Courts martial these days tend to be pretty well regulated by law. In my own jurisdiction, this involves the association of the Court Martial (a standing, if not often used court) with the civil High Court, governed ultimately by our written Constitution. This was certainly not the case around 1900, when the legal basis for the actions of a court martial was, in most jurisdictions, somewhat unclear as to legal basis and even purpose. Even in, say, the British military jurisdiction, parameters were unclear, practice and procedure and rules of evidence (to say the least) malleable, and mandatory legal qualification for any member of such a court non-existent without even the requirement that the court should have a legal adviser as “amicus curiae”.
An example in some contrast with the Morant case, but from the same period, was the court martial procedure put in place in the immediate aftermath of the Easter 1916 Irish Rebellion. This handed out death sentences like snuff at a wake; only 16 of the condemned were actually executed as British politicians realized what a public relations disaster the shootings could develop into in Ireland.
Now, don’t get me wrong. One point arguably at least in common with the Morant case was that these guys were (as Mel Brooks put it in “The Producers”) “incredibly guilty”. Almost all pleaded “not guilty”, but made no substantive defense against the various rebellion/insurrection/treason etc. related charges put to them (the dense, second-rate British officers trying them showed little or no understanding that most of the accused here “went out” expecting to be killed, and actually wanting to be martyred). Also, the use of court martial procedure in order to enforce martial law over a community (not just over members of the British military) was generally accepted at the time. Even allowing for all this, however, one would have imagined that, where “not guilty” pleas had been entered, some obligation lay on the court to adduce some proof of guilt. Er …
Most of the hearings were conducted within a very short period. Legal expertise among members of the court was entirely lacking. The standard of evidence introduced in most cases ranged from ridiculous to non-existent. The one that amused me was that in which the only evidence adduced was testimony from an officer of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) that the particular subject had spent about a year hanging around public houses (sometimes spending a long time) during which he associated with (unidentified) “Sinn Féiners”. Could surely have done better - the accused in this case was an officer of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and a prominent advocate for armed rising.
On the basis of this kangaroo court proceeding, 16 men were actually executed. One of these - Willie, brother of Patrick Pearse, a person of no influence in the conspiracy - pleaded guilty, and stated in his defence that he had only acted as aide-de-camp to his brother. This seems only to have persuaded the court, on the “witch in ducking stool” principle, that he was guilty of the high offences of which he was charged. He was shot, along with the others, in reality, for no better reason than being named “Pearse”.
What point am I making here ? Well, there is the “flexibility” of the whole procedure, its summary quality, the severe consequences for the accused, and the complete absence of any respect for the principles of natural justice. There is the additional point that these proceedings were subject to the tacit approval of politicians in London, who received prejudicial reports on the accused from the Army in advance. In the Morant case, more attention seems to have been given at least to the appearance of proper procedure, but the outcome still seems to have been determined by obscure political determination. I would ask - where a “system of justice” is so polluted by inconsistency and partiality, is the question of whether somebody should be “pardoned” at this stage, well, realistic or appropriate. My personal view is that Morant, like the 1916 leaders, “incredibly guilty”. In a way, the gross inadequacies of the procedure that ended in his execution assists people now in taking an unjustifiably lenient view of his actions. But courts martial of this period were of their time. Their verdicts might range from “morally correct” all the way over to quasi-judicial murder. Either way, arguing about “pardon” now seems like dancing on the head of a lawyer’s quibble … Yours from the Stonebreaker’s Yard, JR.