More as to imi speculating that Hitler should have ordered Japan to help the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union - the Russians had badly bloodied the Japanese in Mongolia in 1939 and the IJA was not in any hurry to fight them again anytime soon.
Thanks Wizard for more clarification, I agree, Hitler didn’t suffer from lack of quality commanders on the E. Front, his worst enemy was himself.
How?
Where?
Even if Japan attacked in Manchuria and deprived the USSR of the benefit of the forces released by its 1941 non-aggression pact with the USSR, how would this have ensured victory for Germany?
Rommel was the equivalent of only an Allied Lieutenant General in 1941. What experience and or ability did he have to command the three army groups facing the Soviets in 1941? Research the elements of an army group; an army; and a corps and see where his experience and ability sits on that scale.
As others have already said, Rommel is overrated in the popular mind. He would have come a gutser if put in command of one of the army groups in Barbarossa, never mind overall command. After all, he outran his supply lines in North Africa, which the higher German commanders in Barbarossa also managed to do in that operation.
1.The III. Reich and Soviet Union is also have a non agression pact and what happened?
If Japan help the axis in the biggest operation and not doing spare and suicide wars with other nations more useful for the axis.
2. I think it makes no difference Afrika or USSR for gain experience,but you’re right the British troops are well experienced in the first half of war
Yes, Germany certainly broke it’s treaty with the Soviet Union. And it’s a fact that the Japanese government considered doing the same thing, and attacking the Soviet Union in 1941. But Japan had several very good reasons in 1941 for not attacking the Soviet Union.
First of all, you have to accept the notion that all countries act out of self interest, not altruistic motives of friendship or self-sacrifice for some higher ideal. It was certainly not in Japan’s interest to attack the Soviet Union until Germany had secured the defeat of that country. In 1940-41, Japan fully expected, as did many other countries, that Germany would defeat both Britain and the Soviet Union and saw no advantage in intervening before that happened.
Secondly, as I have already pointed out, Japan was involved in a war with China which had been on-going for four years, and which was tying down a major portion of Japan’s Army, and putting severe strains on the Japanese economy. Moreover, actions taken by the Japanese Army in that war had angered the US and led to an embargo that effectively cut off 90 % of Japanese oil imports. This meant that Japan’s military would soon be crippled by a lack of fuel for ships, planes and vehicles; embarking on another war against the Soviets would simply hasten that event.
Third, the Japanese government realized that Japan’s lack of any domestic source of oil was a major threat to Japan’s status as a first rate power, and it was determined to remedy the situation by seizing the NEI in what Japan termed the “Southern Resources Area” (SRA). This entailed the simultaneous seizure of Malaya/Singapore and the Philippine Islands which meant war with Britain, the US, and the Netherlands. This war, in itself, would be a major boost to the Axis, as it would weaken Britain and require the United States to allocate significant resources to fighting a Pacific war.
Fourth, in the summer of 1939, the Japanese Army had been involved in a major border conflict with the Soviet Army. The Japanese were soundly defeated and suffered thousands of casualties. This convinced the IJA that any war with the Soviets would be bloody, very costly, and that a favorable outcome could not be counted on. Japan therefore, and with very good cause, decided that the best course of action was to attack the SRA, secure a supply of oil, and prevent the United States from intervening on Britain’s side in the European war. It not only appeared to be the best alternative, it was, in practical terms, Japan’s only alternative, since no source of oil meant that Japan would, within a matter of months, be finished as a military power in Asia.
For all these reasons, it was, in modern parlance, a “no-brainer” that Japan maintain good relations with the Soviet Union in the early 1940’s.
You a real wizard,don’t you? 
You whole post is very good point of view :army:
You’re right every nation fight his own ideas and ideals. :roll:
Very interesting debate and discussion!
We are all talking about Hitler making the fatal decision to attack the Soviet Union. What if he never attacked the Soviet Union at all? There would have been no eastern front and Hitler could have focused all of his military resources on western front and Africa. War probably would have broken out between the Soviets and Germans but probably not for another few years (I saw a source somewhere awhile ago that Stalin was predicting a German invasion in 1944 or 1945). The Germans would also have had more resources to develop new technologies.
Ultimately, I think that we all agree that Hitler never could have won the war, regardless of what he did, mostly because the Germans lacked the industrial capacity to fight against a country like the US, which pretty much had limitless industrial production.
Any thoughts about this?
If Hitler not attack the Soviet Union,they seize Afrika and the UK.
England was very brave and persistent under the german attacks,but if the Wehrmacht bigger part not fightning in the Eastern,first attack the UK,germany was victorius I think.
Hitler was too greedy to capture all country,that’s divide and too many for the Wehrmacht.
That time the german military was high professional,and was the best in the world,but too many location opened and attacked by the allies.
Actually, I don’t think so…The Battle of Britain was almost a full year before Barbarossa and many of the resources being used in the Battle of Britain were later used in Russia (in fact, that was one of the reasons why the battle ended). At the time that the Battle of Britain was being fought, the Germans didn’t have any other fronts. Even with this, the Germans were never really able to deliver the “knock out” that they needed, especially once they started attacking civilian, rather than military targets. My point is that the Germans pretty much had a “one front” war and they still weren’t able to succesfully invade England.
That said, what if another scenario took place? What would happen if the “Phony War” resumed after Dunkirk and no one did anything? The Germans could have built up their military (researching new technologies), and MAYBE would have had a chance by late 1941 (before the US entered the war) to conquer England.
I tend to agree with this.
It’s important to remember that Germany was not able to defeat Britain before Operation Barbarossa was launched and there is no reason to believe that Germany simply refraining from attacking the Soviets would have changed it’s military situation all that much. No matter how many troops Germany had, they still couldn’t invade Britain, which was the only way they could defeat that country.
But Britain would have become much more difficult to defeat if Germany had not attacked the Soviets. First, Britain delivered huge amounts of Lend-lease aid to the Soviets after they were attacked, and this instead would have gone into building up British forces, as would the Lend-lease materials which the US also delivered to the Soviets.
Second, the Royal Navy expended considerable resources escorting the Arctic Convoys to northern Russia; without the necessity of delivering Lend-lease aid to the Soviets, the British could have reinforced their Mediterranean fleet and made Germany’s plight in North Africa even more perilous. Germany’s biggest problem in North Africa wasn’t a lack of men, but a lack of fuel and ammunition due to poor logistics. Not attacking the Soviets and pouring more troops into North Africa would have simply exacerbated this problem, and wouldn’t have made it any more likely that Germany could have prevailed in that campaign.
Third, an all out attack on Britain would have resulted in more support from the US and might even have drawn the US into the European war months sooner than historically. In any case, without the burden of supplying the Soviets with Lend-lease aid, the US could have sent that aid to North Africa, making Egypt virtually impregnable.
By late 1941, Britain was already beginning to outstrip Germany in aircraft production and significant deliveries of US aircraft were arriving in Britain. So Germany, which hadn’t been able to defeat Britain in the air campaign of 1940, would have had no chance of doing so in 1941, or at any later time.
I seriously doubt it.
Another “phony war” period would have played into the hands of Britain and the US which were getting militarily and economically stronger at a far faster rate than Germany. Moreover, the US and Britain were, in every important technological field save one, either on par with German science or slightly ahead, and as the war continued, Germany fell further behind. That one field where German science held a significant lead was large ballistic rockets, and these weapons proved to be nothing more than costly distractions in the search for war-winning technology.
Furthermore, the Royal Navy blockade of Europe would have only intensified over time and choked off the raw materials Germany needed to pursue high tech research in a multiplicity of areas such as jet engines, electronics, chemicals, nuclear research, etc.
Finally, The Soviet alliance with Germany, while supplying on a short term basis vitally needed food, oil, and certain other critical raw materials, put the Soviets in control of Germany’s future, and Hitler was painfully aware of this fact. Germany could not afford to maintain it’s pre-Barbarossa relationship with the USSR for any significant period of time, or it risked becoming a client state of the Soviet Union. Stalin may well have countenanced a war between Germany, and Britain and the US, on the theory that both sides would be weakened which was to the Soviet’s advantage, but he would never have allowed Germany to consolidate it’s hold on western Europe; that would have given Germany too much economic power to suit Stalin. Stalin’s military was getting stronger each month, and as soon as he judged that it could hold off any German attack, Stalin would have clamped down on Germany’s critical supplies.
Excellent points!
Im not going to read 25 pages, so accept my apologies if this is reptition, but I have a couple of points I would like to make.
The comment “The Germans would also have had more resources to develop new technologies” is, in my view utterly false. If we remove the Eastern Front, we remove the factors that forced Germany to develop new technologies. How would the Germans have Panther tanks if they did not meet the T-34? The gun versus armour spiral would not have got going, especially with little action elsewhere and the Germans would have in all likelyhood remained fairly static in development, other than perhaps the development of the Tiger I, but given the lack of fighting, I imagine that too would have been curtailed.
Without the Eastern Front you deprive the Germans of a need to develop their new ‘wunder-weapons’.
Also what ‘new resources’ would they have found by not invading the USSR? They already had everything before 1941. Unless you foresee the push into the Middle East, either to support Iraq or Vichy Syria, there seems little else for the Germans to take other than that which they already have. They may have had more time to focus on synthetic oil production, but that remains such a small factor I wouldnt really consider it.
Secondly how does Germany defeat the UK?
A maritime blockade wont work. Increasing the U-Boat attacks will only lead to the US enetering the war as their vessels become targets. But at the end of the day the Germans must occupy the UK in order to secure Europe. The UK is one vast jumping off point for the re-conquest of western Europe. To win, it has to be occupied.
In short the Germans are incapable of doing so, and neither seriously expected too, or even believed they could.
The German Armed Forces had no experience of seaborne invasions. While the British had built up a long tradition of seaborne operations, as far back as Quebec in the 18th Century, the Germans possessed none of their experience. The half-hearted efforts with which they converted river barges to landing craft show exactly how little idea they really had with regards conducting an opposed seaborne attack. If we take the seaborne assault force for the invasion of Crete in 1941 we see that it gets utterly wiped out by the Royal Navy. There is no reason at all to expect anything different to happen in the Channel. In short the German cannot conduct a seaborne invasion as they lack the doctrine, experience and technology.
Following this is the Luftwaffe’s flawed conceptual doctrine that has it built and designed for short, sharp wars were it can project local air superiority for a short period of time. It is not a force that in the early years of the war is capable of long, drawn out periods of combat operations. It simply isnt up to the task. Add to this the losses in transport aircraft and bomber trainers during the airborne operations in Norway, Holland and Belgium and actual losses to 7th Flieger Division and you have to rule out any airborne force support for a seaborne invasion until 1941 at the earliest.
The main point however is that Hitler was always going East. It was his whole reason for the war, his whole sense of purpose and his belief of the birth right of the Germanic people of ‘living space’ in the east. He was always going to be in direct conflict with the USSR, and it was all a case of who would strike first. Hitler gambled and hit first. had he waited, I suspect Stalin would have chanced his arm, which may actually have been the best option for Hitler.
German know that before the conflict with Russia, the problem is that a small nation will face against huge nations, like USA. Even UK, with his huge Empire, can use more men and resources than German. So the only available choise is to beat with more advanced weapon more numerous enemy. For example, the Nazi surface fleet will never able to beat UK Home Fleet, UK has more warships and has type of warship that Nazi doesn’t have at all, like aircraft carrier. But Hitler choosed to enter a war without leaving enough time to keep this gap. So the wunder-weapon arrive to late.
For sure without T-34 and KV-1 Panther and Tiger perhaps will be never produced, but for a simple reason: until campaign against Urss the superior tactics and equipment (CAS airplanes like Ju-87 or giving to each tank radio and intercom were all new entries) is enough. In France, against better equipped tanks division, it works fine.
For sure you cannot say that Germans are incapable to occupy England, for a simple reason. It never happened! And the reason is because Lutwaffe lost air battle, ignoring wrong strategies like cease attacks on radar station and airports, is that when Hitler force Lutwaffe to be ready for war in 1939, Lutwaffe doesn’t have sufficient resources for creation of both long-rage aviation and mid-range aviation, so it was choosed to create only mid-range aviation. But attacking UK showed to everybody that without long-rage bomber and fighter there is no way to win.
How could they invade the UK, from the sea, with no seaborne invasion doctrine?
For evidence look at the mess they made in Norway and at Crete.
Neither of these would have faced the resources the RN, RAF and beach defences of the UK.
They also failed to accurately assess the English Channel and its current and effects and associated weather patterns.
They lacked any viable Intel on the UK, its defences, its troops, upto date maps and decent photo recon.
With regards fighting the USSR, if the Germans had waited, as was mentioned till 1944, they would have faced a tank force comprised largely of KV series and T-34/76 tanks. Are you seriously suggesting that 1941 period German armour would have defeated a force that fielded T-34s in large numbers? No matter how many radios the Germans fielded, they would have faced a far different opposition.
You are also discounting the Soviet change in doctrinal influence. After the rapid German victories, they began once again to look at armour doctrine, too late for 1941, but if left till 1944, the likelihood is that the Germans would have faced a force with a stronger, more sensible doctrine, better armour across the entire Tank arm and possibly a force that was ready to launch its own attack and thus prepared mentally for war.
There is an additional factor at work here - the Soviets were recovering from the Purges of the 1930s rapidly, and the fact that the Finns slapped them stupid had permeated through, leading to a reduction in the political influence of the Red Army (the Commissars were still there, but Officers were able to make tactical/strategic decisions once more). This also had the effect of speeding the elevation of a bunch of highly competent officers such as Zhukov, to replace the political toadies heretofore entrusted with the Red Army. The Red Army hit it’s Nadir in the late 1930s, so waiting a few years would have seen it massively stronger even with no re-equipment.
Simple: NOT BEING HITLER (or Stalin, Musolini, etc.), and he’d won 3/4 (73.086% to be exactly) of the war. Democracy isn’t perfect but no one man/woman can pull such a job, so democracy will return in the end. I’m glad bout it btw, for it’s the most perfect humanity has to offer (sofar) It’s a no brain and non original reply to the question but it’ll come back the most. Things like he’d should have done this or that (what ever we can think of) doesn’t stick (atleast not for me). Hitler simply was to stupid to win the war period!, one can even raise the question: (many did, or stil do, and -lots of- for ever will) IF HE DID WANT TO WIN WWII
He was many things but he certainly wasnt stupid.
He was however intensely arrogant with a massive inferiority complex and a true belief in his own sense of importance. He was also a very cleaver maniuplator of those around him and a gifted orator. I also think early on he managed to cultivate the personal touch that so endeared him to many of his followers.
He may have been unhinged to start with, and likely insane and deranged by the end, but he wasnt stupid.
It seems rather illogical to assert that Hitler could have won WW II, or most of it (whatever that means), by not existing.
If one posits the non-existence of Hitler, or a Hitler-like personage, in the interwar years in Germany, would WW II have even taken place? German rearmament would probably still have occurred because it was supported by the large majority of the German population, but that factor alone would not have been sufficient to cause WW II. It was specifically Hitler’s maniacal vision of a “Greater Germany” complete with an eastern empire carved out of the Soviet Union to provide “Lebensraum”, that triggered the world war.
I guess another way of reading your comments is that there was NOTHING that Hitler could have done to win the World War, and with this I heartily concur. Germany was simply too small a player to have any chance of achieving the program envisioned by Hitler.
I’ve always been impressed by your knowledge of WWII, but I am in awe of your response to stano666 as it appears you understand what he is talking about.
I had, and despite your response still have, not the slightest ****ing idea what he meant!
Not being hitler in this case meaning not being hitlerLIKE as in not being the stupid dictater as he was. I don’t want to kill the discusion (do cary on by all means), but for me it ends here: theres no way Germany could win the war with him in controle alone, anything he could have done to win (wwII) automaticly makes him less (or not at all) dictator, hence Hitler. Becouse dictator is kind of synomynous to his person . I think (& hope) you understand. Greetings stano666
That depends upon how we define stupid.
For convenience I’ve used a web dictionary definition:
stu·pid (stpd, sty-)
adj. stu·pid·er, stu·pid·est
- Slow to learn or understand; obtuse.
- Tending to make poor decisions or careless mistakes.
- Marked by a lack of intelligence or care; foolish or careless: a stupid mistake.
- Dazed, stunned, or stupefied. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/stupid
4 certainly didn’t apply to Hitler during Germany’s aggressive phases in the war.
There is no shortage of examples of 2 later in the war but these are understandable as decisions under pressure from many points which anyone in the same position could make. But some earlier decisions with profound consequences are less understandable, most notably (a) declaring war on the US when there was no need to do so and no benefit to Germany in doing so and (b) failing to get onto an adequate war economy pre-Speer. The trite ‘war on two fronts’ ‘mistake’ was the understandable product of the confidence from great successes in western Europe, successes in North Africa, and even in Greece and Crete which delayed Barbarossa.
I don’t know that there’s a lot to support 1. Hitler may have been dogmatic and determined, but apart from reinforcing failure in the east (which was about the only choice he had apart from suing for peace) after starting that conflict he wasn’t any slower to learn or more obtuse than lots of other commanders at political and military levels during WWII.
Where he was somewhat stupid, more or less within 3, was creating myths about Aryan superiority and its ability to triumph by will over lesser peoples and the converse that untermensch from the east couldn’t beat Aryans, just as the Japanese came up with their own self-defeating version of the same idiocy. If Hitler had put the same national energy into doing things of military benefit in the field, such as mechanising to the same extent as Britain and America rather than relying on horse drawn transport over vast distances, he might have done better. Yet the things that most attract those who nowadays find the Nazis impressive are the essentially empty pomp and circumstance of the Nazis which had very little to do with their military successes, except to the extent that a belief in self and nation aids morale.