Japan's war interests whom?

Not at all! In fact, I think Hitler had big ideas and certainly his often (but certainly not always) poor decision making impacted and set the tone for the eventual German strategy. I’ve only stated that if Hitler had any long term strategy to meet his goals or objectives (which I think are better words), he almost certainly abandoned such a line of thought in late 1939…

Obviously you don’t.

Right, much like I don’t understand how Hitler blamed the Jews for “stab in the back” in 1918 and contentions that the German Army had never been defeated in the field. Though he certainly had much input and even a few good ideas, Hitler wasn’t much of a military strategist, unless you count his scheming and putsches in order to gain power. He was a political strategist in the Nazi Party, he had enunciated goals, but these were not what could be called an actual ‘strategy’ to win. But he only indirectly had anything to do with strategic planning. There was no Nazi grand scheme of “Blitzkrieg” and Hitler got by prior to Barbarossa by winging-it in no small part…

Strategies start with assumptions about current situations, that should be pretty easy to understand. If those assumptions are reasonably close to reality, it’s possible to chart a course of action that should logically bring one to a specific objective or goal. The strategy, or course of action, is distinct from the assumption; one can be logical (or “correct” if you will) without the other being correct. But a strategy is only “workable” if both are valid.

Um, Hitler had goals, but it was his general staff’s job to articulate a strategy to obtain his nebulous end game. And while he had many strengths, few would state that Hitler was much of a logic-based person, if we’re talking about the Fuhrer who was defensing Berlin with phantom divisions that no longer existed while entertaining wonder weapons fantasies and the tealeaves of FDR’s death meant German victory as the Allies fell apart and fought each-other. In any case, he had no coherent “strategy” once Poland fell and the Allies declared war on him. I don’t believe the German command even had a war plan to attack France other than dusty copies of the old Schlieffen Plan.

I’m saying that German strategy made sense provided the underlying assumptions were valid. Unfortunately for Germany and Hitler, their assumptions about the world situation, and in particular German military capabilities, and the military capabilities of their potential opponents, were NOT valid. Therefore, even though their strategy was logical, invalid assumptions made it unworkable; shouldn’t be too difficult to understand.

How in the world could anyone have a valid strategy without considering the state of their armed forces? That would be like a football team gameplanning to their own weaknesses! Secondly, while I have read that Hitler was misinformed about the state of his Wehrmacht, he was had a serious row with his COS Brauchitsh when informed that his army was only half trained, somewhat overage, and some units did not perform well in Poland despite the resounding victory (not too mention that stocks of ammunition were dangerously low). Furthermore, had the French seriously attempted the Saar Offensive and penetrated the West Wall, many German officers believed they could have made it to Berlin.

The mistakes the French or British made are irrelevant in assessing German strategies.

Wrong. It was their blundering that allowed the Germans to affect a “strategy” to defeat them

And who says Hitler went to war “far sooner than anticipated”? Anticipated by whom? The timing of The European war in no way constitutes evidence that Hitler had no strategy. In fact, such a statement implies that there was a strategy that was amended for some reason.

By his own military that felt that they were not ready for such a monumental clash with the French. According to Alistair Horne, “The studied view of the Army (O.K.H.) at this time (Oct 1939 I think) was that there could be no successful offensive against the French until 1942.” --p.174 2nd para.

Hitler did not expect Britain and France to declare war as a result of his invasion of Poland, but that doesn’t imply he had no plan if they did,

The fact the Western Germany was defended by about 32 half-trained reserve divisions with no tanks, little artillery, and almost no mobility probably indicates that Hitler, nor his Army, were prepared for a significant clash with the French and Germany was wide open to a determined invasion the French seemed too timid to commit too. There was no War Plan, sorry:

On Gen. Halder’s initial “Gelb” plan against the French written up weeks after the start of hostilities, Horne writes, “It was a manifestly bad plan, so conservative and uninspiring that it might well have been thought up by a British or French General Staff of the inter-war years, and through its many imperfections glimmered the half-heartedness of O.K.H. and the Army commanders…” p.175

…nor does that mean he didn’t create a plan to deal with Britain and France after they declared war.

A plan was certainly created, initially a very awful one! But not by Hitler, by is GS. And it was eventually worked into a brilliant one; and yes Hitler did have little input, but mostly he forced his generals to revise and revise to his credit I suppose…

Your reasoning really doesn’t make any sense and seems to suggest that Hitler existed in some sort of vacuum that insulated him from thinking about the potential consequences of any actions he might take. That’s just simply not true. It ignores all historical evidence of the period.

Well, Hitler didn’t live in a vacuum, however, his entire career is one of bluffing and bullying and posturing his way to power. He got back the Rhineland, took Austria, and Czechoslovakia firing nary a shot. Perhaps he was expecting more of the same? Or to make peace even if the Allies did declare war? He in fact offered peace 71-years ago today. What evidence? I think we can point to many instances where Hitler stoked fantasies about signing an armistice with the British, or simply ignoring facts when he found them inconvenient…

So what? There was still a strategic plan and it was successfully followed.

No, there was no “strategic plan” actually. You’ll have to point us to one. I recall something about Fuhrer directives, but those are sort of general outlines. Nothing specific nor concrete enough to be called strategy. The closest thing to that was Führer-Directive Number 6 issued in early October (9th?) of 1939 regarding an attack into the Low Countries prior to launching into staging areas in France…

Just because it didn’t exist in 1937 or 1938 means what exactly? That Hitler didn’t have a crystal ball and could foresee every event on the world scene? In that, Hitler was exactly like every person ever involved in strategic planning. Strategic plans aren’t conceived and engraved in stone, to be forever blindly followed no matter what happens subsequently; strategic plans evolve and change according to events that change situations.

Of course Hitler couldn’t predict the future, he thought his shitty Reich would last 1000 years. But I think Hitler rather blundered his way from one crisis to the next when he wasn’t starred down by the Entente as opposed to having any real plans, which means he tended to instigate crisis’s and then he reacted as necessary. It got him pretty far actually…

You have an amazing talent for going off on meaningless tangents.

Thank you! They are called “threads” for a reason, though…

Who cares why France folded?

I do.

The issue was the fragility of Germany’s economy compared to those of the Allies. The proof is the subsequent performance of each; Germany’s gradually declined in power, while those of the allies became more robust with time. Germany’s economy was unable to support the measures necessary to sustain a successful war of attrition, a war the Allied economies won.

Which Allies? The United States was not at War with Germany, England and France were in the Fall of 1939, and the Fatherland had struck a deal with the USSR. If you measure the German economy against the French, it wasn’t so bad at all. The Germans could outproduce the French something on the order of 3:1. But yes, despite this, Germany was in a severe strategic disadvantage as I’ve mentioned. France had many problems with the Great Depression, the Popular Front rising of the mid-30’s, and the fact that her factories were scaled back to a 40-hour work weeks (until the War I think) as relations with Germany were already eroding severely effecting not only production of planes, tanks, etc., but also of spare parts which greatly hindered French readiness.

Strategies are time-phased; Germany’s was to engage it’s opponents in sequence and defeat them in detail. Plans for 1942 and 1943 depended on what happened in 1940 and 1941.

There were no such phased plans and the invasions of Norway, France, and the one that never was: Sealion. They were all ad hoc affairs or various sorts. And there certainly was no expectation of defeating France in six weeks! I think the closet I recall to a very optimistic time prediction may have been three months IIRC…

Con’td

Yes, in other words, Hitler’s strategy was based on invalid assumptions.

True. But not always.

I don’t find your “doubt” very convincing. In fact, Adam Tooze in “The Wages of Destruction” says on page 333, “Since the spring of 1939, at the latest, Hitler had been driven forward by the sense that time was not on Germany’s side. Once war was declared, the gathering strength of the Western coalition, reinforced by the United States, contrasted with Germany’s economic vulnerability and it’s new dependence on the Soviet Union only reinforced this motive.” Obviously Hitler was, in 1939, thinking strategically about the future role of the United States.

Great book, isn’t it? Anyhoo, Tooze is correct. But this wasn’t limited to Hitler. In one of the great ironies of the War to me, one of his key generals who hated him and probably wanted Adolf dead, Gen. Franz Halder, constructed a war plan infamously horrific and wanted to stop the war with France as soon as possible. Once the war was initiated fully, he came on-board as a believer in strategic envelopment and despite being one of the ‘conservative German generals,’ he began to argue for the strategic gamble of the “Sickle Cut” through the Ardennes to the Channel Coast over the objections of many officers who thought it was suicide. His argument was that it may not work, but neither would fighting a long war of attrition with France and Britain…

According to who? The citation above belies any such dubious “fact”.

See the above quote from Horne. There are numerous others however as the initial war plans involved staged, limited offensives in the Low Countries at first, to be followed months later by incursions into France mainly through the Belgian corridor based on logistical reasonings. Too many war plans and revisions to count and list actually…

The actual introduction of “Sichelschnitt” into Fall Gelb only took place in late February of 1940 as a decisive gamble in hopes of a “cheap victory” for Germany…

In 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1939, 1940, and 1941.

He may have issued directives until his little mustached piehole turned blue, but hitler only made a specific directive regarding the invasion of France around this time in 1939…

Of course, Japan’s action in signing a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union occurred in April, 1941. The significance of that fact seems to escape you. April, 1941, was before the Germans attacked the Soviet Union;

The significance that seems to escape you is that they were well aware of hitler’s bloodfeud with Bolshevism, and it was only one month prior to Barbarossa. The extent of contacts between the Germans and Japanese we’ll never know, but Axis partners were certainly selective and self-serving re. whom they chose as their common enemies. In any case, the Imperial Japanese didn’t seem to renounce their nonaggression pact despite huge numbers of the Red forces being tied down or destroyed in the West. Had they done so, the Germans might have made it into Moscow, how that would have effected the war’s outcome I know not…

Japan had no idea that such an attack was going to take place until it actually happened, so to imply that the Japanese disregarded Germany’s future interests indicates a complete lack of understanding as to the actual sequence of events.

Are you sure about this? I thought I recall something of a communist agent in either the Japanese gov’t or at the German diplomatic mission in Tokyo that actually warned the Soviet secret police and dum dum Stalin of an impending attack based on information received, but that’s purely from distant memory and I could be wrong on that. One of a number of HUMINT sources reporting such an attack actually…

However, we do agree that there was precious little coordination or cooperation between Germany’s and Japan’s war planning. But to claim that neither Germany nor Japan had any strategic plans, or did any strategic planning simply doesn’t hold water.

They both had goals and objectives, and the Japanese seemed far more meticulous in their planning as there was far more consensus despite bitter rivalries between the Army and Navy. Although, didn’t said rivalry also prove troublesome in terms of strategy?

Are you sure about this? I thought I recall something of a communist agent in either the Japanese gov’t or at the German diplomatic mission in Tokyo that actually warned the Soviet secret police and dum dum Stalin of an impending attack based on information received, but that’s purely from distant memory and I could be wrong on that. One of a number of HUMINT sources reporting such an attack actually…

Side note here, I was thinking of Richard Sorge of the Soviet GRU who was indeed a spymaster in Japan. I have no idea if he obtained the invasion date (22 June-correction, I thought it was May) through Japanese gov’t channels though…

Well, I guess what that gets down to is an admission that Hitler and German military leaders in general, were making strategic plans and giving thought to strategic matters, which was my original contention.

Strategy is strategy whether you understand it or not.

It matters nor whether Hitler or his generals made the strategic plans; the point is they weren’t simply academic exercises. By 1944, the time was over when any strategy had any chance of working for Germany, so of course I’m referring to the period prior to 1942.

No one said anyone in Germany did that, so stop trying to rephrase things to suit your arguments.

I said Hitler and the German military itself, badly overestimated German military power and badly underestimated Soviet military resiliency; two completely different issues than you are trying to portray

No, it was the Allied mistakes that proved Germany’s pre-existing strategy workable.

As Hitler once said, no senior military officer ever feels completely prepared to fight.

You’re speculating. That fact simply means it was Germany’s strategy to bet on a short and very decisive campaign. They believed the French would not launch a counter-offensive until they had safely contained the German offensive and that never happened.

So what? What does that prove?

Again, so what? Strategies and plans aren’t always created without defects, and the fact that a plan is finally perfected means there are planners who always thinking of the possibilities. Doesn’t matter if they are Hitler or relatively low ranking staff specialists.

Ok, you don’t like Hitler; fine, neither do I. But just saying he was a bastard who schemed his way through life hardly rebuts my argument that he gave considerable thought to strategic matters and planned his actions, both military and political. Yes, he sometimes ignored facts when he found them inconvenient, so did Churchill and Roosevelt, so what?

Strategy doesn’t have to be detailed or written down in an order somewhere. It can be as nebulous as simply avoiding certain situations considered to be disadvantageous. Hitler’s strategy was to use aggressive foreign policy to get what he wanted. When that pushed him into a war he had bet against, his strategy was to engage his opponents in a series of sequential, very quick, campaigns and count on superior Germany military power to defeat those opponents in detail. That strategy broke down because Hitler had overestimated German military power and underestimated the will and determination of his opponents.

That in itself is a strategy. And it was successful until he ran up against the consequences of his invalid assumptions.

Yes, but not, as you seem to think, so you can go rambling off on irrelevant soliloquies.

Bully for you! But it does nothing to advance your argument so kindly keep it to yourself.

[QUOTE=Nickdfresh;172015]Which Allies? The United States was not at War with Germany, England and France were in the Fall of 1939, and the Fatherland had struck a deal with the USSR…

The Allies, as in Britain and France. Germany’s economy was far more fragikle than either Allied country’s. Your assertions that Germany could produce more of this or that than one country or another are meaningless.

[QUOTE=Nickdfresh;172015]There were no such phased plans and the invasions of Norway, France, and the one that never was: Sealion. They were all ad hoc affairs or various sorts. And there certainly was no expectation of defeating France in six weeks! I think the closet I recall to a very optimistic time prediction may have been three months IIRC…

Three months is still a very short period of time to defeat what was supposed to be the strongest Army in Europe. And the plans for Norway were timed to take place before the invasion of France, while Operation Sea Lion was to take place after the Fall of France; like it or not that means the planes were phased with each operation taking place as a separate phase. What don’t you understand about that?

In the cases you cited they were.

Then your contention that the thought of the US limiting his actions in time never occurred to Hitler is proven incorrect.

This seems to contradict your basic theory;that Germany never formulated any war plans or strategies.

Which confirms my contention that Germany did, in fact, have a strategy for defeating France.

Which proves…what, exactly?

Sure, the Axis partners were self-serving, so were the Allied partners. But to blame Japan for signing a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union when Germany had already done exactly the same thing is ridiculous. BTW, Germany never renounced it’s neutrality pact with the USSR either. And Germany was continually urging the Japanese to attack Malaya and Singapore; in order to do that Japan had to have a neutrality pact in place with the Soviet Union. You really ought to study the global situation in more detail.

Yes, I’m sure. What Sorge informed Stalin about was that the Japanese government had no intention of attacking the territories claimed by the USSR in the Far East. Japan had no inkling of German plans to attack the Soviet Union until it actually happened.

Actually, there was far less consensus in Japan’s case than in Germany’s strategic planning, but the IJA and IJN eventually agreed that the attack on the Southern Resources Area had priority because the Army realized it also needed more oil to fight the war in China. Japan’s short-term planning was more meticulous, but it’s long-term strategy was left in a bare-bones outline form. The rivalry between the Army and the Navy actually caused more trouble at the operational level than the strategic planning level. This was because a basic division of responsibility based on geography had been reached; the Army was responsible for the Asian mainland and the Navy was responsible for the Pacific and most of the islands therein. The operational breakdown came when circumstances forced the IJN to cooperate with the IJA in New Guinea and the Solomons.

Germany also suffered from a bitter rivalry between the Navy and the Air force, but because Germany was basically a land power, it was less consequential. As for Axis planning in general, it was crippled by the fact that Axis war aims were almost exclusively focused on the acquisition of territory. Each Axis country had it’s eye on different territories, so naturally their strategies were different. Since each country was forced by their meager economic resources to concentrate on very short, decisive wars, the Axis didn’t have the luxury of prioritizing it’s goals, as did the Allies. In essence, each Axis country was trying to do too much with too little, too quickly.

Not quite.

Military strategy is not the same as political strategy or diplomatic strategy, while all of them, along with a lot of other things, are but components of grand strategy. As Liddell Hart stated:

[T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will. …

Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.
Strategy, London, Faber & Faber, 1967. 2nd rev. ed. p.322, lifted from Wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_strategy

Problems arise when military strategy is divorced from, or contrary to, grand strategy. Or when there is no grand strategy to dictate military strategy or, more accurately, when there is no sound grand strategy to dictate military strategy.

When political leaders begin to dictate military strategy in response to immediate issues but without regard to grand strategy there will usually be problems for both military strategy and operations and for the achievement of the grand strategy.

This was not confined to Hitler in WWII. Churchill did it in Greece and duly lost forces and resources which in turn compromised Britain’s ability to pursue its grand strategy. Ironically, Hitler also did it in Greece with the same result by hampering the impending Barbarossa. Hitler should have left the Italians to sort out their own problem with Greece (as he should have left them to sort out the mess they created in North Africa), while Churchill should have left the Greeks to deal with the German invasion which was always going to end in defeat with or without the inadequate forces Churchill squandered in a (foreseen by Allied commanders at the time) futile attempt to save Greece.

Two quotes summarise some of the problems which flow from military strategy not being informed and dictated by grand strategy, both of which are apposite to Germany and Japan in WWII:

Grand strategy depends upon policy, and policy upon political knowledge of war. If this knowledge is nil, policy will be nil, and grand strategy will follow suit. In other words, generalship becomes impossible.
J.F.C. Fuller, in The Army in My Time

War is “too serious a business” for the destinies of nations to be controlled by mere strategists. There is a need for the wider horizon of grand strategy, which embraces the state of peace that lies beyond every war.
Liddell Hart, in Thoughts on War

Yes, I’m absolutely certain.

Japan had no idea that Germany was going to attack the Soviet Union in June, 1941. There were a lot of rumors flying around Europe, but no hard information.

Sorge, a German, (and holder of a WW I Iron Cross) supposedly reported to the Soviets that Germany would attack the Soviet Union on 20 June, 1941, but he got that information not from the Japanese government or military, but from a German military attache at the German embassy in Tokyo. Stalin, according to what I have read, ridiculed the information and dismissed it completely.

In September, 1941, just before the Japanese discovered Sorge’s espionage activities, Sorge reported that the Japanese Army had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union unless the Germans were able to capture Moscow. It was this information that allegedly led to the transfer of Soviet forces to the defense of Moscow.

Despite the attempt to make it seem like something akin to a bureaucracy, strategy is strategy.

Either you are thinking about what you should do in certain circumstances or you are not. You can separate it into “political strategy”, “military strategy”, and “grand strategy” (whatever that might be), but the process is the same, planning for future contingencies. In reality, it is extremely difficult to define any sort of hard line between the arbitrary categories of strategy listed above.

All good strategy evolves with changing conditions, and is based on valid assumptions (realistic assessments of conditions). Logical strategies that would otherwise be quite workable, can easily be undermined by invalid assumptions. In fact, this is the most common reason why strategies fail.

I just told you specifically which German ‘military leaders’ formulated which strategy…

And what would have to admit? I said the following right off the bat talking specifically about the outset of the Phony War:

I think this is a bit of a contradiction. I’d first have to understand Hitler’s strategy as I’m not sure it was ever actually predicated on anything verifiable nor workable, or whether he had any sort of predetermined strategy at all. If it wasn’t realistic or workable, it certainly wasn’t logical…

Strategy is strategy whether you understand it or not.

Which strategy are you talking about? The Jews stabbing the German Army in the back in 1918?

I thought we were talking about Hitler’s capacity for logic, not strategy there…

It matters nor whether Hitler or his generals made the strategic plans; the point is they weren’t simply academic exercises. By 1944, the time was over when any strategy had any chance of working for Germany, so of course I’m referring to the period prior to 1942.

Thanks for the admission and you’re welcome! But it does matter! Because you said “Hitler” conducted strategy and I said his staff officers did the actual work under the guise of his direction. I was specifically talking about the period prior to June 1941, as there was no actual plan by the Heer to attack France until after the War started, and there was no real workable strategy until the early spring of 1940.

Why are you making “points” to me? I’ve never stated that German strategy was an ‘academic exercise’. I said the Germans were reacting and creating strategy ad hoc as events moved them and that WWII unfolded far faster than anticipated or desired…

No one said anyone in Germany did that, so stop trying to rephrase things to suit your arguments.

Um, you stated that Hitler had misconceptions regarding his Armed Forces, which he did to some extent but his misconceptions were clearly his own fault as he listened to liars and yesmen and effectively silenced most dissent in his armed forces…

I said Hitler and the German military itself, badly overestimated German military power and badly underestimated Soviet military resiliency; two completely different issues than you are trying to portray

I was speaking more in terms of prior to the Battle for France, not so much Barbarossa where I concur that Hitler and, some but certainly not all, his senior officers overestimated their forces–especially when accounting for logistics. They may or may not have underestimated the Soviet Red Army however. The Heer did indeed inflict huge losses, and many Soviet soldiers fought hard. But the Red Army was also blessed with time and space giving them breathing room to hearken back to “Deep Battle” and rid Stalin’s inept political cronies and his total control over the armed forces…

No, it was the Allied mistakes that proved Germany’s pre-existing strategy workable.

Which Allies? The French? What “preexisting” strategy was that?

As Hitler once said, no senior military officer ever feels completely prepared to fight.

And as one of Hitler’s anonymous generals once said, “he’s just a ****ing Austrian Corporal!” :slight_smile:

You’re speculating. That fact simply means it was Germany’s strategy to bet on a short and very decisive campaign. They believed the French would not launch a counter-offensive until they had safely contained the German offensive and that never happened.

Nope. No speculating here. I’ve actually read about it several times over. There were no “plans” for a “short decisive campaign” until well into the Phony War. And some Germans may well have believed that. Some German officers shit their pants over the Saar Offensive the French decided to abandon despite encountering no actual resistance. The French under Gamelin surely wanted the Germans to attack first in order to blood them. But in fact, the French General Staff was planning an offensive sooner than the German OKH were!

So what? What does that prove?

That there were no war plans against France prior to the Phony War, and that you’re giving the Fuhrer way too much credit…

Again, so what? Strategies and plans aren’t always created without defects, and the fact that a plan is finally perfected means there are planners who always thinking of the possibilities. Doesn’t matter if they are Hitler or relatively low ranking staff specialists.

There was no plan prior to hostilities (or nonhostilities in 1939). How often can I say this? How much more can you be wrongheaded?

Ok, you don’t like Hitler; fine, neither do I. But just saying he was a bastard who schemed his way through life hardly rebuts my argument that he gave considerable thought to strategic matters and planned his actions, both military and political. Yes, he sometimes ignored facts when he found them inconvenient, so did Churchill and Roosevelt, so what?

No one likes Hitler, well a few do, but they’re banned. :slight_smile: But firstly, I’m talking about a specific period, Hitler certainly put significant thought into strategic action and he certainly had a long term goal. But he also blundered into WWII and his actions had thus far exceeded his capacity for strategy. All I’m saying is that Germany was in many ways completely unprepared for the War with France initially, and the quick and decisive battle that ensued had little to do with any preexisting war plans and more to do with a plan borne out of desperation that was ultimately a gamble. The German plan was brilliant, because it had to be. But it was something that didn’t exist until at least the Spring of 1940. I’ve also said that Hitler deserves enormous credit here for being a general manager or project manager of sorts in pushing his generals, but his contributions to strategy were marginal at best, and again made only after the War was declared…

Strategy doesn’t have to be detailed or written down in an order somewhere. It can be as nebulous as simply avoiding certain situations considered to be disadvantageous. Hitler’s strategy was to use aggressive foreign policy to get what he wanted.

I don’t disagree…

When that pushed him into a war he had bet against, his strategy was to engage his opponents in a series of sequential, very quick, campaigns and count on superior Germany military power to defeat those opponents in detail. That strategy broke down because Hitler had overestimated German military power and underestimated the will and determination of his opponents.

Here’s where you’re getting it wrong. There was no “strategy” to engage his enemies of “sequential, quick campaigns.” Historians since the 1970s have painted this notion as a “Blitzkrieg legend” (by Bundeswehr Colonel Karl-Heinz Frieser) or “myth.” The secret blitzkrieg plans never existed and the attack on France was merely the continuation of the previous tradition of mobile forces attempting envelopment --but now with mechanization. I have been saying this and am well grounded in my contentions. The actual plan carried out was born out of necessity and pieced together ad hoc out of sheer desperation. In the case of Barbarossa, things are different as the Germans fully implemented what is erroneously called ‘Blitzkrieg’ into a more formal codification. But the original plans against France were anything but “short and decisive,” and involved various phases lasting months or a couple of years. The plan was evolved, not revolutionary nor was it in existence prior to the War…

That in itself is a strategy

Yes, a political one. But even here, Hitler is more poker than chess IMO…

Yes, but not, as you seem to think, so you can go rambling off on irrelevant soliloquies.

Stop! you’re making me blush! I know, you’re welcome!

Bully for you! But it does nothing to advance your argument so kindly keep it to yourself.

Actually, I think it did. We were talking about production, and the supposed inferiority of German industry. But clearly, they were more efficient than the French were. And the tactical and medium bomber Luftwaffe air arm had a huge impact in the short, decisive campaign…

The Allies, as in Britain and France. Germany’s economy was far more fragikle than either Allied country’s. Your assertions that Germany could produce more of this or that than one country or another are meaningless.

Well, I haven’t read much of Tooze’s book, but I’d love to know how he compares them with the French. Horne (To Lose a Battle) absolutely buries the French system of military procurement as corrupt and parochial as well as prone to strikes and slowdowns…

Three months is still a very short period of time to defeat what was supposed to be the strongest Army in Europe.

I certainly agree. But an army devoid of a strategic reserve and saddled with so many poor preconceptions is only as strong as its weakest point.

And the plans for Norway were timed to take place before the invasion of France, while Operation Sea Lion was to take place after the Fall of France; like it or not that means the planes were phased with each operation taking place as a separate phase. What don’t you understand about that?

Nothing.

I was being open ended, yet agreeing with you. Relax.

Then your contention that the thought of the US limiting his actions in time never occurred to Hitler is proven incorrect.

I dunno what occurred to Hitler and didn’t occur. But I’m pretty sure that the United States wasn’t at the forefront of his mind in 1940. But of course the phantom of U.S. industrial production surely haunted him in later phases, yet prior to the American entry in the War…

This seems to contradict your basic theory;that Germany never formulated any war plans or strategies.

Um, seriously. WTF are you talking about? I’ve never said nor implied any such categorical statements of the sort, and I grow weary of having such trash statements tied to me…

Which confirms my contention that Germany did, in fact, have a strategy for defeating France.

Um, yeah, after the war started and Hitler blundered into it. But okay…

Which proves…what, exactly?

That he had little direct involvement in actual military strategy…

Sure, the Axis partners were self-serving, so were the Allied partners. But to blame Japan for signing a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union when Germany had already done exactly the same thing is ridiculous. BTW, Germany never renounced it’s neutrality pact with the USSR either. And Germany was continually urging the Japanese to attack Malaya and Singapore; in order to do that Japan had to have a neutrality pact in place with the Soviet Union. You really ought to study the global situation in more detail.

Not blaming Japan for anything. The Japanese were good, fearful saps when it came to the Soviets after being whipped at Khalkhin Gol. It was very honorable for them not to break their sacred neutrality pact until the Red Army spanked them again in August Storm…

Yes, I’m sure. What Sorge informed Stalin about was that the Japanese government had no intention of attacking the territories claimed by the USSR in the Far East. Japan had no inkling of German plans to attack the Soviet Union until it actually happened.

I’ll take your word for it…

Actually, there was far less consensus in Japan’s case than in Germany’s strategic planning, but the IJA and IJN eventually agreed that the attack on the Southern Resources Area had priority because the Army realized it also needed more oil to fight the war in China. Japan’s short-term planning was more meticulous, but it’s long-term strategy was left in a bare-bones outline form. The rivalry between the Army and the Navy actually caused more trouble at the operational level than the strategic planning level. This was because a basic division of responsibility based on geography had been reached; the Army was responsible for the Asian mainland and the Navy was responsible for the Pacific and most of the islands therein. The operational breakdown came when circumstances forced the IJN to cooperate with the IJA in New Guinea and the Solomons.

Interesting. Agreed…

Germany also suffered from a bitter rivalry between the Navy and the Air force, but because Germany was basically a land power, it was less consequential. As for Axis planning in general, it was crippled by the fact that Axis war aims were almost exclusively focused on the acquisition of territory. Each Axis country had it’s eye on different territories, so naturally their strategies were different. Since each country was forced by their meager economic resources to concentrate on very short, decisive wars, the Axis didn’t have the luxury of prioritizing it’s goals, as did the Allies. In essence, each Axis country was trying to do too much with too little, too quickly.

I would go beyond that as far as rivalries in the Third Reich. In fact, one of Hitler’s tenets to maintaining power seems to have been to foster rivalries in nearly every facet as sort of a form of ‘divide and conquer.’ As for the second part of your statement, I agree that the Axis in general wasn’t ready and were trying to do too much too soon.

I never limited my contention about German strategic thinking to Hitler, that was your assertion. My original contention was that the Axis countries did, in fact, plan their strategies.

No, aside from your excursions into Hitler’s mental processes, what we are discussing is the issue of whether Germany and Japan, as Axis countries, ever considered planning for war and strategic objectives. My contention is that they did, and your contention, as far as I can decipher, is that they didn’t.

No it doesn’t matter because you have already admitted that there was a strategy. Yes, it changed somewhat after the war started but that is a characteristic of all strategy. It doesn’t matter who did the strategic thinking, Hitler or some railway clerk, it ended up as part of Germany’s strategic plan.

Not only Hitler, but it doesn’t matter since the essential issue is that the assumption of overwhelming German military power was invalid.

I’m beginning to suspect you are just trying to confuse the issue when you keep asking the same questions. The term “the Allies” refers to the British and French, no one else, as I’ve stated before. The pre-existing strategy refers to the German plan to attack France. Are you now going to claim the Germans didn’t have a plan of attack?

And that is relevant in what way?

Then provide some citations. When someone uses the qualifier “probably” it’s a dead giveaway that they aren’t certain.

According to who? citation please.

It proves absolutely nothing of the sort. War plans and revisions are written up all the time, often without reference to prior plans. And no, I am not giving Hitler any credit at all; I’m simply saying he had input into German strategic thinking.

You can say it as often as you like, doesn’t prove a thing though.

I guess this gets down to the crux of the argument.

My contention is that Germany did give considerable thought to strategic plans. That doesn’t require that Germany have a detailed war plan for hostilities with France. It simply means that Germany did have a general plan for dealing with it’s enemies and that plan was to engage them sequentially rather than all at once. Germany’s final plan to invade France didn’t exist prior to September, 1939, so what? Germany did have a plan to invade France under certain circumstances, and although it was not the version that was actually put into practice really doesn’t matter. And Hitler’s contribution, big or small, also doesn’t matter. My contention is that Germany and Japan did give thought to strategic planning and produced some initially pretty successful plans. All the BS about who was involved, or when, I don’t care about.

No, here’s where you’re getting things wrong. You are getting all wound up in specific campaign plans which are really not relevant.

Both Germany and Japan realized that they were outclassed economically by their potential opponents and that rendered them extremely vulnerable to attritional warfare. But attritional warfare takes time to be effective so, regardless of the fact that there may not have been detailed war plans for dealing with specific enemies, both countries planned to avoid long wars which might involve them in attritional slugging matches.

Where such plans unraveled in both cases was in the assumption that their respective militaries would be able to so overwhelm their opponents that the enemy’s determination to continue the struggle would be broken. This came about because both Japan and Germany overestimated the effectiveness of their own military, and underestimated the will of their adversaries.

I know you did, but you’re wrong. Production of a single class or weapon or even several classes of weaponry does not provide conclusive proff of the staying power of a given economy. To assert something like that is extremely naive. You’ve apparently read Tooze, you should know that.

A comparison to the British economy (or a combination of British and French economies) would be more pertinent, after all, Germany was fighting both. I suggest you read the rest of Tooze’s book; it’s not easy, but well worth wading through it

Tooze disagrees with you and actually suggests that Hitler viewed the United States as Germany’s primary enemy. I don’t know if that is true, but I think Hitler had to view the US as the eventual arbiter of the war, if only because of it’s latent productive potential.

Well, my basic contention is that both Germany and Japan gave considerable thought to strategic planning and you seem to expending serious effort to disprove that argument, although you have focused on issues that I have never disputed. So an admission by you that either Germany or Japan did indeed have strategic plans would seem to contradict your theories.

Which is fact not in dispute

The implication in your comments on the issue certainly seemed to be a criticism of Japan for not being more supportive of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union.

In fact, The Japanese never did break their neutrality pact with the Soviets. The Soviet Union, on April 5, 1945, renounced the pact with Japan, one year before it’s original expiration date.

I didn’t attempt to make it seem like a bureaucracy and I don’t understand how you could have got that impression, nor that strategy is akin to a bureaucracy.

However, there is a great degree of irony in your analogy with bureaucracy because any type of national strategy for or in war is the product of various military, government, diplomatic, and industrial bureaucracies which devote a great deal of time and resources to gathering information, analysing it, and developing strategies based on that information and analysis.

You seem to think from your simplistic assertion that ‘strategy is strategy’ that the development of strategy existed outside the bureaucracies which all the major powers utilised for a couple of decades before the war in their progressive planning for the outbreak of war.

Liddell Hart’s quote makes it quite clear what grand strategy is.

It is vastly more than military strategy, which is what most of the discussion in this thread has been about.

Agreed.

That is why they are all part of grand strategy.

And a nation’s failure to have a grand strategy for a war represents a failure to contemplate and plan on all those levels, which is exactly what Japan failed to do and a large part of the reason it was never going to win a war it would not have got into if it had engaged in proper grand strategic thinking before starting its war.

No, strategies which fail because of invalid assumptions are just examples of inadequate research, analysis and planning.

Facts are what matter in all research, analysis and planning.

A ‘logical’ strategy based on invalid assumptions is just a stab in the dark by someone who didn’t do their homework and who deserves the consequences of assuming that things would be as they thought rather than as they are.

No, My reference to a “bureaucracy” was in response to your referencing people like Liddell Hart and Fuller, who, in my opinion try to put entirely too much emphasis on “defining” things like strategy, much like bureaucrats who develop their own mysterious terminology in an attempt to puff up what they are doing and mystify the uninitiated. Hart and Fuller, were, after all part of a military bureaucracy who were trying to keep themselves employed in tough times for the military.

I sense we are just going to have to disagree on this.

To me, strategy is simply making assessments of a given situation and charting a logical course of action for getting from the current situation to some desired goal or objective. You can talk about political strategy, military strategy, grand strategy, global strategy, universal strategy, this strategy, and that strategy; but what it all comes down to is the rather simple, straightforward, two-step process that I have suggested. Anything else is just trying to make your resume look more impressive.

As for Japan, prior to WW II, it had a strategy in place to achieve it’s goals and it was, given the Japanese leadership’s understanding of the situation, a logical strategy. Unfortunately, the Japanese military and civilian leadership had accepted rather cursory assessment processes and the results of those assessments were erroneous assumptions that invalidated the strategic planning when it was put into practice.

Yes, another way of putting it is that the Japanese failed to do their “homework”, and the result was a strategy based on unrealistic assumptions; same thing as I have always maintained. But to say the Japanese never considered strategic matters or war planning is incorrect, they just went about it in a way that replaced cold hard judgment, and acknowledgment of unpleasant facts, of with wishful thinking.

No. We were speaking specifically of Hitler, if you want to include a more broad interpretation, than you should have stated that. My 'excursion into Hitler’s mental processes?" You’re the one that was intimating that he was “logical” and was following some sort of rational plan or strategy. Much of Hitler’s “plans” had to do with annihilating the Jewish threat, something that didn’t exist to an actually logical person. Logical people tend not to be driven by conspiracy theories and blind racist/anti-Semitic ideology. And, as much of Hitler’s so-called “strategy” of Lebensraum involved getting rid of the Jews as it did expanding the German state and acquiring the raw materials vis-à-vis the conquest of the Soviet Union. Nor were his plans (or stated goals) purely about economics and military strategy as they were a hybrid of ideological and racist demagoguery…

Secondly, I’ve never debated anything other than the Axis did plan their strategies. My “contention” is that Hitler was not really on the same page as his strategists and more or less bluffed his way through crisis’ he initiated and put Germany in a precarious military situation far sooner than his generals had anticipated or advised him too. A subtle nuance that never seems to fail to escape you…

No it doesn’t matter because you have already admitted that there was a strategy.

I never said anything of the sort!

Yes, it changed somewhat after the war started but that is a characteristic of all strategy. It doesn’t matter who did the strategic thinking, Hitler or some railway clerk, it ended up as part of Germany’s strategic plan.

Um, what? How can one have a plan/strategy/outline as a means to reach a goal, then completely ignore it in practice?

Tell me. What was Hitler’s “strategy” involving the Rhineland reoccupation? That the French hopefully wouldn’t attack German troops? To pre-order his Heer to quickly turnaround and exit the Rhineland in the face of any French resistance? Is that what you would call a rational, logical strategy? A gutsy political one? Perhaps. An actual military one? Nope. Hitler was an impulsive gambler, and a bluffer. But I wouldn’t call many of his actions any sort of coherent strategy as they seemed to ignore the basic tenets of such…

Not only Hitler, but it doesn’t matter since the essential issue is that the assumption of overwhelming German military power was invalid.

What was his assumption based on, then?

I’m beginning to suspect you are just trying to confuse the issue when you keep asking the same questions. The term “the Allies” refers to the British and French, no one else, as I’ve stated before. The pre-existing strategy refers to the German plan to attack France. Are you now going to claim the Germans didn’t have a plan of attack?

And I’m beginning to suspect that you have no idea what you are talking about in regards to German strategy and haven’t really researched or read anything regarding the period we’re discussing other than Tooze. Unfortunately, Tooze is writing of macroeconomics and not actual “strategy” and a lot of bad assumptions are being made thusly…

And that is relevant in what way?

As relevant as any Hitler quote you can come up with!

Then provide some citations. When someone uses the qualifier “probably” it’s a dead giveaway that they aren’t certain.

I already have. Try reading the book. Why don’t you come up with some citations that in any way support your “quick war” theory regarding German military operations where none actually existed other than in the traditional German precepts of “Annihilation Battle,” “Mission to tactics,” and “Schwerpunkt.” Because you seem to fail to grasp any specifics regarding the aforementioned and certainly have provided no “citations” regarding such and you have no idea what you are talking about!

I would at least hope that you realize that Blitzkrieg wasn’t even a term used in any significant capacity by the Wehrmacht prior to its popularization after the Polish Campaign…

It proves absolutely nothing of the sort. War plans and revisions are written up all the time, often without reference to prior plans. And no, I am not giving Hitler any credit at all; I’m simply saying he had input into German strategic thinking.

No one said he didn’t have ‘input.’ He certainly did. Then he usually provided his generals crisis’ to deal with after ignoring the fact that Germany would not be ready to actually actuate a conclusive victory over the West until the mid 1940s…

I guess this gets down to the crux of the argument.

My contention is that Germany did give considerable thought to strategic plans. That doesn’t require that Germany have a detailed war plan for hostilities with France. It simply means that Germany did have a general plan for dealing with it’s enemies and that plan was to engage them sequentially rather than all at once. Germany’s final plan to invade France didn’t exist prior to September, 1939, so what? Germany did have a plan to invade France under certain circumstances, and although it was not the version that was actually put into practice really doesn’t matter. And Hitler’s contribution, big or small, also doesn’t matter. My contention is that Germany and Japan did give thought to strategic planning and produced some initially pretty successful plans. All the BS about who was involved, or when, I don’t care about.

What “argument?” I’ve never said that Germany didn’t give considerable thought to strategic plans–only that Hitler largely ignored them and often ignored any advice or planning, and of course, the capabilities, of his Army. And if you think that Germany had plans to invade France prior to 1939, by all means cite a legitimate source for them! How could they? The German Army was a very small constabulary force incapable of significant action until the mid-to-late 1930s and to plan for an offensive would have been laughable. They were barely able to defend Germany until the mid-1930s, and after the renunciation of Versailles and the re-institution of conscription, it still took the Heer a long time to train the requisite number of troops. What point would there be of only the most academic of war plans?

No, here’s where you’re getting things wrong. You are getting all wound up in specific campaign plans which are really not relevant.

Really? Then how could your contention of nebulous “plans for quick wars” at all be true if Germany didn’t even have a specific war plan to attack her archenemy?

Both Germany and Japan realized that they were outclassed economically by their potential opponents and that rendered them extremely vulnerable to attritional warfare. But attritional warfare takes time to be effective so, regardless of the fact that there may not have been detailed war plans for dealing with specific enemies, both countries planned to avoid long wars which might involve them in attritional slugging matches.

It depends how you define attritional warfare. In fact, the German birthrate was twice that of the French, the Germans anticipated far higher casualties than the actually suffered, and in fact the Polish campaign involved many of the same artillery-infantry slugging matches one associates with battles of attrition. In fact, the key German strategy was “annihilation battle,” and really wasn’t all that different from their conceptualizations in WWI–only faster.

Where such plans unraveled in both cases was in the assumption that their respective militaries would be able to so overwhelm their opponents that the enemy’s determination to continue the struggle would be broken. This came about because both Japan and Germany overestimated the effectiveness of their own military, and underestimated the will of their adversaries.

Well, as far as the Germans, many in the Heer actually overestimated the French and rated their own capabilities realistically. I think that’s a bit of an overstatement though, but one firmly based on the truth that both Germany and Japan were overconfident after being flush with initial victories…

I know you did, but you’re wrong. Production of a single class or weapon or even several classes of weaponry does not provide conclusive proff of the staying power of a given economy. To assert something like that is extremely naive. You’ve apparently read Tooze, you should know that.

No I’m not wrong, because I’m not actually saying what you’re trying to imply I am. I implied a singular example demonstrating that the German industry was at least capable of besting their immediate foes in some aspects. I fully realize the German industrial sector had many weaknesses, even without reading much of Tooze yet. Extremely “naive?” Well, then please explain how the Germans defeated the French? I’m pretty sure an economist like Tooze certainly cannot adequately answer that and attempting to do so would be rather limiting to ones’ knowledge. In no small part was it due to the significant advantage in every facet of the air war, which affected the very demoralization of Hitler’s enemies you outlined above…

A comparison to the British economy (or a combination of British and French economies) would be more pertinent, after all, Germany was fighting both. I suggest you read the rest of Tooze’s book; it’s not easy, but well worth wading through it

Perhaps, but the British had a very small and relatively lightly equipped, if well trained and highly mobile, Army. The British economy would have only been a marginal threat to Hitler’s Germany for some time and they were far behind. As far as a strategic war, Britain could not have been a significant continental threat to Germany for years as she also suffered a severe manpower disadvantage and was largely only able to build up her Air Force recently, largely due to Chamberlains own actions during Appeasement…

No, your interpretation of Tooze does. I read the forward in between coffees and talking to girls at the bookstore, and I’m pretty sure Tooze states that Hitler certainly viewed a hegemonic America as a threat. But not an immediate one necessarily nor could have Hitler predict the Attack on Pearl Harbor. And could anyone actually call Hitler’s impulsive declaration of War something in anyway strategically viable?

Well, my basic contention is that both Germany and Japan gave considerable thought to strategic planning and you seem to expending serious effort to disprove that argument, although you have focused on issues that I have never disputed. So an admission by you that either Germany or Japan did indeed have strategic plans would seem to contradict your theories.

Then apparently, you’re reading a completely separate one, as I’ve never stated nor argued anything of the kind. I’ve merely stated that Hitler never actually abided by a coherent strategy and was never on the same page as his actual military strategists and was often impulsive, irrational, and bullheaded…

The implication in your comments on the issue certainly seemed to be a criticism of Japan for not being more supportive of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union. In fact, The Japanese never did break their neutrality pact with the Soviets. The Soviet Union, on April 5, 1945, renounced the pact with Japan, one year before it’s original expiration date.

Or that Japan gained nothing by not being more supportive, in the end. Not that it mattered much either way…

Only in your imagination. I was talking about the Axis countries; specifically Germany and Japan. You included Hitler in the equation, not I, and my contention has nothing to do with Hitler or his relationship to his military officers.

Good, then we agree.

Not as simple as that. I refer you to “The Wages of Destruction”, page 333, “Since the Spring of 1939, at the latest, Hitler had been driven forward by the sense that time was not on Germany’s side. Once war was declared, the gathering strength of the Western coalition, reinforced by the United States, contrasted with Germany’s economic vulnerability and it’s new dependence on the Soviet Union only reinforced this motive.”

Germany may not have been militarily ready for war, but waiting wasn’t going to improve that situation; Germany’s economy was shaky and delay on ly played into the hands of the United States.

So either Germany had a strategy or it didn’t; which is it? I’m tired of listening to you blow hot and cold on that issue.

So you’re saying strategy has to be set in stone and followed rigidly no matter how conditions might change? Otherwise it can’t be considered a strategy?

That, in itself, is a strategy; testing the will of one’s opponent makes a lot of sense in certain circumstances. So, yes, that was a strategy that was both political and military. I

If you’re referring to Hitler’s assumption, I’d say it was based on his belief in the racial superiority of the German people

Well, it’s been obvious to me since we started that you neither know what you are talking about, nor understand what is meant by “strategy”. You keep saying Hitler was “bluffing” or was a “gambler” or similar dismissive adjectives, but that doesn’t really address whether he was following a strategy. And my contention really doesn’t involve Hitler; I’m talking about Germany as a country.

Well, not really. My quote demonstrated that no general ever really believes his forces are ready for battle. That feeling isn’t unique to Hitler. I believe Marshall also said something similar and Eisenhower also voiced similar sentiments. your citation doesn’t demonstrate anything except that Hitler’s troops didn’t think much of him.

Ok, how about “Wages of Destruction”, pages 333-334; “Given the constellation of 1939, even with the support of the Soviet trade deal, Hitler had no interest in fighting a protracted war. Everything depended on winning a decisive victory in the West at the earliest possible opportunity.”

Your problem is you really have no idea what was going on in Germany in 1938-39 and are focused exclusively on military war planning, not overall strategy which included political, economic, and military considerations.

Yeah, I’m aware of that, and it has absolutely no significance.

And what you don’t seem to realize that by the mid-1940’s, Germany, militarily and economically, would be so far behind the Anglo-American coalition that it would have been impossible to wage any kind of warfare at all. Hitler did understand that.

Detailed plans to invade France? No, none existed to my knowledge before the fall of 1939. But yes, there were certainly plans for war with France as early as 1935 (Fall Rot, or Case Red). And no, Hitler didn’t ignore Germany’s strategic planning, he drove it.

You don’t need a detailed plan for war in order to have a strategy of pursuing only short wars for limited objectives.

So what? The German economy couldn’t sustain a long war regardless of the disparity in birthrates between Germany and France

I disagree. You are focusing on a single issue among dozens. The air war in the Battle of France was important but not the sole decisive factor, and certainly not indicative of relative economic strengths. The Germans defeated the French by getting inside their decision cycle and initiating successive battles before the French could respond; that has nothing to do with economics.

Actually, that’s incorrect. Britain’s economy was in far better shape than Germany’s, and was, by 1940, out producing Germany in aircraft and ships. The British economy supported a Navy that was actually, by the end of 1939, strangling Germany’s ability to import materials crucial to Germany’s war production, while Germany could hardly scratch Britain’s ability to import crucial materials. If that wasn’t a significant threat to Germany, I don’t know what was. Britain’s manpower “disadvantage” had no real significance since Britain had no intention of challenging Germany on the continent, and German had no means of projecting it’s manpower beyond Continental shores. If you really had studied the European war as much as you like to pretend, you’d realize that naval power trumps land power any day.

You’re kidding? You read the forward while talking to “the girls” at the bookstore? Actually, there is a preface, and an introduction, but no forward in “Wages of Destruction”. I thought maybe you’d at least read the Cliff’s Notes version. Makes me wonder what are the other books in which you’ve read the forward?

I suggest you read the whole book before telling me what Tooze does or doesn’t say. In fact, I never said the US was an “immediate” threat to Germany, I said that Hitler viewed the US as the “primary” threat to Germany. In fact, Tooze, early in the book, on pages 7-11, makes it plain that Hitler regarded the United States as the ultimate threat to Germany and the rest of Europe. According to Tooze, Hitler saw the struggle in Europe as merely the preparatory phase before a grand “war of the continents” could be successfully (for Germany) pursued. Of course no one could foresee Pearl Harbor in 1939, but that is irrelevant.

Hitler’s declaration of war against the US only acknowledged the inevitable in Hitler’s mind, and the action was taken because he felt he could at least gain some temporary political advantage by declaring a war which he knew would eventually occur

Well, Hitler is completely beside the point that I am arguing. I disagree that he never abided by a coherent strategy, but I guess you can make that interpretation if you like. I don’t think you will convince many who have actually studied Hitler’s behavior. As for being impulsive, irrational, and bullheaded…so what? So were Roosevelt and Churchill at times.

No, that implication never emerged in your comments; it seemed more of a criticism of Japan for not standing by her Axis partner Germany. When someone writes; “Thank you, Japan!”, it’s difficult not to sense a certain rancor toward that country.

As for gaining nothing, well, I’d hardly call gaining a three-front war an advantage. Japan’s industrial and economic situation was really far too constrained to fight on a single front successfully, so not intervening in the German conflict with the Soviet Union made a lot of sense.