PzKpfw V Panther....the best tank in WW2 ?

World War II German Military
#421

name, losses, kills, ratio

Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 120 450 3.75
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 107 1,400 13.08
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 252 1,700 6.75
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 109 250 2.29
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505 126 900 7.14
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506 179 400 2.23
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507 104 600 5.77
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508 78 100 1.28
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 509 120 500 4.17
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 510 65 200 3.08
13./Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland 6 100 16.67
III./Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland 98 500 5.10
13./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 42 400 9.52
8./SS-Panzer-Regiment 2 31 250 8.06
9./SS-Panzer-Regiment 3 56 500 8.93
Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 (501) 107 500 4.67
Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 (502) 76 600 7.89
Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 103 (503) 39 500 12.82

TOTAL: 1,715 9,850 5.74

#422

These numbers are total at the end of war, and therefor taking allied air superiority into account.
Kill ratios had a downfall from mid 1944 on, still reaching 5.74 average.

#423

Taken from wikipedia, but from a distance, I don’t think it is really worth to be proven untrue …

One source has cited the cost of a Panther tank as 117,100 Reichmarks (RM). This compared with 82,500 RM for the StuG III, 96,163 RM for the Panzer III, 103,462 RM for the Panzer IV, and 250,800 RM for the Tiger I. These figures did not include the cost of the armament and radio

The Panther tank was seen as a necessary component of the upcoming Operation Zitadelle, and the attack was delayed several times because of their mechanical problems, with the eventual start date of the battle only six days after the last Panthers had been delivered to the front…

…However, it comprised less than seven percent of the estimated 2,400–2,700 total AFVs deployed by the Germans in this battle,[74] and its effectiveness was limited by its mechanical problems and the in-depth layered defense system of the Soviets at Kursk. Its greatest historical role in the battle may have been a highly negative one—its contribution to the decisions to delay the original start of Operation Zitadelle for a total of two months, time which the Soviets used to build up an enormous concentration of minefields, anti-tank guns, trenches and artillery defenses…

Against the M4 Shermans of the Allied tank forces during this time, the Panther tank proved to be most effective when fighting in open country and shooting at long range—its combination of superior armor and firepower allowed it to engage at distances from which the Shermans could not respond.[81] However, the Panther struggled in the bocage country of Normandy, and was vulnerable to side and close-in attacks in the built-up areas of cities and small towns.[82] The commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, reported the weaknesses of the Panther tank in the fighting in Normandy:

While the PzKpfw IV could still be used to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman because of its maneuverability and height was good ... [the Panther was] poorly suited for hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneuverability in village and forest fighting. It is very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears out the front final drives, made of low-grade steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-bombers. Fuel lines of porous material that allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank interior causing a grave fire hazard. Absence of vision slits makes defense against close attack impossible.[82]

Through September and October, a series of new Panzerbrigades equipped with Panther tanks were sent into France to try to stop the Allied advance with counterattacks.[83] This culminated in the Battle of Arracourt (September 18–29, 1944), in which the mostly Panther-equipped German forces suffered heavy losses fighting against the 4th Armored Division of Patton’s 3rd Army, which were still primarily equipped with 75 mm M4 Sherman tanks and yet came away from the battle with only a few losses. The Panther units were newly formed, poorly trained, and tactically disorganized; most units ended up stumbling into ambush situations against seasoned U.S. tank crews.

A status report on December 15, 1944 listed an all time high of 471 Panthers assigned to the Western Front, with 336 operational (71 percent). This was one day before the start of the Battle of the Bulge; 400 of the tanks assigned to the Western Front were in units sent into the offensive.[85]

The Panther once again demonstrated its prowess in open country, where it could shoot its victims at long range with near-impunity, and its vulnerability in the close-in fighting of the small towns of the Ardennes, where there were heavy losses.[86] A status report on January 15, 1945 showed only 97 operational Panthers left in the units involved in the operation, out of 282 still in their possession. Total write-offs were listed as 198

#424

I was also talking about 1943 and the allied landings in North Africa in 1942. Hence the January 1943 reference to 3 Tiger I being knocked out by British 6 pdr AT guns in a couple of days. Panzer III production stopped in 1943 most survivors were sent for conversion to Stug’s, they were rare beasts by 1944 in German frontline units. Panzer IV and Panthers made up the bulk of the German armour.

The Tiger was also be a concept, it was an idea of mounting the only weapon they had capable of taking on the British I Tanks and French Heavy Tanks they encountered first in 1940, with armour thick enough to withstand any AT weapons the British and French had. It was a concept that went into production.

Even if production of thousands of tanks would have been available, there wouldn’t have been enough well-trained crews, making every “cheaper” tank hopelessly weak on the field.

Logistics comes into play here, German Divisions were rarely at their correct strength some armoured divisions had less than 20 tanks due to them not being produced fast enough. Compare that with the allies who had an abundance of tanks in reserve with no crews, a tank is disabled, breaks down or destroyed the crew can be issued a new one. With the Germans they became infantry until one could be provided. Now which is the better system 10 Panzer IV Ausf F2/G which can take on all allied armour in 1944 or 4 Tiger I with their many faults.

#425

It may be possible the Panther may look a very good tank and the IV outdated and the Tiger useless consumption of production capacity.
But after decent study and reflecting it could be argued that the development of “the cat” was worse in its strategical value compared to development the III/IV tank and the Tiger…

  1. III/IV would have been easily transportable, less fuel hungry, less material and upgrading the engine would’ve made a more reliable move. The 75/L48 gun, let us be honest, was effective enough for a medium “workhorse”.
  2. The ultimate loss of Panther in battle and/or operational status, was caused by the same elements that cause the Tiger II to be called useless.
  3. The Tiger (I) was much more a walking pillbox than the Panther, having more side armor. The Panther, however, never really proved to be that more usefull for other purposes.
  4. The features that make the Panther really famous are the sloped armor and the monster gun. These features were much more available in the Tiger II.
#426

True. But how much Allied armour did the Tigers knock out at that time?

Panzer III production stopped in 1943 most survivors were sent for conversion to Stug’s, they were rare beasts by 1944 in German frontline units. Panzer IV and Panthers made up the bulk of the German armour.

Most Panzer III(N) were III with retrofitted 75mm mortar cannons when the IV had to swap theirs with the long 75mm. Many of these remained in service. Along with command service tanks.

The Tiger was also be a concept, it was an idea of mounting the only weapon they had capable of taking on the British I Tanks and French Heavy Tanks they encountered first in 1940, with armour thick enough to withstand any AT weapons the British and French had. It was a concept that went into production.

Ok, :). But I pointed out that putting the tanks together in a “heavy formation” and operating them in open field battles was a good concept.

Logistics comes into play here, German Divisions were rarely at their correct strength some armoured divisions had less than 20 tanks due to them not being produced fast enough. Compare that with the allies who had an abundance of tanks in reserve with no crews, a tank is disabled, breaks down or destroyed the crew can be issued a new one. With the Germans they became infantry until one could be provided. Now which is the better system 10 Panzer IV Ausf F2/G which can take on all allied armour in 1944 or 4 Tiger I with their many faults.

there were over 8500 IV’s produced and only 1347 Tigers (I). total of around 10 000, of which a bunch with the 88 gun.
I don’t see that much difference with 11 500, of which none with the 88 gun.
The Tiger suffered of it’s birth illness at the very beginning with limited production runs (end 1942) resulting in convergence of upgrading and mass production. The Panther however came rushed into the front at Kursk with a relative high number, before the birth illlness.

And the Allies were on the move, meaning that in most circumstances a knocked out tank left a waiting crew with a supply zone coming ahead.
The Germans had to shoot as much up as possible, with a crew that was left for the taking once disabled, with a supply zone retreating even further away.
Even the IV crews didn’t have the chance of waiting for the new tank to arrive, since the only arrival was that of even more allies.

At the end, I think it was overkill to develop the Tiger AND the Panther. I repeat: The best features of the Panther are found in the Tiger (ic: long range pillbox).
And the production benefits of the Panther are found in the IV.
German development was full of contradictions (no mass production of heavy tanks in the beginning <> the end, many diverted designs at the end <> mass production, …).

#427

The Tiger I was a hurried development due to meeting superior armour on the British and French tanks in 1940, it suffered as a result. It was costly in time and materials to produce and was very difficult to transport. It was virtually impossible to recover as there was no vehicle that could tow it. Two or three standard heavy recovery vehicles were required or another Tiger I which invariably caused its engine or transmission to fail were required.
It had a long range gun but suffered in close in fighting (terribly slow turret traverse) the same as the Panther as they were at their best in long range engagements. The tiger II was just a total waste of design and construction resources.

The Panther was hurried into production without all faults being rectified, the Panther D was unreliable as issued with most originally lost through breakdowns, by the time the Ausf A came around the problems were mostly sorted. Of course then they took a backward step with the Ausf G which although reliable lacked many features of the Ausf D making them less effective. Of course they did the same to the Panzer IV to simplify construction and reduce costs/strategic materials.

As for the original list here on the best tank I am afraid that none would be my vote.

Panther Ausf G the final variant was a retrograde step of the Panther Ausf A. Worse than early Shermans for Brewing up due to rounds placement.

T34/85 by the time it was introduced it was a desperate attempt to catch up with German Armour, it became equivalent to the then current Pzkpfw IV, much better to have put the resources into the T44 instead of delaying it.

Sherman M4A1 ended up being too long in the tooth and way past its best, good for indirect fire although its HE shell was worse than the 75mm armed ones. AT penetration was better but it was never issued with decent AT rounds which went to the TD battalions.

Tiger I big scarey gun on a heavily armoured chassis, unfortunately it was prone to engine and transmission problems, slow turret traverse, limited mobility. Thought to be impervious to nearly all allied AT weapons but in first combat with the British three were lost, two to towed 6 pdr and one to 6 pdr Churchill tank.

And now for some of the rest

Sheman Firefly, good AT gun in a reliable vehicle, good fire control and turret system but let down by thin armour and lack of main gun depression, HE ability reasonable. Rough ground ability not so good, high profile.

Comet, good gun almost equivalent to the 17pdr, fast, reliable, low profile, good cross country ability, no upgrade path. Too little too late to prove itself.

IS2, good gun but slow to reload and limited rounds carried, armour variable due to indifferent quality control at times.

M26 Pershing, good gun and armour, reliability issues with the engine and transmission.

Churchill, Good armour and crew survivability, reliable, good rough ground and climbing ability, poor AT gun with 75mm but good HE, 6pdr good AT but out classed. Chassis excellent for adaptability. Infantry support tank only no pretence at being built to take on other tanks.

Panzer IV ausf G, probably the best version, later ones had some serious retrograde steps. Fairly good all round medium tank just at the start of the chassis being overloaded. Replacement design due really (Thats what the Panther was to be).

#428

Panther would’ve been interesting as heavy tank, with increased side armour as I stated before, and tending to a 88 gun. Of course with compromise in speed, not a big drawback on a heavy tank.

#429

Through September and October, a series of new Panzerbrigades equipped with Panther tanks were sent into France to try to stop the Allied advance with counterattacks.[83] This culminated in the Battle of Arracourt (September 18–29, 1944), in which the mostly Panther-equipped German forces suffered heavy losses fighting against the 4th Armored Division of Patton’s 3rd Army, which were still primarily equipped with 75 mm M4 Sherman tanks and yet came away from the battle with only a few losses. The Panther units were newly formed, poorly trained, and tactically disorganized; most units ended up stumbling into ambush situations against seasoned U.S. tank crews.

Someting tells me that Pattons Shermans had no deal to German “heavy” loses;) The likely american aviation had…

One source has cited the cost of a Panther tank as 117,100 Reichmarks (RM). This compared with 82,500 RM for the StuG III, 96,163 RM for the Panzer III, 103,462 RM for the Panzer IV, and 250,800 RM for the Tiger I. These figures did not include the cost of the armament and radio

That make no sense to affirm that the PzIV was really much cheaper compared to Panther.Or Panther was too much expensive

#430

You mean Patton had no essential part in inflicting the losses?

Well, something tells me the succes of the Panzerwaffe in the early days were indeed tactics, training and morale.
The Panther gave perhaps the wrong idea of being invincable

Again, no tanks could deal with the problem of aviation

That make no sense to affirm that the PzIV was really much cheaper compared to Panther.Or Panther was too much expensive

  • cost of Panther is probably late production :wink: no exact definition and the price of the IV is not stated to be G, H, J …?
  • Panther was already cheaper in technology, even the sloped plates construction is a cheaper method, while "old "IV was old production.
  • L48 gun is cheaper than L70

and…

  • Panther had breakdowns … cheap production? :mrgreen: slave labour
  • Late Panther had from mid 1944 lower quality armour.
#431

You would wrong, then. Air power was not a major factor in the battle IIRC. It was actually the fact that the Americans were on the defensive and able to ambush the Panzers from cover. Besides the Sherman, they also had M18 Hellcat tank destroyers firing 76mm guns available…

Secondly, tactical air power destroying large numbers of tanks is a myth–since rockets were inaccurate and cannon fire was usually ineffective. I think I’ve read that an RAF post war study gave a strafing Tempest pilot a roughly four percent chance of destroying a tank. However, if memory serves correct, a unit of French recon spotted dozens of Panthers and Mk IV’s taking cover in an orchard and called down air strikes using incendiaries (napalm?) essentially burning the tanks and their crews alive. But this preceded the battle…

.

#432

]
I mean it’s not clear what has exactly inficted the heavy loses for Germans tanks from that wiki quote. And nobody can argue the early succes of Wermacht was becouse of that…

  • cost of Panther is probably late production :wink: no exact definition and the price of the IV is not stated to be G, H, J …?
  • Panther was already cheaper in technology, even the sloped plates construction is a cheaper method, while "old "IV was old production.
  • L48 gun is cheaper than L70

and…

  • Panther had breakdowns … cheap production? :mrgreen: slave labour
  • Late Panther had from mid 1944 lower quality armour.

Sure,but the same was for the all german tank industry, wasn’t it? The losing of armor quality was determined the shortage of Ni and Mn.SO it has deal to all the germans armored vehicles. And hardly you mind that the PzIII/IV were built on the another factories without using of slave labour.We can only see that the PzIII/IV was actualy bit cheaper then definitely more powerful Panther. The PzIV, like the Panther, was in serial production till the most end of the war.

#433

Yes it was a importain factor. The aviation was very active since 20 september against germans who had no any air cover and one-way spare fuel. And 76-mm M18 looks …laughable compared even to Sherman, Nick:)

Secondly, tactical air power destroying large numbers of tanks is a myth–since rockets were inaccurate and cannon fire was usually ineffective. I think I’ve read that an RAF post war study gave a strafing Tempest pilot a roughly four percent chance of destroying a tank. However, if memory serves correct, a unit of French recon spotted dozens of Panthers and Mk IV’s taking cover in an orchard and called down air strikes using incendiaries (napalm?) essentially burning the tanks and their crews alive. But this preceded the battle…

The Air support is not a MYTH but a matter. As stated Gans Rudel in his memours “Stuka pilot” he was able to hit even alone tanks with his U-87 diving bomber. I do believe the success depend on pilots experience and probably the Germans were looking superior to allied Tempest ( its fighter as i know) pilots;) with their 4%. The soviet Shturmovic Il-2 wa also were trained WELL to the end of war to hit the armored vehicles with double 30-mm cannon.So hardly the situation with air support was’t endeed such uneffective for allies,especially if to mind that the Germans itself feared to move their tank columns when weather was god for allied fighters.It’s a historical fact.
Besides, in many cases for succesfull air raid you don’t need to hit the enemy tanks at all. More then enough to bomb the ammo/fuel supplies columns and even it’s infantry cover, spoiling their rear echelons. Coz the alone tank ( even such god like Tiger) without infantry cover is nothing but fine target for that…foolish M18:)

#434

It was “only a bit” more expensive (but difference is bigger because of gun not taken in account) but was definitely much more expensive on the long run (parts, maintenance, breakdown, transportation).
As I stated, the specific armour construction of the Panther was a cheaper method, that was not used on the old IV (straight plates on the Panther, a lot of small plates and corners on the IV)…

#435

The flakpanzer is on the square in Jindrichuv Hradec, town in the south of the Czech Republic (close to the border with Austria). Photos were taken in may of 1945 and according to this topic on one of the Czech forums about WWII it is a Flakpanzer Panther Ausf. D mit 3,7 cm Flak. The sign next to APOTHEKE is realy saying LEKARNA which means Pharmacy in Czech

#436

Note the comments on the weather, it seems the fog prevented air power taking part. Most of the German losses were to Shermans and TD’s.

The 113th Panzer Brigade, with forty-two Panther tanks of the Mark V battalion and the 2113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment in the lead, had moved from Bourdonnay in a successful night march, reorganized its advance guard near Ley, and now pushed through the heavy fog toward Bezange. In the meeting engagement which followed, as in the later tank battles, the morning fog common to this area played no favorites: it protected the German armor from air attack, but permitted the American tanks to fight at close quarters where the longer range of the Panther tank gun had no advantage[/b]. A section of M-4 tanks were in an outpost position south of Lezey when the first Panther suddenly loomed out of the fog-hardly seventy-five yards from the two American tanks. The Panther and two of its fellows were destroyed in a matter of seconds, whereupon the remaining German tanks turned hurriedly away to the south. Capt. William A. Dwight, the liaison officer who had reported the enemy armor, arrived at Arracourt and was ordered to take a platoon of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion to aid the tanks at Lezey. Just west of Bezange-la-Petite Dwight’s platoon saw a number of German tanks moving through the fog. The tank destroyers quickly deployed in a shallow depression and opened fire at about 150 yards. In the short fight that followed, three of the four American tank destroyers were lost, but not until they had destroyed seven enemy tanks.

The 113th Panzer Brigade attack developed in a series of consecutive jabs, generally made by a company of tanks and a platoon of infantry, as the enemy probed to find an opening in the CCA defenses. Meanwhile the American outposts had been drawn in, the company of medium tanks was hurried down from Chambrey, General Eddy sent the task force at Lunéville back to rejoin the command, and the armored artillery ranged in on the

[224]

attackers. The superior mobility of the American tanks and self-propelled tank destroyers gave the defenders a decided advantage. When the Panthers turned away, after the abortive attack at Lezey, Captain Lamison took four tanks from C Company and raced the enemy some three thousand yards to a commanding ridge west of Bezange-la-Petite. Arriving on the position about three minutes before eight Panthers appeared, Lamison’s tanks got set and knocked out four of the German tanks before they could return the fire; then they withdrew over the crest of the ridge, moved south a short distance, reappeared, and finished off the remaining Panthers. In the late morning the German attack turned west toward Réchicourt-la-Petite, attempting to drive around the town, first to the north, then to the south. Here again the American artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers inflicted severe losses on the enemy armor. A platoon of tank destroyers from the 704th netted eight Panthers and succeeded in driving the rest of an enemy tank company back in flight.
The company of medium tanks which had been sent to Lunéville returned in the afternoon and Colonel Clarke was ready to counterattack. A combined force from Companies A and B, 37th Tank Battalion, led by Maj. William L. Hunter, wheeled south through Réchicourt, caught the Germans in the flank, and knocked out nine Panthers with the loss of only three tanks. As the day ended, the 37th Tank Battalion turned its attention to mopping up the German infantry west of Moncourt, and finally, guided through the night by burning German tanks, assembled in the vicinity of Lezey.

The German armored attack appeared to have spent itself. General Patton, who had come to Arracourt from the Third Army headquarters at Etain, talked with General Wood and agreed that CCA should begin the push toward Sarreguemines the next morning, reinforced by CCR, which had arrived from Lunéville during the day. On the whole there appeared to be no reason for worrying further about a German threat in the Arracourt sector, since CCA reported that forty-three enemy tanks, mostly factory-new Panthers, had been destroyed,24 and that its own losses had been only six killed and thirteen wounded; three American tank destroyers and five M-4 tanks had been knocked out.

#437

Imagine the battle with more Pz IV to spend instead of V, with trained crews and free tactics (no orders from above except to succeed).
Even the turret of a IV was faster I think…

The advantages of the Panther (long range gun, front armour) were all put aside in this story. And there were few Allied tanks that survived a well aimed shot from a 75/L48 gun.

#438

Although the Panther mobility and gun was a advantage over the tiger, but in WWII the result was that the Panther is only good in defensive usage and mostly their kills is raked up in defensive usage. If they take on the offensive, they succumb to huge losses. The Panther lacked a balance of protection from enemy firing angles in which in WWII battles, enemy tank will likely fight from the flank to oust its opponent. Even if the Panther were in good mobility condition in the battle of Kursk and all tigers were Panthers, the Germans will still achieve less than what they had done historically. The great number soviets tanks and anti-tank gun could still shoot at all directions towards their flanks and reduce the panther to ashes. If panther advance quicker with their speeds, their shot of accuracy will be harder to achieve. On the contrary if the Panther are Tigers at Kursk, the American might need nuclear bomb to force Germany to surrender.

#439

Or if every 10 Panthers were 1 extra Tiger and 12 upgraded IV’s, such as the III/IV project.

Truely, I believe the Panther was the best prototype design to step into a new generation of tanks. But it was not the best tank of WWII.

Even in the attack with long range fights (eastern steppe) - which brought the best of the Panther on top - Tigers could have at least as good results as the Panther with a specific advantage on very long range because of the higher mass projectile.
And with the chasis/hull turned in angle (a typical tactic of Tigers) towards the enemy, the armour was even better than the Panther, simple because it was based on thicker plate.

Summarized, the best elements of the Panther were:

  • very high velocity gun
  • relative high speed per weight
  • sloped armour with explicit strong front

Yet respectively:

  • projectile was lower mass than Tigers
    This resulted in higher energy loss during flight. Less precision and impact on very long range. The hollow charge and HE shell were weaker.

  • speed per weight was not that higher compared to IV or even the Tiger
    Many engines and transmissions failed on top of that.

  • weak on sides.
    Close range made Panthers very vulnerable. In fact as vulnerable as any German medium tank. But the others were smaller and had at least quicker turrets.
    Long range armour of angle turned Tigers was much better. And of course hollow charge protection was superior on thicker plated vehicles rather than angled (hollow charges always have higher angle impact than high velocity projectiles).
    Medium range in ambush was succesful with every longer 75mm gun, with the cheap and sturdy low silhouet StuG on top and even the tiny Hetzers were good for that.

On the whole it could be noted that what many believe to be the best German tank design was the most redundant of the pack. Yet, as I stated before, it led to a new generation of tanks in an age that was different form the WWII situation and tactics.
And no war or campaign ever has been won because of mere superior tank design.

#440

Panther cost 1/2 of what the Tiger did, which means you can get twice as many built. That alone should make it better than Tiger. When its maintenance problems had been worked out by 1944 it was showing 78% availability.

The best tank of the war would have been a Sherman M-4A3E8 turret with a 17 lb gun & APDS mounted on a suitably modified T-34 chassie.