The Matilda, queen of the desert.

The engine were diesels, but 2 stroke diesel, a very rare one, specially for that time. It had the advantage of fewer parts tha the usual 4 stroke engine, but is a bit tricky to repair and requires a very clean air to work properly.

I suppose the air cleaners in this tank were very good, few complains reported in that aspesct.

Thanks PK. I thought that was particularly interesting, as I didn’t know what the motor looked like.

Panzerknacker.
What you write makes perfect sense.

Churchill.
I bet that Matilda was jealous of the double-deckers top speed!

Thank you lads.

Some squematics, external stowage, turret, and driver location.

Maybe a stupid question…is that cylinder at the rear of the tank an external fuel tank? Just want to be sure.

Probably.

Definately!

It is, in the pictures is rarely seen with that attachment though.

Track repair.

[QUOTE=Panzerknacker;141296]It was better armored than anything the the Us had in that time , for sure. But I guess since the tank was not suited for cavalry like penetrations it didnt fit in US tank doctrine./QUOTE]

Yes, I can imagine the US Cav’s reaction. They had control of US armoured doctrine at the time, I believe. Absurdly, because of a political decision not to build tanks (US public opinion was very isolationist at the time), 1930s procurement requests had to call them “combat cars”. The Matilda 2 would hardly have been welcome in 1940, when Chaffee and Patton were emphasising speed and exploitation.

Cheers,
Cliff

Well, I guess the concept of speed was right, the speed was the engine behind the Blitzkrieg too, however the US tank of that time were too lightly armored and too lightly armed to do real harm in other than soft skinned targets once achieved the penetration. ( that is if they achieved to penetrate a defensive screen, thing that is doubtful considering its characteritics)

The sturdy Matilda in the other hand, was the only tank of the time wich could survive frontal attacks against enemy emplacements, and hold on the penetration defending the acompanying infantry from a enemy tank attack.

British tactic wasnt that bad after all, the problem is that to be really sucessful it required of a static enemy waiting to be attacked like in Bardia, Nibeiwa, Sidi Barrani, Capuzzo…of the werstern front in 1918.

If the enemy tanks are constantly in the move and supported by heavy AT guns ( like in the case of Afrika Kors) the Matilda efectiveness is greatly undermined of course.

I’m reading Antony Beevor’s Crete and will have some comments on the Matildas and their overall mixed performance on the island. So I’m returning this thread to active duty…

Did the matildas actually fired in anger in that island ? i knew there were a dozen of mark IIs but I thought that armor was overrun by german paratroopers. By the way is good to see most of the photos in this topic had actaully survived, in many other they dont. :smiley:

My recollection of the Crete campaign is that tanks would have played quite a minor part in what was reduced to numerous small infantry contacts, although often quite bitterly fought and at times involving Cretans as fighters, over a couple of hard weeks.

A dozen, or even several dozen, tanks scattered over the island wouldn’t have been able to change the result.

Well, they could be used as mobile fire support for the kiwis , purely fighting agaist infantry, the Matilda armor cannot be defeated by the ridiculous 8mm antitank rifles wich some nazi paratroopers carried, the terrain didnt help much for tank mobility either.

There were several Matildas on Crete, maybe around a dozen. I believe Freyberg’s aim was to station at least two tanks at each major strategic target of the Germans (i.e. airbases). Typically, they were to be kept as sort of a strategic reserve in each area and generally were held back unless the the local Commonwealth commanders felt they were losing control or unless they could center a counterattack. The two Matildas at what turned out to be the most strategic point of the Maleme airfield suffered the fate of many of the tanks - they both suffered turret failures and one became logged in the rocky terrain. Unfortunately, Beevor reports that all of the tanks on the island were leftovers from the Western Desert and were in poor mechanical states requiring overhauls that could not be done on Crete. Also at Maleme, one of the Matildas had the wrong ammunition on board (I’m assuming Beevor meant the 7.92mm machine gun ammo was mistakenly left out for perhaps .303 rounds, but he doesn’t specify whether it was the machine gun or cannon). In fact, the Matildas did have some success against paratroops lacking arms and in some cases even ran over unfortunate Germans. I believe the final major Allied counterattack, where tanks were most effectively used, was little more than a spoiling operation as the fate of the British command of the island was sealed. The Fallschirmjäger, while initially weak and scattered and suffering heavy casualties, did have some AT capability, and they were soon reinforced with the mountain troops and even motorcycle units. The Germans supposedly eventually landed tanks but I’m not sure this is correct. Of course, above all else the Germans had air supremecy for most of the battle and this also mitigated the effective use of armor.

Beevor also mentions “Whippet tanks”, as being used but this is most certainly incorrect and I think the general consensus was that there were no Whippets left in the British inventory by 1941, and he probably means Light Tank Mark VI’s (?) since he describes them having turrets.

They wouldn’t have been the first choice against the Matildas, but certainly they did knock out some light tanks…

Good info Nick,I am pretty sure no german panzer landed until the end of the fight for Crete. Maybe some halftrack but surely no tanks.

Would the Germans have been able to bring a tank in during the battle for Crete?

After the Germans had secured the crucial main airfield at Maleme, they brought in reinforcements etc through that airfield. Could they have transported a tank by air?

Could they have brought tanks in by sea when they didn’t control the Mediterranean?

Separate aspect on tank use, and loss, in small engagements in Crete.

New Zealand counter-attack

Destroyed British tank at Galatas

As the New Zealanders withdrew, the Germans wasted no time in occupying Galatas. Colonel Howard Kippenberger, commanding 10th (NZ) Brigade, realised that if the village was not retaken it would become a jumping-off point for an attack on the New Zealand line. So when two light tanks from the British 7th Royal Tank Regiment arrived that evening, Kippenberger quickly formulated plans for a counter-attack.

[Lieutenant] Farran stopped and spoke to me and I told him to go into the village and see what was there. He clattered off [in the tanks] and we could hear him firing briskly, when two more companies of the Twenty-third arrived … each about eighty strong. They halted on the road near me. The men looked tired, but fit to fight and resolute… . I told the two company commanders they would have to retake Galatos with the help of the two tanks… . The men fixed bayonets and waited grimly.

Colonel Howard Kippenberger in D.M. Davin, Crete, 1953, p. 311

Kippenberger placed the remnants of 18th Battalion on the eastern edge of Galatas. At the same time, two companies from 23rd Battalion fixed bayonets and moved into position on either side of the road into the village. The plan was simple: each company would attack on their side of the road behind the two tanks.
Alfred Hulme VC

Sergeant Alfred Hulme, 23rd Battalion, played a prominent part in the counter-attack at Galatas. When the New Zealand assault was delayed by a German strongpoint, Hulme rushed forward alone and used hand grenades to clear the position. For this action, and earlier exploits around Maleme airfield on 21–22 May, Hulme was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) in October 1941. Read more.

The tanks set off just after 8 p.m., followed by the infantry. They were soon under fire from all sides. Rather than stopping and clearing each house, the New Zealanders raced through the village to the main square. There they found the tanks: one was knocked out, the other damaged. Under heavy fire from the other side of the square, the men charged. The action was brutal – much of the fighting was at close quarters with bayonets and rifle butts – and the Germans withdrew in disarray. Reinforced by 18th Battalion, the New Zealanders pressed forward. When the fighting died down, the Germans had been pushed back to the south-west corner of the village.

Despite the success of the counter-attack the decision was made to withdraw from Galatas. The New Zealanders did not have the resources to hold the village – a lack of men, artillery and air support had left the defending troops exhausted. There was also concern that the Luftwaffe (German air force) would begin bombing Galatas. With many civilians still inside the village, it was considered an unacceptable risk for the New Zealanders to remain there. In order to maintain an unbroken defensive line, Puttick ordered his forward brigades to withdraw and set up a new line west of Canea.

http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/the-battle-for-crete/the-battle-day-4-6

I would agree. The only other possibility I think is perhaps the Germans put some captured/abandoned ‘beutepanzers’ back into service. But it seems the Commonwealth forces were pretty good about destroying the engines of any abandoned vehicles (usually with sand put into the sump then racing the engine). And as stated, many of the British tanks may already had been barely serviceable…

I don’t see how they could have. AFAIK, the Ju-52 Junkers was the only widely available transport and I doubt it could carry a panzer. And there was an effort by the Kriegsmarine and Italian Navy to send a flotilla or rickety sailing ships to Crete, but this was destroyed by a Royal Navy sortie and was nothing more than a resupply effort, the heaviest equipment I think being AA guns…