Just on those figures, how would the Soviets have managed without those supplies?
Oh, I can be pretty gullible. I once went on a “snipe hunt.” 
But c’mon man, there’s no way the Soviets could have sustained the advance very far without those trucks. The (mostly) Dodges were rugged and reliable, virtually disposable. Granted, the main combat weapons save for the ones previously mentioned, were of very limited value. But even a hated Valentine tank provided a temporary stop gap and could augment the T-34s in service allow the Red Army to field even more motorized units…
if the comrad Stalin ordered they would had to invent teleportation. In a month. Never say never!
In particular the trucks and spam were of immence help! Did I ever said otherwise?
With strugle and more losses.
I was right. Murmansk LL route accounted for about 20% of all LL deliveries. Iran route - 30%. The Vladivostok route in the Pacific - 50%.
All shipment in the Pacific was done only with ships under Soviet flag and manned by the Soviet crews. There were no convoys - the ships operated separately (about 300 ships).
Of all LL deliveries, tonns:
- 19.4% were carried on the initially Soviet ships with Soviet crews.
- 30.7% were carried on the ships received by USSR as a part of the the LL itself. Soviet crews.
- 49.9 were carried by the US and UK ships. Non-Soviet crews.
source (Rus): http://www.transport.ru/2_period/more/96_6/amer_vl.htm
Hi Egorka
Just wondering if you know who said these statments, you may [or may not] be surprised.
“It is now said that the Allies never helped us . . . However, one cannot deny that the Americans gave us so much material, without which we could not have formed our reserves and “could not have continued the war”. . . we had no explosives and powder. There was none to equip rifle bullets. The Americans actually came to our assistance with powder and explosives. And how much sheet steel did they give us? We really could not have quickly put right our production of tanks if the Americans had not helped with steel. And today it seems as though we had all this ourselves in abundance.”
And…
“Speaking about our readiness for war from the point of view of the economy and economics, one cannot be silent about such a factor as the subsequent help from the Allies. First of all, certainly, from the American side, because in that respect the English helped us minimally. In an analysis of all facets of the war, one must not leave this out of one’s reckoning. We would have been in a serious condition without American gunpowder, and could not have turned out the quantity of ammunition which we needed. Without American `Studebekkers’ [sic], we could have dragged our artillery nowhere. Yes, in general, to a considerable degree they provided our front transport. The output of special steel, necessary for the most diverse necessities of war, were also connected to a series of American deliveries.”
That illustrates one of the most important differences between the Axis and Allies: the lack of co-operation among Axis powers. Each effectively fought its own war (or in Italy’s case just started fights it couldn’t finish), where the Allies co-operated against all the Axis powers.
If the Japanese had targeted merchant shipping generally, and the LL shipping in particular, to the same extent that the Germans did in the Atlantic, it would have had a significant impact on Russia’s ability to fight, which would have assisted Germany and the general Axis fascist cause of defeating the communist USSR. Whether or not it would have resulted in a German victory is debatable, but reducing the 50% of supplies coming across the Pacific had to have an effect. It would be easier to evaluate the likely effect if we had figures on what was being shipped across the Pacific and when, primarily 1942-43, and how that contributed to Russia’s defence at the time.
Attacking LL Pacific shipping would also have diminished American naval capacity in the Pacific as ships would have had to be diverted to convoy protection. Those ships would be mostly anti-submarine destroyers, which if diverted to convoy protection in large numbers could have hampered USN operations and strategy by taking away ships needed for large ship screening and protection.
As it was, even American merchant ships crossed the Pacific mostly unescorted because the Japanese failed to grasp the importance of attacking merchant shipping.
I assume Japan would have been reluctant to attack Soviet ships in case it brought the USSR into a land war with Japan in Manchuria, which was Japan’s major conquest and which it badly wanted to hold. However, from an overall Axis viewpoint, it might have been much better strategically to have the USSR fighting on two fronts. Again, it’s debatable whether the Japanese would have won against the Soviets, but they would certainly have created significant difficulties for the Soviets in fighting serious wars on two fronts.
From an overall Axis strategic viewpoint, the IJN would probably have been better employed targeting Allied merchant shipping from about March 1942 instead of trying to expand eastwards from the NEI to try to isolate Australia from America while looking for the decisive battle with the USN.
The IJA would definitely have been better employed stopping at Indonesia and Rabaul instead of trying to expand eastwards and southwards, thus releasing several battle hardened divisions for immediate service against the Soviets, and avoiding tying up about 350,000 Japanese soldiers in New Guinea during the war. Equally importantly, this would have released relatively scarce Japanese merchant shipping from long voyages to New Guinea for most of the war and to Guadalcanal early in the war, along with the supplies they carried, which could have been much more productive in the short voyages to support a war against the USSR.
This is all generalisations with the benefit of hindsight, and without looking at particular circumstances at any specific point in the war, but you still have to wonder why the Japanese didn’t grasp the importance of targeting merchant shipping when their German allies were giving them a continuous lesson in its importance. The primary explanation is usually because of the bastardised Bushido spirit and the notion that merchant ships weren’t worthy targets (unlike, say, Chinese civilians and Allied nurses 
), but the deeper problem was that while Japan was highly proficient in offensive military strategy and tactics, it lacked the same wider strategic grasp that the Germans and the Allies had about how to conduct a modern war.
I missed that the first time around, you bastard! 
Five minutes! :shock:
Mate, I’d be spoiling her if she got one minute, and then only if I was taking my time because the footy wasn’t on television.
Do you know what constitutes foreplay in Australia?
The husband says to his wife: Are you awake?
Do you know constitutes a caring husband here?
A bloke who cares if his wife is awake.
Do you know what constitutes an Aussie husband who is concerned about whether or not his wife got any pleasure? A bloke who asks
Were you awake?
A really good husband can tell if she’s awake, but he still doesn’t care.
Any husband here can tell if his wife is awake, if he’s that interested. They move. A bit.
Guess what the perfect Aussie wife says?
Did something happen while I was awake? Can I get you another beer?
So I am gullible how?
From: http://www.o5m6.de/
Covering the Engines of the Red Army (or »Workers and Peasants Red Army« RKKA, called officially) in the Great Patriotic War in scaled multi-view colour profiles is quite a challenge.
The domestic vehicles alone, armour and softskins, would fill dozens of pages, but ,often overlooked, the Soviet Union received some 450,000 vehicles (trucks, jeeps, tractors, tanks, armoured cars etc.) from their allies (U.S.A., Great Britain, Canada) in World War 2 as well.
Hi Ashes,
Kruschev wrote it.
Just learning by example… 
Ah, yes, but your refer us only to models.
The Soviets were consistenty disappointed during the whole war when their allies insisted on delivering only 1/32 models of everything, but the Soviets worked 64 times harder to make up for these deficiencies and did twice as well with what little they were given.
My wife would be pleased for you, if she was awake.
Well, considering how seriously you reacted on my comment on teleportation - yes you are gullible.
So the Soviet union took lend lease aircraft to help the countrys who gave them? I think my B.S. meter is pegged out with that train of thought.
"By the end of 1941 the Soviet Union was near collapse and its air force almost annihilated, leaving large numbers of surviving pilots with no aircraft to fly. At this juncture the United Kingdom put aside its prewar animosities toward the Communists and despatched several hundred Hurricane fighters despite the fact that at this time the British were still struggling to supply the RAF with modern fighters in North Africa and the Far East. A total of 4300 Hurricanes and Spitfires, as well as several hundred Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and Airacobras, obtained from the USA under Lend-lease, were eventually supplied to the USSR in an attempt to present a Russian defeat. After the United States had entered the war, the Americans extended Lend-lease to include direct supply to the Soviets as well as the British, and among the aircraft sent were almost 10,000 fighters - mainly P-39s, P-40s and P-63s. Although many of these aircraft were outdated when they arrived, and some were not particularly suited to Russian operating conditions, they served when they were needed. A number of Russian pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union flying Lend-lease aircraft, and many more gained their early experience before converting to their own Yaks and Lavochkins. All of these types, including the Hurricane, remained in active units until the end of the war, and even into the post-war period.
The Soviet government tried to play down or conceal the importance of Lend-lease fighters until well into the 1980s, and the pilots who flew them were discriminated against as ‘foreigners’. Only in recent years have these pilots felt free to admit what they flew."
The P-39/63 Airacobra was legendary in the the USSR. It didn’t quite work in the West because of its low service ceiling, but this was ideally suited the air war over the USSR as most of the combat was tactical, low-level operations which forced the Me109s down on the deck so to speak…
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4159
Somewhere between 7000 and 9000 were sent…
I think I was reacting to your perceived attitude overall and not one specific comment…
That makes two of us !:roll:
Some extract from :
Lend-lease: Aircraft Deliveries to the Soviet Union
By Carl-Fredrik Geust posted by Chevan.
Regardless of Soviet cold-war attempts to forget (or at least diminish) the importance of Lend-lease, the total impact of the Lend-Lease shipment for the Soviet war effort and entire national economy can only be characterized as both dramatic and of decisive importance. The outcome of the war on the East front might well have taken another path without Lend-lease. There were undoubtedly big difficulties in the early period: aircraft modified for tropical conditions were delivered to Arctic ports, Russian-language instructions were lacking, a big number of aircraft were grounded because of lack of spa res, ammunition, bombs or high-octane fuel. Soon many technical problems 'were overcome, Soviet guns and bomb racks were installed, and numerous other technical improvisa tions were made in Soviet AF frontal units. Soviet specialists developed also ingenious technical improvements and modifi cations of the original aircraft versions. In parallel the new American technology was systematically investigated in research and design institutes, and the total impact for the modernization of the Soviet aviation industry was certainly immense. The ultimate peak of this learning process was the post-war copying of the Boeing B-29 in only two years time, resulting in the Soviet nuclear-bomb carrier Tu-4.
"Lend-lease aircraft amounted to 18% of all aircraft in the Soviet air forces, 20% of all bombers, and 16-23% of all fighters (numbers vary depending on calculation methods), and 29% of all naval aircraft. In some AF commands and fronts the proportion of Lend-Lease aircraft was even higher: of the 9.888 fighters delivered to the air defense (PVO) fighter units in 1941-45 6.953 (or over 70%!) were British or American. In the AF of the Karelian front lend-lease aircraft amounted to about two-thirds of all combat aircraft in 1942-43, practically all torpedo bombers of the naval air forces were A-20G Bostons in 1944-45 etc.
Some American aircraft types were simply irreplaceable and very highly appreciated on all levels during the war, e.g. P-39 Airacobra fighters, A-20 Boston and B-25 Mitchell bombers and C-47 transport aircraft.
Several Soviet aces scored more than 40 victories with Airacobras. G.A.Rechkalov’s 50 victories are apparently the highest score ever with an American fighter, while the No.2 Soviet ace A.I.Pokryshkin claimed 48 of his 59 victories when flying Airacobras.
Initially the main Lend-lease route was by ship to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in northern Russia. In 1942 two other supply routes were opened: a southern route via Iran (where the aircraft are assembled and flown into the southern part of the Soviet Union), and above all the ALSIB (Alaska-Siberia) route which was opened on 29 September 1942. The aircraft were flown by American crews to Fairbanks, Alaska, where they were handed over to a Soviet commission headed by Col. M.G.Machin, and ferried to Krasnoyarsk in Siberia by specially selected Soviet pilots of 1 PAD (ferry aviation divi sion) commanded by Arctic veteran-pilot Col. I.P.Mazuruk (HSU 27.6.1937)."
So Chevan, just the trucks and the spam ? This is exactly what I was saying… It was critical at that time, and the Murmansk convoys were the only supply route then.
Thanks for the link. Very detailed info.
I wonder… are you related to Stalin?:mrgreen: