US Unpreparedness 1945-1950

[Nickdfresh]

@Ashes

Yep, Hastings work is the best I’ve read on Korea.

But that scenario Hastings describes, could easily have become reality, and as you say, ‘‘the US military would have used nukes to stave off certain defeat’’

And for a period, things were pretty grim.

According to Cumings, on the same day as Trueman said that the U.S. would take whatever steps necessary to meet the military situation, including the use of nuclear weapons, Air Force General George Stratemeyer sent an order to General Hoyt Vandenberg that the Strategic Air Command should be put on warning, “to be prepared to dispatch without delay medium bomb groups to the Far East . . . this augmentation should include atomic capabilities.”

Well, the problem here is that Cumings is failing to put things in historical context and is guilty of sensationalism. War plans and hypotheticals do not equate to close calls nor definitive planning.

The US military was supremely nuke-happy, which was one of the factors allowing the US Army to fall into complete disarray as far as training and conventional equipment. Of course there was discussion and speculation. But I’d love to see their target list. The “pretty grim” situation wasn’t caused by lack of firepower, it was caused by the over-reliance on firepower, and the inability to deal with Chinese tactics that essentially thwarted US artillery and tactical air support by tactically closing with US formations and swarming their flanks. Once the Army learned how to deal with this with old fashioned WWII style infantry training in small unit tactics and defense; the situation improved. Organic firepower was able to defeat superior Chinese numbers, and the tide turned. It should be said that the Marines never really had this problem as they were always very infantry-centric.

I’m not sure what effective role nukes would even have played. It’s the classic quandary of high tech, industrialized societies attacking low tech, agrarian societies with weapons meant to destroy other high tech industrialized societies…

How useful would they be?

Haven’t thought of it to be truthful, but I for one wouldn’t like to be on the Communists side if they started going off.

That’s a great question. Do we vaporize Peking and kill millions of civilians because Mao is a prick? Or do we attempt to employ tactical nukes to attack the already faulty Chinese logistics that were pretty rotten even without any UN interdiction?

What’s the point?

It’s like lobbing hand grenades to kill chipmunks!

Don’t think the Russians would have [or could have] done much, by all accounts they had about 25 bombs to the U.S. at least 450.

But you never know do you?

Well, they could have given a couple to the Chinese and/or nuked Seoul or even Tokyo…Though I honestly did not know the US advantage was that great, but then again, I doubt the Truman administration did either…

What chance do you think the Sovs had of hitting U.S. cities with the Tu-4 [B-29]

I dunno. But if you consider that the CONUS was defended by piston engined P-51 Mustangs of the US Air National Guard (and not the F-86 Sabres being sent to the front in Korea), then I think their odds improve quite a bit. Certainly enough to think twice.

And even if they can’t get at the US, what about hitting European or Asian allies? Is Peking worth Bonn or Paris?

I think the Administration quickly thought twice about the consequences about using nukes. I also think that there was a certain weakness in the discussion of using nuclear weapons because our Army was too soft and under trained to fight in the field…

Better to be able to beat them in an infantry engagement as well as in a nuclear confrontation I think!

[Cojimar_1945]

I can understand the US not initially doing spectacularly in the Korean war but the conflict dragged on for several years and following initial setbacks the U.S. not only did not proceed to win impressively, it did not win at all. How do people explain the failure to achieve decisive victory in 1951-53?

[Nickdfresh]

@Cojimar_1945

I can understand the US not initially doing spectacularly in the Korean war but the conflict dragged on for several years and following initial setbacks the U.S. not only did not proceed to win impressively, it did not win at all. How do people explain the failure to achieve decisive victory in 1951-53?

The entire war was one of surprise and momentum. There was no plan, just reaction to crisis. Nobody really knew what to do, and I think you’re failing to appreciate the scale to which the US Army slipped only five years after WWII ended.

In fact, the original mission of preventing South Korea from being controlled from Pyongyang was achieved. Also, US and NATO conventional forces were rebuilt into viable armies and the Chinese suffered heavy losses. Ultimately, there was a deterrent effect…

[Chevan]

@Nickdfresh

At dawn on the July 5th, Smith ordered his artillery, mortars and machine guns to conduct registration fire. Steady rain precluded air support. Further, because of earlier, disastrous cases of U.N. aircraft hitting friendly ground forces, all air support that day was confined to north of Suwon. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., movement was detected to the north. Within half an hour, a column of eight North Korean T-34 tanks, part of the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, approached across the open plain from Suwon. At 8:00 a.m. the artillery received a request for a fire mission and at 8:16 a.m. the first American ground fire of the Korean War was opened against the tanks, about 2,000 yards in front of the infantry position. The high-explosive (HE) rounds had no effect on the tanks, which had their hatches closed. The battery had only six armor-piercing high-explosive antitank HEAT rounds available (one-third of the total on hand when the 52d was loading at Sasebo, Japan), all of which were given to the single howitzer forward. Antitank mines would have stopped the enemy advance, but there were none in Korea. Smith ordered 75mm recoilless rifle fire withheld until the column of tanks reached the 700-yard range. The recoilless rifle crews scored direct hits, again without apparent effect. The tanks stopped and opened fire with their 85mm main guns and 7.62mm machine guns. Second Lieutenant Ollie Connor fired twenty-two 2.36-inch bazooka rounds at the enemy armor, all from close range, including a number at the more vulnerable rear ends of the T-34s, but there was no apparent damage. The 2.36-inch rounds could not penetrate the armor of the T-34. Smith later said he believed that the rounds had deteriorated with age. The 3.5-inch bazooka round would have been effective, but again, there were none in Korea.

Ha ha ha.This is very interesting story, thank you.
The helpless jankees nothing can do with T-34 with their 2.36 bazooka:)
As i nowte americans started to produse the bazookas in 1943 to fight against Germans Panzers. But if this shit was incapable to destroy even t-34-85, how can they hope to hit the TIger with it?

[Chevan]

@Nickdfresh

Well, they could have given a couple to the Chinese and/or nuked Seoul or even Tokyo…Though I honestly did not know the US advantage was that great, but then again, I doubt the Truman administration did either…

Hardly they the SAF would nike the ONLY the Tokio or Seoul , in case if Americans will start the WW3 by a-bombing the CHina.The more likely scenario on this terrible way - is to hit the AMerican allies in Europe including the Britain and of course the USA biggest cities. The Soviets had enought abilities to drop at least half of avialable bombs at the targets in USA and Europe.

[Chevan]

@Ashes

What guarantees were they?

Stalin seemed in a win win situation at the time, at least as far as the Soviets were concerned.

There was little chance of the Soviets being attacked, as long as the Red Army kept out of it, it was the Soviets surrogates, the Koreans and Chinese who would do the dirty work, so no come back on Stalin, although he was the instigator of the war.

The chance of attack of USSR were very possible , keep in mind that officially the Chian was the ally of USSR. But the USSR was still weak to wage the war agains USA&company. Pure the economical abilities were weak.

Not sure what you mean ‘‘not real vision of situation.’’

The Sung made the rough mistake when he was sure that the S .Koreans “workers” would support the N/Koreans troops right after the N Koreans enter the country.
He obviously was,'t aware of real political situation.

During WW2, Roosevelt became very chummy with the dictator, more or less agreeing to most of what Stalin wanted, expecting [hoping] that eventually Stalin would let the Eastern countries decide their own fate.

But with Roosevelt’s death, Truman took a harder line and listened more to Churchill, who was espousing in the U.S. the '‘iron curtain descending across Europe’'theme.

Actually Rooswelt know how to search understanding with Stalin.
But Rooswelt never seriously think that STalin would let the Eastern Europe to be independent, as well the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.

Not to sure about the use of nukes, from Wiki…

Historian Bruce Cumings said that the U.S. reached its closest point of using nuclear weapons during the war in April 1951. At the end of March, after the Chinese had moved large amounts of new forces near the Korean border, U.S. bomb loading pits at Kadena air base in Okinawa were made operational, and bombs were assembled there “lacking only the essential nuclear cores.” On April 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released orders for immediate retaliatory attacks using atomic weapons against Manchurian bases in the event that large numbers of new Chinese troops entered into the fights or bombing attacks originated from those bases. The same day Truman gave his approval for transfer of nine Mark IV nuclear capsules “to the air force’s Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons” and “the president signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets.” Remarking that the signed order was never sent.

In October 1951, U.S. forces performed Operation Hudson Harbor intending to establish the capability to use nuclear weapons. Several B-29s conducted individual simulated bomb runs from Okinawa to North Korea, delivering “dummy” nuclear bombs or heavy conventional bombs; the operation was coordinated from Yokota Air Base in Japan. The battle exercise was intended to test “actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming,” and so on. The results indicated that nuclear bombs would be less effective than anticipated, because “timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare.”

And would the Soviets become involved, as you said… the total nuclear destruction of USSR was very possible.

But the resault wasn’t so ineffective agains the Soviet and N/Koreans cities( i mena if the ww3 would have been started). SO finally the USSR ability to wage the war could be damaged by a-bombing.
BTW this is interesting information for me.

Yep, from then on as far as the super powers were concerned, it was an arms race between them, and to use surrogates, or to fight only where their was no danger of head to head confrontation like Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan [1978-88 version]

yes , as i sayd , we trained each other by killing the lockal population. The Korea was the first international “test field” created by USA during the cold war.

[pdf27]

@Chevan

But if this shit was incapable to destroy even t-34-85, how can they hope to hit the TIger with it?

The answer is that it was useless against the later German tanks, and marginally capable against the Panzer IV. They did later develop the 3.5" Bazooka to give the infantry a chance against the Tiger/Panther, but for some mad reason none of these made it to Korea in time for use with Task Force Smith.

@Chevan

But Rooswelt never seriously think that STalin would let the Eastern Europe to be independent, as well the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.

Roosevelt was more interested in getting Stalin’s help in breaking up the British Empire than he was in resisting Stalin taking over Eastern Europe…

[Rising_Sun]

@pdf27

Roosevelt was more interested in getting Stalin’s help in breaking up the British Empire than he was in resisting Stalin taking over Eastern Europe…

I haven’t encountered that view before.

Could you expand on it?

[the_librarian]

Here’s a background link with more information, mostly political as well as being “airpower” oriented. Nevertheless, might add to the general knowledge:

http://www.afa.org/magazine/Nov2000/1100korea.asp

[Ashes]

@Chevan

The chance of attack of USSR were very possible , keep in mind that officially the Chian was the ally of USSR. But the USSR was still weak to wage the war agains USA&company. Pure the economical abilities were weak.

Think there was little chance of the Soviets being attacked, as long as the Red Army kept out of it, and I don’t think Stalin was crazy enough to do that, as you say the USSR was still weak to wage the war.

U.S. was in a shooting war with the Chinese and despite MacArthur urging the use of Nuclear weapons, Truman refused, although emergency plans were put in place, and if things became critical for the U.N. forces, there was a chance of them being used in Korea.

@Chevan

The Sung made the rough mistake when he was sure that the S .Koreans “workers” would support the N/Koreans troops right after the N Koreans enter the country.
He obviously was,'t aware of real political situation.

What do you think was the real political situation?

@Chevan

Actually Rooswelt know how to search understanding with Stalin.
But Rooswelt never seriously think that STalin would let the Eastern Europe to be independent, as well the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.

Agreement signed by the big three at Yalta…

The Big Three agreed that all original governments would be restored to the invaded countries [the Polish government-in-exile were excluded by Stalin] and that all civilians would be repatriated. Democracies would be established and all countries would hold free elections and European order restored per this statement…

“ The establishment of order in Europe, and the rebuilding of national economic life, must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. ”

Roosevelt seemed to think that with Germany nuited and occupied, and no danger to Russia, that Stalin would keep to the signed agreement.

Not sure what you mean by ‘‘the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.’’

@Chevan

But the resault wasn’t so ineffective agains the Soviet and N/Koreans cities( i mena if the ww3 would have been started). SO finally the USSR ability to wage the war could be damaged by a-bombing.
BTW this is interesting information for me.

The last thing the U.S. [or anyone else] wanted was world war3.

@Chevan

yes , as i sayd , we trained each other by killing the lockal population. The Korea was the first international “test field” created by USA during the cold war.

The difference in Korea was that the U.S. kept Rhee on a leash, while Stalin gave Sung the both the ability, and the green light to attack South.

Which brings us back to my first post on this thread, did that green light set in motion the eventual downfall of the Soviet empire, or was the Soviet system so flawed that it’s end was inevitable?