Victor's injustice

World War II General WWII Discussion
#21

Nick, as far as I can recall, from having read Leslie Grove’s book, (I think “Inside the Manhattan Project” - I no longer have the book) there was a concerted program to produce enough fissile material for 5 Atom Bombs, and indeed this was done, The “bottleneck” was in producing containers suitable for the safe transport of the fissile material.

The early model of container, had been deemed “barely adequate” and had been ordered to be re-designed and a better version manufactured.
Thus, these two factors influence the production of the 4th and 5th bombs, and their belated completion.

The third bomb Groves says, was stored, in case another raid had to be sent against the Japanese mainland.

IIRC, Groves says that by 1947, there were 9 A-bombs in existance, though I do not now recall how many of each type, make up that number.

I hope this infobit is of assistance.

Kindest Regards, Uyraell.

#22

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/72.pdf

Memo of a telephone conversation between a Colonel Seaman of the Manhattan Project, and General Hull, of Marshall’s staff, outlining the production schedule. Basically, the US intended to produce one atomic bomb roughly every 10 days, and use them against Japan. But Marshall was aware that there would be an issue of “diminishing returns” involving the use of the atomic bombs.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm

"While Groves was making plans for the use of a third atomic weapon sometime after 17 August, depending on the weather, Marshall’s note on this memo shows that he was following Truman’s instructions to halt nuclear strikes: “It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President.”

http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoichi-Funabashi/1757

Stanford University professor Barton Bernstein, a prominent scholar in the history of atomic bombs, writes in an essay titled “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki”: “Had the surrender not arrived at the 14th and if the war had dragged on into the next week, (Harry) Truman would undoubtedly have used at least one more A-bomb on a city and probably even more cities or other targets. If such nuclear pummeling did not soon produce the desired surrender, and if Truman did not retreat to offer softer surrender terms, Marshall’s loose plan for tactical nuclear usage with the Kyushu invasion might have looked attractive to the White House.”

http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Atomic:bombings:of:Hiroshima:and:Nagasaki.htm

From Dan Ford’s old web site:

"In an August 2002 interview with Studs Terkel published in the British Guardian newspaper, Paul Tibbetts recalled something similar: “Unknown to anybody else–I knew it, but nobody else knew–there was a third one. See, the first bomb went off and they didn’t hear anything out of the Japanese for two or three days. The second bomb was dropped and again they were silent for another couple of days. Then I got a phone call from General Curtis LeMay. He said, ‘You got another one of those damn things?’ I said, ‘Yessir.’ He said, ‘Where is it?’ I said, ‘Over in Utah.’ He said, ‘Get it out here. You and your crew are going to fly it.’ I said, ‘Yessir.’ I sent word back and the crew loaded it on an airplane and we headed back to bring it right on out to Tinian and when they got it to California debarkation point, the war was over.”

Plus from the book “Downfall” p 303 by Richard Frank

There was a third atomic bomb target. The next bomb would be ready by August 21st and the six targets on the list in order of priority were:

  1. Sapporo
  2. Hakodate
  3. Oyabu
  4. Yokosuka
  5. Osaka
  6. Nagoya

So a good chance Sapporo would have had an instant sunrise if Japan had not surrendered.

PLUS:

In the NARA files General Groves’ memos to General Marshall exist.

Leslie R. Groves’ Memo to the
Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall)
30 July 1945
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(a few paragraphs after Groves describes the successful Trinity test to Marshall)

  1. There is a definite possibility, [sensitive information deleted] as we increase our rate of production at the Hanford Engineer Works, with the type of weapon tested that the blast will be smaller due to detonation in advance of the optimum time. But in any event, the explosion should be on the order of thousands of tons. The difficulty arises from an undesirable isotope which is created in greater quantity as the production rate increases.

  2. The final components of the first gun type bomb have (already) arrived at Tinian, those of the first implosion type should leave San Francisco by air-plane early on 30 July. I see no reason to change our previous readiness predictions on the first three bombs. In September, we should have three or four [more] bombs. One of these will be made from (U) 235 material and will have a smaller effectiveness, about two-thirds that of the test type, but by November, we should be able to bring this up to full power. There should be either four or five bombs in October, one of the lesser size. In November there should be at least five bombs [more], and the rate will rise to seven in December and increase decidedly in early 1946. By some time in November, we should have the effectiveness of the (U) 235 implosion type bomb equal to that of the tested plutonium implosion type.

  3. By mid-October we could increase the number of bombs slightly by changing our design now to one using both materials in the same bomb. I have not made this change because of the ever present possibilities of difficulties in new designs. We could, if it were wise, change our plans and develop the combination bomb. But if this is to be done, it would entail an initial ten-day production setback which would be caught up in about a month’s time; unless the decision to change were made before August 1st, in which case it would probably not entail any delay. From what I know of the world situation, it would seem wiser not to make this change until the effects of the present bomb are determined.

L.R. GROVES
Major General, U.S.A.
Source: Manhattan Engineer District – Top Secret (de-classified), Manhattan Project File, Folder 4, Trinity Test, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

In short, we could have had seveal bombs and just about vaporized every Japanes major city… one by one.

Deaf

#23

A few comments I think appropriate.

First, the link you provided is no longer operative; however, I remember most of the details from Peter Padfield’s “War Beneath the Sea” and also Clay Blair’s “Silent Victory”

Secondly, the trial of Eck and the other officers of the U-852 was conducted entirely by the British; No Americans were involved, and the United States declined any involvement in the matter.

Third, Lt. Cmdr. Morton certainly did kill at least dozens of Japanese military personnel from ships that he had sunk, but it was not a war crime. The incident cited by you took place, but you neglected to mention, and possibly were unaware, of one pertinent fact. When the Wahoo surfaced and began charging it’s batteries near the Japanese survivors, a number of them had taken pistols and rifles into the lifeboats with them, and at least one individual (and probably several) opened fire on the Wahoo. At that point, it became Morton’s duty to return the fire. He could have simply moved out of range, but he didn’t and under the rules if war wasn’t required to do so.

I have never heard the claim of Indian POW’s being present and can find no mention of it anywhere in the sources I have read. However, if there were POW’s present, it was incumbent upon the Japanese authorities to notify the US that POW’s were being transported by Japanese ships and arrange a safe conduct for them. The Japanese routinely ignored such niceties during the war, And this led to the deaths of hundred, perhaps thousands of Allied POW’s. Submarine skippers had absolutely no way of knowing which Japanese ships were transporting captured Allied personnel.

There was also an incident where an American sub skipper sank a Japanese hospital ship and was not punished for it. It’s possible that no punishment was forthcoming because, the sub involved cruised through the floating wreckage and picked up several bales of raw rubber; the hospital ship, in violation of international law, was transporting vital war materials in it’s hold.

There was another incident where Japanese survivors were machine-gunned in the water and in lifeboats. This was the aftermath of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea when eight Japanese military transports and four Japanese destroyers were sunk by American and Australian air attack in early March, 1943. The convoy had been transporting the Japanese 51st Division and it’s equipment to Lae on New Guinea. When the ships went down, the soldiers took to the lifeboats carrying their rifles, light machine guns, and in at least one case, a 75MM artillery piece on an improvised raft. The Allies attacked the survivors with machine-gun and cannon fire from aircraft and PT boats; very few Japanese survived to reach land. Was this a war crime? I don’t know. The Japanese were armed, and apparently intended to carry on the fight; the Allies on the other hand, went out intending to kill any Japanese survivors they could find and even shot at those in the water. It seems both sides expected no quarter and gave none.

#24

If Japanese survivors had armed themselves they were certainly legitimate military targets.

I think the discussion point centres around the lack of opposing ‘evidence’.

digger

#25

My dad fought across Europe with the 506th PIR.
They were on stand down in Austria when notified they were going to the Pacific.

No riots, just a sense of continuing their duty as US fighting men.
I don’t believe anybody ever considred themselves as continental or hemispherically specific.

Hirohito gave up before they got transported.

Studs Terkel wrote some really good stuff.
A lot of folks today don’t realise that during our great depression, communism was not seen as demonic at all.
That changed with time.

#26

I’m not sure what you mean by the phrase “…lack of opposing ‘evidence’.” If you are referring to evidence that the Japanese survivors were armed, I don’t think that is seriously in question; numerous Wahoo crewmen, including Richard O’Kane, Morton’s Exec (later skipper of USS Tang), were on Wahoo’s bridge and witnessed the Japanese returning fire.

Moreover, some of the Japanese were in motorized landing craft and had every possibility of reaching New Guinea, armed and in fighting order. Had the Wahoo simply come upon such vessels on the open sea, there is no question but that Morton would have been justified in firing on them.

I believe even Japanese records concede that the troops in these and other similar incidents, were armed and intended to carry on the fight. Admiral Gene Fluckey wrote in his book “Thunder Below” that, in a later incident, the USS Barb torpedoed a transport which was carrying a landing barge, and that as the ship sank the barge floated off. The Barb passed close to the barge and received gunfire from it, but did not return the fire. In the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, less than a month after the Wahoo’s third patrol, and in the same general area as the sinking of the Buyo Maru, Japanese troops, abandoning their sinking transports, made every effort to retain their arms and ammunition when taking to their boats. To me this clearly establishes a pattern which supports the claim that the Japanese fired on by Wahoo were armed.

On another issue; that Lt. Cmdr. Morton was nicknamed “Mushmouth” because he was deemed a braggart, this charge is entirely without merit. Morton received his nickname while in the US Naval Academy, long before he was in command of any submarine. According to several accounts, he was so nicknamed because of 1.0 his tendency to tell long-winded stories, 2.) his pronounced Kentucky accent, or 3.) his resemblance to a cartoon character of that name. To infer that a man is a braggart is an insult and one that Morton, as a southerner, would not have tolerated.

As for his claims of ships sunk, Morton was certainly not any different than any other submarine skipper in any navy in over-claiming sinkings; some were far worse than he. In fact, there is a great deal of controversy among USN sub skippers and crewmen about the accuracy of the JANAC postwar findings on Japanese shipping losses; many contend that submarines in general were under-credited with sinkings, and there is some reason to believe that this may be true.

Furthermore, Morton was among the very few US sub skippers who, as a routine, allowed his Exec to man the periscope during attacks. If he was intending to consciously over-claim sinkings, he certainly would not have allowed another crew member to observe the actual attack through the periscope.

#27

All I am saying is if there were no Japanese survivors, or any independant witnesses then the facts cannot be disputed.

digger:)

#28

I thought it was reasonably well documented.

In a supremely ironic and tragic postscript, it was later revealed that the Buyo Maru also carried 491 British allied Indian P.O.W’s, 195 of which were killed. This was information that Morton obviously did not have at the time. The remainder of the ship’s 1,126 troops, P.O.W’s, and crew were rescued by the Japanese. All told only 87 Japanese were killed.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/usswahoo.aspx

See also, for example, at p.173
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=UrhBItGMEH4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=execute+against+japan&client=firefox-a&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

How would that have altered the result when the US was conducting unrestriced submarine warfare against Japan?

#29

How dare you make such a facile comment in a thread entitled “Victor’s injustice”. :wink: :smiley:

#30

Well actually, if there were no Japanese survivors, or independent witnesses, such a hypothetical case would likely be subject to endless speculation and irresolvable dispute. However, since I’m aware of no such historical situation, it’s a moot point.

#31

Well, it seems to be reasonably well documented now, but I note both the authorities you have cited are very recent, appearing only in the last 14 months. Apparently, the presence of the Indian POW’s was not known until Japanese records were examined, because earlier scholarship turned up no knowledge of them. Incidentally, page 173, of “Execute Against Japan” is deleted from the Google Books link. Just goes to show that history is never complete.

On a side note, I wonder why the Japanese were transporting 491 Indian POW’s to (or from??) New Guinea? New Guinea was a war zone; under international law, POW’s are to be removed from active war zones as soon as possible.

Not all vessels sailing through a war zone were attacked by USN subs. Soviet Ships, properly marked and lighted, transiting the La Perouse Strait between southern Sakhalin and Hokkaido (both under Japanese control during most of WW II) were granted safe passage by US subs.

Moreover, unrestricted warfare does not preclude the possibility that safe passage for certain vessels may be arranged on a per voyage basis. Hospital ships, for example, are generally granted safe passage as a routine, unless there is a suspicion that the rules under which safe passage is granted are being abused. Diplomatic exchange vessels are another example; at least two such vessel sailed safely during WW II. It is, therefore, safe to assume that had the Japanese arranged for safe passage for ships transporting POW’s, the USN would have recognized the status of such ships which, in turn, would have reduced the number of POW deaths accordingly.

Of course, as desperate as the Japanese soon became for imports of vital raw materials to support their war effort, they probably would have abused this privilege, as they did in the case of hospital ships, leading to the US revoking safe passage.

#32

It’s still working for me. I just click on the link and then scroll down to p.173.

They were Indians in the British forces captured in Malaya who refused to join the Indian National Army or otherwise assist the Japanese. Perhaps as many as 10,000 were transported to New Guinea. More info here http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j37/indians.asp

Perhaps, but Japan wasn’t exactly a glorious example of observance of international law or proper treatment of POWs. The Indians were transported from a non-war zone to a war zone to be employed on war zone construction.

I should hope so. The Soviets were on the same side as America. During WWII, anyway.

It had nothing to do with imports of war materials, at least in the case of the night sinking of the conspicuously marked and fully lit hospital ship Centaur about half way down the east coast of Australia in May 1943. http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/centaur/index.asp The Japanese were carrying on their own unrestricted submarine warfare, albeit not very intelligently or effectively as they failed to grasp the importance of attacking merchant shipping like the Allies.

Japan responded to Australia’s complaint about the sinking of the Centaur by denying it and complaining about Allied attacks on Japanese hospital ships, which suggests that both sides attacked hospital ships and perhaps the Allies more than the Japanese.

From the Japanese Foreign Office at the time.

GENERAL - W17455 18 Dec. 1943
Attacks on Japanese hospital ships. Refers to Berne telegram No. 2804 , 5th June (W7731/379/49). The Japanese Government deny that the hospital ship “Centaur” was sunk by Japanese forces and protest against attacks on the Japanese hospital ships Takasago Maru; Arabia Maru; American Maru; Manilla Maru; Ural; Huso Maru; Buenos Aires Maru; Muro Maru; and Mizoho Maru. Requests that this protest may be passed to the Australian Government.
http://www.education.mcgill.ca/profs/milligan/centaur/FO36575-6

The original of the following document is very hard to read, so there may be some transcription errors.

PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT
CABLEGRAM
Dated:- 25th December, 1943
Received:- 26th December, 1943
DECYPHER FROM:-
The High Commissioners Office,
LONDON
244. S E C R E T
Your telegram 73 of 18th May.
The British Prime Minister at Berne has now telegraphed as follows:-
The Swiss Minister at Tokyo has received a communication from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs for transmission to the Australian Government of which the following is the substance:-
Australia addressed to Japan a protest concerning the loss of the hospital ship CENTAUR alleging that the ship was torpedoed by Japanese submarine in Queensland waters on 14 May, 1943. Thorough enquiry by the Japanese Government as revealed no facts justifying the Australian allegation. Japan therefore, categorically states that she cannot x the Australian Government’s protests and that she can take no responsibility for any Australian claims. Japan protests (group undecypherable) to Australia concerning frequent attacks conducted by enemy planes and submarines against the hospital ship TAKASAGO MARU and eight other Japanese military hospital ships and reserve all rights because these attacks constitute an obvious violation not only of the Hague Convention of 1907 for adoption to naval warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention but also of International Law. Further, these acts must be considered as barbarities against the principles of humanity in view of the fact that the names of the ships were communicated to the enemy Government with all other necessary information in conformity with Article 1 of the Convention. these ships were sufficiently illuminated at night in conformity with Article 5 and on them in the following circumstances.
(i) TAKASAGO MARU was hit by two torpedoes fired by enemy submarines on 26 April, 1942, at 0133 hours in position 3 degrees 19 minutes south and 127 degrees 27 minutes east. The ship received damage to steering gear, machinery controlling steering gear and hull.
(ii) Arabian MARU suffered repeated bombardments by three “Consolidated” planes one 4th January, 1943, in the Port of Rangoon. More than 10 bombs fell near the ship causing damage
(iii) American MARU suffered an attack of enemy aircraft which dropped four bombs and then swept the ship with machine gun fire on 30th January, 1943, at 0430 hours in position 4 degrees 12 minutes 38 seconds south and 152 degrees 17 minutes 45 east. the same ship suffered on the second occasion an attack from a consolidated plane which dropped four bombs and machine gunned it on 6th September at 1129 hours in position one degree 32 minutes south and 49 degrees 19 minutes east. Three members of the crew were wounded and the hull damaged.
(iv) Manila MARU was attacked with two torpedoes by enemy submarines on 4th March, 1943, at 1120 hours in position 136 degrees 17 minutes east 5 degrees 26 minutes north; the ship escaped by changing course.
(v) Ural was dive-bombed by an enemy plane on 3rd April, 1943, at 1459 hours in position 2 degrees 47 minutes south and 150 degrees 7 minutes east. 7 dead and ten seriously wounded. One bomb scored a direct hit and bombs fell near the ship causing damage to the hull.
(vi) Huso MARU was bombarded three times by enemy planes which dropped three flares and five bombs on the night of 15th April 1943 Position 152 degrees 20 minutes east, three degrees 33 minutes south. On 16th April between 1813? hours and 2022 hours Huso Maru was attacked by enemy planes twice in the same place with machine guns and four times with bombs. Damage to hull.
(vii) Buenos Aires MARU was attacked with torpedoes off Hong Kong on 25th April 1943 at 1545 hours by enemy submarines. Seven wounded and damage to hull.
(viii) Mare? MARU Was torpedoed by a submarines on 1st July, 1943, at 0903? hours. Position 7 degrees 37 minutes north 134 degrees 26? minutes east.
(ix) Mizuho MARU was attacked by enemy planes which dropped three bombs on 1st July, 1943, at 0217? hours. Position 152 degrees 13 minutes east 3 degrees 42? minutes south.
http://www.ozatwar.com/ozatwar/centaur.htm

#33

The link itself works, but when I get to the web page with the book on it, page 173 of the book is not available. There is a notation at the end of page 148 that says, “Pages 149-182 are not part of this book review.” The book skips from page 148 to page 183; none of the intervening pages are available to me, and , I assume, anyone else accessing that web site.

I’m well aware that thousands of Indian Army POW’s were taken by the Japanese in Malaya, Singapore, Burma and to a lesser extent in Borneo. However, I had not heard of any Indian POW’s being shipped to New Guinea or nearby Japanese bases. According to your source, very few historians wrote about those Indian POW’s, and they themselves did not publish many accounts of their captivity. There seems to be a reluctance in western literature to mention them, perhaps because their exact status is rather murky; “The evidence of Indian and Japanese protagonists also presents challenges in deciding what actually occurred in the light of conflicting testimonies. Indeed, the evidence is so problematic that the few historians who have examined them have reached very different conclusions. Much of the evidence comes from surviving prisoners themselves, raising suspicions at the time and later that their testimony served to conceal “disloyal” decisions and actions.”

Yes, that would be the presumption. The Japanese were not in the habit of granting POW’s cruises to exotic spots for the purpose of sight-seeing. It seems odd to me that Allied accounts of the fighting in New Guinea, New Britain, and other places in the area, do not contain mention of encountering liberated Indian POW’s whom the Japanese had put to work on construction of Japanese bases in the area.

Actually, most of the Soviet ships steaming through La Perouse Strait had begun their voyage either in Seattle or San Francisco, and many had been built in those places. But that completely misses the point of my mentioning it.

I mentioned it because it proves that it was possible for submarines to recognize markings on ships indicating that they were not to be attacked. A few were actually torpedoed by US submarines, but in every case it was because they were not displaying the agreed upon recognition markings or lights, or because of visibility which precluded the use of such markings…

I am well aware of the Centaur incident, but do not consider it relevant to the discussion. The perpetrator of the Centaur atrocity was a war criminal who also was involved in other episodes of blatant crimes against humanity.

The examples of US submarines torpedoing Japanese hospital ships are interesting, but hardly conclusive. For instance, the Takasago Maru’s TROM indicates she was torpedoed twice by US subs; first on 8 April, 1942, by USS Porpoise, SS-172, sustaining light damage, and then 18 days later on 26 April, 1942, by USS Pickerel, SS-177, again sustaining light damage. The Porpoise’s patrol report indicates that she attacked a “cargo vessel”, which might indicate that the Takasago Maru was improperly marked and lighted or that visibility was so poor that markings would not be discernible. The attack by the Pickerel was not even noted in her war patrol report. Under the circumstances. it seems that a hospital ship, attacked by two separate submarines within 18 days, suggests to me that she was not properly marked or lighted, or was engaged in some activity prohibited by international law. The torpedoes which struck the Takasago Maru are presumed to have been duds. Had the warheads exploded itr’s unlikely that sh could have been repaired in the time indicated in her TROM.

I can find no data on the other Japanese vessels purportedly attacked by Submarines. As for the air attacks, that was a problem throughout the war and on all sides because aircraft attacking ships seldom had the chance to identify ship’s markings while making bombing attacks. Ships were particularly difficult to identify from aircraft, in any case.

Continued…

#34

Continued from Previous post…

I did find a report which verifies that the Japanese illegally used hospital ships to transport troops and military supplies;

                              [i][b]U.S.S. CHARRETTE (DD581)  	 
                             Care Fleet Post Office 	 
                              San Francisco, Calif. 	 
  	                        17 August 1945.

From: The Medical Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report on Japanese Hospital Ship TACHIBANA MARU.

  1. This report concerns e Japanese Hospital Ship TACHIBANA MARU, designated by the Japanese Government as AH-31, in October 1943. She is not a large vessel. Her gross weight is seventeen hundred seventy-two (1772) tons, with a length of two hundred forty-nine (249) feet and a beam of forty (40) feet. She is powered by diesel engines and has a maximum speed of sixteen (16) knots and a normal cruising speed of fourteen (14) knots.

  2. The TACHIBANA MARU was boarded at 0658 on the morning of 3 August in the Banda Sea north of Timor. The purpose of the boarding was for a routine check on patients and cargo.

  3. The senior Japanese medical officer escorted the medical inspecting party, which consisted of the author and one hospital corpsman, thru those parts of the ship quartering the patients. The Japanese doctor, an Army captain, was polite and correct in manner, but declined to elaborate on any questions asked, such as specific methods of treatment and his personal opinion as to the physical condition of the patients. When asked if he had anticipated the death of any patients on the trip, he replied that he had not. All patients lay with eyes closed while the inspecting party was passing thru the wards, no doubt previously instructed to look as sick as possible. No objections were voiced when the inspection party pried into several large boxes marked with red crosses and labeled medical supplies. These were found to contain thousands of ampoules of vitamin preparations. As the inspection progressed the Japanese medical officer became noticeably nervous and it was with relief that our party climbed out of the holds and up to the relative security of the bridge.

  4. Contraband of war consisting of arms and ammunition was found by the search party at 0750 and the ship was then taken over by our force and sailed into an Allied port for further investigation.

  5. An excellent opportunity for appraisal of the ship as a hospital ship as well as Japanese medical methods was afforded on the trip in. Fortunately, one of the junior medical officers proved very cooperative and most of the following information was obtained from him.

FACTS OF GENERAL INTEREST

  1. The junior medical officer came aboard the TACHIBANA MARU on 17 December 1944, at Manila. He had previously served three years aboard Army troop ships. He stated that since he reported aboard, the TACHIBANA MARU had made trips between Saigon, Takao, Java, Singapore, Celebes, Sumatra, and other Japanese occupied islands in the Southwest Pacific. At no time had the ship carried more than seven hundred (700) patients, which was normal maximum capacity. This is an interesting fact, because at the time of interception, more than fifteen hundred (1500) “patients” were aboard.

  2. When the TACHIBANA MARU was boarded she was enroute from Toeal, Kai Islands, to Makasses, Celebes, and thence to Soerabaja. The informant stated that to the best of his knowledge the patents aboard had been evacuated by barge and small craft from the Vogelkop Peninsula of New Guinea, and surrounding islands. he said that they had been hospitalized in a large general hospital at Toeal for periods up to six months. The officer also volunteered that only those men in the best physical condition were evacuated on this trip. In as far as he knew, this was the first time a Japanese hospital ship had visited the Kai Islands.

  3. Three doctors, all indifferently trained, were aboard the ship and permanently attached to her. The senior medical officer had spent on year as an interne but had no other training. The junior medical officer persisted in referring to himself as an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist, in spite of the fact that he also had but one year postgraduate training. The third medical officer had been recently inducted into the Army and was still in apprentice status. A total of thirty-three (33) medical corpsmen were aboard. Hardly an impressive staff to care for over 1500 patients.

EVALUATION AS A HOSPITAL SHIP

  1. While approaching and still several hundred yards away, the stench from the TACHIBANA MARU was very much in evidence. Urine and feces from cats and monkeys, of which there were numbers aboard, as well as excrement from the patients and crew were noted in the scuppers. There were two large heads on the port side of the ship aft, one on the main deck and one on the first platform deck. Many of the toilets were inoperable and the urinals had no flushing systems. Evidently they had not been cleaned for months and their odor was overpowering.

  2. The patients were quartered in three wards, two of them actually being holds. One was situated on the main deck forward and two built in two of the holds, halfway between the deck and the overhead. Patients were lying on these platforms and on the decks beneath them, in conditions so crowded that they were actually stretched out over each other. A few higher ranking officers were placed in staterooms, three to a room. The officers had mattresses and pillows but the enlisted men had neither. Lighting facilities on the wards were so poor that the opposite end of the ward could not be seen without a flashlight.

  3. The ship had no forced ventilation system and the heat below decks was stifling. The ship did not have evaporators. Fresh water was carried in storage tanks and doled out in small amounts for drinking purposes only. No water was allowed for bathing or personal hygiene. Samples of water were taken from all tanks after reaching port. None of the water was potable, being heavily contaminated with E. coli. Fortunately, the boarding party had been forewarned and avoided all ship’s water.

  4. There were no operating rooms on the ship. Neither were there dental facilities, treatment rooms, X-ray facilities, or isolation wards. There was no laboratory and no diet kitchen.

CARE OF THE PATIENTS

  1. The patients were fed twice daily, at 0830 and at 1600. Japanese medical corpsmen prepared the food under guard and carried it to the wards. The diet consisted exclusively of boiled white rice and dried fish chips. The rice was dumped into large wooden kegs and the fish into smaller buckets and carried to the wards. These containers were passed from patient to patient and each grabbed a double handful of rice and fish which he fashioned into a large ball and ate with his fingers. No vitamin supplements were given, in spite of the fact that many of the patients allegedly suffered from beriberi and malnutrition.

  2. Conditions in the galley were in keeping with the rest of the ship. The only cooking facilities were large kettles heated by steam from the engine room. Roaches two inches long swarmed over everything and no attempt was made to curb them. Rats nested in the raw rice bins and monkeys and cats played in them.

  3. All patients were ambulatory and went to the head unassisted. No bedside care was given, although apparently no patients were sick enough to require it.

TABULATION OF DISEASES

  1. A roster of the patients and a diagnosis for each was aboard. According to the junior medical officer this roster had been compiled while the group was in the hospital at Toeal. The ship’s doctors were not familiar with the patients.

  2. The following breakdown according to diseases shows a total of 1538 patients, leaving a few unaccounted for. The junior medical officer with the aid of an interpreter tabulated the cases as follows:

Beriberi 550
Malaria 400
Malaria and Beriberi 212
Tuberculosis, pulmonary 60
Pleurisy, chronic 59
Infestation, Ascaris 34
Bronchitis, chronic 32
Enteritis, chronic 16
Neurasthenia 11
Ulcer, stomach 11
Dengue Fever 10
Dysentery, Amoebic 5
Dysentery, Bacillary 1
Catarrh, acute (coryza) 1
Kidney stone 4
Icterus 8
Malaria and Icterus 4
Malaria and Dengue Fever 5
Beriberi and Asthma 8
Contusions, back 4
Lumbago 7
Sciatica 6
Beriberi and Sciatica 4
Malaria and Tropical Ulcers, Leg 9
Amputation, finger 1
Beriberi and Kidney Stone 4
Hemorrhoids 4
Malaria and Enteritis, acute 12
Prolapse of Rectum 7
Appendicitis, chronic 8
Ulcer, duodenum 4
Tuberculosis, spine 4
Eczema, chronic 11
Otitis Media 3
Beriberi and Tropical Ulcer, Leg 8
Tuberculosis, pul., and Beriberi 1
Beriberi and Gastritis, chronic 4

  1. When the ship was docked at an Allied port, all the “patients” were marched off the ship and obediently formed ranks. They were cheerful and made no attempt to cause trouble. It is the opinion of this medical officer that these Japanese should be more accurately referred to as troops, for their physical condition did not warrant the term “patient”.

  2. By our standards the TACHIBANA MARU resembled a hospital ship only in the respect that she was marked as one.

L. M. CARTALL.[/b][/i]

See;http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/DD/dd581-mo-report.html

#35

I apologize for my facilities;):lol:

digger:)

#36

Your generous apology is noted, but I am reliably informed that your facilities are considerably more generous. :smiley:

#37

I wondered where my girlfriend got to. How is she?:wink:

digger:lol:

#38

Generous.

#39

Unfortunately, the winners always apply the international laws after the shooting is over. There were someof the punishments meted out at Nuremburg that I do not feel were right. There were some of those that I felt were deserved. Punishments deserved by leaders of the winning sides have to be dealt out by their own courts of military justice. If they let them slide, then there is little that can be done. Otherwise, Northern commanders such as W.T. Sherman go scott free for their behavior and the behavior of some of his men during the War of Southern Independence.

#40

It’s a sad fact that the Northern military commanders broke no laws in the War of Northern Aggression because there were no laws, international or otherwise, which were in effect in the jurisdictions in which they were operating. Lincoln may have (probably did) violated the Federal Constitution in that he pursued an aggressive war in the absence of any Constitutional justification, but that is more a political matter to be adjudicated in the US Supreme Court. No Federal laws governed actions in the States until the advent of the 14th Amendment after the Civil war, and no international Conventions on War existed until 1864 (and at any rate, weren’t ratified by the US until 1882).

That is not to say there was no precedent (The first war crimes trial was held in 1474, the defendant was Peter von Hagenbach, and he was convicted and executed after claiming to just following orders) for a trial of some Union commanders, but nothing was binding on them. There was something called the Lieber Code which imposed criminal liability on troop commanders for ordering or encouraging their men to wound or kill troops who had ceased resisting. This apparently was a protocol attached to Lincoln’s declaration of martial law, which was of questionable legality in itself.