Small arms

[CliSwe]

Just as a general observation (and I refuse to touch the politics in any other way): there was a surprising eclecticism in Argentine arms procurements, considering that most of their equipment, training and tactics were US-sourced. Most of the major European arms exporters achieved success in Argentina (including the UK, with the sale of two Type 42 destroyers, plus the aforementioned “Silenced Sterling” SMGs). Whilst the equipment itself was on par with the UK forces’ kit, the men handling it on the Brit side were far superior in training, fitness and professionalism than the Argentines’ conscript-heavy forces.

Cheers,
Cliff

[Rising_Sun]

@CliSwe

Whilst the equipment itself was on par with the UK forces’ kit, the men handling it on the Brit side were far superior in training, fitness and professionalism than the Argentines’ conscript-heavy forces.

Which perhaps assumes that conscripts are necessarily inferior troops.

That certainly wasn’t the case with Australian conscripts in Vietnam, nor with American conscripts there and in other wars, nor with British conscripts in various wars.

I’d suggest that the problem with the Argentinian forces was less to do with being conscripts but more to do with leadership and training issues, although deficiencies in the latter are really just a sub-set of the former as poor training reflects poor leadership. And that comes back to deficiencies in the high command and senior officer corps, not the poor bloody conscripts sent out with inadequate training, leadership, equipment, and logisitics.

Which, in Argentina’s case in the Falklands, also comes back to not having fought a war against a modern enemy nation. In particular, Argentina lacked the experience even of Brazil of having fought in just one of the world wars or any other modern large scale conflict.

Again, that doesn’t reflect on the potential fighting qualities of the Argentinian conscripts but on the failures of their leadership to keep abreast of the modern warfare they would encounter against Britain, which has been semi-continuously involved in minor and major armed conflicts for roughly the past 1,500 years and has learned a bit from that, including taking on most of Europe a few times and winning (well, since 1066 anyway). While Argentina spent a relatively short time frigging about with internal guerrillas who could never mount anything approaching any assault or defence Britain could and did mount against Argentina.

[CliSwe]

@Rising_Sun

Which perhaps assumes that conscripts are necessarily inferior troops.

That certainly wasn’t the case with Australian conscripts in Vietnam, nor with American conscripts there and in other wars, nor with British conscripts in various wars.

Conscription had gone by the time I joined up, but my father - who was a small-arms instructor - was most impressed by the quality of the National Servicemen he trained.

I’d suggest that the problem with the Argentinian forces was less to do with being conscripts but more to do with leadership and training issues, although deficiencies in the latter are really just a sub-set of the former as poor training reflects poor leadership. And that comes back to deficiencies in the high command and senior officer corps, not the poor bloody conscripts sent out with inadequate training, leadership, equipment, and logisitics.

I very much doubt that anyone in the Argentine officer corps seriously considered that they’d have to fight a campaign against a professional European army. The “Malvinas” campaign must’ve been a very steep learning curve for them.

Which, in Argentina’s case in the Falklands, also comes back to not having fought a war against a modern enemy nation. In particular, Argentina lacked the experience even of Brazil of having fought in just one of the world wars or any other modern large scale conflict.

Brazil’s contribution to WWII was fairly impressive; Argentina OTOH has always been a fairly insular nation. The “Dirty War” was their main focus for a long time before the Falklands.

Again, that doesn’t reflect on the potential fighting qualities of the Argentinian conscripts but on the failures of their leadership to keep abreast of the modern warfare they would encounter against Britain, which has been semi-continuously involved in minor and major armed conflicts for roughly the past 1,500 years and has learned a bit from that, including taking on most of Europe a few times and winning (well, since 1066 anyway). While Argentina spent a relatively short time frigging about with internal guerrillas who could never mount anything approaching any assault or defence Britain could and did mount against Argentina.

I can do no more than absolutely agree with everything you said above - except to point out that the Argies were definitely misled by the political signals they were receiving.

Of course, the political background to the conflict presents us with two leaders desperately in need of a distraction from their internal economic and social problems: a war will do nicely, thank you. The difference was that Thatcher’s diplomatic machinery was much more efficient than Galtieri’s.

Cheers,
Cliff

[Rising_Sun]

@CliSwe

The difference was that Thatcher’s diplomatic machinery was much more efficient than Galtieri’s.

Diplomatic machinery? If that was any good there might not have been a war.

Or her war machinery?

It strikes me as one of those wars that neither side expected to occur when they were chesting each other, and then somebody went and kneed the other bloke in the nuts and it was on.

[CliSwe]

@Rising_Sun

Diplomatic machinery? If that was any good there might not have been a war.

Or her war machinery?

It strikes me as one of those wars that neither side expected to occur when they were chesting each other, and then somebody went and kneed the other bloke in the nuts and it was on.

Yeah - that’s a good enough metaphor. But to clarify my point, RS: The UK’s diplomatic success was not in preventing war, but in gathering support abroad for the UK’s position. Before the Argies could scratch themselves, the UN, EU, NATO, Old Uncle Tom Cobley & All were against them. This after a series of veiled hints from the FO that the Brits regarded the Islands as an encumbrance. (Very similar to the signals the Whitlam government sent to Indonesia in 1975 re. the East Timor question.) And the Brits had to overcome Jean Kirkpatrick’s support for the Argentines - no mean feat.

Cheers,
Cliff

[Rising_Sun]

@CliSwe

Very similar to the signals the Whitlam government sent to Indonesia in 1975 re. the East Timor question.

I’m old enough to remember that well, and still to be acutely ashamed of what Australia did. And didn’t do.

Which in simple terms was to recognise a potential (supposed) communist threat and potentially unstable nation on our doorstep and leave it to the Indonesians to remove that problem for us, in the full knowledge that they weren’t likely to observe the sorts of principles in fighting and occupying East Timor that we would.

Our government’s signals to Indonesia weren’t exactly veiled. It stood out like the proverbial dog’s balls at the time.

[CliSwe]

@Rising_Sun

I’m old enough to remember that well, and still to be acutely ashamed of what Australia did. And didn’t do.

Which in simple terms was to recognise a potential (supposed) communist threat and potentially unstable nation on our doorstep and leave it to the Indonesians to remove that problem for us, in the full knowledge that they weren’t likely to observe the sorts of principles in fighting and occupying East Timor that we would.

Our government’s signals to Indonesia weren’t exactly veiled. It stood out like the proverbial dog’s balls at the time.

We’ve gone waaay OT here (and I did promise to stay away from politics):rolleyes:but - it would have gone according to plan if not for the Balibo Five. And I remember the fear and loathing which did the rounds when the RAN threw out the script - and produced their transcripts of Indon military radio transmissions ordering the executions.:shock:

Cheers,
Cliff

[Ww1-Jdh-Ww2]

The Browning Hi Power looks alot like the M1911 if u watch on the front side of the Pistol:lol:
I like the 7.65x21mm Parabellum much more than the 9mm:)
the M1911 is an Very old pistol But maybe on of the best !
i think it is sure the best of the 20st Century;)

[QUOTE][/QUOTE]

http://www.eliteukforces.info/images/sas/browning-high-power.jpg

http://world.guns.ru/handguns/1911a1.jpg

[visitor]

I know this is probably posted somewhere else in this forum so sorry if it’s a repost, for this small arms thread I’ll do my best to clear up the differences between the British L1A1 SLR and the Argentine clone of the Belgian FAL, whilst this in no way a definitive guide to all the differences between the L1A1 and FAL, in general this applies to any direct L1A1/FAL comparison (Israeli varints are not covered) so feel free to use the links or quote if you want to make a simliar post elswhere.

So what is the difference between a L1A1 also called an Inch pattern FAL and a origonal Belgain pattern FAL refered to as a Metric type?
A good start is this link - http://50ae.net/metric-vs-inch/ - not a complete comparison but a very good start.
A very good pictorial on the L1A1 can be found at -
http://imageevent.com/badgerdog/cgnmilsurpknowledgebase/fn1a1vsfnl1a1vsfnc1a1 - this compares an American replica of a British L1A1 to the Canadian C1A1 and a Indian 1A1.
To finish - http://www.milsurps.com/showthread.php?t=4285 - which apart from being the source of the pictorial above also includes a history of the FAL and a brief guide to it’s variants.

I hope this has been useful.

[mkillebrew]

@visitor

A good start is this link - http://50ae.net/metric-vs-inch/ - not a complete comparison but a very good start.

What’s missing?

[visitor]

Some internal details are not shown, primarily the L1A1 trigger mechanisms are slightly different internally and strip differently to the FAL see - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJRuTPiY6Ss - for a L1A1 trigger disassembly.
Also the cuts in the L1A1 bolt carrier evacuate particles through a gap in the bolt carrier rails the bigger gap from the side of the L1A1 magazine to the reciver compared to the FAL is to allow this. See the second link in my first post for the gaps in the bolt rails visible in the top down angle pictures of the recievers, also please see the top picture in the first link of the origonal post to see the FAL and L1A1 with magazines inserted placed side by side.

Another difference that’s in a way relavant to this topic is that the L1A1s long flash hider has a rear lug and smaller diameter tip to mount a knife bayonet, again this can be seen in the second link of the first post, FAL’s usually mount a socket type bayonet, the argentine FAL mounted a socket type. See - http://www.old-smithy.info/ - for just about anything to do with bayonets including a captured Argentine FAL bayonet and a variety of L1A1 bayonets from Britain and the Commonweath.

THE place to go for the FAL and L1A1 is - http://www.falfiles.com/index.php - I find it a very useful resource.

[mkillebrew]

Thanks, I’ll look more into it and update the page with the additional differences.

[visitor]

I know night vision is mentioned in this area of the forum so I did some searching and found this on the FAL files forums - http://www.falfiles.com/forums/showthread.php?threadid=194981 the link shows L1A1s with a variety of night vision fits, but you’ll have to register to see them all.

[visitor]

The images attached are not mine a big thank you to those who initially posted them on the various sites I found them on.

Ok have wanted to do this for a bit here’s a little bit on night vision in use by both sides in the Falklands lots on British equiptment, I havent yet found an english language source detailing Argentine kit.

First picture, this has already been posted by Panzerkacker in post 18 shows the FM FAP (heavy barrel FAL clone) this is depicted with a US AN/PVS-4 night vision sight a “GEN II” night sight with day/night adapter for use in daylight.

The next picture illustrates the British L1A1 with the IWS (Individual Weapon Sight) that could be fitted to a variety of British weapon systems It is shown with it’s US equivalent the “GEN I” AN/PVS-2 also mounted on a L1A1. the “Argentine sniper” in Panzerknacker’s post 14 has a AN/PVS-2 on a M14.

Third and fourth is another picture of a British L1A1 with IWS mounted.

Pictures of the conflict also show British soldiers with the SUIT (Sight Unit, Infantry, Trilux) a day/low light sight which has a tritium illuminated sighting reticule this is shown mounted to L1A1s in the next 2 pictures.

Last is the British Hythe sight, a replacement rear sight component for the L1A1 with a tritium insert for night combat, the rear sight has a second flip up leaf to give the user a tritium illuminated sight and there was a repalcement “trilux” front sight with a internal tritium vial.

If anyone has more on Argentine issued sights please post it.

[visitor]

Hi again could anyone tell me the distribution of MG’s (FAP/MAG/L4/L7) per platoon for the 2 sides please?