The problem is that we still don’t know what was the mean reason for Imperor to make its gov capitulate.
Has it even deel with A-bombing at all or it was just the resault of the TOTAL military defeat of the JApane forces everywhere ( in the august the operation agains Kwantung army has been started and it was absolutly clear - the Japan lost this war from military point)
It might be safe to say that when your cities start disappearing with one bang, the bomb would have weighed pretty highly in their thinking, at the very least, it was a catalyst for the Emperor to say, that’s enough fellas, we’re cactus.
And there were at least 2 million Japanese troops still deployed throughout the Pacific and China, willing to fight to the last man, plus up to another 2 million in Japan, backed by 28 million militia.
I think nobody even care about cities in Japane.
Becouse after the burning out of Tokio 13-15 march of 1945( the entire city has been burned out) - nobody even tryed to take it as a “reason to surrender”.
And there were at least 2 million Japanese troops still deployed throughout the Pacific and China, willing to fight to the last man, plus up to another 2 million in Japan, backed by 28 million militia.
After 8 august of 1945 the entire 1.6 million mehanized soviet army entered the war agains Japane.
So i think the Impor was not Last Idiot not to realize that his 2 millions of rest troops without food and ammos ( the lost Manchjuria was the last “external product colony” of Japane) are nothing agains the Common allied forces.
Beside his 28 of so called milicia ( i.e the mostly teenagers with picas and knifes) has no any chances for Imperia to survive much more long time.
I think the Soviet Union joining the Allies was the act which convinced the Japanese High Command that they were totally defeated, and that total destruction was only a matter of time, but I also think that the atom bombs played a major role in Japan’s decision to surrender.
For while they now knew they were defeated, the Japanese sense of honour would have never have allowed them to surrender, they would have fought until the Allies had totally overran their country, but the use of the Atom Bombs, gave them an excuse to surrender without losing too much ‘face’.
Not true. In fact, there were attempts by the Americans to open a line of communication with the Japanese regarding surrender. They were met with silence…
So i think the Impor was not Last Idiot not to realize that his 2 millions of rest troops without food and ammos ( the lost Manchjuria was the last “external product colony” of Japane) are nothing agains the Common allied forces.
The two million troops in Manchuria had been starved of their best infantry, most of their tanks, artillery and air assets. Much of it sent to the home islands for use against the invasion. They were a hollow army in an Army that could not deal with mechanized enemy in open (non-jungle, non-volcanic island) fighting…
Beside his 28 of so called milicia ( i.e the mostly teenagers with picas and knifes) has no any chances for Imperia to survive much more long time.
I agree that after a certain point (the inevitable US armored breakthrough on the Tokyo Plain) that things would have ended in short order. I also believe that hundreds of thousands of casualties would have been suffered on both sides then otherwise were with the dropping of the bombs…
Given that US plans called for the use of a LOT of mustard gas plus up to 10 tactical nuclear weapons in the invasion, there would be a hell of a lot of casualties even before a breakout…
As they intertwined [bombs and Sov invasion,] it’s impossible to say which had more effect on the Japanese, suffice to say the Emperor used the bombs as a catalyst to bring about surrender…
…Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization…
That the Americans were worried about an invasion of the home islands and the potential cost in Allied manpower of reducing Japan could be deduced from the fanatical Japanese resistance on Okinawa as late as April-June 1945 when more than 49,000 (12,500 dead) Americans fell in battle against about 117,000 Japanese troops. And the Home Islands still had more than 2.3 million soldiers.
Sure with Silence, becouse the Allies demanded from the most beginning the Unconditional surrender.
It was initially unacceptable for Japs.
Instead Japanes tryed to negorate with Stalin, but allies even did not wish to hear about possible Japane surrender to the USSR:)
So the Allies have persisted in the Potsdam conference to promote a “Allies declaration” to Japane, that was absolutly unacceptable initially.
The two million troops in Manchuria had been starved of their best infantry, most of their tanks, artillery and air assets. Much of it sent to the home islands for use against the invasion. They were a hollow army in an Army that could not deal with mechanized enemy in open (non-jungle, non-volcanic island) fighting…
Just One million Kwantung Army Nick
And did Okinawa defenders have the experience of fighting agains mechainized enemy in volcanic Islands?
I agree that after a certain point (the inevitable US armored breakthrough on the Tokyo Plain) that things would have ended in short order. I also believe that hundreds of thousands of casualties would have been suffered on both sides then otherwise were with the dropping of the bombs…
The mythical casualties of Invasion that would probably never happened
We have discussed it already in this thread.
I would think the enormous incompetence of the Japanese leadership would have caused Japan a loss of face prior to the a-bombs. The idiocy of at least the Japanese leaders seems difficult to reconcile with the intelligence of regular Japanese people.
On estimated casualties.
Nearly 500,000 Purple Heart medals were manufactured in anticipation of the casualties resulting from the invasion of Japan.
Wiki states…
Casualty estimates were based on the experience of the preceding campaigns, drawing different lessons:
In a study done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, the figures of 7.45 casualties/1,000 man-days and 1.78 fatalities/1,000 man-days were developed. This implied that a 90-day Olympic campaign would cost 456,000 casualties, including 109,000 dead or missing. If Coronet took another 90 days, the combined cost would be 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities.
A study done by Adm. Nimitz’s staff in May estimated 49,000 casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea.[ A study done by General MacArthur’s staff in June estimated 23,000 in the first 30 days and 125,000 after 120 days. When these figures were questioned by General Marshall, MacArthur submitted a revised estimate of 105,000, in part by deducting wounded men able to return to duty.
In a conference with President Truman on June 18, Marshall, taking the Battle of Luzon as the best model for Olympic, thought the Americans would suffer 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days (and ultimately 20% of Japanese casualties, which implied a total of 70,000 casualties). Adm. Leahy, more impressed by the Battle of Okinawa, thought the American forces would suffer a 35% casualty rate (implying an ultimate toll of 268,000). Admiral King thought that casualties in the first 30 days would fall between Luzon and Okinawa, i.e., between 31,000 and 41,000.
Of these estimates, only Nimitz’s included losses of the forces at sea, though kamikazes had inflicted 1.78 fatalities per kamikaze pilot in the Battle of Okinawa, and troop transports off Kyūshū would have been much more exposed.
A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s staff by William Shockley estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.
Outside the government, well-informed civilians were also making guesses. Kyle Palmer, war correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, said half a million to a million Americans would die by the end of the war. Herbert Hoover, in memorandums submitted to Truman and Stimson, also estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities, and were believed to be conservative estimates; but it is not known if Hoover discussed these specific figures in his meetings with Truman. The chief of the Army Operations division thought them “entirely too high” under “our present plan of campaign.”
For context, the Battle of Normandy had cost 63,000 casualties in the first 48 days; and the Battle of Okinawa ran up 72,000 casualties over about 82 days, of whom 18,900 were killed or missing. Several thousand soldiers who died indirectly whether from wounds or other causes at a later date are not included.
Soviet troops suffered 352,475 casualties (including 78,291 dead) during their final, twenty-three-day assault on Berlin and central Germany.
So, take your pick, although it’s all conjecture, there’s no doubt it wouldn’t be a picnic.
If anyone feels like a good long read, try this…
I think I might have said this somewhere in this very long thread or maybe another one, but there is some serious academic analysis that says that Hirohito decided on surrender primarily to preserve the Imperial house and line rather than to save Japan as such.
There’s a dense book on it by some academic but, alas, I can’t recall the author or title.
Again, you keep repeating this trash.
The Japanese sent “feelers” to the Soviets, and the Soviets promptly said nothing in return and claimed war invading Manchuria. But that’s the “Allies” fault?
And in Stalin’s infinite benevolence, the Soviet military also invaded the Kurile Islands three days AFTER the Japanese surrendered, thus murdering people after the hostilities ended for a cynical land grab…
Just One million Kwantung Army Nick
And did Okinawa defenders have the experience of fighting agains mechainized enemy in volcanic Islands?
It wasn’t a million, it was more like 600,000 that were stripped of much of their equipment. The Soviets defeated a largely immobile army on an open steppe with few tanks or portable anti-tank weapons, almost all of which were obsolete before the War began…
And the Red Army/Naval Infantry also suffered heavy casualties and stiff resistance on their few amphibious landing operations made. Resistance which “interfered” with their time tables…
I think we’ve been over all this before…
The mythical casualties of Invasion that would probably never happened
We have discussed it already in this thread.
It didn’t happen, but the invasion was the inevitable alternative to dropping the A-bombs or a long blockade; one which would have starved the Japanese population causing famine and disease…
Perhaps not so much an immobile army but one caught in the midst of major troop redeployments to incomplete defensive positions.
The Japanese hoped that rough terrain, long distances, and determined opposition would take their toll on the Soviets, eroding Soviet strength to the point of exhaustion by the time they reached the redoubt area, where the Japanese could check the Soviet advance and perhaps even counterattack. The immediate problem for the Japanese in the summer of 1945 was to effect the unit redeployments needed to implement the plan, and to complete the required fortification and construction program. Both the redeployment and the fortification programs were still incomplete when the Soviet offensive began.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp#ch3
this wasn’t feelers but Japas actually were searching the diplomatic ways of solution.
But the Allies have made everething not to let Japs to surrenders via Moscow.
And no , it wasn’t their “fault”, just progmatic political interest.
And in Stalin’s infinite benevolence, the Soviet military also invaded the Kurile Islands three days AFTER the Japanese surrendered, thus murdering people after the hostilities ended for a cynical land grab…
But it was Alleas who have persisted to join the USSR the war agains Japane.
Sorry to remind you the elementary historical facts, but at hte Potsdam conference both CHurchil and Trumen signed the special declaration
Potsdam Declaration (July 1945) and the Treaty of San Francisco (September 1951). The Yalta Agreement, signed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, stated:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute#World_War_II_agreements
“The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that: […] 2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.: (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union; […] 3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.”
So i have to distress you again:)
The so called “cynical land grab by Stalin” has been fully sanctioned but “democrats” Churchill and Trumen:rolleyes:
It wasn’t a million, it was more like 600,000 that were stripped of much of their equipment. The Soviets defeated a largely immobile army on an open steppe with few tanks or portable anti-tank weapons, almost all of which were obsolete before the War began…
Oh already 600 000 of cripples
Nickdfresh , the Soviet had captured ONLY POWS about 600 000.
And the Red Army/Naval Infantry also suffered heavy casualties and stiff resistance on their few amphibious landing operations made. Resistance which “democrats” with their time tables…
Yes , becouse nobidy even thought to surrender on the Kuril Islands after so called Declaration of SUrrender in Tokio 15 august.
Stalin was playing his own games.
Here’s one interesting reappraisal of Japan’s surrender.
Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan
Canadian Journal of History, Spring 2006 by Allison, William ThomasRacing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan, by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2005. ix, 382 pp. $29.95 US (cloth), $18.95 US (paper).
Racing the Enemy is a compelling work of scholarship on the end of the Pacific war. This provocative book challenges current paradigms explaining the use of the atomic bombs and Japan’s decision to surrender in August 1945. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a Professor of History and Director of the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, offers a new and intriguing framework to reconsider the final months of the Pacific war from the viewpoints of the United States, Russia, and Japan. This is a very significant book and should be read by all specialists in international relations and diplomatic history.
Rather than massive destruction of the two atomic bombs, Hasegawa argues that the looming threat of the Soviet Union’s entry into the war instead forced Japan to capitulate. Further, Hasegawa suggests that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin intentionally misled members of Japan’s “peace” faction, who put out feelers for a Soviet-brokered peace, in order to buy time to deploy military forces to ensure rewards promised at Yalta. Fearing the Pacific war might end too soon, Stalin manoeuvered to maximize his spoils, while the United States hastened to end the war as soon as possible to deny Stalin his Yalta rewards and a role in post-war Japan. For Japan, the massing of Soviet forces in the East, according to Hasegawa, ended all hope of a negotiated end to the war. For the United States, the atomic bombs served much less to intimidate Stalin than to simply limit Soviet influence in the East by ending the war sooner rather than later, when Soviet forces would have made such advances as to warrant a greater role in the post-war settlement. Such conclusions place the impact of the atomic bombs in an entirely different light.
Hasegawa convincingly outlines the Truman administration’s internal discussions about how to end the war against Japan. The principal catalysts for debate were the desire to avoid an invasion of the Japanese home islands and the question of whether to allow the emperor of Japan to retain his throne. Intensive discussion about these two issues were further complicated by the imminent Soviet entry into the war. Likewise, Hasegawa reveals the deep divisions within the Japanese government during 1945 over how to end the war and details how the “peace” and “military” factions within the Japanese government argued over how to ensure the best end in a war both factions conceded was more or less lost.
Hasegawa’s most significant contribution, however, may be his discussion of the inner workings of the Soviet government during the last weeks of the war. Stalin played both ends at once by simultaneously keeping the door for mediation just open enough for Japanese diplomats to maintain hope for peace. In the meantime, Stalin swiftly moved military forces from west to east in preparation for offensive operations against Japanese forces in Manchuria. In many ways, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Empire of Japan were indeed “racing” each other to end the war on the best terms possible.
Hasegawa masterfully uses primary material from American, Soviet, and Japanese archives. Much of the material from Japanese and Soviet archives is new and enlightening. This is the first major work to effectively bring together such research from the three languages - this alone is a significant achievement. Hasegawa ably weaves together this complex story in a cogent, lucid manner that illuminates the many perspectives, as well as personalities, represented in the Japanese, Soviet, and American governments.
Make no mistake, this is revisionist history, but it is well-grounded revisionist history with sound interpretation based upon solid research. Hasegawa’s conclusions will certainly stir debate among historians, as already evidenced on online discussion lists such as H-DIPLO, and this may have been an underlying purpose. Whether or not Hasegawa’s ideas are completely acceptable, his work will force reconsideration of the end of the Pacific war. Along with Richard B. Frank’s Downfall: The End of the ImperialJapanese Empire (New York, 1999), Racing the Enemy is essential reading on the end of the Pacific war. Hasegawa has offered a major contribution that sets a new benchmark, not only for scholarship on the end of the Pacific war, but also in the research of and approach to international history. Read this book.
My bold. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3686/is_200604/ai_n16634861
Sakhalin and kurile islands was the price of Stalin joining the fight against the Japanese.
This was part of American ‘‘appeasement’’ carrying on Roosevelt’s policy of virtually agreeing with anything Stalin wanted.
Stalin was suspicious of the capitalist West, Roosevelt argued. He had to be coaxed into trusting the West and working for the worldwide “New Deal.” This was the motive behind Roosevelt’s infamous remark that “I think if I give [Stalin] everything I possibly can, and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of peace and democracy.”
Truman eventually went on to take a harder line, and the rest is history, the end of the last colonial empire.
To be fair to Stalin, the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin were IIRC taken by the Japanese as war booty only 40 years before in the Russo-Japanese war. In the circumstances the action to take them back was entirely justifiable IMHO.
Unfortunately, the islands had to be ethnically cleansed first…
At the time, this was seen as a means of preventing future problems, not as a war crime. It was euphamistically phrased as “population transfer” and generally accepted as a way of making the population base on the ground fit in with official nationality of that bit of ground. Given that Europe had been through the two worst wars in world history for just such reasons, it was generally accepted at the time.