What was the reason for Deporting Poles and other ethnic groups from Eastern Poland?

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#21

Well thank you guys for the links and infor.
As it was clear in source of honest Egorka the number of deported poles in 1939-1941 was about 320 000. And total number of deported poles which showed by Lexa during 1930-50 is about 600 000 -700 000. Now it’s absolutly clear there were never a “millions” of deported poles.
I agree with Lexa it was rather the class clearing then the ethnic. As it was said above for the bolshevic the national problem was not existed ( excetp deportation of some caucas peoples)
Having mostly not russian origin the bolshevic leaders reduced all problems to the “Class struggle”
As we could calculate the death rate of poles in Syberia was about 2,5% per year. Now we could compere some obvious things.

As we know the 30 million Poland in WW2 lost about 3 +( 3 million of jews) millions killed i.e. about 20% for 1939-45. So its about 3,5 % per year. As you could see the medium death rate of peoples was MORE than among deported to the Syberia.
In practice ( although it sound cynicaly) the poles who was deported to the Syberia had a more chances to survive. Especially some ethnic polish groupes like the jews.

Cheers.

#22

The low numbers of deported that have been quoted assumes that all the information / files concerning the deportations in 1940-1941 have been released.

There are many people that beleive it was many more.

Clear that many would die, so they were deliberately sent to their deaths.
Not to mention that many had to work like slaves.
Many suffered great hardships before they died, freezing cold, hunger.
Watching their children, their parents suffer and die.

Its not just about the number of people who died.
I am not trying to compare suffering or numbers with other groups.

If the Nazis had not invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 who knows how many more would have been deported. Many more of those that had been deported earlier would not have been released and would have died.

#23

And what do you think about the opinion of Zbigniew Gluza? His centrum “Karta” is investigating this issue for many years. If he suspected that some significant information is not opened by Russia, would he say about it?

I agree, 2,5% of death rate is not just for all deported groups.
I’ve read that from 600,000 repressed Poles, about a half - 300,000 - died. It’s very big number.

If the Nazis had not invaded, who knows what could happen. Maybe Soviet people would make a revolution, killed Stalin, and liberated all prisoners. Maybe Ukraine would separated from Russia, and Ukrainian nationalists did more ethnic cleansing on Poles… Nobody knows.

Marek sometimes it look like you’re speaking with us as with enemies.
The war is ended many years ago.
I know that deported Poles suffered much. I deeply sorry for it.
You started this thread with reasons and numbers, so I decided you wish to discuss them. Of course, we can speak about tragical fate of those Poles, stories of particular people. Many Russians have no idea about it, although information in Russian is available.

#24

to 1PUK:

The low numbers of deported that have been quoted assumes that all the information / files concerning the deportations in 1940-1941 have been released.

And you say this because??? Or is it just a feeling? Or maybe it is because you have got used to hear about millions of victims?

There are many people that beleive it was many more.

There are also people that beleive Stalin should be proclamed as a saint by the Christian Chirch. Incredible, is not it?

Clear that many would die, so they were deliberately sent to their deaths.
Not to mention that many had to work like slaves.
Many suffered great hardships before they died, freezing cold, hunger.
Watching their children, their parents suffer and die.

Yes, they were send deliberetly. Just like millions of others. Before 1939 Stalin deported at least 2.000.000 kulaks. And he would deport more than 1.500.000 excluding Poles after 1941. In this sence the fate of 320.000 Poles was not exceptional, though very tragic.

They were not slaves in the sence, I think you imply. They had to work just like any one else around. In USSR one had to work or go to jail. The Poles had to work and got salary. They were supposed to be provided with various materials by the local autorities. And they indded got practical help. Of course the standards were not particularly high and the hardship was immence. But they were not in labor camp with guards with sticks.

If the Nazis had not invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 who knows how many more would have been deported. Many more of those that had been deported earlier would not have been released and would have died.

If Poland had invaded Germany together with France and UK after Jozef Beck proposed preventive war against Germany in January 1933. Who knows maybe some Germans would be deported to Eastern Poland instead.

#25

That’s a WAS ( and only COULD BE POSSIBLE) due to the the German invasion. As we remember Hitler planned firstly to separate USSR ( and then the Russia) and secondary - “limited the slav population”.
This was a FACT - After the German capturing of Ukraine the ukraine nationalists immediatelly had begin the slaughter of poles who lived in Western Ukraine. The atrocities which did the UPA ( ukrain nationalists) above the polish children could be only compare with Japane atrosities in China ( just in less scale).
Germans enjoy the situation and nothing did to stope the UPA - the “favorite” Nazy tactic in occuped Eastern territories.

But what’ is sound really strange - the honest Marek try to present the German invasion into USSR as the “magic saving” of Polish people from Stalin’s deportation to Syberia.
Don’t forgot dear friend please if not USSR fight against Germany the Last pole in Poland
had finished its life in 1953-55 somewhere in the crematorium of Aushwitz.( being the “dirty low race” according Hitlers race theories).
The irony of destiny was that due to Red Army Poland was saved from total destruction , becouse allies will never liberate the Poland -they too afraid to spend life of its soldiers. and therefore the fate of Poland will be decided.

Cheers.

#26

Lexa,

Thank you for that.

Marek

#27

Hello,

I guess Marek is reluctant to acknowlege that by the will of God the deportation saved many people (it of course does not justify the deportation!). And I understand him.

But here is an interesting link: http://www.logtv.com/films/deportation/
It is about a film “Saved by Deportation: An Unknown Odyssey of Polish Jews”. The title speaks for itself.

Here is a quote:
[INDENT]

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, 3 million three hundred thousand Jews lived in Poland By 1945 only 300,000 survived. Of the survivors, approximately 80% escaped the Holocaust as a result of Stalin’s deportation deep into the Soviet Union. This film tells the story of seven deportees, who in 1940 were sent to Gulag labor camps.

In 1940, a year before the Nazis started deporting Jews to death camps, Joseph Stalin ordered the deportation of approximately 200,000 Polish Jews from Russian-occupied Eastern Poland to forced labor settlements in the Soviet interior. As cruel as Stalin’s deportations were, in the end they largely saved Polish Jewish lives, for the deportees constituted the overwhelming majority of Polish Jews who escaped the Nazi Holocaust. Saved by Deportation tells this historical irony for the first time in mainstream media.
[/INDENT]

#28

Are you saying that the invasion did not save those Poles?

Don’t forget if the Soviets had not made a pact and joined with the Nazis to invade Poland then the Nazis might not have felt bold enough to attack Poland and be in a position to kill Poles.

The Soviets could also have sided with Poland and helped them and maybe avoided the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Nazis.

Don’t forget that after the ‘liberation’ what happened next to Poles & Poland and many other countries. I don’t think the Polish people or the people from the other countries felt liberated.

Chevan, I have to ask, how do you feel about the Soviet / Communist government that was in Russia?

#29

No, I just saing the deportation into deep of USSR saved a lot of polish lives from the German henocide.
Certainly it could sound cynically but its happend.
And I don’t wish to justify this, but lookind to the real events…

Don’t forget if the Soviets had not made a pact and joined with the Nazis to invade Poland then the Nazis might not have felt bold enough to attack Poland and be in a position to kill Poles.

Well Marek before we will continie i wish to learn something about you;)
You are the pole who lives in UK ( perhaps you ancestors emigrated in the England during WW2). Am i right?
If yes i suppose you support the anti-soviet version ( pro-British) of ww2 beginning.
This is the common western version of Cold war period which simply lead to the two Evils Empire Russian and Germany who teared the innosent Polan in 1939 and thus they beginning they only are guilt in the beginning of WW2.
This is very primitive version which serviced mistly politic aims and ignored some VERY interesting international events till aug 1939. (We had discussed it hot whith our polish friend later). And i don’t wish to repeat it again, if you wish to learn - simply search in other our threads about this…
You forgot that befor the conclusion pact whith Germany Stalin tryed to reach the allies war agreement with England, France and Poland particulary against Germany. But all the states ignored his as “dirty bolshevic”. Instead of those guys come to the Munich in 1938 and presented the Hitler Chechoslovakia. And as may be you now Poland took active part in this “democratic” action and demand for itself the Teshin area. What’s nice.
And after that in summer 1939 Stalin being afraid to stay in politic isolation offered the Poland the Soviet was assistence (Note of Molotov) but do you know what them answered him?
“With Germans we lost our land , but with Russian we lost out soul” ( or like so).
Very “clever” position befor the beginning of war, don’t you think?

The Soviets could also have sided with Poland and helped them and maybe avoided the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Nazis.

Sorry mate you don’t know the history. Read please about Molotov suggestion to the Poles in 1939 befor the Pact with Ribbentrop (it was it seems in june ore jule of 1939). Poland proudly refuse it :wink: They hoped to the Britain or France halp. How it was in reality we all know today.
I could understand you feeling endeed. This is the ill for wha’t the happend in 1939 and why Poland had a quick defeat. But just undertand me right, but iIMO it’s not good to blame all the world ( i know poles blamed the Britain and France also for the froud) it’s not right behavior. Every people has to bring its responsibility for the personal destiny.

Chevan, I have to ask, how do you feel about the Soviet / Communist government that was in Russia?

Well this is too personal question :wink:
My feelings is controversial, under communists USSR had its victories and loses, happiness and pain. But if to be the short - i would wish that those non-russian bolshevic bastards were executed in 1917 and the world will never see the comunism IMHO.

Cheers.

#30

Well mate you have shocked me :smiley:
I didn’t knew the from 320 000 of deported poles 200 000 of them were the …jews?
Or jews lie again , or may be they suppose the total number of deported poles was over some million , becouse as you know the medium persentage of jew in Poland was no more 10%, this is mean if this site tell the true the totel number of deported poles much be not less then 2 million(!!!). Or mabe they simply again try to represent the polish deportation as mostly anty-jewish action. ( and this is lie again)

From the some time i think we need more carefully consider the declared jewish figures victims .

Cheers.

#31

Chevan,

Yes, 200.000 deported Jews sounds to much. It should be either a mixup or deliberate mistake.

But I put it here to show that not only russians can think this way.

Take a look at the film preview: http://www.logtv.com/films/deportation/video.htm
The first 5 minutes express it well enough.

#32

The “Red” version is also not objective. If USSR were as much peace-loving as it declared, then agreement with England and France was very possible. USSR is, at least, co-responsible for this agreement being not signed.

#33

Lexa, do you say this because you know specifically that USSR tried to jeopardise the negotiations or it is just hypothetical talk?

I know for sure that 1) British negotiation team members could not take any decisions at all, 2) they were ordered from London to do everything to slowdown the effort and make sure there would be no result until October 1939. But Germany already planned to start on September 1st. The chances are very good that London knew about the German plans.

USSR might have some resposability too. But what can prove it? Any idea?

#34

As far as I know, on the military negotiations in Moscow in august 1939, both Soviet and British sides were not interested in the result, they already were quite disappointed by each other after unsuccessful political negotiations. It’s the text of instruction given by Stalin to Voroshilov before the military negotiations:

«1. Секретность переговоров с согласия сторон.

  1. Прежде всего выложить свои полномочия о ведении переговоров с англо-французской военной делегацией о подписании военной конвенции, а потом спросить руководителей английской и французской делегаций, есть ли у них также полномочия от своих правительств на подписание военной конвенции с СССР.

  2. Если не окажется у них полномочий на подписание конвенции, выразить удивление, развести руками и «почтительно» спросить, для каких целей направило их правительство в СССР.

  3. Если они ответят, что они направлены для переговоров и для подготовки дела подписания военной конвенции, то спросить их, есть ли у них какой-либо план обороны будущих союзников, т. е. Франции, Англии, СССР и т. д. против агрессии со стороны блока агрессоров в Европе.

  4. Если у них не окажется конкретного плана обороны против агрессии в тех или иных вариантах, что маловероятно, то спросить их, на базе каких вопросов, какого плана обороны думают англичане и французы вести переговоры с военной делегацией СССР.

  5. Если французы и англичане все же будут настаивать на переговорах, то переговоры свести к дискуссии по отдельным принципиальным вопросам, главным образом о пропуске наших войск через Виленский коридор и Галицию, а также через Румынию.

  6. Если выяснится, что свободный пропуск наших войск через территорию Польши и Румынии является исключенным, то заявить, что без этого условия соглашение невозможно, так как без свободного пропуска советских войск через указанные территории оборона против агрессии в любом ее варианте обречена на провал, что мы не считаем возможным участвовать в предприятии, заранее обреченном на провал.

  7. На просьбы о показе французской и английской делегациям оборонных заводов, институтов, воинских частей и военно-учебных заведений сказать, что после посещения летчиком Линдбергом СССР в 1938 г. Советское правительство запретило показ оборонных предприятий и воинских частей иностранцам, за исключением наших союзников, когда они появятся».

http://militera.lib.ru/research/bezymensky3/12.html
It gives clear steps to disrupt the negotiations.

#35

Sorry Lexa is it you favorite method to tear the statements out the article and make the own conclusions?
You wrote

…they already were quite disappointed by each other after unsuccessful political negotiations

That’s right. But by the strange way you don’t notice what’ it was the reason of unsucsessfull previous negorations. If you would read the article more attentive you should found

Так или иначе, по инициативе Лондона дипломатическая изоляция СССР после Мюнхена была снята. Начался новый тур трудных переговоров. Англия и Франция предложили советскому правительству принять совместную декларацию, которая, однако, не предполагала никаких обязательств Англии и Франции в случае прямого нападения Германии на Советский Союз. Правда, Франция предложила более реалистический проект советско-французской декларации о взаимной помощи, однако под давлением Англии французское правительство само отказалось от своих идей.
…

…One way or another, on the initiative of London the diplomatic isolation OF THE USSR after Munich was taken. The new stage of difficult negotiations began. England and France they proposed to Soviet government to accept the joint declaration, which, however, assumed no obligations of England and France in the case of the direct attack of Germany in the Soviet Union. True, France proposed the more realistic project of Franco-Soviet declaration about the mutual aid; however, under the pressure of England French government auto forewent its ideas.

How do you think is it normal to demand from the USSR the war guaranties against Germany but don’t give simular guaranties for USSR?
This is not war alliance. Это развод ЛОХА.
If Germany invaded the USSR Britain could nothing did for the help ( as they nothing did it for the Poland). And could be represented by the Britain as “new anti-communist Crusade to the East of union Europe”. Nothing is more.

and …

Я располагаю текстом отчета Спенсера, при оценке которого надо учитывать стремление автора представить свою деятельность в наиболее благоприятном свете. Кроме того, этот отчет не содержит самого важного: меморандума, который был вручен английской стороной Герингу. Однако характерно, что перед вручением этого документа Спенсер счел необходимым заверить, что ведущиеся Англией переговоры с СССР «не должны пониматься как проявление какой-либо симпатии к русскому методу правления. Конечно, в Англии есть люди, выступающие за политические связи с Россией. Но они ведут себя тихо, их мало, и они не располагают влиянием». О содержании меморандума можно судить и по тому, что, прочитав его, Геринг заявил, что в Англии рассматривают Чемберлена как «творца конференции в Мюнхене». Что же касается угрозы конфликта из-за Данцига, было выдвинуто предложение созвать новое мюнхенское совещание четырех держав, без участия Польши и Советского Союза.
…
I have available (Author - my comment) the text of Spencer’s report, during estimation of whom one must take into account the tendency of the author to present its activity in the most favorable light. Furthermore, this report does not contain the very important: the memorandum, which was entrusted by English side to Hering. However, it is characteristic that before the presentation of this document Spencer considered it necessary to certify, that the led by England talks with THE USSR "must not be understood as the manifestation of any sympathy to the Russian method of administration. Certainly, in England there are people, which speak in favor of political connections with Russia. But they behave quietly, there are few of them, and they do not have available influence ". The content of memorandum can be judged also from the fact that, after reading it, Hering stated that in England is considered Chamberlain as the “creator of conference in Munich”. However, concerning the threat of conflict because of Danzig, was advanced proposal call the new Munich conference of four powers, without the participation of Poland and Soviet Union.

As we could see in that article the Britain suggestion could be (or not) were represented as the “second Munich”. For this time the Poland must be divided without Poland and USSR like Chechoslovakia was year ago.
In this condition there no any DOUB"T the alliance whith USSR was quite UNPOSSIBLE far long time till aug 1939.
But what’s is character France had a more responsible diplomacy ( it’s not strange France had no La Mansh as the barier from the German agression ;))
They tryed to stop Germany , but Chemberlain don’t support this idea.
P.S. thank you for the link but next time please don’t take the statements out of full context.

Cheers.

#36

Chevan, I was asked by Igor if there existed any evidence of Stalin’s intentions to disrupt the military negotiations. I cited the text of Stalin’s instruction to Voroshilov - it’s a documental evidence of such intentions. Bezymenski is one - but not the only - author who mentions the existence of this document.

As to the policital negotiations, which preceded the military ones. The first variant of the English declaraction was unacceptable for USSR. But it was only the beginning. The negotiations continued later on the basis of the Soviet project of the agreement suggested on 2 June. Britain and France accepted most principal conditions of USSR, except for the definition of “indirect aggression”. They were afraid that the Soviet definition was too wide, which could let USSR to invade other countries.

This article contains the texts of variants of the agreement on different stages of the negotiations:
http://fat-yankey.livejournal.com/37819.html#cutid1
You may not agree with the anaysis of the author, but the texts of documents are interesting.

Bezymenski says clearly that the British suggestion was only taken by Germans as possibility of another “Munich”. But this plan failed. Britain intended to fulfil its security garantee to Poland.

The situation was very complex, and mutual distrust between USSR and Britain was natural.
But my point is that statement about “peace-loving USSR” and “guilty Englishmen and Poles” is not just.

#37

Lexa,

I don’t think that USSR was extraordinary peace loving, nor that it didn’t have certain interests in certain territories. In my opinion it was not better nor worse than other European countries with regard to foreign politics. I am a big admirer of the view held by Vadim Kozhinov (Вадим Кожинов) on this subject. I do not know if you are familier with his works.

Regarding the Stalin’s note to Voroshilov, I agree with you that it was OK to post it here and take it out of the article, because it is a document.
But I disagree completely with your conclusion that, this particular note was ment to disrupt the negotiations.
In my opinion this note proves my point!
Read it carefully and you will see that it proves that Stalin saws that english group had no rights to make any meaningful agreements and instructed Voroshilov accordingly. On the other hand we have a specific instruction to the english team in Moscow from London to to do everything to drag the negotiations until October. I will post the content and link of it later.

Regarding the second article about the different stages of the negotiations, I have not read it yet and I am looking forward to it. Give me a little time to read it.

#38

Sorry Lexa but i don’t see here any attamps to disrurpt the negorations.Becouse it was not “negoration” but demagogy.
The undefined position of Britain and France delagation in Moscow in august 1939 just proved the intention of Britain to delay the time nothing more. The delafation had no any right to sign any agreements. May be Stalim used it in its aims ,but the fact is fact.
In this perspective the Stalin’s introduction to Voroshilov look very right. He don’t wish to let allies to waste a time - if they would really to sign anti-german agreement with USSR they did it. If NO - so why they come to Moscow is right question.
Don’t forget the time was going out the new war was inevitiable. Hitler never hided his intensions to “take the Eastern land” the first step was made already. The quik “joining” the Cheshoslovakia was a worst sign. Not nessisary to say to you what was the main mortal ideological enemy of Germany - not Western Europe but the USSR.

I cited the text of Stalin’s instruction to Voroshilov - it’s a documental evidence of such intentions. Bezymenski is one - but not the only - author who mentions the existence of this document.

As to the policital negotiations, which preceded the military ones. The first variant of the English declaraction was unacceptable for USSR. But it was only the beginning. The negotiations continued later on the basis of the Soviet project of the agreement suggested on 2 June. Britain and France accepted most principal conditions of USSR, except for the definition of “indirect aggression”. They were afraid that the Soviet definition was too wide, which could let USSR to invade other countries.

The only main condition to give the guaranties for USSR from the Germany invasion. (Simular like the USSR-France-Chechoslovakoan anti-agression from Geramy agreement of 1935)
This is absolutly didn’t touch the invadering other countries.

This article contains the texts of variants of the agreement on different stages of the negotiations:
http://fat-yankey.livejournal.com/37819.html#cutid1
You may not agree with the anaysis of the author, but the texts of documents are interesting.

Well i will read it more detailed.

Bezymenski says clearly that the British suggestion was only taken by Germans as possibility of another “Munich”. But this plan failed. Britain intended to fulfil its security garantee to Poland.

What do you mean as fulfiling the guaranties for Poland. Do you know that TILL the German invasion Britain ans France had a meet where they decided NOT to help the Poland? More over when they planned its possible allie war action agains Germany in Europe the Poland EVEN DIDN"T CONSIDER as the potential war ally.
So I have no idea what secret guaranties do you mean. I think if Stalin had let the Britains
take the head for a ride.(As it has happened with Poles) it would has much worst consequences for the USSR than it was in 1941.

The situation was very complex, and mutual distrust between USSR and Britain was anatural.
But my point is that statement about “peace-loving USSR” and “guilty Englishmen and Poles” is not just.

Well you right the situation was a quite confused. And nobody tells here about peace-loving USSR. I just wish you to prove the stupid the popular point about Evill USSR which begin the WW2. I just try to show you the argument that it tragical situation befor the begining the WW2 were guilt all the allies sides.

Cheers.

#39

Lexa:
I have read the article you reffered to and another material by the same author on the same subject. I think that the author is very good at explaning things and presenting his arguments. Especially considering it is just a blog entry.

My personal conclusion it that the information presented in the article just shows that USSR politics were cold bloded. Stalin has his own game going on- Just like Hitler, Chamberlein and Deladier. USSR was acting selfishly and it can not be used as a moral example. I would even say that USSR political standards in 1939 fell so low, that it was on the same level with Britain and France.

#40

Hello,

Here is some more info info in Polish from site http://www.karta.org.pl/
But the table can be understood with no knowledge of Polish.

“The KARTA Center - an independent non-governmental organization (incorporated as a foundation), documenting and popularizing the recent history of Poland and Eastern Europe. It continues the activities of the illegal “Karta” and the clandestine Eastern Archives of the 1980s.”

from page: http://www.indeks.karta.org.pl/represje_sowieckie_10.html

PODSUMOWANIE
Aktualny stan wiedzy o rozmiarach sowieckich represji przedstawiamy w tabeli zestawiającej podstawowe dane (str. 33). Podajemy liczby szacunkowe (wyjątek stanowi dokładna liczba rozstrzelanych jeńców) ustalone przez historyków w badaniach; w drugiej rubryce - liczby osób, których dane zostały imiennie zweryfikowane w “Indeksie Represjonowanych”; w ostatniej - przybliżone liczby możliwe do takiego zweryfikowania przy uwzględnieniu wszystkich źródeł, co do istnienia których Ośrodek KARTA ma całkowitą pewność (niemniej w czasie kwerend okazuje się czasem, że nie do wszystkich źródeł udaje się dotrzeć, a niektóre zawierają dane o innej liczbie osób).
W tabeli nie uwzględniamy represji wobec Polaków przed II wojną światową, ponieważ nie były one dotąd przedmiotem jakichkolwiek prac weryfikacyjnych. Nie były też podjęte podstawowe kwerendy archiwalne. W przyszłości powinny być w takim wyliczeniu obecne przynajmniej najbardziej drastyczne zbrodnie lat 1937-38.
Podana sumaryczna liczba represjonowanych przez ZSRR Polaków i obywateli polskich po 17 września 1939 - 570 387 osób - jest nieco większa niż w wydaniu raportu sprzed ponad dwóch lat. To dokładniejsze przybliżenie, ale nadal liczba szacunkowa, która będzie się zmieniała wraz z postępem badań. Jednak wszystko wskazuje, iż te zmiany nie będą już znaczne.
Pierwsza przedstawiona w tabeli kategoria represjonowanych - jeńcy wojenni i internowani 1939 roku (wyłączając jeńców zwolnionych po kilkutygodniowym zatrzymaniu oraz przekazanych Niemcom do grudnia 1939) - jest jednocześnie pierwszą grupą niemal w pełni udokumentowaną. W wyniku prac “Indeksu” zweryfikowano imiennie i opublikowano dane 41 457 jeńców. Możliwe będą w przyszłości nieznaczne dopełnienia w ramach tej grupy. Dokumentowanie losów aresztowanych na Kresach Wschodnich podczas pierwszej okupacji sowieckiej (druga kategoria) zaawansowane jest w znacznie mniejszym stopniu. Dużo słabsza jest tu dostępność źródeł, a jeśli już stają się dostępne - są niekompletne. Tak jest w przypadku zestawień osób zrehabilitowanych (tom VI Aresztowani w rejonie Lwowa i Drohobycza oraz przygotowywane obecnie zestawienie dotyczące aresztowanych w zachodnich obwodach Białorusi) - dotarcie do spisów wszystkich osób aresztowanych i skazanych, a nie tylko tych, których w ciągu ostatniej dekady postanowiono zrehabilitować, okazuje się na razie niemożliwe.
Wyjątkowo kompletne jest zestawienie więźniów, którzy z wyrokiem trafili do łagrów w rejonie Workuty; zarazem jednak jest to odstępstwo (jedyne) od reguły przyjętej w “Indeksie Represjonowanych”. Podział represji na kategorie następuje zasadniczo zgodnie z pierwszą formą prześladowań. Kategoria wyjściowa to w tym wypadku: aresztowani na danym terenie; więźniem Workuty zaś można było się stać różnymi drogami. Niemniej taka forma udokumentowania aresztowanych daje szansę zbadania tych losów “od końca”, a to akurat zestawienie okazało się bardzo bogate informacyjnie.
Dlatego też planowany jest kolejny taki wykaz: więźniów polskich aresztowanych po 17 września 1939 i osadzonych w łagrach obwodu archangielskiego (na podstawie materiałów archiwalnych udostępnionych w Archangielsku). W kategorii “aresztowani na Kresach Wschodnich” perspektywy badawcze zależne są ściśle od dostępności źródeł posowieckich; może się okazać, że są one szersze niż realne dzisiaj, szacunkowe dane przedstawione w tabeli.
Deportowani w latach 1940-41 stanowią kolejną podaną w tabeli grupę represjonowanych, która staje się obecnie podstawowym zadaniem “Indeksu Represjonowanych”. Wprawdzie indywidualnych informacji o osobach deportowanych jest w krajowych archiwach bardzo dużo, jednak nigdzie w Polsce nie mają one cech kompletności. Do weryfikacji tych rozproszonych źródeł niezbędne są zestawienia sowieckie - niektóre z nich, po poszukiwaniach, udało się odnaleźć. Prace docelowe nad tą kategorią już trwają, chociaż nie opublikowano jeszcze żadnego zestawienia (w tabeli ujęto dane przygotowywane do druku). Dotychczas uzyskano sowieckie dane dotyczące (w przybliżeniu): 56 tysięcy deportowanych do obwodu archangielskiego (łącznie z dziećmi urodzonymi na zesłaniu) - w Archiwum Urzędu Spraw Wewnętrznych w Archangielsku; 20 tysięcy deportowanych do Republiki Komi - w Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych w Syktywkarze; 11 tysięcy deportowanych do obwodu mołotowskiego (obecnie permskiego) - w Archiwum Urzędu Spraw Wewnętrznych w Permie. Dane te są sukcesywnie weryfikowane ze źródłami polskimi. Czyli na pewno uda się przedstawić los około 87 tysięcy osób. Co do ponad 80 tysięcy następnych jest to również bardzo prawdopodobne.
W najbliższym czasie zaplanowana jest kwerenda w Archiwum Urzędu Spraw Wewnętrznych w Wołogdzie, dzięki której możliwe jest uzyskanie danych 14 tysięcy osób deportowanych do obwodu wołogodzkiego. Rozpoznany stan zasobów archiwalnych w innych regionach Rosji daje szansę na pozyskanie kolejnych danych: 27 tysięcy osób deportowanych do obwodu swierdłowskiego, 9 tysięcy - do obwodu omskiego, a także części spośród 26 tysięcy deportowanych do obwodu nowosybirskiego (przebywających na zesłaniu w okręgu narymskim, w późniejszym obwodzie tomskim). Największych trudności przysparza pozyskanie materiałów źródłowych dotyczących osób deportowanych w kwietniu 1940 do Kazachstanu.
Liczebność kolejnej kategorii - aresztowanych w latach 1941-44 - szacuje się na 3 tysiące osób. Weryfikacja tych danych zależna jest od dotarcia do dokumentacji poszczególnych zespołów łagrowych, co jest trudne i nie daje szans na kompletność informacji. W “Indeksie” zweryfikowano jak dotąd jedynie nieliczną grupę osób, które trafiły do łagrów w rejonie Workuty.
Represje od stycznia 1944 objęły ponad 90 tysięcy osób - internowano 42 tysiące, aresztowano i deportowano 50 tysięcy (szacunki podane w tabeli). Do chwili obecnej zestawiono i zweryfikowano dane dotyczące 20 178 osób internowanych (uwięzionych bez wyroku), czyli około połowy internowanych Polaków i obywateli polskich wywiezionych w głąb ZSRR w latach 1944-45. Około 16 tysięcy spośród nich uwięziono wówczas za udział w Armii Krajowej i innych polskich organizacjach podziemia niepodległościowego, a to stanowi co najmniej 80 procent wszystkich internowanych pod tym zarzutem. Udokumentowanie do końca tej grupy jest podstawowym zadaniem “Indeksu”. Prace nad ostatnim zaplanowanym zestawieniem dotyczącym tej kategorii są w toku. Obejmuje ono osoby wywiezione w 1945 roku z Polski do trzech obozów w obwodach mołotowskim i swierdłowskim. Wśród tych uwięzionych znajdowała się ostatnia duża grupa członków AK (ponad 1100 osób) internowanych w ZSRR, których dane nie zostały dotychczas zweryfikowane. Pracami w najbliższych latach nie zostaną objęte jedynie znacznie mniejsze grupy uczestników polskiego podziemia internowanych w ZSRR, rozproszone po różnych obozach jenieckich.
W przypadku aresztowanych od 1944 roku zweryfikowano dane dotyczące 5690 osób uwięzionych w łagrach w rejonie Workuty. Planowane jest pozyskanie dokumentów dotyczących więźniów łagrów w obwodzie archangielskim, irkuckim, kiemierowskim, Kraju Krasnojarskim i Republice Komi.

Przyjęta w “Indeksie Represjonowanych” metoda okazała się skuteczna. W ten sposób udaje się ustalić historię wielu ludzi, także taką, którą system sowiecki próbował zatrzeć. Dzięki tej metodzie można też sprawdzić wiarygodność tajnej kiedyś dokumentacji statystycznej, co sprawia, że coraz lepiej wiemy, jaka była prawdziwa skala tamtych zbrodni.
Jeżeli Ośrodek KARTA będzie miał możliwość kontynuowania prac “Indeksu” w tempie, które udało się uzyskać w 2002 roku - do końca obecnej dekady możliwe będzie osiągnięcie stanu udokumentowania represji, jaki oszacowany został w trzeciej rubryce tabeli. Opisanie imiennie losów niemal połowy wszystkich represjonowanych w ZSRR oznaczałoby taką wiedzę, jaka u progu poprzedniej dekady była nie do wyobrażenia. Już dzisiaj efektem tej pracy stało się centrum danych, o którym można powiedzieć, że ma charakter informacyjnego pomnika pamięci narodowej.

Ośrodek KARTA serdecznie dziękuje instytucjom, których wsparcie finansowe umożliwia obecnie realizację planów “Indeksu Represjonowanych”:
Instytutowi Pamięci Narodowej
Komitetowi Badań Naukowych
Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej (która finansuje kwerendy na Wschodzie)