The Germans defeated a barely mobilised poorly equipped army in Poland, it was not however a complete smashing. The Germans lost alot of men and equipment which is very often glossed over in the Blitzkrieg myth.
The Invasion of Poland brought the British Commonwealth and the French into the fray, it bought German forces next to the Soviet Union with no more buffer. The US started to lean more towards the Allies and started to provide equipment (as cash and carry, although it did not really start arriving in significant numbers until 1940).
So Poland had nothing to do with it then?, hmm apart from the cause and effects trail.
If you read the previous posts you will have seen that Germany was in a de-facto war with the US already in the Atlantic and was providing material under Lend Lease (as well as Cash and Carry and Destroyers for Bases deals). Under the terms of Lend Lease Britain and France (later increased to many other nations) would pay back the US once the Axis had been defeated (or return undamaged equipment). Hardly able to do that if they were defeated and part of the German Empire, US interests were at stake.
quote: So Poland had nothing to do with it then?, End quote.
Yes.
quote: The Invasion of Poland brought the British Commonwealth and the French into the fray, end quote.
Sorry please excuse my language here; France and Britain didn’t do Jack sh/t.
The US got in involved in Dec 1942, when Germany quite clearly were still winning the war. Germany successfully invaded SU until fate step in. Then after that, Bye Bye Nazi Germany.
The U.S. came in December of 1941, and was sending Lend Lease supplies to Britain well before that. The German victory over France was rapid and complete, but they also sustained serious losses of aircraft and tanks and German was unable to bring the war with Britain to conclusion…
You really have a very limited view of what happened and when.
The Germans successfully invaded the USSR - hmmm - they attacked the Soviet Union and got their butts spanked after initial victorys, hardly a successful invasion (they never completed their initial aims).
December 1942 allies had already landed in Algeria and were working to clear Tunisia, the second U Boat happy time was over and never came back so they failed in their task of strangling Britain and the supplies to the Soviet Union (despite 3 years trying). Operation Uranus had cut off Stalingrad in Nov 1942 (the Germans never mastered the Soviet winter offensives) By Dec 1942 Germany was clearly no longer winning the war which had become a war of attrition, one Germany was ill able to survive.
The British and French may have had limited succes on the ground in 1940 but the Germans lost over a years worth of production of tanks and aircraft, the Kreigsmarine was pretty much eliminated as a surface force. The German manpower situation was already getting bad along with its resources and production capabilities (not to mention the German economy).
As the war progressed more and more was diverted away from the East, more supplies were being sent to the Soviets (it was not just the US that did lend lease with the Soviets, the British Commonwealth sent the first equipment in 1941).
But Germans ,however, as winning side in 1938-41 has captured a RICH economic and military booty. Chehoclovak industry was as big as german one, plus a german got all the equipment (including guns, panzer and trucks)of chehoslovak and french armies. All this equipment were actively used in first stage of Barbarossa.
The industrial capability of Germany has increaced folowed to each captured territory. Ukraine provided Reich with a grain and food within almost 3 years.
Germany certainly had an equipment boon after the invasions of Czechoslovakia and France/Low Countries, which increasingly mechanized what was largely still an army bound to railroads and horse drawn supplies. But The Wehrmacht began to suffer a bit of a logistical nightmare as a result with so many different types of trucks, the captured tanks were quickly outmoded or didn’t fit Heer doctrine, and the fact Germany was never able to fully mobilize French nor Czech industry to suite their needs nor really enough to offset the costs of occupation in manpower. The biggest benefit was perhaps slave labor, but even this is a mixed blessing as unhappy, conscripted laborers aren’t trustworthy nor productive. I guess the point is is that it is not easy to simply come in, take over factories and just retool them to fit one’s needs. Even the plans for Barbarossa set off quite a bit of dissent within the German Economic and military establishments over the assumption that the economic benefits of acquiring Soviet industry and agriculture would not be undermined by the costs of occupation in the near term; the near term being the time frame for the inevitable ‘long war’ with the United States (in an alliance with an unconquered Britain and Canada), an industrial superpower even prior to WWII…
Yes, but nevertheless the Germans made a lot of efforts to reach the economic grow on the controloled territories.Take a look at the file from Wiki:
The 1940 was a year the Third reich almost has reached the US and UK altogether, having still not fully mobilized economy.
As it shown in graph the 56% of french industry contributed to Axis in only in 1940!!althoug France has capitulated in 22 june 1940 ,i.e . in mud of year- the next half of year under German controll they produced the even MORE then befor the campain. Obviously Germans was not capable to save the french industry capabilities, but even slightly increaced in that year.
P.S. slave labour wasn’t the ONLY third reich matter - the people in fighting USSR worked and lived in conditions , hardly diferent from pure slavery as well. The childrens and womens worked for 12-15 hours per day for very bad FOOD - i don’t know what ELSE can be called as slavery…
Little bit of a myth about the German economy not being fully mobilised, it had been preparing for war since before Hitler came to power, it did several major re-equipment programs in the 1930’s.
30% of German GDP was directly involved with military expenditure in 1939 (before 1939 it wavered from 20-30%)
What many seem to mistake is modernised as opposed to mobilised. As the war progressed industry became more modernised, new production lines were built etc.
The chart on wiki you linked to i have a few problems with as it says the results are estimates. it misses out many countries in the totals, Italy is included in the Allied total from 1944 onwards despite most industries being in the German occupied North.
Some of the other percentages are a bit fanciful like Soviet 1941 and French 1940 production percentages as they seem to have averaged out the whole years production then divided it by roughly 12 months. France and the Soviet Union suffered huge losses and halts in production during the initial stages of the invasions and the later parts of those years. Prior to the invasions they were producing much more equipment.
I have not found an economic breakdown that is as easy to read and comprehensive as Adam Tooze’s ‘Wages of Destruction’, it does put a few of the more popular myths to bed and brings up some new information previously overlooked.
If we talk about 1939-1940 so the German war economy was still far from the full mobilized state in military sense. Untill the most period when Albert Speer has launched an real FULL mobilization compain in 1943. This however was too late and allied common grow exceeded the axis in times.What is well reflected in picture from wiki.
The chart on wiki you linked to i have a few problems with as it says the results are estimates. it misses out many countries in the totals, Italy is included in the Allied total from 1944 onwards despite most industries being in the German occupied North.
Some of the other percentages are a bit fanciful like Soviet 1941 and French 1940 production percentages as they seem to have averaged out the whole years production then divided it by roughly 12 months. France and the Soviet Union suffered huge losses and halts in production during the initial stages of the invasions and the later parts of those years. Prior to the invasions they were producing much more equipment.
I think you right . The percentages seems looks bit smooth. However there is a huge difference endeed between the captured France in 1940 and USSR in 1941. The germans have got almost undamaged french industry due to very short period of compain ( and also lack of anything, simular to mass bombing raids over industry targets). So germans were able easy and quick to restore the frech industry and make it work FULLY for the Axis profit. As for the USSR in 1941- since the soviet has not caputulated but instead launched an mass evacuation compain of the main industrial plant to the east- the soviet military production, you right, suffered a huge collapse in end of 1941. SO the figures for USSR looks a bit optimistic.But i can’t say it for France. The occuped France continied to work hard, but since mid 1940 - for third reich.
Adam Tooze makes a convincing argument towards what he presents as debunking the Speer’s legend, and he basically states that Speers was very overrated and receives far too much credit for the supposed economic “miracle” that actually began before him with foresight of his predecessors and that Speers happened to be in the right place and the right time to take credit. Tooze also chafes that Speers seems to have gotten off easy at Nuremberg despite being neck deep in slave labor and concentration camps. Unfortunately I left my copy of Wages of Destruction in a hotel room like I usually do so I no longer can reference it until I get my hands on another copy…
I think you right . The percentages seems looks bit smooth. However there is a huge difference endeed between the captured France in 1940 and USSR in 1941. The germans have got almost undamaged french industry due to very short period of compain ( and also lack of anything, simular to mass bombing raids over industry targets). So germans were able easy and quick to restore the frech industry and make it work FULLY for the Axis profit. As for the USSR in 1941- since the soviet has not caputulated but instead launched an mass evacuation compain of the main industrial plant to the east- the soviet military production, you right, suffered a huge collapse in end of 1941. SO the figures for USSR looks a bit optimistic.But i can’t say it for France. The occuped France continied to work hard, but since mid 1940 - for third reich.
The Germans did capture French industry largely intact, but remember the country was divided into a German occupied zone and the Vichy French (puppet) Gov’t areas and there was certainly a passive aggressive effort by Vichy middle-management to bulwark and stifle what quickly became almost outright Nazi-German thievery in France. Also, there was the matter that much of France’s male population was in captivity until the end of the war, and used for labor in German factories and on farms. It’s difficult to ascertain how much the German benefited directly from French production, there was virtually no heavy weapons production transferred to France and few factories were retooled to produce German designs that I am aware of. Certainly the Occupied France provided significant help in food stuffs and other support-role goods and equipment, but the Germans quickly found their captured French military booty was becoming obsolete and good for little more than internal security and anti-partisan roles with some exceptions. But if the French Prewar Gov’t had been worried that the “Red” French unionists were possibly sabotaging the production of arms, the Germans certainly must have shared this fear in multitude…
No need to search a another copy. We have a row of papers around the net , including the good one article of Yale university command : DEMYSTIFYING THE GERMAN “ARMAMENT MIRACLE” DURING
WORLD WAR II. NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE ANNUAL AUDITS OF
GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCERS
This article , however, DOES’T deny the fact of serious increase the German military production, focusing mostly in dismissing the shared “propogandic economic legends” of third reich. If to see any reliable statistic, the german war production had an constant double-per-year grow within a war till the most 1945. Whatever the reason- the Speer or Himmler ( who was responsible for organizing the slave-labour camps in reich), the EGrmany was able to reach the lewel of production of 1000 fighters per month in jenuary-febriary 1945!!!( See the Beevour:“Berlin downfall”) Although they had neither enough the experienced pilotes for them not even enough fuel to take off them all to a sky.
… It’s difficult to ascertain how much the German benefited directly from French production, there was virtually no heavy weapons production transferred to France and few factories were retooled to produce German designs that I am aware of. Certainly the Occupied France provided significant help in food stuffs and other support-role goods and equipment, but the Germans quickly found their captured French military booty was becoming obsolete and good for little more than internal security and anti-partisan roles with some exceptions. …
The obsolete was not a critical matter for first period of Barbarossa coz the most of early WW2 soviet vehicles like seria of tanks BT, T-35 , bombers TB , I-16 fighters were as well obsolete , just like the the manies of first lend lise vehicles , like say the M3 Stuart or General Lee tanks.Any wearpon might be usefull if to use if proper, like GErman did, shocked the soviet command stuff, who was incompetent to use effectively even the newest soviet designs .
Of course i agree- we have a certain troubles in in figures accurate statistic of french military production under german occupaton.Nevertheless , i heard,all the industry plants continied to work during the period of occupation, inspite of relative rare acts of sabotage.
The real idiocy was Hitler declaring war on the US. The provisions of the pact with Japan placed no obligation on Germany to come to its aid if Japan did the attacking and was not itself attacked. The US did not declare war on Germany when it declared war on Japan, and did so only after Germany gratuitously and unnecessarily declared war on the US. That absolutely sealed Germany’s fate. “I will always strike the first blow,” Hitler said. What a fathead.
Churchill thought he had been saved when he got news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but if Hitler hadn’t declared war on the US on his own initiative, it is more than highly unlikely the US would have done so on its own. I’m sure this will provoke a bit of a howl.
No that’s not the point. The USA delivered huge amounts of weapons and other supply to England and the SU long before Pearl Harbour. The war in North Africa and Italy was always a “quantite negligeable” in comparison to what was going on at the “Ostfront”, so the first time the USA really put “All In” was the D-Day. But by this time, the “Wehrmacht” was already in a state of agony. You only have to think about the casualities of the Soviets and the Germans compared to those of the USA and you will know, at which war theater the second world war was really fought out.
I think, you missed the point. The horse-based infantry was the only reliable (and very effective !) force in this war theatre. At the beginning of the summer campaign in 1942 two Panzerdivisionen were taken away from the Heeresgruppe Sued and moved to France, because (according to General Halder) it was impossible to use them properly !. The situation for the rest of the mechanized divisions grew worse from day to day. While the infantry found plenty of food (for men and horse) during their advance into the Caucasus, the the 6.Armee and the 4.Panzerarmee could never strike in combination during their advance to Stalingrad. One of these two armies (sometimes both) always stood still due to lack of fuel.
The only reliable transport was transportation by rail and since the Russion rail gauge was different and nearly no rolling material was captured, the rail gauge must have been adjustet do German standard. And when the pioneers finaly opend a working rail road, the partisans blew it up. Using lorries was no alternative (you can’t call those russian ways of these days “Roads”). So the problem was not lack in mechanization, not even lack of fuel, but the problem was “transportation”.
The German General Staff never realized the importance of Logistics. All there thinking was based on medium range operations in central europe, but before 1940 no German General ever dreamed of the conquest of Russia (in WWI it was Hindenburgs horror, to move deeper into Russia. He always rejected plans to capture Petersburg or even Kiev).
Bullsh*t. The Soviets had received 182 US tanks (Stuart and Lee) and no aircraft by the end of 1941 (3 weeks AFTER Pearl Harbour). There will have been other supplies as well, but the US assistance to the Soviet Union didn’t really get going until 1943-44. The battles which stopped the German advance were fought and won solely with Soviet equipment.Aid to the UK was a bit more substantial, but still minimal before the end of 1941 - the act had only been passed 6 months earlier and the major effect early on was to ensure the UK could actually pay for all the armaments it had ordered.
Nice little article which does however use Tooze’s work for reference as well as other sources and of course it focus’s on aircraft whereas Tooze covers the whole economy.
That’s not that clear i think. Although the Lend lease program has been launched in march of 1941 and US has shipped a certain amount of wearpon in UK prior the Pear Harbor ( take a look at here, Chapter 3) the US , however start to sell a wearpon to UK a year befor the lend lease has been approved by congress. America on war papers.
May 31, 1940: Roosevelt introduced a “billion-dollar defense program” to boost American military capability. Supplementary expenditures were announced in the following months.
June 13, 1940: The first surplus stocks of American rifles and artillery weapons were shipped to the UK in response to prior requests made by Churchill to Roosevelt during the Battle of France. The Neutrality Act was circumvented by first selling the arms to a steel company and then reselling them to the British government.
June 27, 1940: The American Secretary of State met with British and Australian representatives and discussed the Japanese threat. No agreements were reached.
July 25, 1940: The US prohibited the export of oil to countries outside the Americas and Great Britain. This decision was confirmed on August 1, 1941 when it is modified to include aviation fuel and allow exports to all countries of the British Empire as well.
August 16, 1940: Roosevelt announced discussions with the UK on the acquisition of bases for western hemisphere defense. He did not disclose that the British wanted old destroyers in return.
September 2, 1940: The US transferred 50 old destroyers to the UK in return for bases in the West Indies and Bermuda.
I can’t call this amount a “huge” but still a significant. SO de-facto US was already involved in war prior the formal declaration the war on Germany , via the active supplies to fighting UK.
The U.S. Navy was also actively combating U-boats in the Atlantic in what is largely now regarded as a secret, undeclared low intensity naval conflict designed to goad Germany into war, or at least create incidents and free up the Royal Navy…
The neutrality act had a clause in it that allowed the US to sell weapons to belligerent countries, the so called ‘Cash and Carry clause’. This meant countries had to pay for the items in full before taking possession and transport the equipment themselves. Until the Lend Lease act this was the situation with the British Commonwealth paying for materiel and transporting it on non-US flagged carriers.
The Destroyers for bases deal was because Britain could not afford by then to buy 50 (even obsolete and poor condition) destroyers so a deal was made.
Lend Lease was the extension of credit to belligerent nations during war which was forbidden under the US Neutrality Act, there was also the reverse Lend Lease by which the British Commonwealth supplied materiel to the US (the biggest provider to the US was Canada I believe).
Well, the starting point of the discussion was: could Hitler avoid war with the US and if yes, were the advantages bigger than the disadvantages.
First you have to keep in mind, what Hitler said to General Jodl in Mid-December 1941: “Im Prinzip ist der Krieg verloren” (“We have essentially lost the war”) and years later: “since the end of 1941 I try to hold on and wait for a miracle”. He knew, that Roosevelt’s greatest desire was to declare war on Germany, Raeder and Doenitz urged him to act and not to wait until the US Navy has build up a effective defense against German U-Boats. In a state of desparation his thinking might have been something like: well let’s do em as much harm as possible for the moment and maybe widen the gap between now and the day they could strike back.
In my opinion from late 1941 on Hitler’s thinking was completely occupied by his perverted “campaign” against the Jews. He was too clever not to realize that he had not the slightest chance to win the war. The turning point was not December 1941, but earlier, maybe September or October 1941. From that moment on he “waited for a miracle” and -if it does not occur- at least to postpone the final defeat until his “plans” with the Jews were fully implemented.
