http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJHxlGQ4hNM
i am correct watch this and u will see
in the revoloutinary war ur method would work cause they would have powder horns as opposed to the percussion cap
Well, I think the pouches held 40, but soldiers carried 10 in each pocket…
That’s exactly what I was about to say. Also, as the percussion caps were state-of-the-art back then, you can be sure that there would have been people still using them, especially in the South, though I have to admit that I didn’t think of the percussion cap.
Experienced troops heading into combat usually carry as much ammo as they physically can. There were some troops in Vietnam that would carry up to 1500 rounds (75 mags) for their M-16s but with that load you wouldn’t be carrying much else.
Well, if they felt like they needed it… I can’t imagine carrying that much Ammo on me - it must be almost impossible to move quickly while carrying that kind of a load…
Guys, did every soldier in ww2 get to carry handgrenades, in addition to ammo; or were only certain soldiers allowed? Were handgrenades avail to all as many as they wanted or were they rationed. What you think?
hahaha i know i had to think about it for a little bit
i am pretty sure the werchmact issued every rifleman in every section with 1 stick grenade.There is 10 men in a section including the squad leader or GruppenFührer then there is a Machine gunner with his loader and another assistant that carried straghit ammunition and had no weapons except a pistol he would stand in the back during combat but move forward when ammo was needed or hand to hand combat.the rest were Rifleman and they were all issued grenades but this is all theoretical they usually did not have enough grenades for every solider
Yes that would be quite a load, I imagine it was members for that units like the ‘Blues Company’ and such that were inserted into hot spots from helicopters that would pack a load like that. They pretty much hit the ground fighting and weren’t so much patrolling. That was just an example though to show that normally men would carry as much ammo as possible. As long as it doesn’t weigh you down too much you can’t have too much ammo.
Aye, when i joined up we had the SLR, it was a mother of a weapon, 20 round mags, big kick, accurate, easy to maintain and from my experience, very reliable. Enough stopping power to floor a Bull!
Just had lunch with a mate who did a half tour as an armoured officer in Vietnam. He thinks 60 rounds was about the standard issue for Australian troops, although they carried more.
I’m sure you’ve heard about the battle of Long Tan, apparently they had got used to firing very few rounds and so had started to carry fewer than normal. Resulting from this when the battle had been going on for a few hours they were down to literally a handful of rounds per man. When the plt sgts/SQMS etc were carrying out cas/am they were literally re-distribting on or two rounds per man.
Moving on, I’m not sure about WW2 but I know that the ‘average’ (ha ha) British rifleman should carry 330 x 5.56mm and possibly a further 150 x 5.56mm in a bandolier for the LSW/Minimi. Added to that grenades and if he’s really lucky some 7.62mm link or 51mm mortar round, plus if he’s super lucky he might have a LAW as well!
:rolleyes:
Was he walking or crawling?
I’ve read various books and other accounts on Long Tan, albeit mostly a long time ago, and can’t recall that aspect, but it could be correct. Do you have a source?
The reference to firing very few rounds might be a misunderstanding of Australian fire discipline, which was different to the American approach in Vietnam. Single aimed shots with the semi-automatic SLR but under pressure 2 to 3 more or less aimed rounds was the Australian training standard, rather than the American tendency to apply overwhelming and often automatic firepower in the general direction of the enemy.
Regardless of the amount of ammunition carried by the Australians, running out was primarily a consequence of Long Tan being an encounter battle which was way, way beyond anything the vastly outnumbered Australian patrols expected to find in seeking out enemy crews which had shelled their base with mortars and recoilless rifles a day or so earlier. These were not the sort of mostly self-supporting patrols which went into the bush for weeks at a time and were equipped accordingly but just forays from the base intended to be of a short distance and duration, and equipped accordingly.
The enemy was equipped at the other end of the scale.
The enemy were well equipped and were almost certainly prepared for a major assault on the base rather than a contact out in the field. Most of the enemy soldiers carried ammunition for crew-served weapons which were not in evidence on the battlefield in addition to their personal AK or SKS rifle with up to 250 rounds of ammunition. Furthermore, most were found to have 2 or 3 grenades on them, with some Grenadiers carrying satchels of 15 to 20 grenades. These were not used during the battle.
http://www.6rarassociation.com/battlelongtan.htm
After a few hours of intense close quarter small arms engagement with a force about 25 times larger than their own, it is surprising that the Australians hadn’t run out of ammunition earlier (and weren’t obliterated by then, but that’s another story). That they hadn’t run out of ammunition and that they inflicted numerically (but, as is to be expected for the smaller force, not proportionally) higher casualties* on the enemy is, in part, testament to their fire discipline and, in particular in this engagement, to the special forces standards of training imposed on his mostly conscript infantry troops by former commando officer Major Harry Smith who commanded D Company which bore the brunt of the action. Not to mention the heroic actions of the RAAF helicopter crews in flying into a very hot zone controlled by the enemy to re-supply the trapped infantry with ammunition, and the rescue by the cavalry.
*The losses inflicted upon the enemy by Australian infantry are uncertain, but here are some figures.
Footnote
(VC Defector) In 1969, Ex Sgt Loc of D445 Bn, Battle of Long Tan, a guide and interpreter with 6 RAR stated that most casualties were caused by artillery. That the total number of VC killed in the battle was well in excess of 1,000. Most of these they were able to carry out on the night of 18 August to a very large hospital complex dug out in the mountains to the North-East of the battlefield. There were also 1,000 missing from the units. He refused to believe that the total Australian force was only about 100 men with casualties of 18 killed and 25 wounded.
Enemy Casualties
• 245 KIA (Body Count)
• 3 Captured
• 150 KIA (Subsequent Intelligence estimate)
• 500 WIA (Subsequent Intelligence estimate)• NOTE: During Operation MARSDEN in late 1969, Australian forces captured a Viet Cong dispensary that had a list of dead and wounded attributed to Long Tan. Those figures were 878 KIA/Missing/Died of wounds and approximately 1500 WIA
Friendly Casualties
6 RAR
• D Coy: 17 KIA , 23 WIA
• A Coy: 3 injured
• B Coy: 1 WIA3 Tp 1 APC Sqn
• 1 DOW (Cpl Clements) 1 WIA (remained on duty)
Maybe it’s because their bullets cost twice as much meaning they had to be fired half as often?
The US also used the 7.62mm NATO M-14 and found cases of small unit infantry firefights resulting in the near wiping out of US units firing semi-auto against North Vietnamese better armed for jungle combat with AK-47s. That’s not necessarily the main reason it was withdrawn, I believe the jungle humidity played havoc on the wooden buts and steel carriers and barrels. The weapon was also expensive and difficult to manufacture in numbers needed by the United State’s armed forces as a standard issue rifle…
Or maybe it has something to do with the Australians being tree-hugging hippies?
They’d rather get hit than shoot any unnecessary bullets into the Jungle.
On a more serious note: I’d say that both approaches had their advantages and disadvantages.
The single fire obviously allows for a lower waste of ammo and is budget-friendly. It also means that the soldiers should be able to concentrate a bit more on the enemy fire, as they aren’t distracted by all their own fire.
The fully automatic Rambo-technique made sure that the enemy would be suppressed and wouldn’t dare to fire back/fire well aimed shots. They should also have a harder time making out separate targets.
Actually, you’re half right there.
Australia lacked, and lacks, the wealth, industrial resources and manpower of the US, so our infantry tactics in and since WWII reflect that by employing the opposite of the massive firepower and manpower which American military doctrine dictated. In Vietnam we were more of an aggressive patrolling force than an assault force.
I think you might be a little right there.
I have some hazy recollection about Australia having to pay compensation for damage to rubber tree plantations in Vietnam and or troops being warned not to damage them to avoid paying compensation. Or maybe it was to avoid getting the local owners off side.
They must have forgotten about it in the Long Tan rubber plantation, because they shredded it.
Agreed, but effective suppressing fire can also be achieved with a low expenditure of ammunition by having two or three riflemen concentrate staggered single or 2 to 3 round bursts on a target.
But that’s more applicable to fire and movement on a small scale. In a large scale assault, and certainly in large scale defence, the fully automatic weapon is far more effective in a furious battle,