Well, I suppose if one has to love something?
How about emotional indifference?
Monty, well, what can you say about a person who wouldn’t start an attack vs a small sick boy armed with a stick unless he had 200,000 fully trained soldiers and 700 years supply of material and 8 years of aerial supremacy and 20 times more artillery and at least 2000 sticks ;-D
I understand you point but I think that is better than have a general trying to conquer a fortress of 35000 men full of mines and artillery with only a machinegunners batallion ( 500 men) armed with Mg-34 and hand grenades like Rommel did in april 1941.
You cant blame Montogmery of trying to get the maximum advantage possible given the intrinsecal quality of the german opossition even with his awful numerical inferiority.
That makes good sense, to a point. Monty never had a twenty-to-one advantage. He had a three-to-one advantage, which is pretty standard for an attacking force against well dug-in troops with any army. Even when Rommel had not the overhaul numerical advantage, he always pressed for local superiority in numbers. He had good intelligence and room to manouvre, the initiative rested with him as th attacking force and he made good use of what he had - and rightly so.
If one considers that Auchinlek held Rommel at El Alamein, then one begins to understand the problems facing Monty.
The British troops were civillian soldiers with, what up until El ALamein had been, inadequate training and equipent. Monty used his infantry to spearhead the attack through the minefields at EL Alamein, because he knew his armoured forces were not up to the tactical demands of the situation.
The Germans considered th British artillery to be the best of the British troops, followed by the infantry. Also, at the same time as Felhas was dismissed from Cairo, thus removing Rommel of his main source of intelligence, which had up until that point allowed him to take a lot of calculated risks, the British were issued first of all with Grants (which as you know was the Armerican Lee tank modified to British specifications) and by the time of the second battle of El Alamein, Shermans (each with 75mm guns).
Also, not only had Auchinlek stopped Rommel at the first battle of El Alamein, but he was also stopped by Monty at Alam El Halfa.
As far as Rommel being sick, under-equipped, petrol shortages etc…Well, there was a time when the German Army had all of the advantages and continued to do so in some respects. When all was going well for him, it was a case of “Hail the conquering hero!” as things began to turn it becomes “Poor Rommel!”…hero worship, or what?
One of the main reasons that Rommel was short of resourses, is because the RAF and the RN had sent much of it to the bottom of the Mediteranian Sea. Also, irregular forces such as the LRDG working in tandem with the SAS had destroyed a lot of his aircraft on the ground. The delivery of Spitfires to Malta and then to North Africa made a difference regarding air superiority.
What was happening, was Britian was beginning to catch up and its forces were beginning to learn the lessons combining Air, Land and Sea operations to some effect.
At the Second Battle Of El Alamein, the figure was nearer 2-1
Here’s a little more detail on the ground forces available to each side during the battle.
‘Pendulum Of War, The Three Battles of El Alamein’ by Niall Barr.
For the 23th October 1942
His figures are;
British Commonwealth forces.
220,476 troops
1,029 serviceable tanks (170 Grants, 252 Shermans, 216 Crusader II’s, 78 Crusader III’s, 119 Stuarts, 194 Valentines)
Artillery 892 guns
A/T guns 1,451.
Axis Forces
108,000 troops (53,736 German)
548 serviceable tanks (249 German- 31 Mk II’s, 85 Mk III’s, 88 Mk III Special’s, 8 Mk IV’s, 30 IV Special’s)
Artillery 552 guns
A/T guns 1,063.
Interestingly, Stephen Bungay in his book, ’ Alamein’ states that, at the ‘sharpest end of the front line’, while the British did hold a 2:1 advantage in equipment. The 86 infantry battalions of the Eighth Army , about 60,000 men, were facing 70 Axis infantry battalions, 42 Italian and 28 German, with some 45,000 men, only a 4:3 advantage. The rest of the other troops for both sides being involved in the logistic train.
Man,. why seems people when they love Rommel,… the tend to dislike Monty,.
the Man is a shrewd calculator,. and careful one,. and not an aggresive gambler,. both got their own pros and cons,…
the engagement of those persons,. was a classic displays of two totally different approach of how to lead their battles.
Yes, well, Monty finished Romell in the Western Desert. They do try to put Monty down, but if they understood that Monty had been handed a ‘poisoned chalice’ in the form of the Eighth Army, at the time he took it over, they might understand just how well he did a little better.
the Man is a shrewd calculator,. and careful one,. and not an aggresive gambler,. both got their own pros and cons,…
the engagement of those persons,. was a classic displays of two totally different approach of how to lead their battles.
Well, there’s something in what you say.
Though Rommel’s WW1 experience was against the Italians and he wasn’t caught up to any great extent by the experiences of the Westrn Front. On the other hand, Monty had experienced the Western Front and understood how grinding a battle of attrition could be. I would venture to say that it was that experience tha enabled him to breakout from the El Alamein lines.
[QUOTE=32Bravo;119604]
Though Rommel’s WW1 experience was against the Italians and he wasn’t caught up to any great extent by the experiences of the Westrn Front. QUOTE]
Very true
in Italy, he always able to round up many italians,. despite of numerical odds against him. This, instilled in him untill the end of Africa campaign. Whereas during preparation for Allied Landing,. he tried to gather as much panzers possible to the beach.
however he also was served for a brief period in western front, he applied similar tactics,. shock attack… rather less succesful comparing to Italian frontier,…
[quote=“gumalangi,post:28,topic:3144”]
Well, the ‘Lightning War’ is one of strategic necessity with Germany on account of its geographic location in Europe. So, it was a bit of a mindset with german commanders for several generations.
Tobruk is an example of how Rommel was unable to adapt to a war of attrition, as is the first battle of El AlaMein and the battle of Alam El Halfa.
His ‘Schwerpunkt’ worked well in other situations, where he could gain local superiority in numbers and outflank defences, but when up against a line he couldn’t flank, he came to a grinding halt.
IMHO, Rommel was a very good commander–not the best German general of the war, but very good.
He continually looked for the knock-out blow in Africa. His “Dash to the Wire” was an attempt to break the British morale and end the war in North Africa in one sweeping manuever. He seriously underestimated the British resolve–especially Auchinlek’s at that time.
Overall, Rommel was inclined to the “lightning” manuever–a grand, sweeping attempt at a knockout punch. But he understood how to fight a battle of attrition. At Alamein, he wanted to pull back and avoid a fight there but Hitler wouldn’t let him. He knew he didn’t have the resources to win.
As for Monty, he was also a very good general and did an excellent job in North Africa. However, he had his own limitations and weaknesses–the main one being his enormous ego.
Rommel can’t have been that bad, he had a post-war West German destroyer named after him!
Troy
www.feldpost.tv
Was Rommel’s daring and dash and ability to capitalise on unexpected results to produce great achievement as impressive as O’Connor’s?
Would Rommel have done as well faced with the same odds?
I think this is a nice, succinct post that covers it…
Rommel’s ‘Dash to the wire’ was more than a serious underestimation of the British and Auchinlek’s resolve. He demonstrated a total lack of understanding of the strategic situation as was. He had not the recourses to take him into Egypt - which was why he was only able to reach the wire - and he left an enemy in his rear whom could but only defeat him if he had not withdrawn. If he had not carried out such a mad dash, he would probably have defeated the Eight Army, but as it turned out he was defeated and had to withdraw way back to Mersa El Brega (practically Tripolitania), allowing the British to relieve Tobruk.
Agree with above. 
Anyone of us can take a shotgun and start to run around and shoot people - and make it to the headlines - but for heaven’s sake, you’re not gonna take over the world. Just a simple matter of resources (after some 20,000 polices show up, you’re going down).
Rommel didn’t have enough resources to be victorious in all of North Africa. It takes a pretty stupid commander to attack, if that commander knows that even without enemies he will run out of fuel and other supplies before reaching his far-fetched goals. 
_
Rommel’s ‘Dash to the wire’ was more than a serious underestimation of the British and Auchinlek’s resolve. He demonstrated a total lack of understanding of the strategic situation as was. He had not the recourses to take him into Egypt - which was why he was only able to reach the wire - and he left an enemy in his rear whom could but only defeat him if he had not withdrawn. If he had not carried out such a mad dash, he would probably have defeated the Eight Army, but as it turned out he was defeated and had to withdraw way back to Mersa El Brega (practically Tripolitania), allowing the British to relieve Tobruk.
Rommel didn’t have enough resources to be victorious in all of North Africa. It takes a pretty stupid commander to attack, if that commander knows that even without enemies he will run out of fuel and other supplies before reaching his far-fetched goals.
True, however remember that he was expecting the British to lose their resolve and the army to crumble. If his armored forces are at the border of Egypt and the UK forces collapse in panic, then he has a free ride to Cairo (gas permitting). Keep in mind that he did make it to the wire–and back again although it did quit a lot of damage to his tanks.
Also, a great deal of the German plans to continue their various offenses during the NA campaign hinged on their finding and using Allied supplies. They didn’t necessarily “plan” on it, but their supply situation was regularly precarious and they exploited any opportunity that additional supplies allowed. The Germans hoped to find and use Allied supply dumps during the “dash” (and in fact they came close to a few IIRC) to carry them into Egypt after the UK forces had collapsed.
Another example of this opportunistic style of thinking (which characterised Rommel) was when Toburk fell and Rommel argued that the invasion of Malta–while a much better long-term plan–should be dropped to allow him to drive to Egypt (he didn’t want to lose German air units that were scheduled to be withdrawn for the invasion), using the new supplies.
He wasn’t stupid at all, he was just more opportunistic than might be considered good for a General. He let that mindset heavily influence his short-term goals instead of thinking more long-term.
Was Rommel’s daring and dash and ability to capitalise on unexpected results to produce great achievement as impressive as O’Connor’s?
O’Conner is an underappreciated General, no doubt. Rommel, IMHO, would have done as well with the opportunities O’Conner had. O’Connor, unfortunately, ended up getting captured and so it’s difficult to really make a comparison of the two, but they seemed to be very similar.
If commanders lose against the odds, with the benefit of hindsight they’re often called stupid or, perhaps more fairly, incompetent or inadequate.
If they win against the odds, they’re called audacious and brilliant.
Everything really depends upon how it turns out, which often is largely beyond the control of any commander once the campaign or battle is launched.
As Clausewitz said, ‘No plan survives the first battle.’
I don’t think Rommel can be discounted as stupid just because he didn’t win, any more than he could be regarded as the world’s best commander if he had won.
He was a very competent commander with some great victories but whose somewhat modest achievements overall have somehow (possibly from the spread and speed of desert warfare early in 1941 compared with Europe where nothing much was happening at the time and German propaganda about his exploits) grown into a myth that he was the best general Germany had in WWII, which he wasn’t. But he was a long way from being Germany’s most stupid general, or being a stupid general at all.
As for running out of fuel, Rommel intended, or hoped, to capture enemy supplies. Was that such bad generalship?
Contrast it with the British forces at Beersheeba in WWI when they had exhausted their water supplies and the Australian light horse was desperate for water for its horses with no water it was able to reach soon enough to remain a fighting force, while the wells at Beersheeba held by the Turks could give them all the water they needed, and more. So they charged, and won. And it was a great victory. If the Turks had been more competent in musketry and machine gun fire, it would have been a great disaster.
In the immortal words of Chrissy Amphlett and the Divinyls, ‘It’s a fine, fine line between pleasure and pain.’
P.S.
If there were any genuinely stupid commanders in North Africa, they were among the Italians who dragged the Germans in to save them, as they did in Greece in mid-1941 to cause further problems for the Germans preparing for Barbarossa.
Rommel can’t be blamed for making a bloody good attempt to snatch victory from the jaws of the defeat the Italians brought upon the Axis in North Africa.
Rising Sun! :shock: The Italians were trusted, loyal and valuable members of the Axis!
Troy
www.feldpost.tv
Yes, you have to admire their commitment, even in defeat.
So many of them sacrificed themselves in North Africa by becoming POWs in such huge numbers to put a severe strain on the Commonwealth forces in guarding and supporting them. That sacrifice still hasn’t been properly acknowledged. 