I don’t know the figures but as i read, the Birma “road” in many places were not a road but … narrow path. And they had to re-load all the amunition from trucks to the pack animals or to their own …hands.
I was using Burma Road in its widest sense, to include airlift over The Hump.
I don’t know what aircraft were used for transport and what their lift capacity was for taking any tanks, either assembled or as parts, but I’d expect that the DC 3 / Dakota / Gooney Bird was the backbone of the operation
I’m not sure the DC 3 was able to lift up even the super-light tank, exept may be the few exotic models;)…
But i think the allies though had supplied the tanks to china using the Ledo Road later ,since 1942.
Yeah, Russia could not only defeat the Japanese without having problems with the germans, but if they really wanted they could conquer Manchuria, Korea, because of their tank superiority and of the size of the red army. However it could not be an easy conquer to the reds, because the japanese had a better air-force (air superiority, destroys tanks,etc), and a better navy. It would be an interesting fight, maybe the soviets could bomb Tokyo even before the americans in 1942.
By the time the Soviets entered the war against Japan the Japanese Navy and Air-forces were spent. The Navy was soundly beaten and lacked fuel to even sortie out far. The Air-force was reduced to poorly trained pilots with ageing aircraft designs. There was precious little of the 1941 forces left to fight or train the new recruits.
Korea was already split between a Soviet Zone and a US Zone prior to troops actually entering.
By Der Toten Kaiser
Yeah, Russia could not only defeat the Japanese without having problems with the germans
The Soviets were having difficulty defeating the Germans in 1941 and still into 1942 so a Japanese attack as well may have had some influence but after the Battle of Khalkhin Gol the Japanese did not have much stomach for heading West.
Japan did not have an air force in WWII, nor did America.
Japan, like America, had aviation branches in its army and navy.
Why would the Japanese naval air arm have been overwhelming in a tank destroying role in Siberia, with particular reference to armaments carried on IJN ships some distance from Siberia and balanced against available Soviet air forces and anti-aircraft defences?
‘A better air force’, whatever that may mean and even if Japan had one, is not the same thing as ‘air superiority’ in a specific theatre. Why would Japan have had air superiority in Siberia?
Even if Japan had a better navy than the Soviets, how would this have altered the result in a land war, rather distant from the sea, if Japan had thrust into Siberia?
Only in gliders. And the tank (tankette really, called the “Locust?” IIRC) was pretty much useless in combat and the airborne/glider-borne troops would have been better off with scout cars and trucks towing anti-tank guns–or even more bazookas/Piats! Although I suppose they could have brought heavier weaponry in in pieces to be assembled at forward areas?
And the Japanese occupation army in Manchuria had largely been gutted in favor of defending the home islands as well…
The Soviets were having difficulty defeating the Germans in 1941 and still into 1942 so a Japanese attack as well may have had some influence but after the Battle of Khalkhin Gol the Japanese did not have much stomach for heading West.
True. The main reason being for the lack of stomach on the part of the Japanese was the massive inferiority in transport, armor, anti-armor weapons, doctrine, etc., highlighted in the early clashes with Soviet forces on open terrain…
A bit of a falsehood. Aircraft were more indirectly effective against tanks than directly so. I think I read in Normandy, a study by the RAF looking at tactical air support provided by their excellent Tempest fighter arms said that a given fighter-bomber only had about a four-percent chance of destroying a panzer using rockets and cannon fire on a given strafing run! A postwar American Air Force(s) study concurred that relatively few German panzers were destroyed by tactical air forces. Tactical fighters were much more effective against the tanks’ support network of soft-skinned trucks and equestrian transport and logistical network…
I’m not even sure the IJA or IJN possessed even the most basic anti-armor weapons to begin with…
It would be an interesting fight, maybe the soviets could bomb Tokyo even before the americans in 1942.
With what?
The Tetrarch (Light Tank MK VII) was used in limited numbers by the airborne forces in Madagascar (May 1942) and on D Day but was hopelessly outclassed as a gun tank (2 pdr main gun, even when equipped with the littlejohn adaptor). It was withdrawn not long after D Day and the M22 (Locust) was used on Op Varsity instead in very small numbers.
The Harry Hopkins (Light Tank Mk VIII) would possibly have been a better vehicle especially the Alecto SPG or Dozer variants if it had been available.
How would these have gone against the Japanese tanks in China and Manchuria?
I’m wondering whether the Japanese relied upon tankettes in those theatres as they did in their southern thrust?
I would love to find out how the Tetrarch fared in Soviet service as 20 were sent and received by them.
It was a small tank armed with the standard 2 pdr and was relatively fast. Having them in service as the light tank in 1940 with the BEF instead of the MkVI (which they were supposed to replace) may have made a significant contribution.
The were probably comparable to the Japanese light tanks and much better than the tankettes, Having them airlifted into the areas to provide immediate mobile fire support would probably have been worth the expenditure (fuel, munitions, spares and repairs).
As a personal preference if they had concentrated on the Harry Hopkins (Light Mk VIII) and especially the Alecto SPG (95mm Howitzer) and Dozer variant, they would have had 2 very useful light support vehicles (Light dozers come into a whole usefulness of their own)
Don’t forget, Rising Sun, that Japan had a current and ongoing treaty with the Soviets at the time. This served the Soviets because it allowed them to focuds on the Germans and served the Japanese because it safeguarded Manchuria. It’s true, apparently, that the Japanese had been badly bloodied by the Russians earler by armies led by Marshall Zhukov.
Still the “careful” calculations of the Japanese Imperial Army were incredibly badly informed if it meant that they thought that attacking the US would be easier than attacking the Russians. My thinking is that the Japanese planners were very poorly led, but were definitely seduced by the lure of Dutch-controlled oil in Indonesia. Why the Japanese thought that attacking Hawaii would make the acquisition of that oil easier is anybody’s guess since the US would definitely NOT have declared war on Japan if it had simply gone after British and Dutch possessions in the far east. As it happened, the only viable force that could counter the Japanese - American carriers - was not even in Hawaii at the time of the attack.
Frankly, the history of Japanese actions prior to and during WW2 in the Pacific amounts to a series of devastating blunders all around.
The soviet-japane agreement was rather …fictional. Westerners traditionally forgetting about a MILLION FAR-EAST Red army that stay there ALL the war as guaranty of Japanese "friendly intentions ":).i read, even during fierce battle of Stalingrad the Stavka keep this reserve untouched. The same role played the Kwantung army - almost 1 million had been keeped out of active war in Pacific.
I do believe that indeed Japanses has chosed the “South direction” of agression only in november 1941 i.e. when it has became clear - the Barbarossa was failured. I will not wonder if Moscow falls in september 1941 as Hitler promised to all the world- the Japane might easy to attack the Russian far east yet in december.
Treatys seemed to matter little to many of the countries engaged in hostilities during WW2 so there would be no reason to really assume that the Japanese/Soviet one would be honoured if either side considered it to be advantageous to discard it (as the Soviets did in 1945).
The Kwantung Army seemed to be left to its own devices during 1939, it did not seem to be under close control and was given a fair degree of latitude in it’s actions. I don’t think the Battle of Khalin Gol was actually a strategic decision by the Japanese High Command, more of a ‘its happened can we profit from it but not go to all out war’.
You stole my thunder there.
My reading suggests that it was less a case of being given latitude than the Kwantung Army going off on a frolic of its own when it suited it, and Tokyo being unable - or in some cases perhaps choosing to be unable - to assert control. This was a consequence of the fractured political and military lines of control in a difficult domestic political situation created by the tensions between the militarists and the civilian government.
That’s pretty much my understanding of it. A small border incident grew into something a lot bigger and was abandoned when Japan realised it was going to get flogged.
It wasn’t purely an IJA decision, but a decision of the combined IJA and IJN approved at imperial conference level.
The thrust to gain the NEI oil was driven primarily by the IJN need for oil, as indeed was the decision to go to war because of the limited supplies to sustain the IJN after the oil embargoes imposed upon Japan.
This is somewhat simplistic, but it seems that the IJA and IJN pursued separate agendas and that the IJN favoured expansion into areas beyond those already controlled by the IJA, i.e. going south across the seas to give the IJA some possessions rather than consolidating the IJA land grabs in China.
With the benefit of hindsight we can see them as blunders, but viewed at the time the attack on Hawaii was the final step in a logical chain which said that America had to be neutralised when Japan attacked the NEI and Malaya, which necessitated taking the Philippines to prevent America straddling Japan’s lines of communication to the NEI and Malaya, which in turn required neutralising Pearl Harbor to prevent that fleet steaming to the assistance of American and Filipino forces in the Philippines. And it worked very well in the early stages but, as Yamamoto said after receiving confirmation of the decision to go to war, or something like this (Can’t recall exact wording) “We shall control the Pacific for six months after the start of the war, but after that …”
I think that Japan’s critical failure in planning wasn’t in deciding to attack Hawaii, for that made sound strategical sense in its overall planning, but in failing to anticipate the strength of American response, both at a popular and military level, to that attack.
Japan should be grateful for the Germany First policy, because otherwise it would have been wiped out by 1944 if America had devoted all its resources to the war against Japan as most Americans probably wanted following Pearl Harbor. And that is without the atom bomb.
Actually, the Rissians did not discard it. They let the treaty lapse and informed the Japanese beforehand that they were doing do.
The Treaty was a 5 year treaty signed in April 1941, it had a provision to denounce it after 4 years (basically giving 1 years notice of termination), if it was not denounced it would automatically be extended for another 5 years.
On the 5th of April 1945 the Soviets denounced the treaty as was their right, this meant the treaty stopped being in force in April 1946.
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, have decided to conclude a pact on neutrality, for which purpose they have appointed as their Representatives:
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan - Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Sacred Treasure of the First Class, and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lieutenant General, Jusanmin, Cavalier of the Order of the Rising Sun of the First Class and the Order of the Golden Kite of the Fourth Class,
who, after an exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form, have agreed on the following:
Article one: Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.
Article two: Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.
Article three: The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.
Article four: The present Pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo, also as soon as possible.
In confirmation whereof the above-named Representatives have signed the present Pact in two copies, drawn up in the Russian and Japanese languages, and affixed thereto their seals. Done in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th day of the fourth month of the 16th year of Showa.
V. Molotov
Yosuke Matsuoka
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa
Well soviet side had formally explained it’s decision by “Japanes will to continie the war”.
There is text of Molotov’s note to japanese ambassador.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s4.asp
On Aug. 8, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Molotoff received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Sato, and gave him, on behalf of the Soviet Government, the following for transmission to the Japanese Government:
"After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan became the only great power that still stood for the continuation of the war.
"The demand of the three powers, the United States, Great Britain and China, on July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan, and thus the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all basis.
"Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace.
"Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposals of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26.
"The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, free the people from further sacrifice and suffering and give the Japanese people the possibility of avoiding the dangers and destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to capitulate unconditionally.
"In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from Aug. 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan