the Spanish Republic against the fascists, the French upper clasand much of the French brass prefered a German Nazi occupation or a puppet government supported by the Nazis over a leftwing French government. Face it, French Jews were largely rounded up by French police and fascist Milice and then handed over to the Germans.
Many leftwings though had a big ideological problem, when Stalin wanted them to do a 180 degree turn after he had the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact signed.
Once the Germans occupied France though, the communists had the most disciplined and efficient partisan organisation.
Jan
Maybe but hither too many French armament works had sabotaged the equipment they had been worrking on in sympathy with their socialist Nazi brothers. Thats how they saw it at the time anyway.