Citing a single ‘Super Perishing’ is a cute anecdote, as is relating certain [quite probably propaganda] stories
about ‘inferior late-war’ German armour-plate…esp’ when its poor performance is so similar to cast armour…
From T.T. @ War P. 77,
While the regular M26 90mm ran to a muzzle velocity of 2,650 fps, a Tiger B’s long 88mm made 3,340 fps…
…enough [by U.S. testing] to do this… “At one mile, it could penetrate more than 6in of armour”.
& the 1943/44 Tiger B had sloped armour…
Is it “cute?” There were two Super Pershings in theater and I think there were another two rumored…
From T.T. @ War P. 77,
While the regular M26 90mm ran to a muzzle velocity of 2,650 fps, a Tiger B’s long 88mm made 3,340 fps…
…enough [by U.S. testing] to do this… “At one mile, it could penetrate more than 6in of armour”.
& the 1943/44 Tiger B had sloped armour…
Yeah, um, the “cute” Super Pershing knocked out a Tiger Royal…
http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/feature.pages/super.pershing.1.htm
The Super Pershing (aka T26E4-1) was equipped with a new long-barreled T15E1 90mm gun that was designed to out-perform the German high-velocity 88mm on the King Tiger. In testing, this new U.S. gun had successfully penetrated 8.5 inches of armor at 1,000 yards at 30 degrees. Even more remarkable, it had penetrated 13 inches of armor at 100 yards. The special 90mm ammunition had produced a muzzle velocity of 3,850 feet per second, or some 600 feet per second faster than the 88mm of the King Tiger. The new 90mm round also proved to have superior range and accuracy over the previous version.
J.A.W., a sad panzer-fanboi…
Not at all, but the ‘facts do speak’
& oh, by the way dear chap …kindly do cease your irrelevant [& rule threatening] personal value judgement posting…
Of course they should have been available, although to be fair, they needed a port facility to be delivered and couldn’t simply be driven off a beach like the Sherman could…
… & oh, by the way dear chap …kindly do cease your irrelevant [& rule threatening] personal value judgement posting…
Seems to be a tad bit of a theme though…
A theme of yours, perhaps… but really…resorting to cheap shots is a bit lame…& needless…
The situation for the poor bloody Allied tankers in Normandy was nothing short of disgraceful…
Equivalent to unescorted bomber missions over Germany, an exercise in sheer bloody-mindedness.
Lord Melchett’s dictum indeed… “If all else fails - then a pig-headed refusal to face facts will see us through.”
J.A.W. you are one of many score of trolling FanBoi types that has thought themselves so very clever. This Site has encountered so many that our software has compiled a comprehensive profile of the essential nature of the Sad Fanboi . I must say, it is remarkably accurate.
Nick, don’t forget that Hitler, leader of the Vril Society had used that arcane technology to infuse Vril into the hot rolled steel armor to transmute it into “Unobtanium” a metal long thought to be only Myth, and Legend. This is what made the Tiger invincible to anything the allies had, or could ever have. 
Something you probably aren’t aware of and should be - the Sherman was about the absolute biggest/heaviest tank that could be landed by existing landing craft. Anything bigger had to wait until after the capture of Antwerp & the approaches in November 1944. Tank landing craft are apparently a bit of a bugger to design - huge point load on what needs to be a thin & flat hull, big centre of gravity changes when it leaves and very strong ramps.
The Allocation of Human, and manufacturing resources, and materials to construct a larger LST would have been a daunting task in itself, even if the design, and testing could be completed in an incredibly short period of time. Every other program was competing for the same parts, and materials, so adding a significantly larger LST would have been nearly impossible in such a short period of time, just to accommodate one larger vehicle,equipment, and spares. Just the loading plan revisions would take dozens of Engineers to work out.
I only read about the LST’s in any depth last year.
Depending on the Mk they could handle different beach slopes, one of the British Designed ones had to be used on certain beaches as the other types could not get close enough with the slope to unload heavy equipment (they also risked breaking their backs when the tide went out iirc).
As it was there was always a severe shortage of landing craft of all types with competing requirements for France, Italy and the Pacific as well as general run around lighters inshore. The shortage was made more severe by the loss of the US Mulberry and the relative failure of PLUTO meaning more had to be landed over the beaches and for longer periods of time than originally thought.
Thinking about the claim that the Tiger led to the modern day MBT I come to a few conclusions
Panzer IV - upgradeable like all post war MBT’s have been, mounted a large calibre duel purpose gun with primarily an AT capability (started end of 1941 when it was decided to cancel the 50mm upgrade and mount the 75mm).
T34 - sloped armour all round, fast, large wheels, mounting again a big duel purpose gun (primarily infantry support though) good flotation and cross country performance.
KV1 - heavy armour, big duel purpose gun, torsion bar suspension, reasonable cross country and flotation
Just what aspect of the modern MBT did the Tiger I bring ?
Thick flat armour only the Leo 2 that I can think of
Big duel purpose gun already done on the above three
Interleaved suspension failed French tank post war never entered service only ones I can think of and they were based on the Tiger II
Torsion bar suspension KV 1 already had that as with others
Big road wheels, many tanks before the Tiger I
Drive train oh Tiger I went forwards through fighting compartment hmm most Soviet and British tanks drove rear sprockets
Diesel engine - oh nope it had petrol - Soviet, Italian, Japanese and some British used Diesel though
Looking at it it seems if anything it would be the Soviet KV1 which led directly to the JS/IS series
Edited to add Med Mk I
Oh how could I forget maybe dedicated AT gun mounted - oh nope that was the Vickers Medium Mk I with its 3 pdr (first tank gun to be mounted specifically to deal with enemy armour), which incidently had a large roomy turret, commander did not double up as loader or gunner - hmmmmm maybe just maybe
Re-think…
At Hitler’s befehl the Tiger would mount the gun proven capable of defeating all tanks yet fielded…
Even though he was assured that such a long overhang [which the Russian tanks did not have - at that point]
would be tactically impracticable…
He also insisted that the frontal armour be reasonably proof against most AT guns…
The early ones also featured snorkelling apparatus to deep wade when needed…
It is another indictment on the rigidity of Allied thinking that the in the 3.7in AA gun, the British had a close counter part of the 88, but it was not utilized either in the AT role or as a tank gun [ unlike the Russians making use of their 85mm].
Which is a higher priority, the best use of your expensively trained & equipped Armoured Forces or not building a landing craft to carry them… another example of the gross waste/misdirection of resources shown by the Allies…
They ought to have rolled into Berlin in 44, emulating Hitler in Paris 40…
Post-war, it was realized that attrition of the WW2 Sherman kind was untenable…
How? They didn’t have the American forces based in the UK in sufficient numbers prior to 1944 (even if they’d cancelled the entire Mediterranean campaign it would have been extremely marginal), and supply constraints dictated their speed of advance once they’d left Normandy. The only thing I can think of that they could have done to speed up the advance would have been to keep pushing after the capture of Antwerp. That would have cut off something like half of the available German armies in the West, and if the forces allocated to Market Garden had gone there they could have cleared out the approaches and captured these troops by the Autumn. Probably still too late for a 1944 end of the war, but should shave a couple of months off the duration.
Ok a few things
Oh do tell! You mean like making less than 1400 expensive, complex and somewhat unreliable “heavy breakthrough tanks” against nearly 100,000 of your adversaries’ tanks? Hindsight is lovely, but you’re completely delusional. There were only so many resources to go around and the Pershing could have been landed in improvised or real ports. But the landing craft point is moot, since The (U.S.) Army Ground Forces Command did everything it could to stall and obstruct the Armored Board and Ordnance Departments attempts to produce superior tanks. The Allies simply didn’t have enough landing craft too even thing about a general European landing until 1944. And as mentioned, the U.S. Army was not built up enough yet after only two years of general mobilization and three years of conscription to achieve anything other than being beached and blockaded in France, an Anzio type scenario at best. The U.S. Army wanted to invade France as early as 1942 with Operation Sledgehammer, but it would have achieved little even if they hadn’t been driven back into the sea…
They ought to have rolled into Berlin in
44, emulating Hitler in Paris40…
Ridiculous. There’s no way they had the combat power nor logistical infrastructure prior to 1944 to even attempt a final push. As it was, the rapid Allied advances and collapse of the Wehrmacht in the West strained the fuel supplies of the Patton’s and Monty’s advances. The Allies were halted in a sense by their own success. Hitler’s Germany, bordering France, faced no such logistical nightmares in 1940 - although the Invasion of France could have been a much closer run thing than is generally realized. If Hitler had had his way, the Heer would have been bogged down in Belgium and Northern France in the Winter of 1939-1940. And that is perhaps the best case scenario for them…
Post-war, it was realized that attrition of the WW2 Sherman kind was untenable…
Then how do you explain the U.S. Army and many Allied nations still using it well into the 1950’s? The Sherman comprised roughly half of the initial U.S. armored forces for at least the first half of the Korean War - albeit it was the M-4A3E8 HVSS “Easy-Eight” version with the 76mm firing the now widely available HVAP rounds. In fact, while the tankers loved the M-26/M-46 Pershing/Patton tanks, the Shermans were preferred when fighting in mountainous country and did very well against whatever T-34/85 foes they faced on a limited basis due to the superior optics and crew training. What was realized postwar was the Tank Destroyer Doctrine was shit and that tank destroyers were useful as defensive, supporting weapons only…
Ok, Allies building numbers of needless BBs… cost benefit vs LCTs? Get serious…
There was an Allied plan for a 6 month post invasion to Berlin victory drive… but it got stymied politically…
& if the Allies had superior numbers of tanks… of equivalent technical proficiency…
Analogous to what P-51s were doing over Germany… then, Berlin by Xmas, baby…
The 88mm could penetrate the frontal armour of Matildas/KVs & etc… & that’s why Adolf was insistent…
The Russian 76mm & Western Allies 57mm & 75mm could not do like-wise to the Tiger…
The major difference in the British 3.7 AA & the 88? Weight/mobility of the mounting…
& the refusal to accept the need for combined arms tactical flexibility…
U.S. armoured units in Korea stuck with obsolescent Shermans wished they had a Centurion…
& likely would not have turned down the Tiger/MG 42/StG 44/Nebelwerfer if they were somehow practicably available…
I would like to see some specific replys to ones I have made to you as you seem to keep ignoring them
Logistics logistics logistics. The Allies had 28 divisions in the field after the breakout from Normandy, and in offensive operations each division needed ~750 tonnes of supplies per day - around 20,000 tonnes. With Antwerp still not usable and the French railway system largely destroyed, they had to be trucked over what by modern standards were pretty awful roads, all the way from the Normandy beaches. The best they ever achieved was ~12,000 tonnes in a day - which means you can’t take the offensive in anything other than a limited, short term way. That explains the screw-up that was Market Garden - it was pretty much the biggest offensive they could have launched with the available supplies. In hindsight they would have done better not to attack at all, but to clear the Scheldt and get Antwerp working again, but this wasn’t understood until quite some time later.
Either way, even if the drive on Berlin had been allowed politically it would simply have ground to a halt about when it did due to a lack of supplies - principally petrol and artillery shells - making further advance impossible.
Regarding the views of Otto Carius on the quality of armour, I do not believe that he ever served in a Tiger II. He did, however, finish the war commanding Jagdtigers, on which his overall view was scathing - “only its armour was satisfactory”. He did admit to a tanker’s prejudice against assault guns and tank destroyers, a prejudice apparently not shared by Wittmann, who had started his armoured career in a StuG III. Carius also had good reason to disparage low-ductility armour. As a loader in a PzKpfw 38t, he had experienced a penetrating direct hit from a Soviet antitank gun. All crew members were wounded; the driver lost an arm, and Otto himself lost a number of teeth. Carius put the injuries down mainly to the severe spalling of the low-ductility Czech-manufactured armour which, he opined, caused much more damage than the direct damage caused by the projectile itself. Best regards, JR.