Not to get off topic, but Rommel WAS a genius. His actions in the French campaign testify to that, even among his (many, even German) critics. He was indeed a gambler on the verge of being reckless and was very much a general that fed off momentum. Poor planner? Perhaps. But he was hamstrung by a battle of logistics he couldn’t control or impact while the British enjoyed a steady stream of supplies and Ultra. Rommel was pretty fearless and always led from the front close to the lines, even if this could be problematic as it often gave him a myopic view of the battle. But he also shifted from an infantryman to a premier armor theorist, perhaps surpassing Guderian in its practical application, almost overnight and relatively late in his career…
True, but Rommel had a lot of room to move in North Africa while Percival had nowhere to go in Singapore.
In gambling terms, Rommel always had a varying number of chips in his hand, but by February 1942 Percival had none. A final assault by Percival would just have increased the Commonwealth casualties, without changing the final result.
Right. In North Africa, armies quickly became victims of their own success and overran their supply lines after major advances. The Japanese had done this to some extent. But Percival’s poor intelligence information, largely the result of fighting an alien culture, would have effectively blinded him to IJA ammunition shortages. But he was well aware he didn’t have much fresh water left. It still would have been interesting to see if the Commonwealth forces could have inflicted a bitter urban battle on the Japanese and what would have happened had they did. But as pointed out previously here, it would have mattered little in the grand scheme of the War as the British had no way to reinforce successes and prevent an overall defeat even with a tactical victory…
‘Gamblers’ tend to come up from the side that is forced to use new ideas to overcome big odds. Hence Germany’s use of Panzers, dive bombers, U-boats, and blitzkrieg tactics.
And in a way Japan was the biggest gambler of them all for they did know America was ten times their size and the odds were low of them succeeding.
But the Japanese didn’t come up with many new ideas except the use of naval airpower as the primary striking arm, and even that came only after watching the British attack the Italian fleet at Taranto coupled with their own sneak attack(s) on the Russian fleets in the Russo-Japanese war. Note the attack on Port Arthur happened 3 hrs BEFORE the declaration of war! Kind of like Pearl Harbor, right?
I think that to attempt that would probably have backfired on the Commonwealth forces, because it would have compressed large numbers of troops, many of whom were not combat troops, and civilians into a very small area where the Japanese could have reduced them at a vastly greater rate than any damage the Commonwealth forces could have inflicted on the Japanese.
Add in the water problem and it was a doomed exercise, without sanitation and other issues which would rapidly have destroyed the garrison from within.
Even had Percival known about the Japanese shortage of ammunition, it wouldn’t have done him much good. That was a temporary situation which the Japanese could have quickly rectified since they controlled the seas around the Malayan peninsula where the Japanese forces were deployed.
There was no shortage of water in Singapore until the Japanese forces managed to get onto the island and capture the water supply, which, if I remember correctly, was a reservoir.
Singapore sits on an island which is roughly 28 miles long and about 16 miles wide at the widest point. The built-up area was heavily populated with civilians. The island itself is surrounded on three sides by the lower end of the Malayan peninsula and separated from it by a narrow, shallow waterway scarcely a mile wide at most points. The Japanese held control of both the sea and the air in the vicinity and could have quickly starved out the defenders. There was absolutely no point to a prolonged battle to hold Singapore since the Japanese cared nothing about their losses, and a protracted defense denied them nothing except the island itself.
Churchill wanted a heroic defense to save face since the city had been touted as “Fortress Singapore”, and it’s quick surrender would make the British look bad. That’s why he gave the order to hold it until the last man fell, but that was just propaganda. Nothing the British could do would have been worth the lives lost in a last ditch defense of Singapore.
Hey, that’s a comment from this very thread by Rising Sun* from 2-16-2009, you plagiarist.
Still it’s a shame he didn’t dispute your post but approved it.:mrgreen:
Anyway, off you go, nikole95.7
Artfully done sir!
I didn’t realise it was mine. It seemed too intelligent to be one of mine. 
Perhaps he was channeling you.
Well spotted! This could explain where my intelligence and memory have been leaking to at an accelerating rate in recent years.
That, or an over consumption of lager.
It is not, in my respectful view, possible to over consume lager, ale, pilsener or anything else of the beer variety.
Cider, certainly, as it is too sweet, but beer: No! Non! Nein! Nyet!
My recollection is that the capture of pumping stations rather than reservoirs was the problem for Percival.
Unfortunately my books are stored in anticipation of moving to a new house, the building of which ideally will be completed some time in the next decade (if that’s not putting too much pressure on the ****ing builder), but my recollection is that Percival in his account focused on a critical pumping station, or perhaps a small number of pumping stations, which when captured by the Japanese gave them control of the water supply to the Allied area. However, I’m reasonably sure that there was one critical pumping station which, when lost, put the Japanese in control and which in combination with other factors discouraging a pointless defence moved Percival to surrender.
Which, I think, was the correct decision at the time and on the knowledge available to him, to preserve civilian and Allied lives.
Very true, however, with the gift of hindsight, had he known what was going to befall his men I doubt he would have surrendered. Personally (and perhaps this is the inner cavalryman talking), I would have tried to break out and try one last attack. That said, the old adage ‘amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics’, rings true. Without any water it would have been jolly difficult to mount an effective attack.
I share your sentiment, but where would he break out to?
The only way out was by sea, and pretty much all of the ships and most of the boats had left by the surrender.
There was no opportunity for a mass break out, by arms or of POWs, in any direction.
I still think the major legitimate criticism of Percival relates to failing to fortify the Malayan side of the causeway before hostilities started and to fight to the end there.
Don’t get me wrong, I’m with you there, his situation didn’t give him many options. But personally I would have launched my combat effective units at the enemy in order to retake control of the water, it wouldn’t have been pretty and I imagine he would have lost a fair chunk of his forces but any chance to keep the strategic port & city in British hands would be worth it, imho.
Singapore’s only strategic value was as a naval base, but since there were no fleet elements at Singapore (after the quick elimination of Force Z), and no possibility of exerting offensive force from the base, Singapore’s strategic value was zero. The only thing being defended at Singapore was British prestige.
Theoretically, Singapore could serve as the western anchor for an Allied defense of the NEI islands of Sumatra and Java, but such a defense was hopeless without significant naval and air reinforcements which simply weren’t available.
I would agree that it’s immediate strategic value was negated by the the destruction of force z, however, its better to have an asset for future use than not have it when you need it.
Yes, that is generally true.
Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, Churchill tried to get the US Navy to deploy a significant portion of the US Pacific Fleet to the naval base at Singapore, averring that Singapore was so important to the British Empire that it’s loss would possibly cause the British Empire to disintegrate.
However, Roosevelt saw through such exaggeration and declined to be dragged into a defense of such a worthless base. In fact, throughout WW II, the British saw no need or reason to recapture Singapore, and any potential strategic value in the area remained unrealized. Defending Singapore simply because of the possibility of future strategic value certainly wasn’t worth the 138,000 troops, 200 aircraft, and 2 capital ships it cost Britain in 1942.