One imagines that the Yanks found the British bottoms both inviting and available for pinching and they, after all, were merely “filling in” for their British brethren.
This was bad and disastrous all right, and Churchill was especially pained at the loss of Poland because he of all people knew fully well the historical importance of that loss. He was desperate NOT to lose Poland but in fact neither he nor Roosevelt could actually do anything about it in the face of the Stalin’s fait accompli. Same with Czechoslovakia which Churchill desperately wanted to keep out of Soviet hands. Unfortunately, General Marshall told Eisenhower to forget about taking Prague, so it wasn’t contested. The allies did race to the Baltic in time to prevent the Soviets from also capturing Denmark, thank god.
True, Covenanter, but you were also stabbed in the back by the Germans big time. The definition of a Hobson’s choice would fit well with having to choose between the Germans and the Soviets.
To round out the list of blunders, one would have to include the disaster at Slapton Sands.
On one view, Australia’s biggest mistake was repeating its biggest mistake of WWI, being going to war automatically with Britain on the other side of the planet in a European war which had considerably less to do with us than it did with America, which wisely stayed out of the European war until the Austrian corporal declared war on the US.
But that was the sentiment of the times when we (apart from a significant component of Irish descendants and the odd person of clearer eye) generally thought of ourselves as British.
On another view, it was lucky that we did get involved in fighting the Nazis because it gave us three battle hardened divisions two of which, over Churchill’s desires to waste them elsewhere in another of his ill-considered frolics (Burma, which would have been even worse than his waste of one of those divisions in his earlier Greek adventure and about as bad as his loss of two brigades of a fourth Australian - the 8th - division in Malaya), returned to Australia in 1942 and were crucial in stopping the Japanese advance on us.
Every cloud has a silver lining.
But, alas, every silver lining usually has a cloud.
[Hope I got that right so far as quotes go. The first quote lacked an opening identifier, but I assumed from royal’s post that he was responding to it. Post a correction if I’m wrong and I’ll correct it.]
One of the problems with long threads and short memories is that I don’t know if I’ve (and probably someone else has) mentioned it in this or another thread, but not only did the IJN attack fleet maintain complete radio silence but the callsigns of the ships in it were assigned to ships in Japanese home waters which maintained normal radio traffic to give, quite successfully, the impression to the Americans etc that those ships were still no threat and certainly nowhere near Pearl Harbor.
The Americans, British and Dutch accurately identified the likely targets south of Japan but, although it was recognised that an attack on Pearl was possible, nobody on the Allied side in their wildest nightmares foresaw the risk of the attack which actually happened.
Right, RS. If memory serves, the Orange Plan for the US fleet was to sail out and defend the Philippines and maybe Guam, Wake and MIdway. Pearl Harbor was not contemplated as a likely target. There was little question that the US and its allies knew something was going to be attacked.
The irony, of course, is that the Japs sank only battleships and not a single carrier (which were out to sea); that they failed to launch a second strike which might have destroyed the vast oil storage tanks at Pearl; and that the Japanese had a failure of vision in not invading Hawaii at the same time. The greater irony was that the attack on Pearl ensured Japan’s defeat. A brilliantly executed first strike does not a victory make.
Because of the Canadian liberation of Holland, the Dutch still revere the Canuks for what they did. After the war, tens of thousands of Dutch emigrated eagerly to Canada which welcomed them with open arms.
Agree, Muscogee. Daylight Strategic Bombing was a great concept without the tools to make it a success. The Strategic Bombing Survey after the war showed that very few bombs, actually hit the intended targets. The Norden bombsight did not live up to expectations. Of course, this couldn’t have been known ahead of time, but after so many repeated calamitous losses to aircrew and equipment(the raids on Schweinfurt being an example) , perhaps they should have awakened to the facts in the number of men and planes that did not return. When the re-engined P51 came into service, odds of survival increased dramatically, although bombing accuracy did not.
Originally Posted by windrider
Well… from the “canadian” point of view … Relying on the Brits too much.
(I don’t feel canadian myself, being what they called a french-canadian, a “québécois”, proud descendant of the fighters who liberated the first french town in Normandy, Bayeux 1944).
While the Dieppe blunder is well documented, other strange things happened.
For example, during the liberation of Holland, the RAF bomber command denied repeated requests for attacks against fortified positions and concentration of troops*.
In effect, this resulted in frontal attacks on narrow roads surrounded by water, covered by deadly accurate german artillery fire all the way. Just because the RAF couldn’t divert a few bombers from the night raids on Germany (even the canadian squadrons). They basically told the commanders on the field to deal with it by themselve, or as we say in french : “arrangez-vous avec vos problêmes”.The result was nasty. No wonder the people from Holland still have a lot of respect for the veterans (few still living) who liberated their country, at the price of blood.
- It is well know how relunctant the bomber command was of tactical air support during the Normandy invasion, and how they were forced to, sort off, by Eisenhower. It is also well known how heavy bombing was a decisive factor in that particular campaign.
So, what in hell were they thinking???
Just my two cents, I’m curious to read your opinions on the matter.
Unfortunately strategic bombers are not much good being used in a tactical setting, they are wasteful in resources, destroy large areas making them a hinderance to the advance, provide lots of hidey holes for the defenders, when they were used you had as much of a chance of bombing your own troops as the enemy (even medium bombers suffered from this).
Much better to have the dedicated close air support of the Typhoons etc on call. The weather for large parts of 1944 were unsuitable for the aircraft working off of the advanced airstrips, many were waterlogged until the all weather runways, taxiways, hard standings etc.
The is a difference between the strategic bombers and the tactical aircraft. There may be some overlap with certain types of medium bomber but generally they can not do each others jobs.
You mean a third strike wave. And if they did, the number of planes would have dictated night carrier landing operations, something the Japanese Navy was not really trained for nor adept at. Also, it was recognized that the U.S. anti-aircraft fire was getting much more deadly by the end of the second wave (where most of the Japanese casualties occurred). It was feared that this would only intensify against low flying, unarmored Japanese aircraft. Lastly, the IJA had no idea where the carriers were that you mentioned, and they feared a counter-punch wave of both carrier and land based U.S. aircraft if they lingered…
An outstanding example being the Allied carpet bombing on 25 July 1944 at the start of Operation Cobra in Normandy in which the USAAF killed, among others, US Army Lt Gen Lesley McNair. Bombing their own troops was predicted in earlier planning when air force staff said that early waves of bombing could cause smoke and dust to obscure the target with the risk of later waves drifting into Allied lines, which is what happened. My recollection is that this is dealt with in The War Between the Generals by David Irving (written when he was a reputable historian).
While it is unfortunate that MccNair was killed, he–being one of the last, pious defenders of the dunderheaded “Tank Destroyer Doctrine”–was no great loss. It also should be noted that the operation was a success as it rendered a Panzer division completely combat ineffective and dazed like zombies. And many of the American losses were attributable to soldiers, and press, wanting to see a big show when they should have been underground. I recall something about Gen. McNair being out of his shelter because he was trying to find the jittery GI who accidentally stabbed his comrade with a bayonet IIRC…
I think the history surrounding what happened to France in WW2 is quite complicated and goes well beyond numbers and types of armaments. We should never forget that the reason the British were able to withdraw from Dunkerque at all is because the French fought a resolute and stalwart rear-guard action in front of that forlorn port giving the English the time to escape. The French often get dumped on in the screeds posted in this forum, but the French resisted longer than any other country invaded by the Germans at that point in the war, and, I would submit, if England had shared a common border with Germany instead of having a fortuitous channel in the way, it too would have fallen like an overripe apple into the Hun’s clutches. Without the luxury of trading space for time as did the Soviets, the French had no place to go.
Part of the reason for Britain’s perilous state of her Army was because the channel was there. It had always favored its Navy over the Army and with the advent of airpower the army got pushed into third place for money and resources. Even when it was decided that Britain needed a continental army, the army was promised half the money it needed and ended up with only a third of what was promised, this came at the time the government also said the Army had to raise and equip another 5 Territorial Divisions with no budget increase for them.
With no channel the decisions may have been different.
With no channel the Germans probably would have been in London.
Without the English Channel Europe would have looked different, Britain would have been part of the European mainland, part of its wars and lands for the centuries prior to WW2. Depending where in Europe the land mass of Britain was added would change a whole lot of things in parts of Europe.
The Channel coloured British and European politics for Centuries by affecting the way Britain acted with its neighbours, its policys abroad, it becoming a seafaring Empire. Therfore deciding its priorities on how to deal with nations, its defence spending (how much and on what and when).
With no channel Britain would possibly have been part of France so no Britain to be saved by any means (or France could have been part of Britain).
The simple fact is, it was there, Britain’s ideas, capability’s, defence, outlook was the way it was because it was there. Those that say the channel saved Britain would also have to change every other aspect of what happened in 1940 based on their never having been any channel so the effect that would have had on the whole European history.
Earlier someone was critical of the U.S. for not having a high opinion of the Japanese and thinking them incapable of attacking Pearl Harbor. I think this arrogance is borne out to some degree by the Japanese performance later in the war. For example, the Japanese failed to sink any American battleships after Pearl Harbor (and all but one of the battleships at Pearl Harbor were eventually repaired and recommissioned as far as I can tell) and they didn’t sink any American fleet carriers after 1942 while by contrast their navy was decimated by the end of the war. This inability to take out the enemy’s capitol ships along with suffering far heavier losses than American forces is not very impressive.
- I wrote that in 2008!
- Did you even read what I was replying to
(apologies for the slow reply - very busy few weeks)
Forgive me if I mention some things that have already been said as I haven’t read the whole thread, but a few of the biggies for the U.S.
- Just about total unpreparedness for the war at all.
- Pearl Harbor
- McArthur losing all the planes in the Phillippines
- Admiral Halsey twice. A. Putiing all his ships in the typhoon. B. Folling Japanese decoy ships north during the Phillippine Invasion.
- Kasserine Pass
- Slapton Sands incident.
- Bombingof Allied forces in Normandy
- A sickly Roosevelt trying to govern in 1944. He should have never run for re-election. The only positive was Truman as VP
And I could probably point out a whole lot more, but I think these were some big blunders.