Stalin guilty for the war

World War II Russian Military
#41

My recollection is that the French high command in 1940 was carefully ensconced in a centre remote from the battlefields with limited communications, and intentionally so, which caused a predictable failure to appreciate the situation on a rapidly moving and fluid battlefield and to deal with it.

My reasonably detailed knowledge is limited mainly to some Australian commanders to a slight degree in WWI and to a greater degree in Australian and American commanders in WWII in the Pacific. In every case in those wars (Monash in WWI, Blamey and MacArthur in WWII) the failure of senior commanders to go forward to appreciate the ground (the usually excellent Monash in aspects of assaulting the Hindenburg Line in WWI and Blamey and MacArthur in Papua - New Guinea on countless occasions from August 1942 onwards) resulted in tactical failures and or unnecessary casualties under pressure from ill-informed senior commanders remote from the battlefields when those commanders were, to a greater or lesser degree, pursuing wider personal motives to retain or advance their own positions.

#42

I think he trusted that he was smarter than Hitler, and refused to believe he had been bamboozled. :slight_smile:

He forbid his commanders to go on alert lest upsetting the Germans until at the very last moment and it was too late…

#43

Hitler was smart? Can you believe the smart guy will start a two-front campain which he couln’t win on definition.At least Stalin was enough smart to unite with former enemyes and join the alliance.

He forbid his commanders to go on alert lest upsetting the Germans until at the very last moment and it was too late…

He forbid them to be caught on german provocation, coz it was clear the Hitler was searching the pretex to attack. Yet don’t forget the US made the same mistake( specially or not) - you too been caught by Japaneses in PErl Harbour.

#44

I think the Germans and the French/British were not as far apart as has typically been accepted in the past. All of them had different classes of tanks and indeed the Germans also assault guns solely for infantry support. The desperation of the situation forced the Germans to essentially design what was a giant end around coup de main attack through the Ardennes. The Maginot was bypassed because:

The French hadn’t finished constructing the portions which were to border the Ardennes and Belgium.

The Belgian forts such as Eben-Emael were supposed to have held out for at least a week giving time for the Belgian Army to retreat to a redoubt and maintain their gov’t while maximizing German casualties. Emael fell after only a few hours because of specialized commando type sappers flying in on gliders in a daring surprise attack upsetting the entire lynchpin of their defense. If the Belgians had been more alert with more anti-aircraft guns, it could have been very different. The situation gave no respite to the Allied forces and the Germans were able to sow maximum confusion and sap the fuel reserves of the British and French forces sortieing into Belgium. The Allies also wasted much of their air forces sortieing over Belgium while much of the Luftwaffe was massed over the Ardennes. Despite propaganda for public consumption, neither the French nor Belgians had any illusions about fortified areas stopping the Germans, even the Maginot would eventually be compromised. They were to give time to mobilize and the real error was not fortifying the Meuse River Valley and Sedan enough, and manning it with second rate troops because of the belief that the Ardennes Forest acted as a natural barrier. Bigger, better, and more numerous fortifications inside the forest along the access roads almost certainly would have severally disrupted sickle-cut and the vehicles were in a very vulnerable traffic jam and unable to maneuver the logging roads were essentially funneling choke points. The belief that major rivers took one to two weeks to cross in anger as military theology was also a major hindrance to the French realizing the unfolding disaster quickly enough as they assumed the Germans would still be pinned down for a bit if the guessed wrong about Belgium.

As for France, the panzers were often far out ahead of the infantry but were only encountering fracturing resistance for the most part after some desperate early battles like Stonne. Once they had broken through the Sedan, the French had only piecemeal units to stop them with which were easily bypassed and their tanks were in the famous phrase “in penny packets” and wasted in small numbers against the panzer formations. There were cases where panzer troops had almost no infantry with them. They typically bypassed areas of resistance, then German infantry would follow along and essentially lay a mini-siege until the French forces were out of ammo. Towards the end, too little too late, General Weygand worked out a “hedge-hog defense” where stores and provisions were set in fortified towns and they were able to hold out and tie down large formations of German infantry for extended periods and interfere with the movements of panzers. It worked more or less. The problem was it essentially didn’t matter at that point because there was no armored strategic reserve to counter attack with. The second German plan of Fall Rot was sort of part two, and initiated a more conventional infantry and artillery battle to crush what remained of organized French resistance. Again, they met with some setbacks and fierce resistance in the hedgerows of the bocage.

Some say that the panzers outrunning the infantry is partially what allowed Dunkirk to be evacuated, because the areas around the port were marshy and tanks typically need infantry support for extended urban fighting…

#45

I think this quite likely if that’s the case…

#46

I think pdf covered it well and I agree with most of what he says, so I’ll add this: You’re thinking logically sir! In pure military logic, you are correct. The problem was that Gamelin had many political constraints on him. It would have been unacceptable for the French to simply abandon Belgium and the low countries. Gamelin also wanted to insure that he had access to the Dutch road networks and bridges and needed to secure them for what he eventually envisioned as a “grand” offensive in 1941 where a built up Anglo-French force would roll into Germany in a plan not dissimilar to Monty’s Market Garden operation.

Also, one thing that needs to be discussed in conjunction with the Maginot Line is the French imperative to keep casualties down while maximizing the ones on the Germans because of their lower birth rate necessitated this in a war of attrition.

The Germans did send some armor into Northern Belgium to hold the Allies there and pin them down, the metaphor most often used is the ‘cape and sword’ matador reference with France being the charging bull at the cape and the Ardennes offensive being the sword in the gut of France…

#47

It would be hard to dismiss Hitler and completely stupid. He was a conspiracist that believed what he wanted to believe, specifically that the U.S. was run by a secret Jewish shadow gov’t controlling FDR and the United States was his existential enemy and he needed the Soviet resources to achieve parity in production and resources. His logic was that the Soviet Union would collapse that no one would fight for the regime for very long and the “whole rotten structure” would collapse. Even more copious German generals like Halder believed if Germany reached the Dnieper-Deviester Rivers, they’d win the war by trapping and crushing most of the Red Army. They had underestimated the Red Army by nearly 100 divisions and never accounted for their reserves in Siberia adequately.

He forbid them to be caught on german provocation, coz it was clear the Hitler was searching the pretex to attack. Yet don’t forget the US made the same mistake( specially or not) - you too been caught by Japaneses in PErl Harbour.

That’s a silly reason to give. Massed, mobilized troops on the border aren’t looking for a pretext. Especially when Stalin received and discounted numerous, unrelated sources of intelligence warnings of the attack and his own commanders on the ground pleading to take their defensive positions.

Of course the U.S. made mistakes at Pearl Harbor. The difference is they had no clear warnings and had no idea where the Japanese carriers were. Stalin knew right where his enemy was!

#48

You mean Hitler didn’t know that “secret shadow gov” is called the AIPAC;)
well it’s not really a big secret for every kid in US.:mrgreen:

and he needed the Soviet resources to achieve parity in production and resources. His logic was that the Soviet Union would collapse that no one would fight for the regime for very long and the “whole rotten structure” would collapse. Even more copious German generals like Halder believed if Germany reached the Dnieper-Deviester Rivers, they’d win the war by trapping and crushing most of the Red Army. They had underestimated the Red Army by nearly 100 divisions and never accounted for their reserves in Siberia adequately.

yes, but why they decided to attack, still having war with Britain in back?I think Hitler was in hury , he though the time was out for Germany- from one side the British Empire with US more and more involving into he war on british side ( supplies was start in yearly 1940 although formally US was “out of war”). From other side- the growing USSR which Hitler was sure( or someone make him to be sure) burned by desire to attack the GErmany. He though the Barbarossa was only the chance for GErmany not to lose war with British-American alliance. But that plan was damn risky and , say Erich von Mainstain critized Hittller for that.

That’s a silly reason to give. Massed, mobilized troops on the border aren’t looking for a pretext. Especially when Stalin received and discounted numerous, unrelated sources of intelligence warnings of the attack and his own commanders on the ground pleading to take their defensive positions.

The warmings were quite unclear. Some sources gives the june , some claims the attack would be in may. Nothing concrete.
When the date was more or less known - 22 june , the Stalin gives few secret orders dated 18 june to western troops to be ready for possible attack. 22 only soviet western front suffers a collaps - the Nothern front faced the enemy in full combat readness , the Southern front even launch the counter attack to the Romania , but later withdrow if fear of surround. The soviet baltic and black sea fleets were ready for batle as well. The ONLY western front ( belorussia) faced the mehanized german armades in superior quantity and quality.Nothing there that STalin could change or infly.Far not all the soviet troops faced the beginning of war beeing uncompetency, but as pdf states - “they had the numbers, the kit and to some extent the right tactics and strategy, but their officer corps was full of clowns”. That was very fairly for Red Army command stuff of 1941.

Of course the U.S. made mistakes at Pearl Harbor. The difference is they had no clear warnings and had no idea where the Japanese carriers were. Stalin knew right where his enemy was!

No difference- Stalin didn’t know for sure untill the last weeks before the attack. And FDR knew for at least three days before the attck but nothing was done.

#49

:mrgreen:

Touche…

yes, but why they decided to attack, still having war with Britain in back?I think Hitler was in hury , he though the time was out for Germany- from one side the British Empire with US more and more involving into he war on british side ( supplies was start in yearly 1940 although formally US was “out of war”). From other side- the growing USSR which Hitler was sure( or someone make him to be sure) burned by desire to attack the GErmany. He though the Barbarossa was only the chance for GErmany not to lose war with British-American alliance. But that plan was damn risky and , say Erich von Mainstain critized Hittller for that.

I don’t disagree. But Germany didn’t have many options as an amphibious operation needed for an invasion of Britain was well beyond the capability of the Kriegsmarine, and the Luftwaffe had begun to crack a bit under the pressure of a strategic air campaign in was neither designed, nor trained to carry out. The FDR Administration had been tacitly supporting the British and had sold large stocks of weapons to the French before the collapse. There were also extensive naval incidents between U.S. Navy destroyers and u-boats, including the torpedoing if a USN destroyer than killed over 100 sailors. It was a matter of time. The invasion was a desperate gamble to knock the Soviet Union out before Britain could again become an offensive threat and the U.S. could fully mobilize its decrepit but rapidly improving armed forces…

The warmings were quite unclear. Some sources gives the june , some claims the attack would be in may. Nothing concrete.
When the date was more or less known - 22 june , the Stalin gives few secret orders dated 18 june to western troops to be ready for possible attack. 22 only soviet western front suffers a collaps - the Nothern front faced the enemy in full combat readness , the Southern front even launch the counter attack to the Romania , but later withdrow if fear of surround. The soviet baltic and black sea fleets were ready for batle as well. The ONLY western front ( belorussia) faced the mehanized german armades in superior quantity and quality.Nothing there that STalin could change or infly.Far not all the soviet troops faced the beginning of war beeing uncompetency, but as pdf states - “they had the numbers, the kit and to some extent the right tactics and strategy, but their officer corps was full of clowns”. That was very fairly for Red Army command stuff of 1941.

No difference- Stalin didn’t know for sure untill the last weeks before the attack. And FDR knew for at least three days before the attck but nothing was done.

I believe Stalin also threatened to execute any commander that deployed to battle positions.

There’s nothing ground breaking nor new in the article and the warning thing is all old hat and easily misunderstood. In fact it was more than three days. But the end of November, 1941, the Administration knew that war with Japan was inevitable. The question was, “where?”. The U.S. believed the Japanese incapable of a coup de main air strike all the way to Hawaii, and felt the war would begin with a naval ambush in the Philippines…

#50

Was the amphibious operation really neded is a still an option. The Donetz argued Hitler to support the sea blocade over the British Islands by u-boat warfare should be very enough to cause the famine and force the UK soon out of war finally.But the massive american supplies to Britain has made the Donetz’s plan doubtful.Germany coun’t build the u-boats as fast a the US destroyers begin to sink them since 1942. Theoretically , if the Eastern front hasn’t been stupidly opened- the Germany migh have more chances to stand agains Britih-American coalition, having the soviet grain and oil supplies behind.

I believe Stalin also threatened to execute any commander that deployed to battle positions.

Far not much commanders have been executed in early period of war. Entire soviet devisions had deployed it’s position becouse of the quick german assault and front-line collaps, repidly retreating. The Military tribunals actually has executed the few of death penalties of soviet top commanders - the general Pavlov among them. But that was just resault of it’s military incompetency which leads to the fatal loses of troops for the most first hours of war.The situation , you imply, come in mid 1942 , folowing the famouse order “No step back” which give the right to Military tribunals to execute the any commander which left the positions without order. But that was a really most dramatical and critical period of war, moreover if happend after the the simular Heer’s orders which should increase, as planned, the troops discipline.

There’s nothing ground breaking nor new in the article and the warning thing is all old hat and easily misunderstood. In fact it was more than three days. But the end of November, 1941, the Administration knew that war with Japan was inevitable. The question was, “where?”. The U.S. believed the Japanese incapable of a coup de main air strike all the way to Hawaii, and felt the war would begin with a naval ambush in the Philippines…

Sure, there is nothing serious. But this case just demonstrates how relictant the gov’ heads might be to the any intelligence datas that can lead to the war. Note, although the US could even read the Japane secrets codes - they still didn’t realize nothing to prevent the “innevitable” attack. The intelligence services datas often migh been mistaken of even fake even TODAY ( remember the Iraqi mdw?). So , this case with Pearl Harbor just proves that if even Stalin’t information was 200% real - no guaranty he could do anything.

#51

Te US couldn’t read all the Japanese codes and only then imperfectly… they had to use a ruse, for example, to get the Japanese to identify Midway as their target when the time came.

Yes, the Iraqi “intelligence” concerning WMD was a complete fake from start to finish. Shame on us.

#52

Think for a moment what non-participation of the USSR meant for the Western allies.

Years more of war, far more casualties than we can ever imagine or ‘handle’, a strong Soviet Union ready to sweep in and grab everything from the winner.

I’d say, considering German plans by people like Brauchitsch and Halder for a “pre-emptive” against the Soviets in 1940, that the USSR acted in a manner that looked after their own best interests first, just as their Western Alliance ‘brothers’ would have in the same position.

If we had acknowleged Soviet sacrifice and sheer guts a lot sooner after May 1945, there might not have been a Cold War, and all that went with it.

The more I read about the USSR, the more I firmly believe they acted with the one enemy they knew they were going to face at some stage, with Germany firmly at the forefront of their minds at all times.

During the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin exchanged raw materials (oil, grain, manganese) for German naval and other military technology. The Germans soon got wind of the fact that the Soviets were not going to give away anything technical at all. Who played who?

Mikhail Tuchachevsky (before he was purged, and as his contribution to the First and Second five Year Plans) campaigned significantly and successfully for the Red Army to have absoulte industrial priority for the raw materials the Soviets did possess. It enabled them to turn out tanks in numbers that even Hitler had cause to tell Marshall Mannerhiem of Finland in 1943, “If we had known they could produce x amount of tanks in one year, we would never have invaded.”…or words very much to that effect.

I would definately say for all his internal crimes, Josef Dugashvali had the interests of the Soviet Union in mind for the long term. He definately wanted to see a better future for Russian and Slavic peoples than as ‘untermenschen’ slaves and serfs, as the Germans planned.

What did the Soviet people think?

My favourite comment, by God knows who…

“During the Great Patriotic War, we had a choice between two dictators. We preferred the one that spoke Russian.” :lol:

Read around before you rubbish the Soviets and their contribution to making your comments possible.

Jeremy Clarkson.