Thanks, Wizard. I do respectfully disagree. I do not believe that Roosevelt could have gotten the votes in Congress to declare war on a country that had not attacked us - witness the struggles he had in dealing with the Germans. There was a very significant isolationist movement in the country that vexed Roosevelt incessantly. You say that Malaysia, Indonesia and other locations would have been sufficient cause for a declaration of war, then what about England, Poland, Norway, Denmark, France, Belgium and Holland? Were those not important enough? Your point about the Neutrality Act may be right, but I think it’s debatable. The Japanese, in my opinion, completely misread the US from the get-go. Maybe we didn’t understand the oriental mind - whatever that is - but they surely didn’t have the slightest understanding of our mindset. The surest way to ensure their defeat was to attack us. The surest way to ensure their victory - albeit temporarily - was NOT to attack us.
Well, that is what forums are for; reasoned disagreement.
I believe that the influence of the isolationist and pacifists movements in the US have been overly exaggerated, especially in the period of 1941. The American public was concerned about being dragged into the European war as it had been in WW I. and that is what the Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1939 were all about. This is obvious when one reads the provisions about arming US merchant ships and US citizens taking passage in belligerent ships. Public opinion polls taken in 1940 and 1941 clearly show that Americans felt differently about fighting in the European war and fighting the Japanese. By mid-1941, these polls demonstrate that a slight majority of Americans were resigned to having eventually to fight the Japanese.
Furthermore, the Roosevelt administration was committed to preventing the defeat of Britain by the Axis, by any means possible; an attack by Japan on British and Dutch possessions in the western Pacific made such an event far more likely, and would almost certainly have resulted in military action by the US. In fact, the Roosevelt administration warned Japan of exactly that possibility in the autumn of 1941. Upon the fall of France in 1940, Congress had easily passed the “Two Ocean Navy Act” specifically designed to create a Navy capable of simultaneously fighting both the Japanese in the Pacific and the Germans in the Atlantic. I think it’s significant that on December 5th. 1941, Admiral Philips, the British commander in the western Pacific, was in Manila meeting with Admiral Hart, his American counterpart. The British had been offered the use of American base facilities in the Philippines in case Japan attacked Malaya. This alone would would have been sufficient reason for the Japanese to declare war on the US. In that case, Roosevelt would have had no trouble getting enough Congressional votes for a declaration of war against Japan.
The Japanese, in any case, planned on attacking the Philippines even if the Pearl Harbor attack had not been approved; this would have automatically resulted in a war with the US. The Japanese had actually sealed their fate when they seized airfields in southern Indochina in July, 1941. The US and Britain realized that the only possible reason for such a seizure was to prepare for an attack on Malaya, Borneo and the NEI. Even the isolationists could not ignore this threat because such an attack would make Britain’s defeat in Europe much more likely, which, in turn, would render the US vulnerable to Axis attach in the Atlantic. In my opinion, the US could not stay out of a Pacific war without seriously jeopardizing it’s own security and both the American public and Congress realized this.
I agree that the Japanese, besides ignoring economic and industrial realities, completely misread American determination and will. The Japanese also misread the international situation especially as to the American perception of the threat that the Axis posed to the western democracies. They simply did not realize that by aligning themselves with the Axis, they became part of that perception of threat. By attacking in the Pacific, even without a direct attack on US territory, they would have forced the US to use military force to counter them.
I don’t disagree with everything stated here. But the Pearl Harbor strike was anything but a simple suicide mission and death wish. On the contrary, the Japanese interpreted the American blockade of hydrocarbons as their downfall. The attack on Pearl Harbor was simply viewed as an extension of the IJN’s premise of “decisive battle,” in which a coup de main strike could cripple a power with far greater resources–as they had done to the Russians at Port Arthur, and force a separate peace. We can also argue all day as to the shortcomings of the IJA air-strike at Pearl, but if the carriers had been at port, it would have been a much greater setback for the Americans–though certainly not necessarily the end of things…
Had the carriers been in port, the USA would have been at minimum, a year before being able to retaliate with any hope of success. This, is not from any lack of skill or will on the part of either the US or the US Navy, but rather, from the sheer necessity of raising the sunken vessels, rebuilding and refitting them, all the while attempting to defend, with next to no resources in place, a large area at sea and ashore.
Accepting the above as logical, we then have a situation where the war may well have gone on into 1950 and beyond.
While I’ve no wish to turn this thread into a “what if”, the above seems, imho, to be a reasonable, and logical conclusion.
I cannot see the IJN strike against Pearl Harbour as a “suicide mission” of any kind.
However, though it was indeed exceedingly well executed, it was flawed, in as much as the vital carriers were simply not in port.
That fact alone doomed Japan: the USA was not going to be waiting long to retaliate with every resource it had available.
Once that happened, the result, was inevitable, as the Japanese themselves knew: witness Isoroku Yamamoto: “I fear we have awakened a sleeping giant.” , and “I can give you a year, perhaps 18 months at most, BUT: if we have not by that time gained decisive victory, we will have earned a result that shall prove disastrous.”
Like you, Nick, I take the view that Japan felt it had its’ back against the wall, in terms of access to hydrocarbon, and various other resources. That alone foretold some form of attack from Japan as equally inevitable.
Kind and Respectful Regards, Uyraell.
I’ve never considered the Neutrality Act before your post in this context, but in light of Wizard’s link http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/neutrality.htm and applying my Australian lawyer’s mind to American legislation I agree with Wizard’s interpretation that it merely limits American citizens rather than the United States in actions involving belligerents. This is sufficiently clear from the second paragraph of the preamble which outlines the purpose of the detailed leglislative provisions:
Whereas the United States, desiring to preserve its neutrality in wars between foreign states and desiring also to avoid involvement therein, voluntarily imposes upon its nationals by domestic legislation the restrictions set out in this joint resolution; and Whereas by so doing the United States waives none of its own rights or privileges, or those of any of its nationals, under international law, and expressly reserves all the rights and privileges to which it and its nationals are entitled under the law of nations
Perhaps there are constitutional issues under American law which are not apparent to me from a jurisdiction where we don’t have anything remotely comparable to the American constitution, but in the absence of such issues Wizard’s interpretation seems to me to be correct that the Neutrality Act limited only American citizens and not America in belligerent actions.
From a more basic perspective on domestic and international law, it is impossible in international law for a nation to bind itself by domestic legislation not to exercise its rights against another nation as other nations are not subject to and have no rights under the first nation’s domestic law.
I don’t know if the Japanese were “incredibly stupid,” but the Germans sure were. They certainly made it easier for FDR and the Congress as there was no compulsion in their pact with Japan, legal or moral, to declare war on a power in which Japan attacked first…
With hindsight it may seem that way, but at the time it was a necessary, well considered, and reasonably well executed (but wold have been much better executed with the final wave which was not launched), and modestly successful for a time, attempt to neutralise the response which would come from Hawaii to Japan’s southern thrust.
It was also a very effective, if unintended, psychological blow in creating at least apprehension and at worst panic on America’s west coast about a Japanese invasion which in turn infected wider America, albeit apprehension and panic balanced by anger and resolve to avenge Pearl Harbor which in time was vastly more damaging to Japan than anything Japan managed to damage at Pearl Harbor.
With huge amounts of luck, or lack of it, on both sides.
For example, Pearl Harbor would have been worse for the US if all the US carriers were in the harbour and Midway would have been better for Japan but for a lucky find and some lucky strikes by the American planes.
Coral Sea didn’t settle much at the time on the water so far as ships and tonnage sunk, but strategically it was critical as it prevented the invasion of Port Moresby which would have been devastating, but not necessarily fatal to the Allies, at that point in the war.
Midway settled much on the water, luck or not, which forced Japan to pull its horns in and to a fair extent go on the defensive for the rest of the war after its brief early but impressive victories. But on that aspect the stunning psychological impact of the earlier Doolittle Raid should not be ignored as it made Japan realise that it was vulnerable in its home waters and islands early in the war and caused it to pay more attention to home defence and to rein in its territorial ambitons in the Pacific.
Mate, I’m sorry if my dissection of your post makes it look like I’m targeting you. It’s just that responding to your post occurs because you touch upon so many important points and open a range of discussions about the Pacific war, and Japan in other respects. This might well result in others dissecting my posts and more useful discussion. Anyway, mate, it ain’t personal.
Back to the quote: America and Japan both had air forces attached to their armies and navies at the time, and their armies and navies undoubtedly had a degree of inter-service rivalry which threatened to impede the common cause, but the Japanese managed to elevate it to a science or art which undermined their war effort.
With vast oversimplification, the problem for the IJN was that the IJA was dominant and, worse, had garnered for itself the riches and benefits of land operations and looting etc in China. The remaining opportunity for the IJN was to advance across the water, which meant southwards and eastwards.
Japan lacked a government which, like America and its fighting Allies (France is excluded due to the Vichy Government), imposed democratically elected political will and objectives on military leaders. Indeed, in Japan it was largely the reverse. So there was no overriding power in Japan which, unlike Roosevelt and Churchill’s, dictated national strategic objectives to the defence force leaders who in turn converted them into what the army and navy and their respective air forces would do.
Japan’s problem was in part that the Emperor, despite being an enthusiastic little militarist when things were going Japan’s way, was in many ways a captive of his military leaders where the military leaders among the Allies were ultimately subject to the control of their democratically elected governments.
In short, in Japan the tail wagged the dog, and in due course the dog suffered for want of controlling its tail.
Or maybe a willingness by America to come to terms with Japan, which by the end of 1942 had (a) won the Battle of the Coral Sea which enabled the invasion of Port Moresby and victory on Guadalcanal and imminent threat to American lines of communication to Australia and (b) then won the Battle of Midway and reinforced all the foregoing reasons for America to cut its losses in the Pacific.
Which was pretty much the Japanese strategy, to the extent that Japan had one, of grab it and hold it and they’ll accept it after a while.
royal 744
Wizard
Uyraell
It’s good to see you all back here on a serious debate, and I hope you’ll stay.
We’ve missed such informed debates on the Pacific War.
While I don’t disagree that Japan’s basic strategy – to the extent it can be said to have had one – was as you say, my friend, I have severe doubts about the USA being willing to come to terms with Japan, albeit the USA would have had its’ back against the wall.
In Europe, US commercial interests would have (and largely did) survived intact, and though in some cases with reduced profitability, the money was still coming through often enough to make the till ring.
The same cannot be applied to the CBI/Pacific theaters, where US commercial interests where not only under continuous ongoing threat, but were in fact (on the accountants’ Profit/Loss sheets) already a loss, in as much as either the relevant respective resource (Oil, cotton, grains, ores, manufacturing plants: all “offshore”) was in Japanese hands or close enough to being so.
Simply put; the money was not coming in (in some cases, at all) and was, in P/L terms, a Loss, that could nonetheless NOT be written-off qv & cf Commercial Law, which consequently meant the relevant Commercial Insurance could not be Claimed either, and thus was (cf) Total Loss.
This meant , in turn, That the US would have had no choice but to continue the fight, from no-matter how disadvantageous a position, which is where and why I suggest the war itself may well have gone on into 1950 and beyond.
In other words, America, it’s commitment to UK, Australia, and the southern Pacific nations notwithstanding, would have had to struggle on somehow, regardless, much as the USSR did when having to transfer much of it’s internal industry deep inland while still defending against the German invasion of '41/'42. This would take vast money and time, hence My referring 1950.
Commercial pressures would have been the cause, regardless public will or sentiment, perceived or actual.
Kind and Respectful Regards RS*, Uyraell.
{P.S: My Thanks, my Aussie mate, for your kind words about the other gentlemen and myself, and reasoned debate.
Your kind compliment is well appreciated, Sir. — Kind and Warm Regards RS*, Uyraell.}
I think you’re probably correct, but given the ‘Germany first’ policy I’m not sure that a series of convincing defeats in the Pacific mightn’t have made coming to terms with Japan a political consideration to free America to focus on Germany.
Against that was the popular outrage, shared by national politicians, which required vengeance upon Japan.
But politicians usually end up being pragmatists.
Something I have yet to understand in detail is the riches China offered the West, but that was much of what the war was about with competition between Japan and the West for those riches, which stretches back to the West’s rampant exploitation of China beginning in the previous century.
It all turned out to be rather futile from the West’s viewpoint as the Nationalists were defeated by the Communists who excluded the West. Which goes some way to explaining subsequent Western policies towards China.
I never said any of you were gentlemen. 
Still, I’d like to see more serious discussion on the Pacific war as it’s a welcome relief from idiotic polls on which rifle was the best etc.
Yes, and as pragmatists American politicians in the 1940’s realized that they wouldn’t have a political career for long if they even hinted at an accommodation with the Japanese. After Pearl Harbor, there wasn’t a snowball’s chance in Hell of anything but the complete destruction of the Japanese Empire. The Germany First policy was a pragmatic strategy that had to literally be forced down the American electorates throats; it was Japan which carried the overwhelming burden of American animus.
While it is true that the US had an irrational love affair with the potentiality of Chinese trade, the reality is that China was only part of the reason for the war with Japan. US investment in China and trade with China, was far below US investment in, and trade with Japan in the 1930’s. We had far more to lose by going to war with Japan than we did by letting Japan dominate China’s commercial possibilities.
The other causes of war were national interests which today we would characterize as “vital”. Probably of the most immediate concern was preventing Britain, already under attack by Germany, from losing important possessions in Asia, thereby making more probable Britain’s defeat in the European war. Allied with this factor was keeping Dutch possessions out of the clutches of Germany’s Axis ally. The US was thoroughly committed to preventing Germany from completely dominating Europe and that meant Britain had to be kept in the war.
Another factor, not usually cited by historians, was that the European possessions in Asia accounted for some very critical US imports. Three colonies alone, Malaya, the Philippines, and the NEI, accounted for one fifth of all American foreign purchases. The United States, with the largest rubber-goods industry in the world, bought 98 % of it’s rubber and 90 % of it’s tin from Southeast Asia. Overall, the Southeast Asian area provided over half of America’s needs for at least 15 vital commodities, including chromium and manganese, metals essential in the steel making process.
Frank Knox, in his 1940 Congressional confirmation hearings for the post of Secretary of the Navy, testified that, “We should not allow the Japanese to take the Dutch East Indies, a vital source of oil and rubber and tin…we must face frankly the fact that to deny the Dutch East Indies to Japan may mean war.”
Finally, when the Japanese signed the Tri-Partite pact in 1940 they placed themselves squarely in Roosevelt’s sights as an ally of Nazi Germany, a regime neither he nor the country was willing or able to tolerate for any length of time. Thus, restricting the causes of the war with Japan to trade with China, misses some other very important reasons the US was willing to go to war. I think trade (or the potential of trade) with China has been way too much overemphasized and others ignored.
Yes, and as pragmatists American politicians in the 1940’s realized that they wouldn’t have a political career for long if they even hinted at an accommodation with the Japanese. After Pearl Harbor, there wasn’t a snowball’s chance in Hell of anything but the complete destruction of the Japanese Empire. The Germany First policy was a pragmatic strategy that had to literally be forced down the American electorates throats; it was Japan which carried the overwhelming burden of American animus.
While mostly i dont disagree, reality could very well have forced USA into a settled “peace”.
When the war started, Japan had planning done and finished for the attack on Pearl, East Indies, Philippines etc etc… Planning that had been made slowly and painstakingly by IJN together with IJA, with compromises and agreements planned out almost to perfection. Once they reached the end of that preplanning however, the cooperation was but a memory most of the time.
This was one big part of why Japan had such stunning early victories, followed by far less impressive actions once the cooperation between IJN and IJA vanished and went back to the earlier cutthroat animosity.
However, as Rising Sun postulated above, lets say the strike on Pearl not just sinks, but utterly destroys at least 2 USA carriers, and that the Solomons and New Guinea campaigns are the stunningly rapid victories they were dangerously close to becoming, followed by another decisive naval defeat that puts 2 or more of USAs remaining carriers on the bottom of the sea, because the need for a fast reaction/revenge pushed a damaged USN to go into battle despite the Pearl losses, and then followed by another success where Japan takes posession of New Caledonia, Santa Cruz and the Vanuatu islands…
Such a string of events, which is totally realistic as long as it doesnt take too long to happen(and if some undesirable ideas, like the Aleutian strike which also gave USA access to a Zero, bringing its huge flaws into common knowledge, but above all else diverted time and assets to unimportant tasks), USA could very well find itself looking at a minimum of 2-3 years before it could respond effectively, during which time continuing the war would cause huge problems for Australia among many others, not to forget risking yet another severe strike at something important…
USA might simply find itself unable to respond to Japan for the foreseeable future and in a very unhappy situation in the Pacific. Some sort of peace in such a situation is far from impossible, even if it would be extremely disgusting to USA and i doubt they would stick to such a peace “agreement” any longer than they had to.
However, an alternate version that might really knock USA into a peacedeal, is if Japan had successfully invaded Hawaii instead of the historical attack on Pearl.
This is an option that has been gamed out in simulations many times, and overall, its completely doable although rather tricky.
The big caveat that most consider as the “dealbreaker” is the problem that it would delay the Japanes attacks southwards by at least 2-3 months more likely a bit more(transports and the troops needed as well as the shipping needed for supplying Hawaii).
Taking Hawaii however is such a huge advantage that it makes up for it more than enough in at least my view(not that im nearly alone in that!). Also, one of the most important parts of going south was the NEI oil, and if Hawaii can be captured quick enough, the oil stores there alone would be enough to keep Japan fighting at “full speed” for at least 1-2 years. And even if the oil on Hawaii is completely destroyed (unlikely really, as USA was surprisingly coy about both protecting them as well as preparing to sabotage them in case of invasion, there was very little thought about either), Japan still had enough to still take NEI, repair the fields if they are sabotaged as historically and resume production before running out.
And with Hawaii gone as a base for USA, it would mean no forward base of significance, and make connections with Australia very chancy, making resistance against their delayed southern offensive less effective.
Oh, and the OP:
The Japanese probaly had the strongest military during WWII.Their navy was also incredibly powerful.It was by far the largest during the whole war.The Japanese also had considerible air power.
:mrgreen:
That is just such a JOKE!
The “cooperation” between the IJA and IJN to which you credit much of Japan’s early success was largely illusory. In fact, most of the planning which went into the initial Japanese offensives in the western Pacific and southeast Asia carefully separated the operational roles of the IJA and IJN, and sought to minimize the reliance of each service on the other. The only real area where cooperation between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy was anything more than minimal was in the convoying of Japanese Army transports by Japanese naval warships. In the face of the meager Allied air attacks and occasional pin-pric-k naval raids or attacks by submersibles, this convoying proved just adequate to avoid major losses en route to the invasion points.
The early Japanese successes had more to do with the fact that the Japanese enjoyed having the initiative and the ability to pick when and where to attack, coupled with comparatively extremely weak and/or incompetently led defense forces.
I will not dispute that such an alternative is possible, but I will assert that it is highly unlikely, especially in combination.
Your first flawed assumption is that the US Navy would rashly attack the Japanese main fleet with inferior and/or poorly prepared forces due to a “need for fast reaction/revenge”. The pre-war plan for the US Navy was to stand on the defensive and hold the “Strategic Triangle” of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Canal. The defense of this Strategic Triangle was considered, for military planning purposes, to be part of the defense of the North American continent, and as such, had absolute first priority over all other war time considerations, including the “Europe First” policy. Thus, the destruction of any carriers at Pearl Harbor would have resulted in their replacement by transferring carriers from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet.
BTW, the capture of an intact Zero in the Aleutians, while useful, did not provide much information which was not already known to Allied pilots. General Claire Chennault, serving in China since 1937, had written a report detailing the Zero’s weaknesses which circulated among American military pilots in February, 1941. My father, who was at that time a carrier pilot in the USN, read it and had numerous discussion with his colleagues about tactics to take advantage of those weaknesses. Moreover, the prototype F6F, which was far superior to the Zero, first flew in October, 1942, just two weeks after the captured Zero was first flown by an American pilot, so, contrary to several accounts, the F6F did not incorporate specific design features to exploit the Zero’s flaws.
Finally, rather than the “2-3 years” required for a response to Japanese aggression, the US Navy could have gone on the offensive within twelve months of the scenario you describe. The fruits of the “Two-Ocean Navy” act were already coming off the ways and by mid-1943, US carriers and carrier planes would have outnumbered IJN carriers and carrier planes. There is no way any US politicians would have suggested negotiations with Japan, even if the situation had forced a postponement of a US counter-offensive in the Pacific. It would be much more probable that the European war would have been put on the back burner until teh Japanese had been contained in the Pacific.
See;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akutan_Zero
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
Far from being “doable”, a successful Japanese invasion of Hawaii at any point during the war is simply far-fetched fantasy.
The Japanese simply did not have the ability to assault a heavily defended island such as Oahu, and maintain the requisite naval forces offshore for the period of time it would take to subdue the defenders. Furthermore the logistics of defending Hawaii against an American counter-attack would put the Japanese at a severe disadvantage.
And even should the miraculous occur, the US would view the loss of Hawaii in the same light as an invasion of the West Coast. The response would be an all out attack to recover the islands regardless of the cost. The Japanese would be forced into a battle of attrition that would make the Guadalcanal campaign look like a day at the beach, and under circumstances that would be far less advantageous to the Japanese. Such a battle would so cripple Japanese forces that the Pacific war would probably end earlier than historically.
See;
http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm
I heartily concur.
The “cooperation” between the IJA and IJN to which you credit much of Japan’s early success was largely illusory.
I didnt say they were happily playing along nicely with each other. I referred to how all that preparatory planning meant that they cooperated because everyone knew what their mission was and BOTH IJA and IJN HQs had agreed on the plans so there was no room for pissing contests “out in the field”.
The early Japanese successes had more to do with the fact that the Japanese enjoyed having the initiative and the ability to pick when and where to attack, coupled with comparatively extremely weak and/or incompetently led defense forces.
Except where they wiped the floor with stronger and sometimes even decently led forces…
Having a well done plan to follow can be a BIG bonus. That they had also spent a few months flying around G3Ms with national markings removed to recon as many areas as possible helped make that planning very good indeed.
I will not dispute that such an alternative is possible, but I will assert that it is highly unlikely, especially in combination.
Not as unlikely as you might think. While the hard numbers favours an outcome closer to the historical, Japan did have some very unlucky occasions whose absence could have made a big difference, or a similar occurence for USA and so on… No, early on, before USA could make use of its advantages, the odds were really quite fair.
Your first flawed assumption is that the US Navy would rashly attack the Japanese main fleet with inferior and/or poorly prepared forces due to a “need for fast reaction/revenge”.
You mean like what actually happened historically? Where USA sent off its carriers to go be a pain in the butt for Japan in a very risky fashion. This happened for real, and it could VERY easily have resulted in more USN carriers lost even than what did happen. Lexington and Yorktown at Coral Sea, those were not “safe” deployments. Wasp was certainly taking quite some chances when struck. Likewise Hornet.
And up until USA started getting newbuilt units, and had improved air defenses on their existing big ships, they certainly were taking a lot of risks.
As it happened, they didnt get a visit from Murphy(of the -anything that can go wrong will- type of visit…) but even then, they lost quite a lot of man and equipment. So i can certainly not see that they would pull back unless utterly and soundly defeated. But then it becomes mostly a moot case anyway.
The pre-war plan for the US Navy was to stand on the defensive and hold the “Strategic Triangle” of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Canal.
But thats not what happened. USA considered it an absolute necessity to be aggressive and take action, and they did, and with a bit of luck it worked out very well.
Thus, the destruction of any carriers at Pearl Harbor would have resulted in their replacement by transferring carriers from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet.
You mean Ranger, Wasp, Yorktown and Hornet.
You realise that the latter three of those WERE transferred to the Pacific, seeing as they were all sunk there in 1942. Although the Yorktown sinking wasnt really because of risktaking.
Meanwhile, Ranger was slow, small, poorly armored and had much more limited supplies than all other USN fleet carriers. Guess why she mostly stayed in the Atlantic?
So if Lexington, Saratoga or Enterprise, or 2 or all of them gets sunk or damaged, exactly HOW do you propose to reinforce any more than was done historically. Sure you can send the Ranger as well, but she was rather busy as it was and would probably have been a very easy “kill” if any Japanese forces had gotten a chance to strike at it. Ranger was really a light carrier in the disguise of a fleet carrier.
BTW, the capture of an intact Zero in the Aleutians, while useful, did not provide much information which was not already known to Allied pilots. General Claire Chennault, serving in China since 1937, had written a report detailing the Zero’s weaknesses which circulated among American military pilots in February, 1941. My father, who was at that time a carrier pilot in the USN, read it and had numerous discussion with his colleagues about tactics to take advantage of those weaknesses. Moreover, the prototype F6F, which was far superior to the Zero, first flew in October, 1942, just two weeks after the captured Zero was first flown by an American pilot, so, contrary to several accounts, the F6F did not incorporate specific design features to exploit the Zero’s flaws.
I most certainly would never claim something as silly as the F6 having any design features based on countering the Zero as thats rubbish, and something i must say that i have never before heard even a peep about.
If that report was so good, then please explain why the tactics that later became very successful against the Zero, didnt appear until after the Zero got captured and tested?
Sorry but your claim goes utterly in contradiction with history and i cant put any trust in it unless you provide one heck of a lot more to support it.
For the simple reason that as i said above, the tactics that worked, was created based on the tests of the captured Zero, this is known, and if that report was circulated, then why ever did the Zero create havoc far beyond its abilities and outright panic in some cases during much of 1942?
The claim simply does not agree with any known facts.
Finally, rather than the “2-3 years” required for a response to Japanese aggression, the US Navy could have gone on the offensive within twelve months of the scenario you describe. The fruits of the “Two-Ocean Navy” act were already coming off the ways and by mid-1943, US carriers and carrier planes would have outnumbered IJN carriers and carrier planes.
:mrgreen:
Oh now you ARE dreaming seriously!
Apart from the Indepence class lights, USN comissions 7 CV from late 1942 to end of 1943. The lights were desperately needed in the Atlantic at the time and would be a bad idea to bring in as the centerpieces of carrier groups.
Meanwhile, including historical losses at Midway, which i very much doubt would have happened with even just a slightly “luckier” IJN, there´s 11 Japanese carriers floating at the end of 1943. Although that includes their lights, but most of those were more suited for independent action than the USN Indepence ships, which OTOH were very good at what they were built for.
So, up until USN starts comissioning its new carriers from december 1942 with Essex and then the others in the same class, up until then you have at minimum Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryuho, Hosho, Junyo and Hiyo able to operate offensively, and the only thing USN can do that it didnt do historically is to send off Ranger to get sunk, because thats the most likely outcome if its sent into battle alone. Also, my alternate string of happenings makes the big loss at Midway extremely unlikely, which means any of Soryu, Hiryu, Kaga and Akagi might still be around as well.
At the END of 1943, USN will have somewhere from rough parity to half the carrier aircrafts and be outnumbered in number of carriers by at least 50% up to more than 100%.
And of course, my Alternate History variant would of course include completely reducing the naval facilities of Hawaii to as finegrained rubble as is possible, unless Hawaii is invaded.
USA had near zero fuel west of mainland California if the stores on Hawaii are trashed. its going to take your 12 months just to get the infrastructure back up and running and have it starting to refill.
And if Japan captures the depots, then Japan will have interesting advantage of having plenty of regional fuel supplies while USA has a severe fuel shortage, and will be forced to ship any fuel needed in the Western and South Pacific, widely around Hawaii, which will take a lot of time.
And if USA gets to keep Hawaii, its also going to take at least 6 months to get a welltrashed harbour back in business enough to even consider contemplating having it support largescale action.
I´m sorry but in this case you´re daydreaming.
Lol, managed to write a post twice as long as the forum allows… :mrgreen:
There is no way any US politicians would have suggested negotiations with Japan, even if the situation had forced a postponement of a US counter-offensive in the Pacific. It would be much more probable that the European war would have been put on the back burner until teh Japanese had been contained in the Pacific.
I rather doubt that. While the Japanese attack was very convenient for those in USA that wanted to enter the war on UK/USSRs side, USA didnt consider Japan to be a serious enemy. While that changed somewhat during 1942, along with mounting losses and experience of the Japanese skill at jungle warfare especially but also in general, something that prewar was unthinkable.
Which was also why the reports of encounters with modern Japanese fighters in China was dismissed as unreal and filed away into oblivion.
So, what do you do? Pull Ranger to the Pacific, and get her sunk as well, while taking away the advantage of her in the Atlantic?
Send out Essex alone the instant it comissions?
THAT i doubt extremely!
Also, any real additional movement of forces from Atlantic to Pacific means the German submarine warfare will be even more successful. Do you really want the “happy days” to be extended by another half year or perhaps even more before enough replacement light units are built?
German submarines operating within visual range of USAs coast, sinking ships in sight of ports, Japan running wild and having a blast halfway across the Pacific(IF they took Hawaii) or on the OTHER side of the Pacifc, 1/4 around the earth…
Let me guess which threat USA will give preference… I can pretty much guarantee that it WONT be “those primitives halfway on the other side of earth” as a congressman at the time so neatly put it.
Far from being “doable”, a successful Japanese invasion of Hawaii at any point during the war is simply far-fetched fantasy.
Go find a realistic simulation of it. I think there´s a few around you can get for free even. Even if you use the most optimistic variants favouring USA heavily, Japan can still achieve it. Although the cost against such is severe.
Give the most realistic conditions and an invasion WILL succeed, its just a question of how fast and how much a reaction force from California can hurt it.
Put a couple of USAs carriers in port when the attack starts and there´s just about zero chance of failing.
The Japanese simply did not have the ability to assault a heavily defended island such as Oahu, and maintain the requisite naval forces offshore for the period of time it would take to subdue the defenders. Furthermore the logistics of defending Hawaii against an American counter-attack would put the Japanese at a severe disadvantage.
The first claim is only correct if Japan tries to conduct the southern attacks historically as well, which would be very stupid as Hawaii is a far more important target. Without trying to do both at the same time, they have plenty enough ability even if the distance will strain logistics.
The key here is that at the time the invasion comes, Hawaii ISNT heavily defended, because Japan has strategic surprise. If that is lost, unless it happens within no more than a few hours ahead of the invasion, odds goes down alot for Japanese success, but unless USA gets at least half a day to prepare, they´re pretty much screwed.
Where do you presume to stage USAs counterattack from? Doing it from the West coast will make it hell for the troops. USA at this time doesnt have any real ability to conduct such a mission at all against even an unprepared opponent. Japan at the time had practised enough to be able to do it, even if they weren´t exactly good at it anyway.
But USA simply wouldnt be able to do it at such a distance at the time.
It would probably be mid-1942 at minimum before it could even be considered as wishful thinking. Even more so without the experience gained from Guadalcanal, which probably wouldnt happen in this scenario.
Instead their main experience source would be Africa, and to turn that around and over to the Pacific forces isnt going to be quick.
Its a BIG difference to perform a seaborne invasion over a short distance of water, and doing it over a distance that takes weeks to get across.
My guess is that USA could retake Hawaii starting sometime in 1943, but they would risk severely heavy losses in trying. Japan would likely post a bunch of its Emily and Mavis fliers on Hawaii as the basic part of keeping it, and probably leave 1 probably 2 light carriers as mobile support there, if the losses at Midway doesnt happen, maybe 2 fleet carriers instead.
USA OTOH, would have zero landbased airsupport.
They would be in strike range for the heavy flying boats for a couple of days before even getting into striking range of Hawaii, and in this situation the otherwise quite poor Japanese submarine doctrine would probably be a big advantage.
In short, even if USA takes all of its newbuilt Essex carriers and puts together a massive force overall, there is a serious risk that they wont even get into striking range of Hawaii before suffering big enough losses to be forced to turn back.
The distance simply favours the holder of the islands too much as long as the holder isnt on peacetime duties. And while USA was moving towards wartime readiness in late 1941, they were not AT such readiness when the historical attack came.
Oh and of course, you have considered the little fact that if Japan takes Pearl, it will also capture any ships it sunk in the harbour… If that included one of the USN carriers, and its easy to patch up, that could be a nasty additional surprise for any counter attack attempt by USA.
And even should the miraculous occur, the US would view the loss of Hawaii in the same light as an invasion of the West Coast.
No the most certainly would not.
If it happened today, yes they would. But not in 1941.
The response would be an all out attack to recover the islands regardless of the cost.
You mean the attack that you above said couldnt ever happen?
The attack that the Japanese would be absolutely delighted to see coming you mean?
The Japanese would be forced into a battle of attrition that would make the Guadalcanal campaign look like a day at the beach, and under circumstances that would be far less advantageous to the Japanese. Such a battle would so cripple Japanese forces that the Pacific war would probably end earlier than historically.
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:lol:
Do you have ANY idea what you´re talking about here? Im sorry but no you appear not to. Guadalcanal happened because conditions there were rather special, among other things including a lot of islands that allowed the Japanese to send in additional troops the sneaky way during nighttime runs with destroyers patched up to carry troops. And they could do so because they had large bases not far away. USA also had the same. But neither had enough airpower close enough to shut the other side down completely.
If Hawaii is taken, Japan would have a whole bunch of airfields to use, and would almost be guaranteed to also position a pair of carriers nearby in mobile support similar to how USN did at Guadalcanal…
HOWEVER, unlike the Japanese attempts at retaking Guadalcanal and Tulagi, USAs nearest large base is a WEEK away even at high speed. At Guadalcanal, Japan sent lots of air raids against Henderson field from Rabaul, and while ineffective, they were still troublesome and forced USA to stay far more cautious and keep its carrier support “in the rear” most of the time.
No such support for USA when trying to retake Hawaii. The best they can hope for is that the civillian population rebels and causes enough problems for Japan that it allows USA the time it needs to establish a bridgehead.
All that happening perfectly together as needed is in the vicinity of pipedreams however.
Oh yes, USA can take Hawaii back, no doubt there. But its going to be very costly, and it wont be able to start doing it until very late 1943 or sometime 1944 when it has enough newbuilt carriers and has gained enough experience in invasions to be able to plan for such an extreme distance opposed landing.
Because thats the only real reason why a Japanese invasion can and most likely will work, because their initial landing will be made against an undefended beach. Or if they have good intel and feel really daring, against an undefended port. Thats why it wont work if USA has a few days of warning, because then they will be able to react within hours or even minutes anywhere on the main islands, and will have troops on all the likely landing sites, and that will kill the operation. Given several hours warning, a Japanese invasion will take a lot of casualties, but will still probably succeed.
Its quite possible also that a USA attempt to take back Hawaii leads to a bunch of ships sunk or damaged and a force limping back to USAs west coast.
Oh and cutting off USAs internal lines by taking Hawaii also means that it is very likely that combat experience will not be transferred nearly as much as historically, because the Solomon campaign is unlikely to happen, and when Japan attacks south, USA troops will have to go to Australia or westwards, and the easy route from Australia to USA is cut off, so any combat experience propagation will have to go westwards around the globe.
So when a USA counterattack comes, IF it does, they will probably still not have good intel on Japanese aircraft especially.
And although USA by this time will have clearly superior equipment at least in aircraft, if they dont know how to use it, its very likely that a lot of pilots will still be lured into turning fights, and that will make the initial large scale fights over Hawaii VERY messy. And probably not messy in USAs advantage (although quite possibly not in EITHERs advantage, as the other flaws in Japanese planes and antiaircraft guns will still be there).
See;
And exactly what has that got to do with anything?
If you consider an attack against Hawaii in mid 1942 to be in any way or shape similar to an invasion done during the first hours of the war starting you must be delusional. An attack in 1942, or even just several weeks after the war starts is totally doomed.
That article is based on going with the historical strike at Pearl AND the southern campaign. Let me repeat again shall i? The invasion of Hawaii will force a few to several months of delay to the southern campaign.
BUT, even though that sucks for Japan in the short term, taking Hawaii means essentially taking control over the Pacific west of Hawaii… The advantage is immense.
When and where? Please be specific…