John Keegan made mention in his overview of WWI that even the appearance of the German soldier by 1918 revealed some mild malnutrition as their rations had become increasingly deficient and quality food stuffs were “cut” with basically what were fillers. They had something of a pasty appearance and seemed prone to search for food and of course any alcohol rather than fight when swooping into towns previously held by the British and French…
Not really - the BEF made a minor contribution at places like Mons and Le Cateau in slowing down the German advance, which may have helped the French stop the German advance before it reached Paris. However, the forces involved were so tiny in comparison to those of the rest of the combatants (it really was a contemptible little army, although the troops themselves were first class) that I simply don’t count the UK as a major land combatant until the New Armies were able to take to the field.
Based on the figures I have seen, BEF combat deaths on the western front in 1915 alone exceeded US combat deaths in the entire Vietnam war. If we include 1914 and the part of 1916 prior to the Somme, the BEF had probably lost over 85,000 soldiers killed, died of wounds, or permanently missing on the western front. These figures are lower than in subsequent periods but they still seem significant to me.
Depends how you look at them. That’s roughly the first half of the war (OK, a little under) and the UK/Dominions/Empire suffered a little under 10% of their total casualties for the war.
A more relevant measure would be to compare British, French, Russian and German casualties over that period. I’d bet that the British casualties would be pretty insignificant as a fraction of the whole prior to the Somme.
I KNOW 1500 is not a division! I was making a joke that if Austrialian divisions were 1500 men, they were the most kick-ass soldiers ever. 
Hmmmm…factual error found on internet. I should report it immediately.
Thanks for the summary of the airpower! It does sound like they fielded a very small air force…despite actually having an airforce before the outbreak of the war. I liked the level of detail in the article. Cheers.
Ahhh…I see. Well, I’d have to disagree with Haig’s achievements being immense. Passable, maybe, but not immense. Lloyd George saw Haig as wasting troops by throwing them into the meatgrinder of futile offensives like Passendale where tens of thousands were killed for no appreciable gain. It was in fact Currie and the Canadians that Haig eventually called upon to deliver a victory at Passendale and save Haig from being fired. Lloyd George rightly saw Haig as wasting troops – a view that has become much more popular after the war, as Haig was reasonably well respected during the war. Llyod George withholding reinforcements during the spring 1918 offences was due to Haig’s previous, poor performance and partly due to George thinking that the war would last into 1919 and 1920 and he was saving the troops for later use.
I think that often Haig is credited with victories provided by his incredibly talented subordinates…men like Currie and Bill Glasglow.
Incompetence and lack of boldness? What general are you referring to? Considering the aggressive doctrines of the time all based around large offensives, a lack of boldness would not be tolerated.
From my understanding, the main problem was the Schlieffen Plan (the main prewar German battle plan that was designed to overcome the fortified frontiers of France and then break the ‘great fortress’ around Paris – as the city was surrounded by modern fortifications.
The plan was, from it’s inception, unworkable. It required all the German troops at the front and yet also required them to guard the railways, supply network, and occupy Belgium and NW France. Also, no contingency for British resistance was made in the very tight timetable. (And so, the British played an absolutely key role in the early stages of the war – and this role has been mistakenly downplayed in this thread due to statements about relatively low numbers of casualties instead of stategic impact.)
But the major flaw of the Schlieffen Plan was the right wing of the advance: the plan was modified and called for an additional “8 new corps” in order to succeed in taking Paris…but these corps were to arrive magically as they couldn’t possibly march as fast as required to reach their destination in time. Additionally, the road network that they were to march upon was already occupied (read clogged) with existing German troops leading to a traffic jams at a time where speed was of the essence.
Therefore, the whole plan was doomed to failure before the whole show got on the road and couldn’t have possibly captured Paris before the British could commit troops that would diffuse the German thrust at the French.
The German plan at Verdun, I believe, was not to have a strategic victory but a victory of attrition by taking a fortress that had great French nationalistic pride associated with it and so the French would feel duty bound to expend great numbers of troops trying to retake it. It was designed as a battle of attrition and the end result was about 400 000 French casualties…which is significant. Unfortunately, it also cost the Germans about 400 000 casualties and so, while achieving the objective of ‘bleeding the French white’ it seems more like a draw to me than anything else.
I think it’s important to note the Germany was drawn into the conflict that became WWI as a result of prewar treaties. Germany was not aggressor nor the instigator of the war but honoured their strategic alliances and that is why they fought.
The strategic surprise…being the Blitzkrieg?? lol. Assuming it was attacking through Belgium…as I posted earlier, this WAS the reason they were stopped dead…not the ‘petering out of the effect of the surprise’. And given the weeks of buildup before the war…it could hardly be called a surprise attack.
In August, 1914, the Germans had 98 regular divisions, Austria-Hungary had 48 for a total of 146 divisions in the field.
The Allies had: Russia = 102, France = 72, Serbia = 11, Belgium = 7 and BEF = 6. Total = 212.
However, the Russian divisons were so weak and poorly outfitted in stark contrast to the high level of German training, equipment and leadership that I’d say the forces were very evenly matched at the outbreak of the war. (If you disagree, then maybe the first 3 years of fighting wasn’t a statemate.) So instead of " stupidity on the part of the Germans for attacking a group of nations stronger than they are!" I would substitute, “Germans honouring treaties causing them to attack a group of nations not significantly weaker than they are.”
Germany and Austria also had a significant logistical advantage with their rail network able to deliver troops quickly to key locations.
FYI, all armies except the British practiced peacetime conscription in 1914.
The Belligerents also produced 2 million more metric tons of steel than the Allies in 1914 (17 vs. 15). So the material and industrial advantage was that supposedly ensured the Belligerent defeat was only greatly shifted well after the war was underway when the U.S. entered the war. Also, the blockade and stranglehold of the landlocked nations was significant in weakening the industrial output as the war progressed.
The US joining the war was significant in breaking down the German morale, far more on a psychological level than on the battlefield – and in combination with the limited rations the Germans had (starving troops) the German army had indeed begun to rot in 1918.
Food shortages were very common for German troops. However, all sides suffered greatly from artillery being overused. See, massive, very intense barrages were essential to cover advancing infantry by keeping the enemy troops in shelters and therefore not shooting the advancing troops. These intense barrages required large amounts of shells fired from guns in a very short period of time. The result of such rapid firing was the melting of gun barrrels, which of course, threw off the accuracy of the shells (mostly making shells fall short).
One favourite story regarding food shortages: The Canadians, seeing that the Germans were so hard up for food, were sick to death of their tough, dreaded bully beef. So they decided to throw some of their rations to the Germans. The Germans would swarm the food and the Canadians would shout complaints about having to eat the same damn food everyday and please, eat this crap. They’d then throw more cans of bully beef. Then even more. Finally, they’d throw grenades which landed amongst the unsuspecting Germans with a similar thud to the beef cans. Then the Germans weren’t hungry anymore.
He is and remains the ONLY British General to defeat the main power of a continental enemy on the field of battle. Before him (and with the arguable exception of Sir John French, who was clearly out of his depth in the job) the largest army previously commanded by a British General had been that under Wellington at Waterloo. This in the midst of a technological revolution unsurpassed since the introduction of Gunpowder which also left him unable to exercise timely command and control of his subordinates while leaving the weapons of defence superior to those of attack. In this situation he had to fight and win an offensive war of attrition (the Germans being on occupied territory had no incentive to come and attack him). The fact that he went and did so, while fighting a coalition war of a size unsurpassed in British history (before or since) and while experiencing massive technological change is an outstanding achievement.
To look at it another way, who else can his achievements be compared to? The list is very, very short - Eisenhower and Foch are his only peers, with Eisenhower coming a very poor third.
If so, then Lloyd George was even more of a moron than I’ve given him credit for. The entire Allied grand strategy for the war was to use their superiority in manpower and resources (thanks to the RN blockade of Germany) to fight and win a war of attrition with Germany, and this came about once the front solidified in late 1914 and it became evident that a breakthrough would not be possible. That given, the role of the Allied armies on the Western Front was to fight offensive battles of attrition in order to wear down the German armies in the field.
And there was a very clear gain at Passchendaele - not measured in the number of acres of shell-torn mud of little value (not none however - the high ground conferred major advantages in artillery observation to those who had it, thus supporting the allied higher command’s intention of attriting the German army. Lloyd George will have understood this perfectly - so if he later claimed that Haig was wasting troops in these attacks then frankly he’s an out and out liar, which I can perfectly well believe.
Not exactly - Passchendaele itself needed to be taken in order to provide the British with a defensible line once the operation was over - and it only took as long as it did due to the unexpected weather. Lloyd George tried repeatedly to fire Haig, and failed each time for two very good reasons:
- The rest of the cabinet disagreed
- There was nobody remotely capable of replacing him
To be exact, it has become much more popular as the very troops he is accused of butchering died off. An excellent example is Alan Clarke’s book The Donkeys, one of the first to accuse Haig and his subordinates of being incompetent butchers (as distinct from viewing WW1 as a tragic waste, a view that itself didn’t take off until the 1930s and the great depression), which came out in 1965. By then, of course, the majority of the troops who served under Haig would be dead or in their dotage.
To give you an idea of just how well thought of by the troops Haig was, look at the history of the Royal British Legion. For a long time (until about 1990 in fact!) the poppies sold in England and Wales had “Haig Fund” on the centre, and Haig only took the role after a great deal of prodding from the ex-service organisations (and after they agreed to all merge together - he was well aware of the need to put pressure on the Government in later years!).
That says two things:
- Lloyd George was out of touch with reality - Haig was doing significantly better than anyone else at his level of command.
- He also had no concept of military operations - since there is both no sensible way of rationing troops (the more you use, the less you lose) and the Allies came close to losing the war due to this very lack of troops. Indeed, there is a fair bit of truth to the assertion that Haig holding his nerve while Gough lost it is what saved the day for the British in summer 1918.
Of course he is. That is both their job and his. Ultimately, however, as the Commander in Chief of the BEF their successes or failures were Haig’s responsibility. I notice you’re quick to place the blame for failures by his subordinates on Haig (Passchendaele, the Somme) - so why should credit for his successes not go to him too?
Secondly, and rather obviously, Haig was also responsible for appointing these men in the first place…
So you think the gains made up the losses? It sure doesn’t seem that way to me…
Not exactly - Passchendaele itself needed to be taken in order to provide the British with a defensible line once the operation was over - and it only took as long as it did due to the unexpected weather. Lloyd George tried repeatedly to fire Haig, and failed each time for two very good reasons:
- The rest of the cabinet disagreed
- There was nobody remotely capable of replacing him
Well, but maybe this one would have finally lead the cabinet to agree. And there’s always an alternative.
To be exact, it has become much more popular as the very troops he is accused of butchering died off. An excellent example is Alan Clarke’s book The Donkeys, one of the first to accuse Haig and his subordinates of being incompetent butchers (as distinct from viewing WW1 as a tragic waste, a view that itself didn’t take off until the 1930s and the great depression), which came out in 1965. By then, of course, the majority of the troops who served under Haig would be dead or in their dotage.
To give you an idea of just how well thought of by the troops Haig was, look at the history of the Royal British Legion. For a long time (until about 1990 in fact!) the poppies sold in England and Wales had “Haig Fund” on the centre, and Haig only took the role after a great deal of prodding from the ex-service organisations (and after they agreed to all merge together - he was well aware of the need to put pressure on the Government in later years!).
Soldiers - or people in general - tend to glorify people that lead them to victory, no matter whether it could have been done better or not. We’re not arguing that Britain didn’t win under his command, but we do argue that he did a poor job at it, anyway.
The German monarchy counted on the exact same principle: They noticed that the Social Democrats were growing ever stronger in their parliament, and they didn’t want to be forced to give up too much power. So when the war came along, they saw it as an opportunity to bring people back on their side through a victory. Just putting that out there…
I assume you’re talking about me here. I’ve already mentioned Mons and Le Cateau. The reality is that the troops involved were a mere handful, and that French troops in the same place would have done nearly as well. The fact that the British were there was all about their proximity to the Channel Ports and the strategic suprise achieved by the Germans pulling most of the French out of position. Essentially I am not persuaded either that the delay caused by these battles was enough to make the difference at the Marne, or indeed that had the British not been there at all these battles would never have been fought with the results experienced.
Ummm… the official Casus Belli was that the Germans were honouring their treaty commitments. However, events were very clearly also manipulated by the Germans to produce such a war (e.g. their giving the Austro-Hungarians the green light to hand over such a provocative ultimatum), and there is some evidence that they had been planning exactly the war they eventually fought for at least a decade. Fritz Fischer, for instance, has produced some highly persuasive work arguing that Germany was running headlong into WW1 from about 1900 onwards.
Note that I said STRATEGIC surprise, not TACTICAL surprise. The timing of the war was a strategic surprise (Germany was fully mobilized for war on both a military and industrial level, her enemies were not yet - but were rapidly getting there). The attack through Belgium was also a surprise (although it should not have been), leaving the French fortifications and troops out of position.
In an industrialised total war (which any prolonged European conflict would inevitably become, as far back as the end of the Napoleonic wars) the number of divisions available at the start of the war doesn’t mean a lot. Unless the disparity was big enough to allow for a quick victory, it is the industrial base that matters. That is a measure of the available workforce, capital, raw materials (both domestic and importable) and installed industrial capacity. The RN gives the Entente powers a massive advantage here, and means that in any extended war unless the Germans can break the blockade (something they were never strong enough to do) or impose an effective counter-blockade (something guaranteed to bring the US into the war) that is one Germany can do nothing about.
Which helps them at the start of the war - but railway lines can be built quickly, so that isn’t a significant advantage in a prolonged one.
Good lord, this appears to be a flash of the blindingly obvious. I think you mean “the major European armies” did - the US and Commonwealth/Empire countries didn’t either.
Hardly - the UK for instance was able to freely import steel (indeed, finished munitions) from day 1 of the war. The very nature of the mobilization system in any case renders prewar production figures irrelevant - any form of mobilization will remove men from the factories and so reduce production, and how it is handled will have a massive impact on output.
Indeed, the food crisis experienced in Germany was in large part down to the way in which farm labourers and railway staff were mobilized - thus cutting down on both food production and distribution.
Agreed - although I would go further and state that the majority of the effect of US entry to the was was Psychological and Financial rather than military.
You’re suffering from a classic case of “the other side of the hill”, looking at the sufferings and tribulations of the British army. Instead, you need to look at the effect of the battles on the German army. It was bled very badly in 1916 at Verdun and the Somme (with no less a personage than Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria pointing out at the time that by the end of that battle the German Army had expended all of it’s first class prewar infantry, and as for Passchendaele, just read Junger on the battle. From his viewpoint (a German junior officer) the Germans were getting absolutely hammered by the allies and suffering badly, and only managed to hang on due to attacks not being pressed home (a symptom of the poor comms of the time).
Ummm… how many soldiers do you know? The ones I know (including myself for that matter) are far more intersted in a high command that cares about their welfare and won’t get them killed unnecessarily. Glory is a nebulous concept that Civvies revere and soldiers generally care little for - particularly citizen soldiers.
You got me there. I don’t know any soldiers who were on the winning side in either World War.:mrgreen:
However, I’ve read plenty of soldiers testimonies from 19th century, mainly French, Austrian and Prussian, and that’s the conclusion I got to. Of course most of these were written by soldiers who wrote their biographies 20, sometimes 30 years after the war(s), so maybe that’s something that comes with the time?
Just out of curiosity: How many soldiers who served under Haig did you know?
None personally, although as far as I can work out a couple of great uncles did but died before I was born. My grandfather doesn’t talk about them much, but they were the right age and aren’t in the CWGC records.
What I have done, however, is had both firsthand indoctrination in the British army’s collated experience of what motivates men in battle (e.g. a lecture I had at Sandhurst from the guy who commanded CIMIC house in Al Amarah when things were getting very hot indeed out there) and my own experience of what drives people on (not from actual war, but as close as they could manage).
Even when the BEF was most heavily engaged on the western front their casualties do not approach the worst losses of the French and French colonials who had around 340,000 men killed on the western front in 1915 alone.
Wouldn’t the Gallipolli campaign also count as a major battle for the British and dominion forces?
It certainly was a major campaign so far as casaulties were concerned.
Casualty figures vary depending upon which source you use. The following figures are the upper ones, which may be up to about 10% to even 20% higher than the lower ones.
About 26,000 Britons were killed; about 8,500 Australians; about 2,500 New Zealanders; and about 1,300 Indians, along with much smaller numbers from other parts of the British Empire.
What is often overlooked, or even unknown, to many many in Britain and the dominions is that France’s dead and casualties were about the same as Australia’s.
So, again as with other aspects of WWI, it was a combined operation which, as perhaps too often happens with Anglo-centric histories, tends to ignore or understate the French contribution.
Indeed, in popular culture in Australia and New Zealand, where Gallipoli was and is hugely significant for all sorts of reasons to do with establishing and reinforcing national identity, most people have little or no knowledge of the British contribution, let alone the French one.
On a different aspect, would the army and naval forces and related resources committed to Gallipoli from the end of April 1915 to the withdrawal aroound the end of the year have made any useful difference if committed to the Western Front during the same period?
Probably not - the land forces involved were just too small, and the naval forces couldn’t really be used anywhere else anyway.
I suspect they could probably have usefully been committed to supporting an advance from say Egypt northwards however, or in Mesopotamia. The Dardanelles were just too hard a nut to crack with the technology of the time.
Taking the opposite view, if the forces originally determined as necessary for Gallipoli, which from distant memory I think were approaching about twice what was actually used, had been applied, would that have weakened the Western Front to a dangerous degree?
And assuming that the larger force at Gallipoli would have beaten the Turks and opened the Dardanelles, which it probably would have (or which the forces actually used could or should have done if better led and co-ordinated) and opened the route to Russia, would that have significantly altered the course of the war as intended?