Talk about reinforcing failure! Churchill strikes again!

[Ardee]

@JR11

The comparison with Lincoln is interesting. … His great problem for much of the early part of the war was that of persuading his “military experts” actually to fight, and to do so in a manner reflective of their alleged skills and of the substantial material advantages enjoyed by the Union. This was complicated by … the defection of a disproportionate number of the more skilled professional officers to the Confederacy, the cadre of Union Army generals were often pure “political” generals, or by generals as interested in their political constituencies and/or political prospects as they were in fighting. That complex figure of McClellan is a notable case. McClellan clearly disliked Lincoln; saw himself, indeed, as a political rival to Lincoln with Presidential prospects; and enjoyed a degree of political support even within Lincoln’s cabinet. Also, while he was widely perceived as a person possessing great military skills, he appears to have been an innately cautious commander, a caution perhaps amplified by a desire to avoid embarrassing defeats that might undermine his political prospects. Whatever about the latter, his innate caution can hardly be doubted. …

Hi JR. Not sure I want to risk going too far off the WWII topic, but it can also be fun… The American Civil War is sometimes referred to as the first modern war, with everything from rifles to submarines to railroads and telegraphs. Warfare itself was undergoing profound change. McClellan, as you say, had a healthy dose of caution: he routinely overestimated Confederate forces, stating his army was in fact considerably out numbered, etc. There was also a Napoleonic influence in how the Armies would advance, engage, and then retire after heavy engagements to recover – allowing considerable time to pass before the next campaign. I think at least some of the reluctance to fight you mention for the north has connection to this notion of maneuver in order to fight major decisive battles. In any case, Grant changed that, believing in long-term closure with the enemy, finally bringing Union superiority of numbers and resources to bear in battles of attrition (shades of WWI). But I’m not sure if I’m reading you right when you talk about political generals and a disproportionate number of skilled officers going south. Yes, Union regiments were raised by rich men with political ambitions – Gen. Sickles, who with his incompetence nearly won the battle of the Gettysburg (and maybe the war) for the south is a classic example. But the Union also had a high number of professional soldiers trained at West Point (the US Military Academy), and I believe the Union had considerably more generals with professional West Point backgrounds (and as top students!) than the south. McClellan certainly had political ambitions, and ran against Lincoln for the Presidency – but I’m not sure when those ambitions developed. Were they there before the war, or did they emerge from the constant egging on he got from Lincoln’s detractors? I’d have to spend time researching to find out, if you’re not sure. McClellan was certainly contemptuous of Lincoln, but he was also a West Pointer, and in theory at least, one of the best military minds around. In reality, perhaps one of his more helpful (if uncomfortable) contributions to the military was the cavalry saddle that bears his name. (Okay, that’s unfair – he is actually credited with instilling the Union Army with the discipline, training, and organization that it needed to win.)

But what also struck me about your post was your comment on McClellan’s excessive caution – his egotism, his desire to compile a massive, overwhelming force before he would commit to battle, and his constant delays in the face of political pressure to attack the enemy. Does that remind you of anyone Churchill had to work with?

[Ardee]

@herman2

If Churchill were alive today do you think he would garnish the same type of respect and loyalty that he did back then?

Smoking had an entirely different social context then versus now. Churchill may have had the moxie to pull off his habit in public today and make it work. If not, he was a good enough politician that he’d probably do what today’s smoking politicians do – i.e., not smoke in public. In the war room? Out of the public eye, he’s the boss and could do what he wants. With today’s ventilation systems, it might not even be an issue (and you can also look at JR’s story about Lincoln, Grant and Whiskey above). Beyond that – I fear you may be wandering even further off topic than JR and I were!

[leccy]

@JR11

A few thoughts on this interesting thread. Regarding Churchill’s reinforcement of failure in France, it is worth noting that he was under very heavy pressure from the pro-war leaders of the French government - who, in turn, were under increasing threat from a defeatist element that could not, for political reasons, be excluded from government - to supply ever-more help to the failing French army, and was (as has been commented) most anxious to secure this group by helping as much as possible so as to keep France in the war, both in Europe and overseas. It could actually have been worse - one factor in his refusal to send even more fighter assistance to France was the adamantine resistance of Fighter Command chief Sir Hugh Dowding to such a move; without this, the RAF advance expeditionary force might easily have been further reinforced. He made other serious mistakes - easy, again, to say in hindsight, but there is a strong argument that he would have been better to allow Wavell to employ the main force of his Middle Eastern Command to crush the Italians in North Africa when he had the chance, rather than diverting resources from North Africa to Greece and the Balkans. There were others.

Hindsight is always a bugbear and often used to blame people for making mistakes at the time which are obvious with use of hindsight.

The RAF was just not strong enough to face the Luftwaffe on the mainland in 1940, even when the French Airforce was at its strongest it would have required the full RAF to be deployed to inadequate bases in France to even come close to matching its strength. Much of the RAF and a major proportion of the French Airforce was obsolete and totally outclassed by the majority of the German airforce.

Politically there was no way the 500+ RAF fighters in 39 Squadrons (a mix of Hurricanes, Gladiators, Defiants, Blenheim’s and still a few Harts with Spitfires just starting volume production(although slow still to produce) could be sent, 13 Squadrons were sent in the end consisting mostly of Hurricanes with some Gladiators and Blenheims (the Blenheim 1F seem to be mixed with the bombers though) with others operating from the UK. Losses were high and mostly due to the airstrips being over run.

Air power on its own would be no good, it could not make up for the strategic and tactical deficiences or lack of training and equipment on the allied side.

There is doubt that the British Commonwealth Forces could have defeated the Italians in North Africa, the troops were willing to fight and were on a roll but the equipment was struggling and the supply lies were stretched past breaking point, increasing amounts of reliance was placed on captured Italian supplies and vehicles - Italian tanks, vehicles, supplies, artillery were all pressed into service to make up for increasing shortfalls.

Italian units were not the walk over most assume and were still fighting hard in places even if the tactics were poor, the equipment was generally equal to or superior to much of the British supplied equipment (especially since it was increasingly being supplemented by italian equipment). They were closer to their main bases while the British Commonwealth were stretched far from theirs.