Tanks of France.

World War II Other Military Units
#41

Incidentally, it should be noted that the Germans later used the captured Char B1s as flammenpanzers by replacing the 75mm gun with a nice, flamethrower. How extensive it was and how many there were, I do not know…

There were 24 B1 tank converted in Flampanzers.

The germans used almost any kind of french tracked and half tracked vehicle for conversion in specializated armor as self propelled howitzers, tankhunters, observation, personel carrier. Even some types the of lorries were armored and given to units stationed behind the atlantic wall, the name of this variants exceed the 100, almost deserve a topic for its own.

A little know fact is the french also toyed with the B1 flamethrowing tank, at list one prototipe was made in 1939.

#42

Go to this link

http://www.chars-francais.net/new/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=672&Itemid=78

Scroll down to 1937 and there is a small photograph of the partially built prototype of the G1. Projected for production in late 1941-42 this had a four many crew, high powered 75mm gun (by 1940 standards), and a low dome shaped turret similar to the Soviet T54 of a decade hence.

#43

The German garrison on the formerly British English Channel Islands also had a few improved/modified Char B1s according to Wiki. But these were not Flammenpanzers, but tanks with applique armor…

#44

Go to this link
http://www.chars-francais.net/new/in…=672&Itemid=78

Scroll down to 1937 and there is a small photograph of the partially built prototype of the G1. Projected for production in late 1941-42 this had a four many crew, high powered 75mm gun (by 1940 standards), and a low dome shaped turret similar to the Soviet T54 of a decade hence.

Interesting thanks, a tank commander and a gunner inside the turret, that is an improvement, I guess the end came to fast for France, no time to get a fully manned tank in service.:rolleyes:

#45

Specifications Renault R-35.

This was a light/medium tank for infantry support. Armor equivalent to the panzer III in this design.The main low velocity old ( extracted from WW1 FT17s) 37mm gun fired and effective high explosive and case shot.



#46

The tank killers. Source “Juin 1940 le impossible soursat”, Trackstory.

#47

That 47mm gun the French brought out just before the war was really effective against German tanks; the problem a lot of the towed infantry models had was that the ammunition trucks couldn’t go where they could.

How effective was the W15?

#48

Suposedly they destroyed several german tanks in the last combats of the war, but very few survived.

And the 47mm gun was very good, with a muzzle velocity of 850 mps was roughly like a pak 38.

#49

Thanks.

I find it strange that France was the first nation to attempt to mechanize forces in WWI and then forgot their lessons

#50

It’s called “To rest on one’s laurels” ^^

#51

More on the 47mm Laffly “Tuers de char” source same as before.

#52

If Rommel had to lead the french after adopting nationality in 1940 I guess Hitler was blast aside in a week… The weapons the frenchies had were excellent. really excellent. If only they had concentrated their armor as a reaction force they could have pentrated the German advance themselves.

Strategy and tactics Strategy and tactics Strategy and tactics …

#53

Hello,

Sorrry to disagree!

Let us see just the tanks!

1/ The french tank crew layout was far from the ideal with the one/two man turret the commander was overemployed with non-comamred tasks!
2/ Also the low speed of the (non Souma) tanks allowed the german field artillery to destroy them with non-AT guns!

sincerely:
TGR

#54

Of course. You are right.

I was, however, talking about the weapons in general and the tactics in general.
In fact, history has proven by the hand of the germans in WWII two things:

  1. you cannot change the war with fantastic design only
  2. you cannot decide about loss or victory only looking at inferiority of material.

The truth is the allies in 1940:

  • had weapons with enough quality. especially artillery orientated. yet they were very clumsy in handling their power.
  • had the quantity on their side from the beginning (till the end).
  • suffered on the other hand a backset in morale and psychology and were dealing with domestic politics.
#55

Disagree on all 3 1940 truths.

We were dismally behind in quantity, quality, and in America, public desire to be involved in any of those things.

Circumstances forced us to rise to the occaision.
The results were a fantastic whirlwind of concepts, development, production and implementation of vast numbers of assets.
Unprecidented in history.

We supplied many of our allies and carried all that equipment and manpower to the corners of the earth.

Leaving out politics and nationality issues.
Simply a feat never before approached in history.

#56

First of all, the US were not an ally in 1940. They remained neutral till end 1941.
Second, the remark on public desire is exactly my third point.
Finally, all numbers I have read tell the same story: there was never a point where the Germans outnumbered the Allies, be it in men or in material.

I think the blitzkrieg period is indeed a very important strategical and tactical lesson in history since it remains fascinating how the western allies (UK + France) did not achieve in halting the germans. There are no technical excuses for men to leave their tanks once they see a swasitka. But in a nutshell: that’s what the nlitzkrieg was all about. There was no connection what so ever between western political elite and the people they wanted to “preserve”. The western leaders created incidentaly a dangerous enigma towards their own people around a “german war machine” even before it was a fact. Small war fatigue led to big war atrocity.

#57

The close air support was unexpected and well-done by the germans.
For the time they left the tanks they got several air raids from Stuka’s.
The Germans came from the unexpected direction, and were better trained .
They dared to shoot to tanks with machine guns and useless 2 cm or 3,7 cm guns, BUT these shoots (richocet or not) created so awful noise inside (bell effect in welded turrets and hull) that they were happy to leave the devil machines. The not so creative, politically driven military leaders moved them north and south, no motivation, no desire, no self-esteem…
OK just examples (Arras was a different stroy) but the picture is not so black and white.

But you are right, no escuses for the “sitting war”.

regards:
TGR

#58

I agree with you to an extent – the poor French tank commander had too much to do against his German counterparts. Not to mention that he had no radio and was usually outnumbered and had little training in tank vs. tank combat. The very layout of French tanks points to poor strategy and tactics…

However, we can attribute much of this to the reactionary French approach to “methodical battle” and the overall thinking that the infantry was still the center of battle with tanks existing mostly for support…

#59

Excuse me but the Frech Char B2 and Somua did have radios. Had had the frenchs some concentrated armored divisons at the german or english stile the story may be different, the French had their oportunity to win the war when Germany was engaging Poland with all his armor and most aircrafts in september 1939.

#60

The French Army was mobilizing its painfully complex system of reserves in September 1939, and was little more than a semi-trained force that was more ominous on paper than it was in the flesh. We tend to forget that the French had less than 200,000 hardcore professionals as a training cadre and that the Republic espoused a “peoples’ army” ethos.

By the time they launched the “Saar Offensive,” the Germans were already withdrawing their panzers and aircraft from Poland. And it’s highly debatable as to how far the French would have gotten attacking into a depression with few good roads…