Congrats, you’re improving.
The Messerschmitt company -after several fusions- is today part of the EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company).
The Me262s weren’t terribly effective when deployed even in numbers. There were simply too many bombers. Even piston engined fighters such as the P-51 not only could be used effectively with countermeasure tactics, but also engine mods, to counter the Me262s. They took down some bombers, but it was pinpricks…
As for Korea, a huge complaint of the USAF crews were that they were flying second rate B-29s and B-26s left over from WWII against second-generation jets (MIG-15s).
And what could they possibly have missed in North Korea? 
Deploying strategic air-power against strategic targets in an agrarian country was pretty silly to begin with. They’d have been better dumping their ordinance on troop concentrations and hitting tangible tactical targets…
most actually conlcuded they were the same. they both had bad engines with only 50 hours life in each jet. Congress nearly cancelled YP-80 since it was killing so many test pilotes. When Major Bong was killed the word went out that these jets were too risky to develope. The Airforce had to do a hugh song and dance to keep them in production with publicity stunts like flying them to Italy at the end of the war etc. The Fuel dump problem was finally ironed out at the end of the war , but it was the adoption of Austentic steel in the german engines that allowed the operational hours to increase from 35-150 hours while bench tests went from 100 hours to 500 hours. The Americans discovered this at the end of the war when they were testing the Me-262 and ran out of engines. They had to go back to occupied territory and found plans for the latest engine designs [Jumo-004D/E].
In actual fact the original Jumo 004A engine had 250 hours operational life , but used to much strategic metals that were needed for the Uboat programe so it was cancelled. Otherwise the engine would have been ready for mass production in 1942 , which happens to be when the rest of the jet was ruled ready to mass produce. It was the move to the Jumo-004B two years later that finally allowed the Me-262 to enter mass production…that and the fact that Hitler finally accepted that Germany was loosing the war and all the special weapons programmes that were canceled or put on the back burner in 1940, were pulled out dusted off and reinvigorated as wunderweapons for the war effort.
BTW P-80 was designed as a dogfighter , while Me-262 was designed as an bomber interceptor , total different missions. P-80 would have been no good as a bomber interceptor in 1944 since it would have only had machinegun armament.
German fighter training in 1942 was fine, just insufficent pilots trained per year…about 15-20,000. Allied empire training programme was only able to train 150,000 over the war period or about 25,000 per year…not much better.
However no argument that building a thousand more trainers and better use of experten to take turns training , should have boosted pilot numbers by 50%.
That way when push comes to shove in the mid war they need not cut back flying hours from 250 to 180, just to get enough pilots for increased plane production.
Germany could have switched over to mass production in 1940-41 had Hitler allowed the initiatives in the mid 1930s to go forward as was being done in Britain and Russia at that time. Hitler wanted to rush everything and refused to allow in depth preperations to be made since he didn’t believe in mass production of armaments anyway. As it was Junkers was restructuring its industry to include subcontracting out back in 1935, while the switching from inefficent costly ‘cost plus contracting’ to incentive based fixed price multy year contracts were adopted by the Luftwaffe back in 1937/38.
Hitler only finally allowed such a change for the Wehrmacht at large in the middle of 1941 and it still took two more years to cooerse the companines into compliance. The only reason Speer gets the credit is because he was able to stand up to Hitler and demand all these changes come in line to allow huge production leaps to occure. Hitler was the obstical, and had he not stood in the way all these changes could have been made prewar.
The German navy was gearing prewar to mass produce a huge fleet of warships which finally became known as the Zplan. Even with the premature begining of the war, they still were on track to produce 24 destroyers , 48 Torpedoboot and 132 minesweepers per year plus 100 Uboats when the war began. But Hitler allowed admrial donuts to screw the entire naval building programe to boost Uboat production from about 10 per month up to 25 per month. In the process the steel efficency dropped from 25-30% utilzation for war products down to 15-20% for most of the war. When the Electric boat finally appeared at the end of the war, this efficency reached 60% steel utlization, when finally the ‘subcontracted out’ ‘modular Uboat construction’ based on ‘multi year fixed price’ ‘incentive based’ methods were adopted.
I could go on and on.
Germany had virtually no armaments production until Hitler came to power in 1933, the industry had to be built up in secret and very rapidly with new equipment being designed and tested then crews trained on it for all the services.
No really overt building up and preparation could be done until the Versailles Treaty was renounced in 1937, so Hitler could hardly have been blamed for failing to implement new efficiancys in the mid 30’s when there was no industry to improve. (Yes he started to ignore it in 1933)
As for Hitler being an obstacle hmmmm he was the one who actually started the re-arming of German forces, he encouraged the various design teams to persue strange and weird weapons and ideas in competition with each other. Without all that and with the state of the economy pre war would the jet aircraft designs have got as far as they did when they did.
Hitler for all his faults could whip up a crowd and he did with the German nation, there is a strong arguement that without him WW2 may not even have taken place (always likely that someone else could have done the same though).
So you are saying he was the reason the industry was not capable of getting the ME 262 into combat in huge numbers in 1942 because he did not allow a virtually non existant industry to modernise in the mid 30’s. He of course did not have to renounce a treaty banning Germany from having a force bigger than 100000 troops, no tanks, no planes, no subs, a severely reduced surface fleet and no heavy artilliary. With an economy that was pretty much bankrupt because of war reparations and loan repayments.
Um, there was never any threat of cancellation since there was nothing else to put up against the Luftwaffe jets other than nitrous modded P-51s. Although this was enough in hindsight, there was no way the US wasn’t deploying a jet in numbers if the War stretched into 1946.
It was a terrible pity and waste of one of America’s finest pilots when Bong died. But could have saved himself by turning a switch, IIRC, instead of bailing out. The incident also illustrated why fighter aces do not necessarily make the best test pilots. The German jets also killed their fair share of pilots as it was a new technology, and of course the US was behind. But they were never considered “too risky to develop.” Quite the contrary, they were too risky NOT to develop! And no one who was sane would have questioned that in 1944-46…
The Airforce had to do a hugh song and dance to keep them in production with publicity stunts like flying them to Italy at the end of the war etc.
“Stunt?” It was a combat deployment - much like the Army did with the Pershing tank during the “Task Force Zebra” deployment.
The Fuel dump problem was finally ironed out at the end of the war , but it was the adoption of Austentic steel in the german engines that allowed the operational hours to increase from 35-150 hours while bench tests went from 100 hours to 500 hours. The Americans discovered this at the end of the war when they were testing the Me-262 and ran out of engines. They had to go back to occupied territory and found plans for the latest engine designs [Jumo-004D/E].
So, the US learned how to make jet engines with greater endurance from the Germans whose jet engines also lacked endurance? The US jet engines were actually British Rolls Royces IIRC. And they were the least of the problem of the P-80, which suffered from technical problems relating to its rushed development as the USAAF knew they were behind the curve…
In actual fact the original Jumo 004A engine had 250 hours operational life , but used to much strategic metals that were needed for the Uboat programe so it was cancelled. Otherwise the engine would have been ready for mass production in 1942 , which happens to be when the rest of the jet was ruled ready to mass produce. It was the move to the Jumo-004B two years later that finally allowed the Me-262 to enter mass production…that and the fact that Hitler finally accepted that Germany was loosing the war and all the special weapons programmes that were canceled or put on the back burner in 1940, were pulled out dusted off and reinvigorated as wunderweapons for the war effort.
I don’t know where you are getting your “facts” from, but I’m beginning to think you’re just making up shit and throwing it on the internet. The Jumo engines only achieved 50 hours of service under ideal conditions and production materials (according to Wiki) and furthermore, the first test flights only took place in 1942, and furthermore Wiki (hardly the most reliable resource, I know. But they do generally get their WWII stuff in the ball park) states that the engines suffered problems with “severe vibration” in 1943. So, how possibly could the Luftwaffe have deployed the Me262 in “1942?”
In any case, so you sacrifice U-boats to make jets? Especially since the German piston engined fighters such as the FW190 and upgraded Me109s were still taking down large numbers of the boundless Red Air Force’s aircraft?
BTW P-80 was designed as a dogfighter , while Me-262 was designed as an bomber interceptor , total different missions. P-80 would have been no good as a bomber interceptor in 1944 since it would have only had machinegun armament.
Sorry, but during the age of the piston fighter, there was no difference between interceptors and dogfighters. That distinction (mostly a false choice to begin with) was started in the jet age, and more importantly - the dawn of effective guided air-to-air missiles, of the mid-1950s…
The F-86 Sabre was tasked to potentially intercept Soviet bombers during the Cold War, and they also mounted .50 cal. machine-guns initially…
German fighter training in 1942 was fine, just insufficent pilots trained per year…about 15-20,000. Allied empire training programme was only able to train 150,000 over the war period or about 25,000 per year…not much better.
So, was the program “fine” or “insufficient?” Because everything I’ve ever read states the latter being the more likely. I think the fact that most competent German pilots were dead by the beginning of 1945 also validates this…
However no argument that building a thousand more trainers and better use of experten to take turns training , should have boosted pilot numbers by 50%.
That way when push comes to shove in the mid war they need not cut back flying hours from 250 to 180, just to get enough pilots for increased plane production.
How were they going to build adequate trainers when they didn’t bother producing more fighters to begin with? they didn’t have the ability too…
Germany could have switched over to mass production in 1940-41 had Hitler allowed the initiatives in the mid 1930s to go forward as was being done in Britain and Russia at that time. Hitler wanted to rush everything and refused to allow in depth preperations to be made since he didn’t believe in mass production of armaments anyway. As it was Junkers was restructuring its industry to include subcontracting out back in 1935, while the switching from inefficent costly ‘cost plus contracting’ to incentive based fixed price multy year contracts were adopted by the Luftwaffe back in 1937/38.
They couldn’t have just “switched” over to a War economy, because they were in a severe strategic disposition as the Axis had limited access to raw materials - especially after they invaded the Soviet Union. In fact, both France and Britain were very confident of victory in a long War of attrition, but more dubious of outcomes in a hasty battle…
Hitler only finally allowed such a change for the Wehrmacht at large in the middle of 1941 and it still took two more years to cooerse the companines into compliance. The only reason Speer gets the credit is because he was able to stand up to Hitler and demand all these changes come in line to allow huge production leaps to occure. Hitler was the obstical, and had he not stood in the way all these changes could have been made prewar.
The German navy was gearing prewar to mass produce a huge fleet of warships which finally became known as the Zplan. Even with the premature begining of the war, they still were on track to produce 24 destroyers , 48 Torpedoboot and 132 minesweepers per year plus 100 Uboats when the war began. But Hitler allowed admrial donuts to screw the entire naval building programe to boost Uboat production from about 10 per month up to 25 per month. In the process the steel efficency dropped from 25-30% utilzation for war products down to 15-20% for most of the war. When the Electric boat finally appeared at the end of the war, this efficency reached 60% steel utlization, when finally the ‘subcontracted out’ ‘modular Uboat construction’ based on ‘multi year fixed price’ ‘incentive based’ methods were adopted.
I could go on and on.
Some key points have been addressed by the previous post of leccy’s. But in any case, much of this is hindsight. Could Hitler have pushed a wartime economy sooner? Yes. But this had little to do with production of aircraft and Hitler was far from the only one that was culpable as the entire Wehrmacht believed they were going to win with what they already had, or maybe just a little more of it…
Allies had no nerve gas until well after the war and Hitler had no problems using them . Their were something like a dozen times the issue came up in planning, just their never seemed enough around at the moment or enough of an advantage for Hitler to considered using gas warfare.
Prewar all combatants expected any future war to begin with massive air bombarment with posion gas and bombs. Each side anticipated massive losses [in the millions] even though the massive useage of gas warfare in WW-I didn’t produce such disasters even orders of magnitued lower. Statistically they produced about one death and one casultie per ton of mustard type posion used.
Even in the early war period the gas programme was continued because if worse came they had something to relaliate with, and even back in 1940 it was considered that Rockets would be the best way to deliver nerve gas to London as a last resort.
With regards to Nukes, these were quite small and they only had a handful at that time. Further the average german town was old stone construction , so the destruction due to ground burst small nukes, would not resemble the scale of the Japanese cities. You’d have to fire many nukes to ‘vaporise’ Berlin.
BTW mustard type gasses are extremely suseptable to weather and wind conditions and dissipate quickly under these conditions, so they would not drown whole cities. Maybe small towns at a time. The allies were over confident in gas warfare, that none of the British troops brought gas masks to Normandy.
Maybe thats the western history POV , but wrong on all counts from the German POV, I’m afraid. The war reparations problem had already been dealt before Hitler came into power and the loan repayment was dealt with under the credit system & Wealfare state, that previous administrations had already set up before Hitler even came to power. Thats what allowed Germany to rebound so quickly from the Great Depression, not anything Hitler did.
German illegal reamament had begun in the 1920s and continued well into the 1930s. They had about 1 million mustard gas shells built and stockpiled by mid 1920s. The strategic plan to violate the Treaty of Versailles by what ever means begun in 1928 under the Stressman administration. The then defense minister [Groener] showed the chiefs of the General staff how they could not even protect Germany from a possible Polish attack, let alone a combined French Polish attack. All their senarios envisaged the west saving Germany through the League of Nations.
More importantly Groener stressed that …
[A] any rebuilding of the military had to assume that any war would lead to a wider European war, so capability had to address this with reasonable chance of success, and
[b] Germany must be prepared to launch a preemptive war if the situation demanded it.
By the early 1930s he had expanded the military to 150,000 personnel and built up the army to 21 active/reserve divisions created a plan for 400 bomber force with multi engined bombers plus a naval airforce and a tank force and directed the Reichmarine to expand the navy well beyond the ToV levels including develope and build a Uboat fleet.
A three phase strategic programme was adopted that would eventually over 15 years lead to a mechanised German armed forces with a large navy and supported by an aviaition branch to launch a preemptive war that would eliminate Poland and France as threats and ‘still have a reasonable chance of winning the wider European war’.
Faced with the continuation of this programme under the Hitler regime, defense minister Von Blomberg demanded the powers to erect an mass production war economy in 1934 to be established with 5-6 years. Blomberg envisaged a CinC position from where he would orchestrate such a massive build up. Von Blomberg envisaged all manner of weapons ,he refered to as ‘technical possiblities’. These included jets, helicopters, rockets and guided missiles etc etc, all the elements of the wunderweapon wet dreams. While Hitler publical agreeed to this , he refused to allow any one person to have too much power. So instead he had each service branch secretly come to him independantly of each other, leaving the inexperienced Hitler to make ill informed decisions with catastrophic consquenses.
The strategic plan envisage an progressive instep programme to rebuild the armed forces, the armaments industry and the secured resource base to manifest this mechanized juggernaut.It was Hitlers regime that hyjacked the strategy in 1936 after his economics minister told him that the completion of the build up would likely take until 1945.
Hitler rejected the notion of a sustained total war as being unnessessary. He viewed the bulk of the European powers as weak and unable to work together. Between his political manuevering and treaties plus an enlarged german infantry army, would be all he needed to impliment his racial war against the Jews and the commies. Hitler would cut deals with Stalin and Britian to allow his war to begin, and fumble from that point on.WW-II would have happened with or without Hitler , it just would not have resembled the fiasco that Hitler dragged Germany into. All the Wunder weapons were scrubbed in early 1940 when the reality of the economic situation finally hit home to Hitler. After Stalin Grad , they would all be reborn to save Hitler from the hurricane he had unleashed.
The P-51 may be effectively used against Me-262 ONLY during landing or taking off.That’s why germans had to use the FW cover near the airfields.
On the air it was almost useless.
Yes the bombers were too many, but even in jen-feb of 1945 Allies losed 10-15% during bombers raids.
As for Korea, a huge complaint of the USAF crews were that they were flying second rate B-29s and B-26s left over from WWII against second-generation jets (MIG-15s).
Second generation Mig OWNed even less firepower than Me-262. Two 20-mm and slow single 37-mm gun.
Plus germans to the end of war have develpoed their non-controlled missles for the attack of bombers.
And what could they possibly have missed in North Korea?
There were a lot of Strategic targets on Korea.Bridges, airfields and ets.
Um, the nukes weren’t “ground burst.” And you seriously think that a near total collapse of command and control of the Wehrmacht/SS wouldn’t have resulted?
Who would have been around to order the use of chemical weapons. And who cares if its nerve gas or chlorine gas?
That’s not true. Many Me262s were shot down in air-to-air combat and the tactics were formulated to deal with the jets superior speed such as gaining air speed by diving, using nitrous oxide to achieve speed bursts, and using their superior maneuvering to avoid the Swallows…
I think you’ll find a better than 1:1 kill ratio in favor of the P-51s actually…
Second generation Mig OWNed even less firepower than Me-262. Two 20-mm and slow single 37-mm gun.
Plus germans to the end of war have develpoed their non-controlled missles for the attack of bombers.
The air-to-air missiles weren’t even close to ready nor were their SAMs. Fighters only need so much fire power to bring down aircraft…
There were a lot of Strategic targets on Korea.Bridges, airfields and ets.
There were a few, but the key airbases were in China and were not hit.
Of course the Reichswehr had already pondered rearmament as early as 1919. But the scale greatly increased under the Nazis as they openly flouted the Versaille Treaty and eventually disregarded even the most basic subterfuge…
Especially in the case of the Luftwaffe, which is the focus of discussion here…
You are grossly overestimating the effectiveness of a handful of small nukes.
There was no protection against nerve gas, but basic gas masks and decontamination protected against Mustard gas attacks. Anyway we are speaking about retaliation attacks and they would have done them. Hitler was willing to fight to the last German.
guided missile technology was mature enough to use ASM in battle in 1943/44 period. A Basic SAM and AAM were partnered with the Hs-293/Fritz X and would have been ready by 1944, had Hitler not had the lot of them scrapped and the effort wasted in 1940. The missiles were to be wireguided or radio guided, much like the Hs-293A and Hs-293B. But that required two seater planes/jets and they were conceived as missiles to protect bombers from enemy fighters.
All of which was initiated in regimes previous to Hitler and would have gone on with or with out Hitler as would the economic recovery and the expansion of the Wehrmacht, especially if the French/Brits/Russians and /or Poles reamed faster. The pre Hitler strategy enviaged an army of ~ 80 divisions with some additional reserves , just like WW-I. But they also planned a strategy around 12 months of continous interlaced campaigns with sufficent stock pile of enough armaments and raw resources to reach total war production within a year of the start of any such war.
I think you’re grossly underestimating their effectiveness and being intentionally glib. Just as you are overestimating the German wonder tech that is so often exaggerated on these forums by “what-if” fanbois that tend to ignore other what-ifs. Such as what if the United States had actually funded some of the excellent jet designs it had around in the late 1930s and early 40s? Et cetera…
But, okay. What would that small number have been with the War dragging on into 1947? And how possibly could you know what the reaction of Germans would have been? The Japanese were far more willing to throw themselves onto their collective samurai sword and they still surrendered after two strikes, this without actually attacking their gov’t or command structure. There’s little doubt the Allies would have incinerated Hitler and much of the Nazi high command if they were able too and by 1945 that might well have led to a collapse or a more successful coup by the Wehrmacht at the very least if not a complete collapse at the front.
There was no protection against nerve gas, but basic gas masks and decontamination protected against Mustard gas attacks. Anyway we are speaking about retaliation attacks and they would have done them. Hitler was willing to fight to the last German.
There was limited protection offered as Allied intelligence pretty much knew everything the Germans were up too by the end. There’s also the little factor that the Germans would have had a hard time delivering significant quantities to do real damage. Assuming of course they could get much of the stuff to the front to begin with. Also, even the Allies using phosegene would have killed the fantastic German transport system of horses, oxes, and carts. So, while we’re discussing the wonder weapons of the German military, they were still using medieval-era logistics!
guided missile technology was mature enough to use ASM in battle in 1943/44 period. A Basic SAM and AAM were partnered with the Hs-293/Fritz X and would have been ready by 1944, had Hitler not had the lot of them scrapped and the effort wasted in 1940. The missiles were to be wireguided or radio guided, much like the Hs-293A and Hs-293B. But that required two seater planes/jets and they were conceived as missiles to protect bombers from enemy fighters.
Firing at ships and aircraft are two completely different technical feats and even there, the USN largely marginalized their ASMs during the Italian campaign by jamming them. And how exactly would any of this stopped the Soviet Red Army’s march Westward or the invasion of Normandy? And why do you seem to desperate to tell us how the Germans could of won WWII?
The previous regimes of the Weimar Republic did initiate the Luftwaffe. Hitler did! They might have trained pilots and all that, and I do believe at least a limited German rearmament was inevitable as I think even the Western Allies didn’t want a defenseless Germany on their East with the rise of Soviet military power.
But their military spending would have been nowhere near the level it attained under the National Socialists, if say, the Christian Democrats were running things…
Don’t know what to do about this guy, but he seems rude? He seems to speak of the end war, mid war and prewar situations as if they were interchangeable, they were not.
OK here goes…
The YP-80 was only brought up to correct the misconception that it was better than the Me-262 , it was not , it was the same. Yes the USA would have rushed it into battle [unless they are fools] , but its history would have echoed the problems with the poor performance of the historical Me-262 and many what ifs they had corrected the YP-80 problems etc etc J .
Americans may have not made the distinction between interceptors and fighters, but the Germans did. The Me-109 was designed from the start as a bomber interceptor as was the Me-262. In fact their was even a rocket/jet hybrid programme that was referred to as “Interceptor I II & III”.
The Jumo 004A began development prewar with the original jet contracts. When it was developed it was able to operate for well over 250 hours. However since it used valuable strategic metals [chrome and Nickel and others vanadium and Molybdenum etc]. These were vital to the U-Boat programme pressure hulls , so their was never any question of using this engine, since the Uboat programme was deemed more valuable. Instead they planned for the jet to be build with the Jumo 004B which was developed with a simplified metal that used 1/3 as much strategic metal like Chrome.
When the Jumo-004B exhibited 100 hours bench test it was judged to be ready for the test programme. However the tests revealed that the metal turbine blades were not up to withstand sudden temp swings inside the engine. The blades suffered from vibration and metal fatigue leading to catastrophic failures. But even at that point it was still thought to be able to last 35 hours, which was the design target. The turbine blades were made hollow with airflow directed through them to allow cooling and mild steel to be used in the engines construction.
But in the context of the poor pilot situation of 1944/45, the average engine actually lasted only 10-25 hours.
The original poster asked what would happen if these jet forces were ready in 1942 , but instead of answering , some asked how this could happen. So to complete the jet engine by 1942, you need to alter the start war situation. When the war began , the German navies strategic plan envisaged expansion of steel quota to 1.4 million tons per year to build 24 destroyers 48 torpedo boots and 132 minesweepers , plus 105 Uboats per year production, after the boats already on the slips were finished.
Donitz petitioned Hitler to change this and allow his Uboat lobby to push for huge U-boat fleet by boosting production to 25-30 Uboats per month production , based on his calculation of 10% per month operational losses. But to do so would require at least additional ½ million tons of steel per year [for 2-3 years] over and above the 1.4-1.5 million tons planned. This was needed just to retool the ship yards/companies to produce Uboats instead of the above mentioned warships plus the associated Uboat engines and armaments , to be built in the sufficient quantities.
Donitz had badly overestimated the number of U-Boat needed and in forcing through these changes not only over taxed the Wehrmacht industry for steel resources, but at the same time crippled the Surface fleet. Most of the surface warship projects had to be canceled no matter how much they were needed or how near to completion they were. Demands for increased tank production and plane production also had to be curtailed to allow the navy to ‘switch horses mid stride’.
The prewar naval strategy envisaged a Baltic battle fleet with up to 1/2 dozen Panzerschiff/battleships plus an aircraft carrier and a dozen cruisers plus 44 destroyers and 20-30 Uboats. When Hitler took power he wanted this plan scrapped and only a coastal defense fleet built, since he believe such a fleet was not needed since he wanted to convince/bully the British into neutrality, so he could get on with the killing in Europe. Admiral Raeder in an effort to save what he could of the surface fleet, argued that a German surface fleet should at least be built to counter the French fleet. So the surface fleet continued but its development was perverted by attempts to ‘one up’ French capital ship, destroyer and escort designs.
Admiral Heyes argued that any surface fleet should be a commerce raiding fleet working in conjunction with Uboat fleet to disrupt the shipping lanes [French]. He envisaged a dozen surface raiders but admitted that this plan could fall apart within 6 months to a year of war. Admiral Donitz argued that only a fleet of up to 300 Uboats would help Germany conduct a serious commerce raiding strategy. Finally Admiral Carls proposed the most radical solution of all, sea control groups with carriers ; battle cruisers , cruisers and flotillas of destroyers to work in conjunction with flotillas of Uboats to control the European waters.
The existing naval industrial capacity was not able to build just one of these fleets prewar, let alone convert the shipping industry and also build the original fleet. . When war began the whole coastal defense mission became the most crucial to the KM , but with little or no capacity left over ,they had to rely on hugh fleet of civilian/captured vessels to patrol and sweep the European waters for mines pretty much throughout the war.
There were far to few resources and time chasing too programmes, to complete them all , but they all were embraced because Hitler assured the navy they would not go to war with the RN/USN until the mid 1940s so they still had time to build them all. Again Hitler could not decide and couldn’t make up his mind. It seemed that after each meeting a new plan would be adopted at the expense of the previous. So when war came choosing any one over the other was bound to wreck the whole effort.
This in turn did nothing to address training armament production or fuel production and basing etc etc, which would have to be different for each different variant of the fleet being planned. It seemed that just when the Z plan was finally adopted, the war began and all that effort was thrown out the window.
To build Donitz plan of 300 boats they would need another 100 boats for training and down for repairs ,while the 10% loss per month would take until 1943 to reach 300 operational boats. Most strategist believed if the war was not won by 1942/43 they would loose. The Donitz plan would cost to much to achieve a fleet that would not be ready until the war was over.
Yet just a couple of months after the war began the navy presented a compromise solution where all there surface ships would be built plus over 200 U-Boats per year, but Hitler vetoed this. At that time Donitz asked to be put in charge of Uboat development and work with Walters to develop the Peroxide boats [Electric boats] , but Donitz was instead put in charge of prosecuting his 300 Uboat war. Initially Donitz fleet did well racking up 18:1 kill ratios average , but the longer the war continued the more the allies recovered their ASW effort mainly through rapid and vast increase in air patrols to cover the Convoy routes.
By the time Donitz got his 300 U-Boats in mid war, the allies had reduced the kill ratios to ~ 4:1. Donitz didn’t help matters by forcing his Uboats stand their ground to fight the allied airpower, which only worsened the situation so the kill ratios dropped to about 1:2 against. Finally Admiral Donitz withdrew his fleet from the Atlantic and conceded the ocean to the allies. This in turn allowed the allies the time and cargo capacity to deploy forces and munitions to prosecute the strategic air war and follow up with the second front invasion and subsequent drive across Europe in n1943-45 time period.
Had Donitz vacated his post to focus on developing U-Boats with Walters when the war began, they could have solved the allied airpower advantage just by applying the lessons Walters learnt from his prewar fish boats designs, directly to the existing inventory of Type VII & IX U-boat fleet. The underwater speed of these boats was limited to about 7 knots because the conning tower bristled with armaments , hand rails and deck guns and produced ¾ of the boats underwater resistance.
By converting this conning tower to the smooth streamline bridge plus an integral Schnorkel with no armaments or railings, the overall boats resistance would be reduced to ½ and thus the power doubled. That would allow these modified Type VII & IX Uboats to get underwater speeds up to about 10 knots. By upgrading the generators at the expense of the surface diesels, this underwater speed could top out at over 11knots. The Type XXIII was the first electric boat to be fielded and did very well with a top underwater speed of 12.5knots.
With the Schnorkel to move via diesel and recharge batteries, this would have allowed these boats to operate mostly under water. Increasing silent operating endurance could have been achieved by replacing ½ the fuel bunkers and the reserve torpedos with more battery rooms. The Uboats would have been forced to operate in European waters , but would have done so with near impunity from the air , while the effectiveness against Escort ASDIC attacks would been reduced by to between ½ & ¼ . Overall the kill ratios against allied Merchant vessels would have plateau at about 8:1 until the Type XXI Electric boats arrive, boosting the kill ratio back up to about 18:1 in the U-Boat favor.
Basing on the Navies 211 Uboat production per year would have freed up enough naval steel/copper to complete the planed capital ship , plus build the escort fleet ship and also free up enough strategic metals to allow ~ 3800 aero engines to be produced as Jumo-004A engines through the 1942-1944 time period.
Because:
a.) you’re turning a threat about a specific subject into a speculative “what if” thread
b.) you are posting alternate “facts” without citing any sources (something called plagiarism) and making absolutely no attempt to verify or prove what you say is in anyway true. You also seem to intentionally post wrong information to support your arguments (i.e. exaggerating the effectiveness of German jet engines and their endurance)
c.) I’ve found many of your assertions easily disproved, half truths posted out of context, or selective in order to “win an argument on the internet” rather than reach some sort of historical truth - with is sort of the antithesis of this site…
And I would say that you are the inconsiderate one throwing out speculations as facts and alternately only selectively addressing arguments to the contrary while ignoring what you cannot answer…
OK here goes…
The YP-80 was only brought up to correct the misconception that it was better than the Me-262 , it was not , it was the same. Yes the USA would have rushed it into battle [unless they are fools] , but its history would have echoed the problems with the poor performance of the historical Me-262 and many what ifs they had corrected the YP-80 problems etc etc J .
You’re point? I never said anything else than what you just posted other than the P-80 was believed to have been superior as a close range dogfighter as it was more maneuverable. I’ve also clearly stated that it wasn’t quite ready by the end of the War. But since we were talking about hypothetical alternate realities, the P-80 WOULD have been ready had the War continued into late 1945 and 1946 as many of its problems were soon overcome. You haven’t cleared up any misconception since you again posted nothing in support of your argument other than your own beliefs masked as facts…
Americans may have not made the distinction between interceptors and fighters, but the Germans did. The Me-109 was designed from the start as a bomber interceptor as was the Me-262. In fact their was even a rocket/jet hybrid programme that was referred to as “Interceptor I II & III”.
LOL The Me109 was designed as what? It was an air superiority fighter. The Me262 was designed as a fighter and then Hitler wanted to employ it as a bomber foolishly. It was finally deployed as a bomber interceptor as a desperate attempt to stem Allied bombing - at which it generally failed…
The Jumo 004A began development prewar with the original jet contracts. When it was developed it was able to operate for well over 250 hours. However since it used valuable strategic metals [chrome and Nickel and others vanadium and Molybdenum etc]. These were vital to the U-Boat programme pressure hulls , so their was never any question of using this engine, since the Uboat programme was deemed more valuable. Instead they planned for the jet to be build with the Jumo 004B which was developed with a simplified metal that used 1/3 as much strategic metal like Chrome.
What are your sources for this? I looked on Wiki, which isn’t a great source I admit, but I think it stated the longest effective endurance was like 50 hours, and was much less in actual practice…
When the Jumo-004B exhibited 100 hours bench test it was judged to be ready for the test programme. However the tests revealed that the metal turbine blades were not up to withstand sudden temp swings inside the engine. The blades suffered from vibration and metal fatigue leading to catastrophic failures. But even at that point it was still thought to be able to last 35 hours, which was the design target. The turbine blades were made hollow with airflow directed through them to allow cooling and mild steel to be used in the engines construction.
But in the context of the poor pilot situation of 1944/45, the average engine actually lasted only 10-25 hours.
Okay, so I am correct. 
The original poster asked what would happen if these jet forces were ready in 1942 , but instead of answering , some asked how this could happen. So to complete the jet engine by 1942, you need to alter the start war situation. When the war began , the German navies strategic plan envisaged expansion of steel quota to 1.4 million tons per year to build 24 destroyers 48 torpedo boots and 132 minesweepers , plus 105 Uboats per year production, after the boats already on the slips were finished.
How could an aircraft be ready when it was barely test flown? The question is a foolish one that ignores thousands of other potential alternative historical outcomes. Such as the ones I already posted. Germany was not the only nation interested in jets pre-war. They just tended to fund the programs more, but obviously not enough to be effective…
Donitz petitioned Hitler to change this and allow his Uboat lobby to push for huge U-boat fleet by boosting production to 25-30 Uboats per month production , based on his calculation of 10% per month operational losses. But to do so would require at least additional ½ million tons of steel per year [for 2-3 years] over and above the 1.4-1.5 million tons planned. This was needed just to retool the ship yards/companies to produce Uboats instead of the above mentioned warships plus the associated Uboat engines and armaments , to be built in the sufficient quantities.
Donitz had badly overestimated the number of U-Boat needed…
There were far to few resources and time chasing too programmes…
Of course! This is why thinking the Germans could somehow put together almost 2000 jet fighters in early 1942 is a bit silly…
What else would Donitz want? How was Germany going at all to win a war without any effective naval arm?
This in turn did nothing to address training armament production or fuel production and basing etc etc, which would have to be different for each different variant of the fleet being planned. It seemed that just when the Z plan was finally adopted, the war began and all that effort was thrown out the window.
To build Donitz plan of 300 boats they would need another 100 boats for training and down for repairs ,while the 10% loss per month would take until 1943 to reach 300 operational boats. Most strategist believed if the war was not won by 1942/43 they would loose. The Donitz plan would cost to much to achieve a fleet that would not be ready until the war was over.
…
Basing on the Navies 211 Uboat production per year would have freed up enough naval steel/copper to complete the planed capital ship , plus build the escort fleet ship and also free up enough strategic metals to allow ~ 3800 aero engines to be produced as Jumo-004A engines through the 1942-1944 time period.
So, it’s all Donitz’s fault they lost WWII? 
Again, you’re just presenting your hypothesis as fact…
[A] The thread WAS a speculative What if…if you recall the poster asked what would have happened if the Germans had Me-262 in 1942. I provide a context to explain how such a thing could occure. I already explained all this!
No one has yet been able to answer this question yet, from the vantage point of 1942/43 WW-II. Applying the 1944/45 context to the 1942/43 situation is obviously flawed, which is why I ignore those posts.
[b] Plagiarism means using some one else’s ‘exact words’ with out citation. I have used others sources of information and ideas which is fine and they are from translated German sources. Since you have not presented any sources for your so-called facts, there is no need for me to the same , it is the MO of this forum, perhaps? You are a westerner and see things through that POV & sources. I am independent so I see things though the eyes of the sources I read, which for the German war situation mostly appear to be translated German works.
[C] This makes no sense since I’m not arguing with you or anyone else, just posting what I understand the German position to be.
[D] Since this ‘what if’ stems from a 1942 ATL, what the YP-80 may or may not be able to do in 1945/46 is not that relevant, but as I already said it should be in use in late 1945 ,just with a poor record, which should intern cloud its ATL history.
[E] Me-109 was conceived as a bomber interceptor after 1934 war gammes showed the LW all bomber force would not be sufficient to deter any enemy attack. Pior to this they had no programme for a fighter sized plane. Read translated German histories to understand this.
[F] Donitz was not in charge of the KM but Raeder was, Admiral Raeder wanted a balanced navy not a uboat only fleet. However Donitz had Hitler’s ear since he was good nazi, not a good naval leader, so he got his own way, and Raeders job in 1942.
[G]
Your Wilki sources…
http://fixedreference.org/en/20040424/wikipedia/Junkers_Jumo_004
“Since the unit Jumo 004A-0 (all marked Jumo 109-004A-015) was still only an experimental form of the use of sophisticated technology and exotic materials (alloys of cobalt, nickel, molybdenum in the hot part) and for mass production of the nehodila, designers came to maximum simplification that RĽM account of the life of 10-25 hours of flight (the other hand, the original prototype Jumo 004A had life very solid - 200 to 250 hours of operation).”
Hummm it also says they produced over 14,000 Jumo 004B. I will have to revise and update my figures 
[H] The jet was pronounced ready by 1942 , it was just awaiting the jet engine to complete its development. This development was based on the Jumo-004B since it had already been decided that the A model was base on strategic metals diverted for Donitz Uboat fleet arm. ALter that redirection and the strategic metals become available for other armaments like the Jet engine programme. You should not trust Wikli unless you can second source the information.
[i]there is enough blame to go around. Admiral Raeder gets some of the blame for being so ‘a political’ , but Hitler is mostly to blame, but I already noted this before :rolleyes:
Here are some translated sources for you to read…
“The German Military in the Age of Total War” Deist.
" The U-Boat" ,Rossler.
“Germany and the Second Work war” Vol 1 & 2
" The Wehrmacht and German rearmament", Diest.
“The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II” [french]
BTW “American Raiders”, Samuel. shows different view of German technology and comparison test fly by American pilots etc. Most thought the YP-80 was at best compariable to the Me-262.
I set out to correct some of the many miss information and present an possible alternative history time line from which the Germans could have had Me-262 early in the war. I have done this. Others can debate all they like since their opinion is just merely a reflection of their history and cultural bias. Good bye, my work here is done :-).
Whatever your view on whether the ME262 could have been gotten into service 2 years earlier still does not change the fact that to produce it meant diverting resources.
The Germans divert resources from U-Boats then the allies dont need to spend as many resources countering them. The allies can then also divert resources to other projects.
Then it starts getting into the ‘well the Germans could have done this’ and ignore what all of the allies may have done at the same time
No matter what Germany also had a limited manpower and relied very heavily on slave/POW/Guest workers to supply their forces with all the equipment required to fight a war.
The main reasons Germany lost the war and would no matter what they did was the usual.
They fought the wrong war at the wrong time with the wrong leaders.
It was almost inevitable that another European war would come about it just depended on who where and when.
I was commenting that the Me262 had only flown in March of 1942. And your non-“Western Biased” (of which, Germany is considered part of the West I might add) seems to encompass a bizarre mixture of hindsight and the typical, German WWII fanboism that seems to worship German “wonder weapons” whose effectiveness is largely exaggerated around the web.
[b] Plagiarism means using some one else’s ‘exact words’ with out citation.
No, actually that’s not the definition. The definition is actually using someone else’s thoughts and ideas without proper accreditation and, in some cases, without their permission.
In any case, you seem to post “facts” without using any sort of citations whatsoever. I still have yet to see German Jumo jet engines being capable of anything even close to reaching 250 hours. Even if they had the alloys needed. Incidentally, I also more often than not list specific sources when I make specific claims. An example of this would be when I admitted that I used Wiki to determine that the first jet powered flight of the Me262 took place sometime in the spring or summer of 1942, the very year you seem to believe the Luftwaffe “could have” fielded large numbers of the jet for a bomber threat they did not foresee two years prior - as they were winning the War and expected to make quick-work of the USSR by the end of 1941 or early 1942…
I have used others sources of information and ideas which is fine and they are from translated German sources. Since you have not presented any sources for your so-called facts, there is no need for me to the same , it is the MO of this forum, perhaps? You are a westerner and see things through that POV & sources. I am independent so I see things though the eyes of the sources I read, which for the German war situation mostly appear to be translated German works.
I think you’re selectively reading what you want to read then in accordance with a pre-existing bias…
[C] This makes no sense since I’m not arguing with you or anyone else, just posting what I understand the German position to be.
I don’t know who would be qualified to “speak” for the “German position” as I doubt there is a single one, which is one of the reasons I am arguing with you, just like you are with me. It is because you present concrete notions of what would have been when you have no idea what the real situation was and project a mixture of a good deal of “hindsight” as well as selective conjecture into your “what-if” scenarios…
[D] Since this ‘what if’ stems from a 1942 ATL, what the YP-80 may or may not be able to do in 1945/46 is not that relevant, but as I already said it should be in use in late 1945 ,just with a poor record, which should intern cloud its ATL history.
It didn’t have a “poor record.” It was successfully deployed and its record was no more “poor” than that of the German jet program which also killed its fair share of German test pilots. The F-80 worked ultimately. It had problems early on because the USAAF realized that they were behind the Luftwaffe in jet development so they had to rush the program through development faster than was safely possible. It took the Germans something on the order of three or four years to develop the Me262 whereas the P-80 was deployed less than 18 months after its initial flight…
[E] Me-109 was conceived as a bomber interceptor after 1934 war gammes…
Right! And an air superiority fighter too! The Luftwaffe barely existed in 1934 and didn’t have any bombers to deter anyone with as they were previously forbidden to have any aircraft. you might recall this in all of your extensive readings of German sources. But I think you are failing miserably with semantics here. Of course the Me109 was to intercept bombers. It was also designed to sweep enemy fighters from the sky. I would argue that Germany faced only a limited bomber threat in 1934 as the French Armée de l’Air never placed an emphasis on strategic air power and RAF bomber command was but a shadow of what it would become.
The Me109 was designed as a fighter because everyone else had one, and it was designed as a multirole platform. Otherwise why have made it so maneuverable?
[F] Donitz was not in charge of the KM but Raeder was, Admiral Raeder wanted a balanced navy not a uboat only fleet…
Please indicate where Adm. Raider and Donitz clashed over the U-boat program. And how would the German surface Kriegsmarine have been any less a drain on War resources than the U-boats were? The U-boats were designed for the very purpose of being a cheaper, effective alternative to larger surface fleets of which the Germans could never hope to match…
[G]
Your Wilki sources…
http://fixedreference.org/en/20040424/wikipedia/Junkers_Jumo_004
“Since the unit Jumo 004A-0 (all marked Jumo 109-004A-015) was still only an experimental form of the use of sophisticated technology and exotic materials (alloys of cobalt, nickel, molybdenum in the hot part) and for mass production of the nehodila, designers came to maximum simplification that RĽM account of the life of 10-25 hours of flight (the other hand, the original prototype Jumo 004A had life very solid - 200 to 250 hours of operation).”
Hummm it also says they produced over 14,000 Jumo 004B. I will have to revise and update my figures
The 250-hour prototype could never have been mass produced with its alloys and was simplified so they could reach the production run and there is a huge difference between an experimental prototype and a deployable weapon. Especially since the Swallows would have to be thought of as expendable, which is why they produced simplified engines that might need to be produced by unskilled, even reluctant, slave labor in some cases…
[H] The jet was pronounced ready by 1942 , it was just awaiting the jet engine to complete its development. This development was based on the Jumo-004B since it had already been decided that the A model was base on strategic metals diverted for Donitz Uboat fleet arm. ALter that redirection and the strategic metals become available for other armaments like the Jet engine programme. You should not trust Wikli unless you can second source the information.
Ready for what? Testing? It was only flown in March or July of that year (depending on the source).
And why shouldn’t I trust Wiki when you apparently do? And I don’t. You presented a Wiki link which said nothing regarding the strategic metals other than they would make jet engine manufacturing too complex (my inference as the translation from Czech was a bit awkward).
Secondly, what was Germany to defend the sea lanes and cut off Allied shipping with if they didn’t have U-boats? Their battleships or massive aircraft carriers? Subs are actually one of the most effective weapons in terms of cost and benefits…
[i]there is enough blame to go around. Admiral Raeder gets some of the blame for being so ‘a political’ , but Hitler is mostly to blame, but I already noted this before :rolleyes:
Heavy speculative hindsight…
So, let me get this straight: your contention is that if Germany had completely ignored its navy in WWII, they would have been able to deploy a sophisticated, new technology in a jet aircraft that had only first flown in the year you say they could have deployed them…
Here are some translated sources for you to read…
“The German Military in the Age of Total War” Deist.
" The U-Boat" ,Rossler.
“Germany and the Second Work war” Vol 1 & 2
" The Wehrmacht and German rearmament", Diest.
“The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II” [french]
Which ones concur with your beliefs and where to they state that it was any more plausible for the Germans to have deployed large numbers of jet fighters in 1942?
Because I’m pretty sure that I’ve read (long ago) a scenario where the Royal Air Force begins substantive funding of Whittle’s engine and the RAF has a working jet fighter by 1939…
Or that the US begins cooperation sooner with the British using variants of their engines prior to American involvement in WWII to produce some interesting designs that were far above anything the Germans might have had.
But of course, this is all speculation…
BTW “American Raiders” Samuel shows…the YP-80 was at best compariable to the Me-262.
Well, if it were comparable, than that would have obviously been enough since the Luftwaffe pilots were ill-trained by 1944 and the best ones were mostly dead…
Here’s a related thread:
http://ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3652&highlight=jets
I set out to correct some of the many miss information and present an possible…
But this isn’t an “alternative time line” thread nor forum…
There is no practical way the Luftwaffe deployed jets any faster than they did. Just as there was no real chance of British and US air arms, beset by underfunding and an economic depression, where going to have jets in the late 1930s. There was a reason events unfolded as they did.