No doubt the U.S. government had an agenda of coming to grips with Japan sooner or later, but It probably needed something cataclysmic like the sneak attack on PH to fully galvanise the congress and the population out of the mind set of no war unless attacked isolationist stance, to a determined America willing to fight to the end no matter what the cost.
Japan solved all that at PH.
I’m interested in the Japanese, only if the information about them is unbiased, as it so often seems.
While attacking Pearl Harbor doubtless could be expected to anger America I don’t think Americans were necessarily determined to win at any cost. After all, the North Koreans were not crushed.
But the North Koreans never in any way directly attacked America nor undertook anything near Pearl Harbor (unless you’re South Korean)…
What is now North and South Korea was a single Japanese colony of the Korean peninsula acquired in pieces by Japan late in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and entirely by 1910 as a result of the 1905 war.
Korea did not exist as a separate nation before WWII, or since.
What is now North Korea was, however, ‘crushed’ by being occupied by Soviet troops at the end of WWII, which is a consequence of the proximity of Soviet land forces to Korea on the mainland. Allied (American) troops occupied what is now South Korea. At the time of those occupations, and throughout the war, it was still Japanese territory.
As an aside, Koreans were often the worst bastards as guards of Allied POW’s during WWII, but they were also among those treated worst on the Japanese side by the Japanese so it probably fed down the line a bit.
Illingworth, Leslie Gilbert
[Japan’s army arrives at New Guinea] - January 24, 1942
http://community.livejournal.com/warhistory/1257298.html#cutid1
Cartoon is close, except that on 24 January 1942 the Japanese soldier should have been coming from the right of New Guinea where the Japanese invaded Rabaul in New Britain at that time, which wasn’t regarded in Australian military circles or by the Japanese as part of a thrust at Australia but essentially as securing the back door to protect and support the IJN naval base at Truk, although the IJN subsequently made Rabaul a base of operations.
It might have been unintentional and unwitting by the cartoonist, who was probably making the point that we’d dropped sport for war, but the inclusion of the cricketing gear relates to something that you don’t hear now in the popular war histories, which was people like the Australian commander General Blamey railing at the Australian public to wake up that it was time to give up sporting events and focus on fighting the Japanese. Even at that stage there were still people here who wanted life to go on as normal!
The North Koreans/Chinese killed a number of Americans in the Korean conflict. Shoulden’t Americans have been upset about their soldiers being killed in Korea? In this instance, as with the Japanese, the enemy was the aggressor.
I wouldn’t be too surprised, Chevan. How was it the Germans achieved such stunn ing success in the beginning? No surprise there either because people just didn’t want to believe it would happen. At Singapore, the English really should not have surrendered so quickly - they weren’t even outnumbered. Had they persevered, they could have done much damage to the Japs though probably would have lost if they lost access to fresh water supplies.
In Hong Kong, well, it was fairly indefensible to begin with and there weren’t that ,mny troops there.
In Java, in spite of a bunch of trumped up hoopla, the Dutch KNIL was very weak and did not have the support of the Indonesians who were only too glad to betray them at every opportunity. The Dutch navy, brave though it was, was heavily outgunned by the Japanese, and the British, Australian and American presence on the sea foiught bravely but suffered from being primarily a pre-war naval force and served only as a minor speed bump along the road. The air forces were weak as well, and the Brewster Buffaloes they flew were terrible in a dogfight with the Zero.
In the Phillipines, the US Army did a good job in holding out as long as it did, but the majority of troops were actually Phillipine Scouts, under-officered and under armed. But they never defected to the Japanese and did not betray the numerous American guerrilla groups that survived the war. America’s primary naval weapon was sunk in the Sunda Strait in a desperate and forlorn attempt to stop Japanese landings in Indonesia.
The American Air Force (Army Air Force) in the Philippines might have given a good account of itself had it not been for a singular act of stupidity and craven indecision on the part of General MacArthur, who ordered the planes to stay on the ground as the Japanese air force winged its way to Manila from Taiwanese bases. He should have been court martialed for that, but instead expended his monumental ego in trying to stop General Wainwright, the chump he handed the hot potato to, from being decorated instead.
We were naked before the Japanese for a while, but not for long.
So, Chevan, surprise is the biggest reason; an inability to believe that the little yellow men could be so smart and ingenious; a continued belief in the superiority of the white man over the asiatics; and a lack of modern, up-to-date equipment and large numbers of troops available.
But, as the Japanese learned to their bitter consternation, it’s not the first victories that count; it is the last victory that matters. Just like the Germans who couldn’t believe that after rounding up literally millions of Russians on the battlefield, they still lost the war against the Russians. In the end they were both crushed. Of the Italians we shall not speak.
Just like the Germans being incapable of actually occupying the endless steppe of Russia, Japan could never have occupied Australia. In spite of Japanese bellicosity to the contrary, such an invasion was wholly impractical and infeasible. Although, to those who saw themselves in the crosshairs they could not have known that at the time.
The destruction of the water system was, in conjunction with Japanese penetration of the defences on the island, primarily what finally impelled Percival to surrender. It’s covered in his book The War in Malaya but here’s an internet version to the same effect.
TUESDAY, 12 February … The administrative situation now began to cause great anxiety. The military food reserves under our control were sufficient for only about seven days’ consumption, though in addition to this units held reserves of varying quantity and there were also the civil food reserves. We only had one small dump of petrol on the island in addition to what was in vehicle tanks. But the water situation caused most concern. In the Singapore Town area breaks in the mains from bombing and shelling began to gain steadily over repairs with the result that from 11th February pressure failed seriously. Royal Engineer personnel and military transport were called in by the Director-General of Civil Defence to assist the civil staff, and special water-carrying parties were organized. But the high-level reservoir at Pearl’s Hill near the General Hospital was already empty and the Fort Canning reservoir was losing water rapidly.
…
It was early on 14 February that the water situation really became serious when the municipal water engineer reported to the Director-General of Civil Defence that he considered a complete failure of the water supply was imminent. At about 10 a.m. I held a conference at the municipal offices at which the chairman of the municipality was present in addition to the above two officials. I was informed that, owing to breaks in the water mains and pipes caused by bombing and shelling, a heavy loss of water was going on, though the two pumping stations at Woodleigh and Mackenzie Road were still working. The municipal water engineer estimated that the water supply would last for forty-eight hours at the outside and that it might only last for twenty-four hours. I promised additional Royal Engineer assistance, but that could not be provided till the afternoon as all available Royal Engineer personnel were at that time fighting as combatant troops.
…
Along the Braddell Road the enemy gained some ground, but on the Serangoon Road front a strong attack was stopped by the 11th Indian Division when within a few hundred yards of the vital Woodleigh pumping station. The staff of this station stuck to its work manfully under close range small arms fire and continued pumping to the end.
…
Sunday, 15 February—Black Sunday … That was the situation which I had to report when the conference assembled. The D.G.C.D. was asked to report on the water situation in more detail. He confirmed what he had said before and added that, if total failure took place, it would be some days before piped water could be obtained again. Ways and means of overcoming our various difficulties were discussed. None of them were really vital except the water problem. Heath stressed the danger of the water shortage as it affected the Indian troops, while the danger to the civil population was also taken into account. I felt that there was no use in remaining passively on the defensive as we were. There seemed to be only two possible alternatives, i.e. either to counter-attack to regain control of the reservoirs and of the military food depots and to drive back the enemy’s artillery with a view to reducing the damage to the water supply system, or to capitulate. I put these alternatives to the commanders. They were unanimously Qf the opinion that in the existing circumstances a counter-attack was impracticable. Some of them also doubted our ability to resist another determined attack and pointed out the consequences that might result to the crowded population in the town. It was in these circumstances that I decided to capitulate.
…
After the cessation of hostilities it was five and a half days, with engineers and water parties working at full pressure, before water again reached the lower levels of Singapore Town which had been deprived of it. It was ten days before water again reached the General Hospital and many other buildings on the higher levels.
My bold
http://www.fepow-community.org.uk/arthur_lane/html/fall_of_singapore.htm
Wasn’t there something too about the lack of effective artillery and no armor available to the Singapore garrison? I’ve read that the coastal guns either could not be transversed to fire into the jungle, or that their shells were mostly AP shot for use against ships and were largely ineffective against infantry…
My recollection is that there were few or no Commonwealth tanks but some armoured scout cars available in Malaya / Singapore, while the Japanese landed maybe a couple of hundred tanks and used them to considerable effect in the campaign. (Their bicycles helped too. The tubes burst so the soldiers tore off the tyres and rode on the steel rims. The clattering of hundreds of tyreless bicycles on the road convinced many Indian troops tanks were coming and they fled.)
It might have helped if Percival could have deployed some tanks at the Singapore (and Malayan) beachheads to repel the landings. Although the Japanese artillery would probably have wiped them out at Singapore. No doubt tanks would have helped against infantry once they got further inland, but the game was already in the bag for the Japanese by that stage.
My impression is that it wasn’t so much lack of Commonwealth artillery that prejudiced the defence of Singapore as two other artillery factors.
First, Commonwealth artillery was under-used against the invaders on the critical first night of the landings in the Australian sector on the north west of the island. Perceval comments on this in The War in Malaya and is mystified by it, even allowing for problems in wire communications destroyed by artillery.
Second, the Japanese surprised the defenders by bringing up guns and landing craft very quickly, so they were able to land after a serious artillery bombardment and with artillery cover after landing. They also brought up special armoured landing craft which weren’t vulnerable to small arms fire and helped the landing immensely in the first waves.
The immobile coastal guns is an enduring myth. See the text in the link below for a detailed description.
You’re right about the AP problem, but it has to be remembered that the whole Singapore defence concept had been based for decades on Singapore holding out against an enemy fleet until the British fleet arrived. The guns were intended for naval targets during that period awaiting relief. IIRC Perecival recognised the problem before the war started and (maybe?) requested HE shells but they didn’t materialise.
I don’t know anything about munitions, but I wonder if a solution would have been to arm the shells with contact or air burst fuses? Or weren’t any made to suit those AP shells?
As an aside, AP can be very effective against dug in troops. Australian tanks used it in Vietnam against enemy bunkers. Went in under them and blew them out.
Even if they couldn’t traverse, they weren’t the only guns on the island. And even if they had HE, 15 inch is a bit of overkill against scattered enemy infantry squads and platoons on Singapore but it would have been very handy against massed artillery and infantry on the mainland, except the enemy they wanted to hit were on the mainland facing the north west of the island while the guns were out of range on the north east of the island, where they’d been sited to protect the channel to the naval base. The causeway blocked the western approach.
Even if they could all have traversed 360 degrees, their arcs of fire (see p 120 http://books.google.com.au/books?id=V8jctMNMbN4C&pg=PT124&lpg=PT124&dq=coastal+guns+singapore+range&source=web&ots=lzEsTtLIzk&sig=xYYwLk1pb0Ph7iyMPTSOAztipQc&hl=en#PPT148,M1 ) didn’t permit them to support the defenders on the north west of the island or, better still, pulverise the massed Japanese artillery, invasion force and landing craft on the mainland. I don’t know if this influenced the Japanese in picking their assault point, but they had a very good knowledge from pre-war spying about the fortifications and weapons on the island and it’s a remarkable coincidence when you look at the arc of fire map.
Just to add to my last post, the trajectory and elevation of the big coastal defence guns lacked the (relatively) close support abilities of infantry support weapons like the standard WWII Commonwealth 25 pounder.
A 25 pounder in the centre of Singapore island would have gone close to covering the same arc of fire to the west as the coastal guns. A battery of them properly positioned would have been more use to infantry than a single coastal gun at Changi etc.
Far too much has been made of the coastal guns, as if they were some super weapon which could have decided the battle for Singapore. They couldn’t, even if they could spin all day through 360 degrees.
Armor piercing is effective when used against hardened (concrete and steel rebar) binckers and blockhouses I believe. Part of the reason why US tank destroyers were able to find a mission in the Pacific is their 76mm guns were effective as indirect fire artillery (using HE) and could also be used to destroy bunkers reinforced with lumber, rocks, and other construction materials…
So, the coastal guns would have been useless I guess unless shells were able to hit landing craft.
Even if they couldn’t traverse, they weren’t the only guns on the island. And even if they had HE, 15 inch is a bit of overkill against scattered enemy infantry squads and platoons on Singapore but it would have been very handy against massed artillery and infantry on the mainland, except the enemy they wanted to hit were on the mainland facing the north west of the island while the guns were out of range on the north east of the island, where they’d been sited to protect the channel to the naval base. The causeway blocked the western approach.
Even if they could all have traversed 360 degrees, their arcs of fire (see p 120 http://books.google.com.au/books?id=V8jctMNMbN4C&pg=PT124&lpg=PT124&dq=coastal+guns+singapore+range&source=web&ots=lzEsTtLIzk&sig=xYYwLk1pb0Ph7iyMPTSOAztipQc&hl=en#PPT148,M1 ) didn’t permit them to support the defenders on the north west of the island or, better still, pulverise the massed Japanese artillery, invasion force and landing craft on the mainland. I don’t know if this influenced the Japanese in picking their assault point, but they had a very good knowledge from pre-war spying about the fortifications and weapons on the island and it’s a remarkable coincidence when you look at the arc of fire map.
Interesting. How did the air forces stack up? Didn’t the RAF have Hurricane fighters available?
Yes, but far too late. See #49 http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4781&page=4 for a very well informed 
comment and #50 for total British air strength.
There is a remarkably erudite post in the archives which indicates how Malaya was lost because of the absence of air power on the British side.
Kota Bahru serves as an example of how, in my view, Malaya was lost in London long before Japan attacked.
I think the faults on the British side come down to two things: London (in large part synonymous with Churchill’s ill-conceived opinions and interference in matters military for reasons political) and lack of air power. The second is really just a consequence of the first.
The first requirement was to implement the preparatory plans, devised in Malaya and agreed in London.
This failed because Malaya command was never given the resources to do so. That was London’s fault.
Malaya command was left to prepare for defence on the basis of the agreed plans, while London never bothered to tell it that it had no intention of giving it the necessary resources and that it had better come up with some different ideas, quick smart.
In the agreed plans Malaya command recognised the need for air power, in particular in northern Malaya to cover the likely, and accurately identified, Japanese landing points and subsequent advances.
Malaya command therefore embarked on building airfields at strategic points. As a result of London’s failure to provide resources, these potentially decisive strategic airfields became millstones around Malaya command’s neck… Of the 9 airfields in the north-west at the time the Japanese landed, only 3 had planes; only 2 of the 3 in the north-east had planes; and only 3 of the 7 in the south had planes. Not only were these airfields unable to fulfil their function in the plans, and thus totally useless, but they also needed to be defended to deny them to the enemy, thus dictating tactical dispositions which hampered Malaya command’s ability to respond with an otherwise free hand to the Japanese attack.
The Chiefs of Staff considered Malaya command needed 336 planes to defend Malaya, while Malaya command said 582 at its latest pre-invasion estimate. London gave it 13 squadrons totalling 158 aircraft, less than half of what London thought it needed. The aircraft it had, and certainly the fighters, were woefully inferior to the Japanese planes. What aeroplanes were in Malaya were doomed before they took off, but take off and fight gallantly they did.
The consequences of these failings were that Malaya command lacked the capacity to repulse the Japanese landings with air power. If we contrast the great effect of the fighters at Milne Bay which flew air support for ground troops and damaged troop landing and supply barges with the mpact of the bombers at Kota Bahru, which had to withdraw fairly quickly as the airfield was in early danger of being taken by the Japanese, it is likely that even two or three squadrons of top line British fighters with good pilots in ground support roles could have tipped the scales at Kota Bahru. The Indian troops at Kota Bahru fought bravely and effectively at the landing point, to the extent that Col Tsuji said it was the most costly fighting in the Malayan campaign. With air support it might have been a lot more costly, perhaps to the point of victory.
The IJN escort at Kota Bahru wanted to leave fairly early in the piece because of the damage they were suffering from air attacks. The IJA commander persuaded them to stay, because he wanted support for his advancing troops on the ground. Had his troops been subjected to solid air attack he might have had a different opinion.
Another consequence of the lack of planes was the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales. In part this was due to Admiral Phillips’ radio silence and failure to call for air support in the latter part of the disaster, but in the early part he was informed that air support would not be forthcoming as he moved towards Singora. Had the British held Kota Bahru and had they had decent air forces stationed there, consistent with its strategic and tactical importance, Phillips would have steamed on to Singora. Or he could have backed up at Kota Bahru, where the Prince of Wales, Repulse, and the three remaining RN / RAN destroyers would have faced an IJN heavy cruiser, light cruiser, and four destroyers. The IJN commander at Kota, already worried about the risk of damage from the air with the meagre forces actually used, might then have withdrawn. At the very least, he would have had to fight and head for sea room to do it, which then deprived the landing forces and transports of naval support, leaving them easy prey for air forces. Phillip’s force might have destroyed or dispersed the Kota naval force, and even got in among the landing force with devastating results. One or two British destroyers against troop transports would be enough.
Or maybe Japan would have diverted sufficient air forces to neutralise or defeat the air power at Kota and sunk the British naval force there instead of further south. Who knows?
Whatever might have happened, the Kota example illustrates how improved air force could have altered dramatically what actually did happen. As the first battle of Wake Island, and Coral Sea on a much larger scale, showed it was possible to repulse a Japanese landing force if its naval force could be sufficiently mauled before landing, and as Milne Bay showed it was also possible to repulse it after landing with ground troops with adequate air support.
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4781&page=2
See also #1 and # 19 in the link for, respectively, ignorance and modified ignorance. 
It shows what havoc a small army of battle hardened veterans, with some armour, air supremacy, [and don’t forget the push bikes] and good infiltratration tactics can do.
Yamashita was a top class commander, was unconquered [and frustrating MacArthur] in the Philippines at the end of the war.
The Aussies first toe to toe battle with the Japanese was in the battle of Muar, the last major battle of the Malayan campaign. It took place from 14 January to 22 January 1942 around Gemensah Bridge and on the Muar River. Allied soldiers, under the command of Major General Gordon Bennett, inflicted severe losses on Japanese forces. Members of the Australian 8th Division killed more than 700 personnel from the Japanese Imperial Guards Division, in an ambush at the bridge.
In Malaya and Singapore, the Imperial Guards Division was involved in notorious Japanese war crimes such as the Parit Sulong Massacre and the Sook Ching massacre. Lt Gen. Takuma Nishimura, who was sentenced to life imprisonment by a British military court in relation to the Sook Ching killings, was later convicted of war crimes by an Australian Military Court in relation to the Parit Sulong massacre. He was executed by hanging on June 11, 1951.
Is anyone out there interested in Japanese soldier’s accounts?
alfiechan in Japan
I am, very much.
I have read parts of the diaries of Japanese soldiers in New Guinea published in various books and on the internet and they were often existing in the most appalling conditions while still trying to fight, such as at Gona, Buna and Sanananda in late 1942 - early 1943. The diaries show the Japanese soldiers to be different in some respects to their Australian and American opponents because of their view of their family and national duties, but in other respects to be the same as their opponents in wishing to return safely to their homeland. Given the way most diaries came into Allied hands, they weren’t the ones who returned to Japan. I’d be very interested in the accounts of those who survived.
This site, a collaborative project between Australian and Japanese military historians, might interest you http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/
That is a good one. I sent them some info before. I interviewed lots of Japanese veterans of the Pacific War and have over 100 stories never published in English before. Also have lots of stories published only in Japanese. Anyone interested? If anyone out there wants to get together we might be able to publish this stuff! Your thoughts, please!