The air war.

Other Wars Falklands/Malvinas War
#221

Sounds like you might have been lucky as the radar they were after was the ANTPS 43 Westinghouse, though I would imagine they’d have gladly attacked your radar anyway. The main issue as the RAF saw it, was the Shrike they were using needed the radar to continue transmitting and the operators were always sharp enough to simply turn off the radar and not play.

Among the reasons they wanted to take the 3-D radar out was that it always provided a warning to the C-130 supplying the islands making it difficult for the Sea Harrier to interdict those flights. They did try to spoof the radar by flying out as a pair in close formation, then splitting up with one of the pair returning to the carrier. Did you guys spot that - the tactic didn’t work by the way.

In addition, I’ve read a lot about a radar on West Falkland, do you know anything of that?

#222

I never heard about a Radar on West Falklnads , could they be talking about a RASIT Infantry Ground Radar ? There was no Aircraft Sourvillance Radra on West Falklands -

I did not understand the question about Radra Spoot - A PAC flying very close one to each other and then splitting , returning one of the airplanes to the Carrier -

#223

Spoof means fool or confuse, falso.

The idea is that two aircraft in very close formation appears as one echo, they then use terrain masking to hide the formation break, with one aircraft returning to the Carrier and the other attempting to interdict the C-130. Didn’t prove to be a successful tactic.

For info, 801 Naval Air Squadron were convinced there was a surveillance radar on West Falkland.

#224

Regardin west islands , there was nothing there up to my knowledge , it either was a Rasit Infantry Radra or an air observation post with radio only -

Regardin PACs , since carriers were east of Falklnads , they did not have any other option than taking off the carriers and heading west towards the islands , and no matter how low they try to fly they were spoted - They did some flying behind the hills just north of Stanley and attack by surprise from the north , but they had been tracked and we knew they were there -

When PACs were coming close to shore , I would say that even flying very close one to the other , you should be able to tell if they were one or two -

When at knight Helo took o the carrier , you very clearly see both , the ship and the Helo even though that Helo was just lifting from the ship -

This will give you an idea of how well we were able to see -When we shot at ships with the 155 mm guided by us we clearly saw the splash on the water , and of course the ship - That splash in the water is seen for two antena turns ( each antena turn took 10 seconds ) - If you work out with normal video , no filters , no MTI its amazing how clear you can see details -

#225

Argentine Air Force Helicopters:

Some info about the AAF helos in the war. ( sorry no translation available here)

The couple of Chinooks deployed in the isles survived the war.

#226

Thanks for the information, it surprises me how much you could see. Later in the war the carriers moved East so you must have had difficulty then? The reason I ask is that the Harriers would conduct a low level egress from the carriers to hide the carrier location. It seems to have worked as on May 30 the attempted attack on Invincible hit completely the wrong location. Costly though as we lost 3 Harriers doing that.

#227

Hello Reydelcastillo, and thank you for some very interesting posts, it’s heartening to see that the mature members can correspond politely with one another.

Reference the 155 gunline you were directing, did you use rdo comms or fd telephones ?

It’s also interesting that you could still see the echo of the splash for over ten seconds of rotation, was that due to droplet reflection & if so what kind of problems did you experience with rain/sea clutter ?

#228

Hello everybody,

Such interesting thread, it is incredible the ammount of interesting information that can be shared thanks to the net. It helps us to understand and hopefully not make the same mistakes.

I would be a happy man if Enrique could explain a bit better how was that case of directing firo of the 155 mm section. I am proud to say that my father company manufactured the elevation gearboxes for the firt 56 howitzers of 155 mm, at that time known as “SOFMA”. I did activelly participated in the “task” and I remember how estrict the quality standards were, every single material should be backed by a laboratory as well as tolerances, termal treatments and functioning, I am proud to say that the EA was extremelly happy with our geraboxes and there was not a single complain.:slight_smile: We worked our backs off then.:slight_smile:

#229

Thank for your words -
Its a Pleasure andf Honor to be able to post in Your Forum

My Respects Enrique Rey del Castillo

The identification as poster is my last name -

#230

Allow me to go back with Long Range regarding the PACS that took of and travel certain distance at low level before gaining altitude to missinform their position regardin the Radar -

Then I will gladly describe what I remember on the 155

Thank you Enrique

#231

Very intrestying , they then were aware that knowing were the ecos lift off and landed , we would be able to track the Carriers -
Yes it was that way , certain days porevious to the attacks on Carriers ( without us knowing about it ) we were requested to update info on the PACs every 30 seconds , ( They i am refering to the PCDA/CIC in the islands ) - By constantly updating that info , they had a rough idea were the carriers were -
I did not know that on purpuse the Pilots stay low when lift off and presumly then flew low some miles before landind to hide the exact position of the carriers -

Let me ask you , you mention a lost of 3 airplanes on the 30th of may , can you tell me the circunstances in which they were lost?

Thank You , Regards Enrique

#232

Some time ago , talking in the Forum Key Publishing aviation that belongs to the United Kingdom , we ( well it was not actualy me , it was the members of that forum ) that came to the conclusion that I would be able to see the PACs at about 90 NM when they reach 3,500 of altitude - They made all the math and came to that conclusion -

#233

Note : It’s 3,500 Feet not meters that the PAC had to be at , in order to be seen at 90 NM - From the first Position on top of Sapper Hill , and I think it was that if they stay at 3,500 I would be able to see them when they were at about 70 NM from the second position -

#234

You ask me how did we transmit info , if by base line or radio , I will tell you wright now , but let me ask you :

Cuts were you the one on top of the Phone posts , that everyone saw when British Artillery was hitting us ?
It was talked about it in all the islands , how come they send someone to repair the phone lines (civil phone lines ) in the middle of a battle ?

From Sapper Hill by radio and mirowave that was install by Air Force , direct link to PCDA/CIC

From the second position , Radio and military line installed by my people

#235

This may be uncomfortable to answer - but did you hit any ships/craft?

#236

No we did not hit any ship , we did hit close to them , in a few minutes i will give you the detail of how was it that we did it -

Regards Enrique

#237

I’m sorry its NickDFresh from Bufalo / New York
My Apolagise -

#238

Regarding 155 mm

Since the begining of the conflict , Daily Naval bombardment , was hamering the troops almost every night , by mid may 1982 a mate of mine with whom we did the Military School , was in charge of the 155 mm canons - One night I receive a call from him , he tells me that he was going to give ita try and shoot one ground towrds the ships , I tell him the positions of the ship , and he shoots - I was able to see the explosion in the water , I had always been able to see the ships , so nowe it was a matter of making the prediccion and try to hit the ship with the 155 - At first we didn’t even come close , anyway it was a psicological help in the islands , we all feel that we could retaliate -
We tried a couple of days , it was imposible , we did not have a clue about ships ,much less when it was moving - So the PCDA/CIC Triple A Air post Comad) assigns me a Naval Oficer , that was a year younger than me , we had the equivalent rank - This Oficer who came to be my friend , a wounderfull Person , very knowledgeble reported to the Radar one night , I told him what was going on , and told him our intentions - He gave to me a brief explanation of how ships operate and do the naval bombardment -
I got him a pen and paper and told him , I will look for the ship , you do the firing - For every shot he did the math , sitting by my side ploting the ships and giving the firing instructions - As nights went on , we were improving , hitting each time closer - We sepend so many nights , with our helmets to the neck waitting for retalation from the ships , whish created a wounderfull friendship - He is still on duty , he is a very courage person , he is actually the Comander of the Argentine Ocean Fleet - He must be 4th or 5th in rank in the navy - Brillant person -
We new that at some point we were going to be targeted by ships because of that - And we were targeted on the night of June 11 -

When shooting at ships , which you see very clearly on the screen , if you work out the radar with normal video , no MTI , no filters , you can clearly see the impact of a big caliber gun when its amo expodes =

#239

One anecdotic thing regarding ships on naval bombardment -

On may 01 I was on top of Sapper Hill , wright at the bottom and a little bit to the south east the Roland was placed giving Air Protection to the Radra - On the afternoon of may 01 . ships came in for naval bombardment , they start the naval bombardment , then comes in an Air Attack guided by the Air Force Radra - At that moment and before the Air Force attack the ships , the Roland Operator had engaged one ship , after some time , after the war ended , the operator told me that he had engaged a ship , but did not fire because it was going to be a long shot , and he had doubts the missil would reach the ship since it was going to be traveling at very low altitude and it could hit anything ( wave ) in between him and the ship - Besides he had only ten missils and the conflict had just began -

#240

No pal, that would normally be a Liney’s job - definitely not this callsign, it sounds downright dangerous ! :smiley:

I think it’s because useful Int was collected from eyes on the ground.

Thanks.